In re UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES
UBS Financial Services Inc. violated Rule 201 of Regulation S-ID by failing to maintain a compliant Identity Theft Prevention Program from 2017 to 2019, lacking policies to identify, detect, and respond to identity theft red flags, leading to a $925,000 civil penalty, censure, and cease-and-desist order.
UBS Financial Services Inc. consented to an SEC order finding willful violations of Rule 201 of Regulation S-ID for failing to maintain a compliant Identity Theft Prevention Program between January 1, 2017, and October 3, 2019. The program lacked reasonable policies to identify covered accounts, detect red flags of identity theft, respond appropriately to those flags, update the program for evolving risks, train employees, or involve senior management in oversight. As a result, the SEC imposed a $925,000 civil penalty, a censure, and a cease-and-desist order, while acknowledging UBS’s subsequent remedial actions, including hiring an external consultant to overhaul its program.
UBS Financial Services Inc., a dual-registered broker-dealer and investment adviser, violated Rule 201 of Regulation S-ID by failing to maintain a compliant Identity Theft Prevention Program from at least January 1, 2017, to October 3, 2019. The program, originally adopted in 2008, was outdated and lacked reasonable policies to identify covered accounts—such as brokerage accounts permitting multiple transactions—detect relevant red flags of identity theft, respond effectively to detected threats, or update the program to reflect evolving risks. UBS also failed to periodically review its accounts for covered status, did not involve senior management or the board in oversight, and provided inadequate employee training. Although the SEC found these violations willful, it accepted UBS’s settlement offer in light of its remedial efforts, including hiring an outside consultant to comprehensively overhaul the program. The SEC imposed a $925,000 civil penalty, a formal censure, and a cease-and-desist order to ensure future compliance. UBS admitted to the Commission’s jurisdiction and the subject matter of the proceedings but did not admit or deny the underlying findings. The case underscores the regulatory expectation that financial institutions must actively maintain and update identity theft safeguards as cyber threats evolve.
Extracted insights
- $925K $925,000 $100K–$1M
- person identity theft prevention program
- company proceedings against ubs financial services inc.
- agency Securities and Exchange Commission
- company ubs financial services inc.
- SEC Institutes Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings
- SEC Deems Appropriate Proceedings Against UBS Financial Services Inc.
- UBS Financial Services Inc. Submitted Offer of Settlement
- SEC Accepted Offer of Settlement
- UBS Financial Services Inc. Consents to Entry of Order
- UBS Financial Services Inc. Failed to Develop Identity Theft Prevention Program
- UBS Financial Services Inc. Violated Rule 201 of Regulation S-ID
- UBS Financial Services Inc. Is Broker-Dealer and Investment Adviser
- UBS Financial Services Inc. Is a Subsidiary of UBS Group AG
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 95368 / July 27, 2022
INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940
Release No. 6074 / July 27, 2022
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-20937
In the Matter of
UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES
INC.
Respondent.
ORDER INSTITUTING ADMINISTRATIVE
AND CEASE-AND-DESIST PROCEEDINGS,
PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 15(b) AND 21C
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934 AND SECTIONS 203(e) AND 203(k)
OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF
1940, MAKING FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING
REMEDIAL SANCTIONS AND A CEASE-
AND-DESIST ORDER
I.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate and in the
public interest that public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are,
instituted pursuant to Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange
Act”) and Sections 203(e) and 203(k) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the
“Advisers Act”), against UBS Financial Services Inc. (“Respondent” or “UBS”).
II.
In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer
of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the
purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the
Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings
herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of these
proceedings, which are admitted, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Instituting
Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Pursuant to Sections 15(b) and 21C of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Sections 203(e) and 203(k) of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order
(“Order”), as set forth below.
2
III.
On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds that:
Summary
1. These proceedings arise out of UBS’s failure to adequately develop and implement a
written Identity Theft Prevention Program as required by Rule 201 of Regulation S-ID (17 C.F.R. §
248.201).
2. UBS is a broker-dealer and investment adviser registered with the Commission.
From at least January 1, 2017 to October 3, 2019 (the “relevant period”), UBS violated Rule 201 of
Regulation S-ID because its written Identity Theft Prevention Program (the “Program”) lacked
reasonable policies and procedures to: (i) identify relevant red flags for the covered accounts UBS
offered and maintained, and incorporate those red flags into its Program; (ii) detect red flags that
have been incorporated into its Program; (iii) respond appropriately to detected red flags to prevent
and mitigate identity theft; and (iv) ensure that the Program was updated periodically.
3. Moreover, UBS violated Rule 201 of Regulation S-ID during the relevant period
because it did not periodically review new or existing accounts to determine whether they were
“covered accounts,”
1
nor did it provide for the continued administration of its Program by not: (i)
adequately involving the board of directors, an appropriate committee thereof, or a designated
employee at the level of senior management in the oversight, development, implementation and
administration of the Program; and (ii) training its employees to effectively implement the
Program.
Respondent
4. UBS Financial Services Inc., a Delaware corporation, is a dual-registered broker-
dealer and investment adviser. UBS has been registered with the Commission as a broker-dealer
and investment adviser since 1971 and has its principal place of business in Weehawken, New
Jersey. It is a subsidiary of UBS Group AG, a publicly traded company incorporated in
Switzerland.
Background
5. During the relevant period, UBS’s Identity Theft Prevention Program failed to
comply with the requirements of Regulation S-ID.
1
The rule defines a “covered account” to include an account that a broker-dealer or investment adviser
“offers or maintains, primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, that involves or is designed to
permit multiple payments or transactions, such as a brokerage account with a broker-dealer.” 17 C.F.R. §
248.201(b)(3)(i).
3
6. Regulation S-ID requires financial institutions, including broker-dealers and
investment advisers registered with the Commission with covered accounts, to develop and
implement a written Identity Theft Prevention Program that is designed to detect, prevent, and
mitigate identity theft in connection with the opening of a covered account or any existing covered
account.
2
As part of such an Identity Theft Prevention Program, each registered broker-dealer and
investment adviser must periodically determine whether it offers or maintains covered accounts. As
a part of this determination, a firm must conduct a risk assessment to determine whether it offers or
maintains covered accounts, taking into consideration: (1) the methods it provides to open its
accounts; (2) the methods it provides to access its accounts; and (3) its previous experiences with
identity theft.
3
7. According to Regulation S-ID, an Identity Theft Prevention Program must also
include reasonable policies and procedures to: (i) identify relevant “red flags”
4
for the covered
accounts and incorporate them into the Identity Theft Prevention Program; (ii) detect the red flags
that have been incorporated into the Identity Theft Prevention Program; (iii) respond appropriately
to any red flags that are detected pursuant to the Identity Theft Prevention Program; and (iv) ensure
that the Identity Theft Prevention Program is updated periodically to reflect changes in risks to
customers and to the safety and soundness of the firm from identity theft.
5
8. With respect to the identification of relevant red flags, Regulation S-ID requires
firms to consider several factors specific to the firm in order to identify red flags that are relevant to
the firm’s business and the nature and scope of its activities, such as the types of covered accounts
it offers or maintains, methods it provides to open accounts, methods it provides to access
accounts, and its previous experiences with identity theft.
6
9. Appendix A to Regulation S-ID, which contains guidelines intended to assist firms
in the formulation and maintenance of an Identity Theft Prevention Program that satisfies the
requirements of Regulation S-ID, lists categories of red flags that firms consider incorporating in
an Identity Theft Prevention Program “as appropriate.”
7
Supplement A to Appendix A further
2
17 C.F.R. § 248.201(d)(1). The rule defines “identity theft” as “a fraud committed or attempted using the
identifying information of another person without authority.” 17 C.F.R. § 248.201(b)(9).
3
17 C.F.R. § 248.201(c)(1)-(3).
4
“Red flags” are defined as “a pattern, practice, or specific activity that indicates the possible existence of
identity theft.” 17 C.F.R. § 248.201(b)(10).
5
17 C.F.R. § 248.201(d)(2)(i)-(iv).
6
17 C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, sec. II(a)(1)-(4).
7
17 C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, sec. II(c). These categories are: “(i) [a]lerts, notifications, or [other] warnings
received from consumer reporting agencies . . . ;” (ii) “suspicious documents,” such as documents that
appear to have been altered or forged; (iii) “suspicious personal identifying information, such as a
suspicious address change;” (iv) “unusual use of, or other suspicious activity related to, a covered account;
4
provides a non-comprehensive list of examples of red flags from each of these categories that the
firm “may consider incorporating into its Program, whether singly or in combination...in
connection with covered accounts.”
8
10. Regulation S-ID requires an Identity Theft Prevention Program’s policies and
procedures to address the detection of red flags in connection with the opening of covered accounts
and existing covered accounts. In order to prevent and mitigate identity theft, the Identity Theft
Prevention Program “should [also] provide for appropriate responses” to detected red flags “that are
commensurate with the degree of risk posed.”
9
In determining an appropriate response, a firm
“should consider aggravating factors that may heighten the risk of identity theft....”
10
In that
regard, appropriate responses might include, among others, contacting the consumer, not opening a
new account, or notifying law enforcement.
11
11. With respect to periodically updating the Identity Theft Prevention Program,
Appendix A provides that firms should consider factors such as: (i) the firm’s experiences with
identity theft; (ii) changes in methods of identity theft; (iii) changes in methods to detect, prevent or
mitigate identity theft; (iv) changes in the types of accounts offered or maintained; and (v) changes
in the firm’s structure or service provider arrangements.
12
12. Regulation S-ID also requires firms to provide for the continued administration of
the Identity Theft Prevention Program by involving the board of directors, an appropriate
committee thereof, or a designated employee at the level of senior management in the oversight,
development, implementation and administration of the Identity Theft Prevention Program, and
training staff, as necessary, to effectively implement the Identity Theft Prevention Program.
13
13. The oversight by the board of directors, an appropriate committee thereof, or senior
management should include reviewing reports of compliance with Regulation S-ID at least
annually. Those reports should address material matters related to the Identity Theft Prevention
Program and evaluate issues such as: (i) the effectiveness of the policies and procedures of the firm
in addressing the risk of identity theft in connection with the opening of covered accounts and with
respect to existing covered accounts; (ii) service provider arrangements; (iii) significant incidents
and” (v) “[n]otice from customers, victims of identity theft, [or] law enforcement authorities . . . .” 17
C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, sec. II(c)(1)-(5).
8
17 C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, supp. A .
9
17 C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, sec. IV.
10
Id.
11
17 C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, sec. IV(b), (e), (h).
12
17 C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, sec. V(a)-(e).
13
17 C.F.R. § 248.201(e)(2)-(3).
5
involving identity theft and management’s response; and (iv) recommendations for material
changes to the Identity Theft Prevention Program.
14
UBS’s Identity Theft Prevention Program
14. In November 2008, UBS adopted its Program which was intended to comply with
the then-applicable Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, issued jointly in November 2007 by several federal
agencies including the Federal Trade Commission (16 C.F.R. § 681.1). The Program applied to
UBS and several other entities and branch offices in the United States and Puerto Rico which
offered private and retail banking, mortgage, and private investment services that operated under
UBS Group AG’s Wealth Management Americas’ line of business.
15. UBS did not make material changes to the Program after Regulation S-ID went into
effect in May 2013 and throughout the relevant period. The Program was only updated, effective
March 28, 2017, to add a reference to “the SEC’s Regulation S-ID” when discussing “related
regulations” with which the Program was established to comply, and to revise the list of legal
entities and branch offices subject to the Program.
16. During the relevant period, UBS did not periodically review new or existing
accounts to determine whether they were “covered accounts” under Regulation S-ID. The
Program provided no policies or procedures for identifying covered accounts, including new types
of covered accounts offered by the firm. Moreover, while the written Program characterized all
client accounts as “covered accounts,” UBS did not conduct any risk assessments or other
evaluations of these accounts for it to determine the types of covered accounts it offered or
maintained and thereby identify red flags based on those types of covered accounts.
17. During the relevant period, UBS’s Program did not have reasonable policies and
procedures to identify relevant red flags and incorporate them into the Program. The Program only
provided that UBS and other covered affiliates would identify red flags based on the “types of
covered accounts” at the firm, the “[p]revious experience” the firm has had with identify theft, and
“[a]pplicable regulatory guidance.” The Program provided no further information for relevant red
flags tailored to UBS’s business and the nature and scope of its brokerage and advisory activities to
be identified. Moreover, the Program did not specifically identify any red flags for identity theft,
or otherwise incorporate or reference any other policies and procedures that enumerated specific
red flags.
18. During the relevant period, UBS’s Program did not have reasonable policies and
procedures to address the detection of red flags in connection with the opening of covered accounts
and existing covered accounts. The Program only provided that each UBS-affiliated entity was
“responsible for maintaining procedures to address the detection of Red Flags” and listed general
categories of activities (e.g., changes to client profiles, unusual client transactions, complaints, and
ongoing monitoring) that those procedures should address. The Program did not identify any
14
17 C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, sec. VI(b)(2).
6
relevant red flags that employees at UBS should be aware of or include, incorporate, or reference
any procedures addressing those categories or the detection of red flags.
19. During the relevant period, UBS’s Program did not have reasonable policies and
procedures to respond appropriately to red flags in order to prevent and mitigate identify theft.
While the Program provided that a “response to and mitigation of identity theft consists of two
parts,” including “[p]rocedures to address responses to identity theft attempts” and
“[i]mplementation of additional account protections,” it did not include policies and procedures on
these ‘two parts,’ or incorporate or reference other policies and procedures addressing responding
to red flags.
20. During the relevant period, UBS’s Program did not have reasonable policies and
procedures to ensure that it was updated periodically. Despite significant changes in external
cybersecurity risks related to identity theft,
15
for example, there had been no material changes to
the Program from its inception in 2008, and throughout the relevant period. During that entire time
period, while the Program provided that it would be updated periodically to reflect material
changes in “procedures and activities” of the entities subject to the Program “for identifying and
responding to identity theft flags and in risks to customers” or those entities, the Program did not
identify or incorporate any relevant red flags or include, incorporate, or reference any policies and
procedures addressing detecting and responding to red flags.
21. During the relevant period, UBS failed to adequately provide for the continued
administration of its Program. The annual reports provided to the board of directors that related to
the Program during the relevant period did not provide sufficient information addressing the
effectiveness of the Program’s policies and procedures concerning the risk of identity theft at UBS
or the firm’s service providers, nor did they provide sufficient detail about significant identity
theft-related incidents and management’s responses, or metrics related to identity theft at the firm,
to enable its board of directors to be sufficiently involved in the oversight, development,
implementation and administration of the Program. In that regard, board minutes do not reflect
any discussion of compliance with Regulation S-ID during the relevant period. In addition, UBS
did not conduct any training of its staff specific to the Program or training on how to identify,
detect, monitor, or respond to red flags involving identity theft.
Violation
22. As a result of the conduct described above, Respondent willfully
16
violated Rule
201 of Regulation S-ID (17 C.F.R. § 248.201), which requires registered broker-dealers and
15
See, e.g., Identity Theft Red Flags Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-69359 (Apr. 10, 2013)
(“Advancements in technology also have led to increasing threats to the integrity and privacy of personal
information.”) (footnote omitted).
16
“Willfully,” for purposes of imposing relief under Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act and Section 203(e) of
the Advisers Act, “‘means no more than that the person charged with the duty knows what he is
doing.’” Wonsover v. SEC, 205 F.3d 408, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 977
(D.C. Cir. 1949)). There is no requirement that the actor “also be aware that he is violating one of the Rules
7
investment advisers that offer or maintain covered accounts to develop and implement a written
Identity Theft Prevention Program that is designed to detect, prevent, and mitigate identity theft in
connection with the opening of a covered account or any existing covered account.
UBS’s Remedial Efforts
23. UBS has undertaken substantial remedial acts, including auditing and revising its
Program.
24. In particular, UBS voluntarily retained an outside consulting firm to review its
Program, which recommended various enhancements involving, among other things, identifying
and responding to red flags, identifying covered accounts, and the periodic updating and
administration of the Program, including the training of employees, all of which UBS adopted.
UBS also made detailed presentations to the Commission’s staff regarding the Program’s
enhancements.
25. In determining to accept the Offer, the Commission considered the remedial acts
undertaken by Respondent.
IV.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to
impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondent’s Offer.
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Exchange Act, and Sections 203(e)
and 203(k) of the Advisers Act, it is hereby ORDERED that:
A. Respondent cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any
future violations of Rule 201 of Regulation S-ID (17 C.F.R. § 248.201).
B. Respondent is censured.
C. Respondent shall, within 30 days of the entry of this Order, pay a civil money
penalty in the amount of $925,000.00 to the Securities and Exchange Commission for transfer to
the general fund of the United States Treasury, subject to Exchange Act Section 21F(g)(3). If
timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3717.
Payment must be made in one of the following ways:
or Acts.” Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965). The decision in The Robare Group, Ltd. v. SEC, which
construed the term “willfully” for purposes of a differently structured statutory provision, does not alter that
standard. 922 F.3d 468, 478-79 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (setting forth the showing required to establish that a person
has “willfully omit[ted]” material information from a required disclosure in violation of Section 207 of the
Advisers Act).
8
(1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which
will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;
(2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov
through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or
(3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United
States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange
Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to:
Enterprise Services Center
Accounts Receivable Branch
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73169
Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying UBS
Financial Services Inc. as the Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these
proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Carolyn
Welshhans, Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission,
100 F St., NE, Washington, DC 20549.
D. Amounts ordered to be paid as civil money penalties pursuant to this Order shall be
treated as penalties paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve
the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Respondent agrees that in any Related Investor Action, it
shall not argue that it is entitled to, nor shall it benefit by, offset or reduction of any award of
compensatory damages by the amount of any part of Respondent’s payment of a civil penalty in this
action (“Penalty Offset”). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty Offset,
Respondent agrees that it shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty
Offset, notify the Commission’s counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Such a payment shall not be deemed an additional civil
penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this
proceeding. For purposes of this paragraph, a “Related Investor Action” means a private damages
action brought against Respondent by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially
the same facts as alleged in the Order instituted by the Commission in this proceeding.
By the Commission.
Vanessa A. Countryman
Secretary
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 95368 / July 27, 2022
INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940
Release No. 6074 / July 27, 2022
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-20937
In the Matter of
UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES
INC.
Respondent.
ORDER INSTITUTING ADMINISTRATIVE
AND CEASE-AND-DESIST PROCEEDINGS,
PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 15(b) AND 21C
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934 AND SECTIONS 203(e) AND 203(k)
OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF
1940, MAKING FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING
REMEDIAL SANCTIONS AND A CEASE-
AND-DESIST ORDER
I.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate and in the
public interest that public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are,
instituted pursuant to Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange
Act”) and Sections 203(e) and 203(k) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the
“Advisers Act”), against UBS Financial Services Inc. (“Respondent” or “UBS”).
II.
In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer
of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the
purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the
Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings
herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of these
proceedings, which are admitted, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Instituting
Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Pursuant to Sections 15(b) and 21C of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Sections 203(e) and 203(k) of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order
(“Order”), as set forth below.
2
III.
On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds that:
Summary
1. These proceedings arise out of UBS’s failure to adequately develop and implement a
written Identity Theft Prevention Program as required by Rule 201 of Regulation S-ID (17 C.F.R. §
248.201).
2. UBS is a broker-dealer and investment adviser registered with the Commission.
From at least January 1, 2017 to October 3, 2019 (the “relevant period”), UBS violated Rule 201 of
Regulation S-ID because its written Identity Theft Prevention Program (the “Program”) lacked
reasonable policies and procedures to: (i) identify relevant red flags for the covered accounts UBS
offered and maintained, and incorporate those red flags into its Program; (ii) detect red flags that
have been incorporated into its Program; (iii) respond appropriately to detected red flags to prevent
and mitigate identity theft; and (iv) ensure that the Program was updated periodically.
3. Moreover, UBS violated Rule 201 of Regulation S-ID during the relevant period
because it did not periodically review new or existing accounts to determine whether they were
“covered accounts,”1 nor did it provide for the continued administration of its Program by not: (i)
adequately involving the board of directors, an appropriate committee thereof, or a designated
employee at the level of senior management in the oversight, development, implementation and
administration of the Program; and (ii) training its employees to effectively implement the
Program.
Respondent
4. UBS Financial Services Inc., a Delaware corporation, is a dual-registered broker-
dealer and investment adviser. UBS has been registered with the Commission as a broker-dealer
and investment adviser since 1971 and has its principal place of business in Weehawken, New
Jersey. It is a subsidiary of UBS Group AG, a publicly traded company incorporated in
Switzerland.
Background
5. During the relevant period, UBS’s Identity Theft Prevention Program failed to
comply with the requirements of Regulation S-ID.
1 The rule defines a “covered account” to include an account that a broker-dealer or investment adviser
“offers or maintains, primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, that involves or is designed to
permit multiple payments or transactions, such as a brokerage account with a broker-dealer.” 17 C.F.R. §
248.201(b)(3)(i).
3
6. Regulation S-ID requires financial institutions, including broker-dealers and
investment advisers registered with the Commission with covered accounts, to develop and
implement a written Identity Theft Prevention Program that is designed to detect, prevent, and
mitigate identity theft in connection with the opening of a covered account or any existing covered
account. 2 As part of such an Identity Theft Prevention Program, each registered broker-dealer and
investment adviser must periodically determine whether it offers or maintains covered accounts. As
a part of this determination, a firm must conduct a risk assessment to determine whether it offers or
maintains covered accounts, taking into consideration: (1) the methods it provides to open its
accounts; (2) the methods it provides to access its accounts; and (3) its previous experiences with
identity theft.3
7. According to Regulation S-ID, an Identity Theft Prevention Program must also
include reasonable policies and procedures to: (i) identify relevant “red flags”4 for the covered
accounts and incorporate them into the Identity Theft Prevention Program; (ii) detect the red flags
that have been incorporated into the Identity Theft Prevention Program; (iii) respond appropriately
to any red flags that are detected pursuant to the Identity Theft Prevention Program; and (iv) ensure
that the Identity Theft Prevention Program is updated periodically to reflect changes in risks to
customers and to the safety and soundness of the firm from identity theft.5
8. With respect to the identification of relevant red flags, Regulation S-ID requires
firms to consider several factors specific to the firm in order to identify red flags that are relevant to
the firm’s business and the nature and scope of its activities, such as the types of covered accounts
it offers or maintains, methods it provides to open accounts, methods it provides to access
accounts, and its previous experiences with identity theft.6
9. Appendix A to Regulation S-ID, which contains guidelines intended to assist firms
in the formulation and maintenance of an Identity Theft Prevention Program that satisfies the
requirements of Regulation S-ID, lists categories of red flags that firms consider incorporating in
an Identity Theft Prevention Program “as appropriate.”7 Supplement A to Appendix A further
2 17 C.F.R. § 248.201(d)(1). The rule defines “identity theft” as “a fraud committed or attempted using the
identifying information of another person without authority.” 17 C.F.R. § 248.201(b)(9).
3 17 C.F.R. § 248.201(c)(1)-(3).
4 “Red flags” are defined as “a pattern, practice, or specific activity that indicates the possible existence of
identity theft.” 17 C.F.R. § 248.201(b)(10).
5 17 C.F.R. § 248.201(d)(2)(i)-(iv).
6 17 C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, sec. II(a)(1)-(4).
7 17 C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, sec. II(c). These categories are: “(i) [a]lerts, notifications, or [other] warnings
received from consumer reporting agencies . . . ;” (ii) “suspicious documents,” such as documents that
appear to have been altered or forged; (iii) “suspicious personal identifying information, such as a
suspicious address change;” (iv) “unusual use of, or other suspicious activity related to, a covered account;
4
provides a non-comprehensive list of examples of red flags from each of these categories that the
firm “may consider incorporating into its Program, whether singly or in combination…in
connection with covered accounts.”8
10. Regulation S-ID requires an Identity Theft Prevention Program’s policies and
procedures to address the detection of red flags in connection with the opening of covered accounts
and existing covered accounts. In order to prevent and mitigate identity theft, the Identity Theft
Prevention Program “should [also] provide for appropriate responses” to detected red flags “that are
commensurate with the degree of risk posed.” 9 In determining an appropriate response, a firm
“should consider aggravating factors that may heighten the risk of identity theft….”10 In that
regard, appropriate responses might include, among others, contacting the consumer, not opening a
new account, or notifying law enforcement.11
11. With respect to periodically updating the Identity Theft Prevention Program,
Appendix A provides that firms should consider factors such as: (i) the firm’s experiences with
identity theft; (ii) changes in methods of identity theft; (iii) changes in methods to detect, prevent or
mitigate identity theft; (iv) changes in the types of accounts offered or maintained; and (v) changes
in the firm’s structure or service provider arrangements.12
12. Regulation S-ID also requires firms to provide for the continued administration of
the Identity Theft Prevention Program by involving the board of directors, an appropriate
committee thereof, or a designated employee at the level of senior management in the oversight,
development, implementation and administration of the Identity Theft Prevention Program, and
training staff, as necessary, to effectively implement the Identity Theft Prevention Program.13
13. The oversight by the board of directors, an appropriate committee thereof, or senior
management should include reviewing reports of compliance with Regulation S-ID at least
annually. Those reports should address material matters related to the Identity Theft Prevention
Program and evaluate issues such as: (i) the effectiveness of the policies and procedures of the firm
in addressing the risk of identity theft in connection with the opening of covered accounts and with
respect to existing covered accounts; (ii) service provider arrangements; (iii) significant incidents
and” (v) “[n]otice from customers, victims of identity theft, [or] law enforcement authorities . . . .” 17
C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, sec. II(c)(1)-(5).
8 17 C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, supp. A .
9 17 C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, sec. IV.
10 Id.
11 17 C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, sec. IV(b), (e), (h).
12 17 C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, sec. V(a)-(e).
13 17 C.F.R. § 248.201(e)(2)-(3).
5
involving identity theft and management’s response; and (iv) recommendations for material
changes to the Identity Theft Prevention Program.14
UBS’s Identity Theft Prevention Program
14. In November 2008, UBS adopted its Program which was intended to comply with
the then-applicable Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, issued jointly in November 2007 by several federal
agencies including the Federal Trade Commission (16 C.F.R. § 681.1). The Program applied to
UBS and several other entities and branch offices in the United States and Puerto Rico which
offered private and retail banking, mortgage, and private investment services that operated under
UBS Group AG’s Wealth Management Americas’ line of business.
15. UBS did not make material changes to the Program after Regulation S-ID went into
effect in May 2013 and throughout the relevant period. The Program was only updated, effective
March 28, 2017, to add a reference to “the SEC’s Regulation S-ID” when discussing “related
regulations” with which the Program was established to comply, and to revise the list of legal
entities and branch offices subject to the Program.
16. During the relevant period, UBS did not periodically review new or existing
accounts to determine whether they were “covered accounts” under Regulation S-ID. The
Program provided no policies or procedures for identifying covered accounts, including new types
of covered accounts offered by the firm. Moreover, while the written Program characterized all
client accounts as “covered accounts,” UBS did not conduct any risk assessments or other
evaluations of these accounts for it to determine the types of covered accounts it offered or
maintained and thereby identify red flags based on those types of covered accounts.
17. During the relevant period, UBS’s Program did not have reasonable policies and
procedures to identify relevant red flags and incorporate them into the Program. The Program only
provided that UBS and other covered affiliates would identify red flags based on the “types of
covered accounts” at the firm, the “[p]revious experience” the firm has had with identify theft, and
“[a]pplicable regulatory guidance.” The Program provided no further information for relevant red
flags tailored to UBS’s business and the nature and scope of its brokerage and advisory activities to
be identified. Moreover, the Program did not specifically identify any red flags for identity theft,
or otherwise incorporate or reference any other policies and procedures that enumerated specific
red flags.
18. During the relevant period, UBS’s Program did not have reasonable policies and
procedures to address the detection of red flags in connection with the opening of covered accounts
and existing covered accounts. The Program only provided that each UBS-affiliated entity was
“responsible for maintaining procedures to address the detection of Red Flags” and listed general
categories of activities (e.g., changes to client profiles, unusual client transactions, complaints, and
ongoing monitoring) that those procedures should address. The Program did not identify any
14 17 C.F.R. § 248.201 app. A, sec. VI(b)(2).
6
relevant red flags that employees at UBS should be aware of or include, incorporate, or reference
any procedures addressing those categories or the detection of red flags.
19. During the relevant period, UBS’s Program did not have reasonable policies and
procedures to respond appropriately to red flags in order to prevent and mitigate identify theft.
While the Program provided that a “response to and mitigation of identity theft consists of two
parts,” including “[p]rocedures to address responses to identity theft attempts” and
“[i]mplementation of additional account protections,” it did not include policies and procedures on
these ‘two parts,’ or incorporate or reference other policies and procedures addressing responding
to red flags.
20. During the relevant period, UBS’s Program did not have reasonable policies and
procedures to ensure that it was updated periodically. Despite significant changes in external
cybersecurity risks related to identity theft,15 for example, there had been no material changes to
the Program from its inception in 2008, and throughout the relevant period. During that entire time
period, while the Program provided that it would be updated periodically to reflect material
changes in “procedures and activities” of the entities subject to the Program “for identifying and
responding to identity theft flags and in risks to customers” or those entities, the Program did not
identify or incorporate any relevant red flags or include, incorporate, or reference any policies and
procedures addressing detecting and responding to red flags.
21. During the relevant period, UBS failed to adequately provide for the continued
administration of its Program. The annual reports provided to the board of directors that related to
the Program during the relevant period did not provide sufficient information addressing the
effectiveness of the Program’s policies and procedures concerning the risk of identity theft at UBS
or the firm’s service providers, nor did they provide sufficient detail about significant identity
theft-related incidents and management’s responses, or metrics related to identity theft at the firm,
to enable its board of directors to be sufficiently involved in the oversight, development,
implementation and administration of the Program. In that regard, board minutes do not reflect
any discussion of compliance with Regulation S-ID during the relevant period. In addition, UBS
did not conduct any training of its staff specific to the Program or training on how to identify,
detect, monitor, or respond to red flags involving identity theft.
Violation
22. As a result of the conduct described above, Respondent willfully16 violated Rule
201 of Regulation S-ID (17 C.F.R. § 248.201), which requires registered broker-dealers and
15 See, e.g., Identity Theft Red Flags Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-69359 (Apr. 10, 2013)
(“Advancements in technology also have led to increasing threats to the integrity and privacy of personal
information.”) (footnote omitted).
16 “Willfully,” for purposes of imposing relief under Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act and Section 203(e) of
the Advisers Act, “‘means no more than that the person charged with the duty knows what he is
doing.’” Wonsover v. SEC, 205 F.3d 408, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 977
(D.C. Cir. 1949)). There is no requirement that the actor “also be aware that he is violating one of the Rules
7
investment advisers that offer or maintain covered accounts to develop and implement a written
Identity Theft Prevention Program that is designed to detect, prevent, and mitigate identity theft in
connection with the opening of a covered account or any existing covered account.
UBS’s Remedial Efforts
23. UBS has undertaken substantial remedial acts, including auditing and revising its
Program.
24. In particular, UBS voluntarily retained an outside consulting firm to review its
Program, which recommended various enhancements involving, among other things, identifying
and responding to red flags, identifying covered accounts, and the periodic updating and
administration of the Program, including the training of employees, all of which UBS adopted.
UBS also made detailed presentations to the Commission’s staff regarding the Program’s
enhancements.
25. In determining to accept the Offer, the Commission considered the remedial acts
undertaken by Respondent.
IV.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to
impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondent’s Offer.
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Exchange Act, and Sections 203(e)
and 203(k) of the Advisers Act, it is hereby ORDERED that:
A. Respondent cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any
future violations of Rule 201 of Regulation S-ID (17 C.F.R. § 248.201).
B. Respondent is censured.
C. Respondent shall, within 30 days of the entry of this Order, pay a civil money
penalty in the amount of $925,000.00 to the Securities and Exchange Commission for transfer to
the general fund of the United States Treasury, subject to Exchange Act Section 21F(g)(3). If
timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3717.
Payment must be made in one of the following ways:
or Acts.” Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965). The decision in The Robare Group, Ltd. v. SEC, which
construed the term “willfully” for purposes of a differently structured statutory provision, does not alter that
standard. 922 F.3d 468, 478-79 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (setting forth the showing required to establish that a person
has “willfully omit[ted]” material information from a required disclosure in violation of Section 207 of the
Advisers Act).
8
(1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which
will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;
(2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov
through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or
(3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United
States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange
Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to:
Enterprise Services Center
Accounts Receivable Branch
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73169
Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying UBS
Financial Services Inc. as the Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these
proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Carolyn
Welshhans, Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission,
100 F St., NE, Washington, DC 20549.
D. Amounts ordered to be paid as civil money penalties pursuant to this Order shall be
treated as penalties paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve
the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Respondent agrees that in any Related Investor Action, it
shall not argue that it is entitled to, nor shall it benefit by, offset or reduction of any award of
compensatory damages by the amount of any part of Respondent’s payment of a civil penalty in this
action (“Penalty Offset”). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty Offset,
Respondent agrees that it shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty
Offset, notify the Commission’s counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Such a payment shall not be deemed an additional civil
penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this
proceeding. For purposes of this paragraph, a “Related Investor Action” means a private damages
action brought against Respondent by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially
the same facts as alleged in the Order instituted by the Commission in this proceeding.
By the Commission.
Vanessa A. Countryman
Secretary
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm