SEC v. SYNERGY SETTLEMENT SERVICES, INC.; FOUNDATION FOR THOSE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS INC.; SPECIAL NEEDS LAW FIRM PLLC; JASON D. LAZARUS; and ANTHONY F. PRIETO, JR., No. 6:22-cv-00820, Middle District of Florida (May 2, 2022) — Complaint
raw: SEC v. SYNERGY SETTLEMENT SERVICES
SEC v. SYNERGY SETTLEMENT SERVICES, No. 6:22-cv-00820 (May 2, 2022)
The SEC sued Synergy Settlement Services, Inc. and its principals for fraudulently operating $46 million in pooled investment trusts by misrepresenting them as non-profit managed to protect beneficiaries' benefits.
The SEC filed a complaint against Synergy Settlement Services, Inc., Jason D. Lazarus, Anthony F. Prieto, Jr., and related entities for managing two pooled investment trusts containing $46 million in assets. The defendants are accused of misrepresenting that the trusts were managed by a non-profit to preserve Medicaid and SSI eligibility while actually operating them as for-profit ventures. The charges include violations of the Securities Act, Exchange Act, and Investment Advisers Act involving unregistered securities offerings and fraudulent management.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has filed a lawsuit against Synergy Settlement Services, Inc., Jason D. Lazarus, Anthony F. Prieto, Jr., and several associated entities for the fraudulent operation of two pooled investment trusts. These trusts, which held approximately $46 million in assets for over 380 disabled beneficiaries, were falsely marketed as being managed by a non-profit entity to ensure the preservation of Medicaid and SSI benefits. In reality, the defendants used a shell corporation, the Foundation for Those with Special Needs, Inc., to hide that the trusts were actually controlled by for-profit entities. The SEC alleges the defendants diverted trustee fees to Synergy and misappropriated funds from deceased beneficiaries to cover business expenses and personal interests. Furthermore, the defendants are accused of misleading beneficiaries regarding investment fees and offering unregistered securities. The Commission is seeking permanent injunctions, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and civil penalties for violations of federal securities laws.
Extracted insights
- $46.00M $46 million $10M–$100M
- $30.70M $30.7 million $10M–$100M
- $675K $675,000 $100K–$1M
- $300K $300,000 $100K–$1M
- $132K $132,000 $100K–$1M
- $100K $100,000 $100K–$1M
- $15K $15,000 $10K–$100K
- $15K $15,000 $10K–$100K
- $2K $1,500 <$10K
- $2K $1,500 <$10K
- $2K $1,500 <$10K
- $1K $1,000 <$10K
- company foundation for those with special needs inc.
- person jason d. lazarus
- agency Securities and Exchange Commission
- company synergy settlement services inc.
- person these defendants
- Securities And Exchange Commission brings this action to enjoin the Defendants’ fraudulent operation of two pooled investment trusts with $46 million in assets and over 380 trust members
- Section 1917 Of The Social Security Act allows Medicaid and SSI recipients to remain eligible for benefits despite receiving assets
- Defendants have operated two pooled investment trusts purportedly established by a non-profit entity
- Foundation For Those With Special Needs Inc. is a shell corporation with no operations or employees
- Synergy Settlement Services Inc. have installed the Foundation as a nominee trustee to hide Synergy’s for‑profit control of the trusts
- Jason D. Lazarus have installed the Foundation as a nominee trustee to hide his for‑profit control of the trusts
- Anthony F. Prieto Jr. have installed the Foundation as a nominee trustee to hide his for‑profit control of the trusts
- Defendants’ operation of the pooled trusts has violated the antifraud and registration provisions of the federal securities laws
- Synergy, Lazarus, Prieto, and Special Needs Law Firm PLLC have misrepresented to potential trust beneficiaries that they would join a non‑profit‑managed trust and remain eligible for Medicaid and SSI benefits
- Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto have lied about the for‑profit operation and management of the trusts to beneficiaries, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Social Security Administration
- Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto improperly diverted all trustee fees from beneficiaries’ accounts to Synergy
- These Defendants improperly used funds from deceased beneficiaries’ accounts to reimburse themselves for employee salaries, other expenses, and to make donations
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
CASE NO. ____________
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
SYNERGY SETTLEMENT SERVICES, INC.,
FOUNDATION FOR THOSE WITH SPECIAL
NEEDS INC.,
SPECIAL NEEDS LAW FIRM PLLC,
JASON D. LAZARUS, and
ANTHONY F. PRIETO, JR.
Defendants.
_________________________________________________/
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission alleges:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The Commission brings this action to enjoin the Defendants’
fraudulent operation of two purportedly charitable pooled investment trusts
with $46 million in assets and more than 380 trust members, most of whom
are disabled recipients of Medicaid or Social Security Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”) benefits.
2. Section 1917 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, allows
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Medicaid and SSI recipients to remain eligible for benefits despite receiving
assets (such as awards or settlements in personal injury lawsuits) that would
otherwise disqualify them from receiving that government assistance, as long
as they place those assets in an irrevocable trust established and managed by
a non-profit association.
3. From no later than May 2015 through the present, the Defendants
have marketed, sold investments in, and operated two pooled investment
trusts purportedly established and managed by a non-profit entity as required
by Section 1396p. In reality, however, the entity named as the trustee of the
two trusts, Defendant Foundation for Those with Special Needs, Inc.,
(“Foundation”) is a shell corporation with no operations or employees.
4. Defendants Synergy Settlement Services, Inc. (“Synergy”), Jason
D. Lazarus, and Anthony F. Prieto, Jr. have installed the Foundation as a
nominee trustee to attempt to hide the fact that Synergy, a for-profit
corporation, Lazarus and Prieto perform all the trustee functions and profit
from the trusts’ operations by collecting all fees and other funds stemming from
operating the trusts.
5. The Defendants’ operation of the pooled trusts has violated the
antifraud and registration provisions of the federal securities laws in several
ways. First, Synergy, Lazarus, Prieto, and Defendant Special Needs Law
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Firm, PLLC (“the Law Firm”) have misrepresented to potential trust
beneficiaries that they would be joining a trust managed by a non-profit
association under Section 1396p, and therefore would remain eligible for
Medicaid and SSI benefits. To the contrary, because Synergy, Lazarus, and
Prieto operated and managed the trusts for their own profit, they created a
situation where the trust funds could count as beneficiaries’ assets and
jeopardize their Medicaid and SSI benefits.
6. Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto have lied about the for-profit
operation and management of the trusts to beneficiaries, the Internal Revenue
Service, and the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), through emails, firm
brochures, marketing materials, trust documents and operating agreements,
among other documents.
7. In addition, Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto improperly diverted all
trustee fees, which come directly from beneficiaries’ accounts, to Synergy.
These Defendants also improperly used funds from deceased beneficiaries’
accounts to reimburse themselves for employee salaries and other expenses, as
well as to make donations to trial lawyers’ and other organizations that
violated their representations to the IRS and beneficiaries that they would only
use such funds to further the trusts’ mission to help the disabled.
8. Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto have also misled beneficiaries with
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respect to the investment of the pooled trusts’ assets. From 2015 to 2017, the
Defendants did not tell beneficiaries they were investing their money in a
certain class of mutual fund that doubled the fees the Defendants told the
beneficiaries they were paying.
9. The trusts are invested in securities, and the trust instruments are
securities the Defendants are offering and selling to beneficiaries. Because the
trusts are not operated and managed by a non-profit association, they do not
qualify for exemptions from registration available to charitable organizations
under the securities laws, and the Defendants have violated the registration
requirements by offering and selling investments in the trusts without
registering the offerings with the Commission.
10. As a result of this conduct, the Defendants have violated Sections
5(a), 5(c) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§
77e(a), 77e(c), 77q(a); Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5;
and/or Sections 206(1), 206(2) and 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-8 of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1), (2), (4) and 17
C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8.
11. The Commission requests that the Court enter orders: (i)
permanently restraining and enjoining the Defendants from violating these
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provisions of the federal securities laws; (ii) directing the Defendants to pay
disgorgement with prejudgment interest; and (iii) directing Synergy, the Law
Firm, Lazarus and Prieto to pay civil money penalties.
II. DEFENDANTS AND OTHER RELEVANT ENTITIES
A. Defendants
12. Synergy is a Florida for-profit corporation with its principal place
of business in Orlando, Florida.
13. Foundation is a Florida non-profit 501(c)(3) private foundation
with its principal place of business in Orlando, Florida.
14. The Law Firm is a Florida professional limited liability
corporation with its principal place of business in Orlando, Florida.
15. Lazarus, age 52, of Orlando, Florida, is an attorney licensed to
practice in the State of Florida. Lazarus is the chief executive officer and
largest shareholder of Synergy, sole owner of and practitioner at the Law Firm,
and president and a director of the Foundation.
16. Prieto, age 48, of Tampa, Florida, is a Certified Financial Planner
and an investment adviser representative of an investment adviser registered
with the Commission. Prieto is president and a minority owner of Synergy,
and a director of the Foundation. Prieto was an officer of the Foundation until
March 2017.
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B. Other Relevant Entities
17. Settlement Solutions National Pooled Trust (“SSNPT”) is a
special needs pooled trust for disabled individuals that purports to preserve
their Medicaid and SSI benefits pursuant to Section 1396p. As of April 3, 2022,
SSNPT had 316 beneficiaries and total assets of approximately $30.7 million.
Since May 2015, Foundation has been the named trustee of SSNPT.
18. Settlement Management National Pooled Trust (“SMNPT”)
is a pooled trust for personal injury victims, often minors and incompetents in
lieu of guardianship proceedings. Per its master trust agreement, “[t]he
purpose of [SMNPT] is to provide a vehicle for investment management” for its
beneficiaries. The trustee may, in its discretion, place beneficiaries in a
Section 1396p trust to qualify for Medicaid or SSI. As of April 3, 2022, SMNPT
had 65 beneficiaries and total assets of approximately $15.5 million. Since
March 2016, Foundation has been the named trustee of SMNPT.
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
19. The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Sections
20(b), 20(d)(1) and 22(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 77t(d)(1) and
77v(a); Sections 21(d), 21(e) and 27(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d),
78u(e) and 78aa(a); and Sections 209 and 214 of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
80b-9 and 80b-14.
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20. The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants and
venue is proper in this District because, among other things, the Defendants
reside and transact business in this District. They also participated in the
offer, purchase, or sale of securities in this District, and many of their acts and
transactions constituting the violations alleged in this Complaint occurred in
this District. In addition, venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. §
1391 because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the Commission’s
claims occurred here.
21. In connection with the conduct alleged in this Complaint, the
Defendants, directly and indirectly, singly or in concert with others, have made
use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce, and
of the mails.
IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
A. Special Needs Pooled Trusts
22. Virtually all of the SSNPT or SMNPT beneficiaries are disabled or
incompetent individuals or minors who have received awards or settlements in
personal injury lawsuits. Section 1396p permits Medicaid and SSI recipients
to retain their benefits despite receiving assets from these awards or
settlements that would otherwise place them above the income eligibility limits
8
for the government assistance.
23. To retain eligibility for benefits under Section 1396p, the
beneficiaries must place the assets they receive in an irrevocable pooled trust
established and managed by a non-profit association. The beneficiaries can
then get approval from the trustee to use the assets for certain types of
expenses governed by the statute to supplement their Medicaid or SSI benefits.
24. Section 1396p expressly permits the assets of such trusts to be
pooled for investment purposes, but the assets of each beneficiary must be held
in a separate sub-account to be distributed by the trustee for the sole benefit
of that beneficiary.
25. Upon the beneficiary’s death, the trusts may retain the sub-
account balance (“retained funds”) depending on the requirements of state law,
whether the beneficiaries have designated remainder beneficiaries, and the
language of the trust documents. Trusts that keep retained funds must use
them in keeping with the representations in trust documents and the legal
obligations of special needs pooled trusts and their trustees.
26. The SSA maintains a Program Operations Manual System
(“POMS”) with policy statements, guidelines for Section 1396p pooled trust
operations, and interpretations of relevant laws. The POMS allows non-profit
trustees to use the services of other entities to help manage the trusts.
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However, under the POMS “[i]f a non-profit association employs the services
of a for-profit entity, the non-profit association must maintain ultimate
managerial control over the trust . . . [T]he use of a for-profit entity must
always be subordinate to the non-profit managers.”
27. The POMS identifies various forms of authority “that must vest in
the non-profit association” (i.e., cannot be delegated), including determining
the amount of the trust corpus to invest and making the day-to-day decisions
regarding the health and well-being of pooled trust beneficiaries.
B. The Foundation
28. The Foundation was incorporated in Florida in February 2012. Its
officers and directors have all been principals or employees of Synergy, and it
shares an address with Synergy. Lazarus, the largest shareholder of Synergy
and its CEO, is the president and a director of the Foundation. Prieto, a
minority shareholder and president of Synergy, is a director of the Foundation
and was an officer until 2017. The Foundation’s three other currently listed
officers and directors are owners or employees of Synergy.
29. The Foundation’s by-laws state that “the specific purposes for
which the Corporation is formed is to assist personal injury victims with
special needs, either directly or indirectly.” Its articles of incorporation list the
identical purpose for which the Foundation was formed. Furthermore, the
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Foundation’s articles of incorporation state that “the Corporation shall not
allow any part of the net earnings of the Corporation to inure to the benefit or
be distributable to any private person, member, director or officer of the
Corporation . . .”
30. Shortly after its incorporation, in August 2012, the Foundation
applied to the IRS for non-profit, tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code. Lazarus signed the application as director and
president of the Foundation. In the section of the application entitled
“Narrative Description of Your Activities” the Foundation reiterated:
The specific purpose for which the Foundation was formed is to provide:
(i) personal injury victims with special needs, through individual grants,
supplemental assistance needed to obtain the care and services necessary for
recovery/rehabilitation/education, helping to alleviate financial difficulties and (ii)
funding of 501(c)(3) non-profit organizations operating specifically in the areas of
providing personal injury victims with special needs, assistance to obtain the care
and services necessary for recovery/rehabilitation/education.
31.
The application further described what organizations the
Foundation would donate money to and the process by which the corporation
would decide on its donations:
Foundation Directors will research potential recipients, the personal injury
suffered and the special needs of each.
The Foundation plans to provide recipients with supplemental assistance to
obtain the care and services necessary for recovery/rehabilitation/education
helping to alleviate financial difficulties.
Foundation Directors will research potential recipient 501(c)(3) non-profit
organizations operating specifically in the areas of providing personal injury
11
victims with special needs, assistance to obtain the care and services necessary
for recovery/rehabilitation/education . . . .
The Foundation will be providing assistance to (i) personal injury victims with
special needs and (ii) 501(c)(3) non-profit organizations operating specifically in
the areas of providing personal injury victims with special needs, assistance to
obtain the care and services necessary for recovery/rehabilitation/education.
32. The application also stated that the Foundation: (i) had no
arrangements with related entities; (ii) followed a conflict-of-interest policy,
including consideration of alternative service providers; and (iii) had no
revenue-sharing joint ventures.
33. Based on these representations, the IRS granted the Foundation
501(c)(3) status, a decision the SSA relied on in accepting the Foundation as a
valid non-profit association that purportedly operated and managed SSNPT
under Section 1396p. During the SSA’s review of SSNPT’s master trust
agreement in 2016, Synergy represented that SSNPT operated in accordance
with the terms of the agreement – that the Foundation was a legitimate
501(c)(3) entity and managed SSNPT as trustee.
34. Foundation became the SSNPT trustee in 2015. On May 15, 2015,
Prieto signed the master trust agreement for SSNPT on behalf of the
Foundation as the named trustee. Prieto signed subsequent amendments to
the SSNPT master trust agreement in March 2016 and December 2016 on
behalf of the Foundation. Similarly, on March 16, 2016, Prieto signed the
master trust agreement for SMNPT on behalf of the Foundation as the named
12
trustee.
35. Both the SSNPT and SMNPT master trust agreements
represented that the Foundation was the trustee and is a “501(c)(3) non-profit
corporation,” and that the pooled trust property “is to be administered and
distributed by” the Foundation.
C. Marketing, Selling, And Operating The Trusts
36. Synergy is a for-profit company that offers a host of structured
financial products, including SSNPT and SNMPT. Synergy’s main source of
business is personal injury trial lawyers whose clients frequently are disabled,
minors, and/or have guardians, and who receive funds from personal injury
and other legal proceedings. Synergy, largely through Lazarus and The Law
Firm, aggressively markets SSNPT and SNMPT to these lawyers.
37. To that end, Synergy, Lazarus, and the Law Firm send a variety
of marketing and other documents containing information about the trusts.
Among these documents are a joinder agreement that each beneficiary
enrolling in a trust must sign, in which they acknowledge and adopt the trust’s
master trust agreement and agree that they are placing assets irrevocably into
the trust they are joining. There are also marketing brochures describing the
benefits of joining a trust (i.e., retaining Medicaid and SSI benefits), uses of
and limitations on the trusts (such as how and for what types of expenses
13
beneficiaries can receive distributions); what happens to any remaining funds
in the trusts upon the death of a beneficiary; and purported options for
investing funds in the trusts.
38. When recruiting new beneficiaries for SSNPT and SMNPT,
Lazarus cross-sells the legal services of the Law Firm to represent the
beneficiaries in joining the trusts. The Law Firm charges each client $1,500
for its services in helping them join SSNPT and SMNPT. The Law Firm’s
invoice for the $1,500 fee describes the legal representation as “regarding
establishment of pooled settlement trust,” including “all consultations and
communications regarding the Trust [and] preparation and drafting of the
Trust.”
39. In 2015, Synergy signed an agreement with an unaffiliated for-
profit firm, National Trust and Fiduciary Services Company, Inc., d/b/a
Eastern Point Trust Company (“EPT”) to act as the administrator for SSNPT
and SMNPT. In practice, Lazarus, Prieto, and Synergy delegated almost all
authority over the trust administration to EPT. EPT developed several model
investment portfolios for beneficiaries and handled all aspects of investing
trust assets in securities. In addition, Lazarus, Prieto, and Synergy delegated
the sole discretion to respond to and approve or deny distribution requests from
beneficiaries. EPT only conferred with Synergy (through Lazarus, Prieto, and
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other Synergy employees) on a handful of distribution requests which, in EPT’s
judgment, required further consideration.
40. In 2017, Synergy and EPT terminated their relationship. Synergy
then found another unaffiliated for-profit investment adviser, True Link
Financial Advisors, LLC, to handle the investment and asset management
functions for both SSNPT and SMNPT. Since 2017, Synergy has controlled
beneficiary distributions and other day-to-day decisions involving SSNPT and
SMNPT, while True Link has handled the investment of trust assets.
41. In addition to the $1,500 fee to the Law Firm, beneficiaries pay a
$500 or $550 “joinder fee” (the amount has varied over time). A portion of that
fee has gone to either EPT or True Link, and the remainder has gone to
Synergy, even though the Defendants represent that the Foundation charges
the joinder fee. Also as described in more detail below, beneficiaries have paid
an annual trustee fee of either one percent (when EPT was the administrator)
or .75 percent (when True Link was the administrator) of the value of the
assets in their sub-account. The administrator deducts the fee directly from
each sub-account and sends it to Synergy. From 2015 through 2019, Synergy
earned in excess of $675,000 from trustee fees, and has earned more since then.
Synergy has earned more than $100,000 from the joinder fee.
42. The Defendants offer and sell the pooled trusts to beneficiaries as
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investment contracts. Beneficiaries are provided membership in the trusts in
exchange for them transferring funds from their monetary settlements or
awards irrevocably into the trusts. As allowed under Section 1396p, the trusts
pool investor funds together for investment purposes. The success of the
investments depends on the efforts of the Defendants and their chosen
investment advisers. Once they join the trusts and select an investment model
developed by the Defendants and their investment advisers, the beneficiaries
have no involvement in the investment of their funds.
43. Although beneficiaries have sought to join SSNPT in part to
preserve their Medicaid and SSI benefits, the Defendants also market the
trusts in brochures as “getting more than just protection of public benefits.”
They promise beneficiaries advantages “including high quality investment
management services” and “better interest rates.” The Defendants also claim
the trusts are superior to other pooled trusts because “the sub-accounts are
actively managed by professional money managers,” which “allows for a higher
rate of return than would be possible if funds were invested separately . . . The
sub-account funds, like other investments . . . may lose value. There is no
guarantee that the money will grow or be secure.” Lawyers for potential
beneficiaries have frequently asked Lazarus and Prieto how the funds will be
invested or if they will earn interest.
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44. No registration statement has been in effect for the pooled trusts
during the time of the events set forth in this Complaint. Furthermore, no
exemptions from registration are available, including exemptions for
charitable organizations under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the
Advisers Act, and the Investment Company Act.
D. The Defendants’ Misrepresentations And Omissions
1. The Defendants Misrepresent That The Foundation Manages The Trusts
45. Lazarus, Prieto, and Synergy, in marketing materials, trust
documents, emails, letters, websites, and elsewhere, repeatedly have stated to
potential beneficiaries they should join SSNPT because it is a Section 1396p
trust established and managed by a non-profit association - the Foundation.
46. For example, in November 2015, Lazarus gave a presentation
touting “How is the SSNPT different from other pooled trusts?” with such
details as “Foundation...is Non-Profit Trustee” and “Lowest fees nationally” of
just $550 at inception and “Annual trustee fee – 1% of assets held in trust”
(emphasis in original).
47. In another example, Lazarus directed a March 2018 Synergy blog
post stating a pooled settlement trust “is managed by a non-profit entity who
created it and acts as trustee. As a result of this arrangement, it is a low-cost
way for a client to set up a trust for their benefit. . . . The trustee of the SMNPT
17
is the Foundation for Those with Special Needs a 501(c)(3) non-profit created
specifically to act as trustee for trusts such as this.”
48. In an email dated May 17, 2018, Lazarus told a prospective
beneficiary: “I am not the trustee. Under Federal Law, the trustee must be a
non-profit. In this case it is the Foundation.” Also, by email dated October 1,
2018, Lazarus told a prospective beneficiary that SSNPT “is administered by
a non-profit called the Foundation.”
49. Prieto made similar statements. On April 19, 2018, he presented
a webinar stating special needs pooled trusts must be “managed by Not for
Profit Trustee pursuant to federal law,” with SSNPT and SMNPT identified as
“available trust solutions.” By email dated August 23, 2018, Prieto told a
representative of a prospective beneficiary “The Trustee [of SSNPT] is The
Foundation for Those with Special Needs, Inc.”
50. Additionally, SSNPT’s website has stated: “Under federal law, a
pooled special needs trust must be created and managed by a non-profit
trustee. SSNPT is managed by [Foundation] who acts as the trustee. . . . While
this is a difficult reality to face, turning your settlement over to a trustee of a
special needs trust, it is what is required by federal/state law to remain eligible
for needs based benefits.”
51. In their retainer letter, the Law Firm and Lazarus assure
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beneficiaries that “[t]he creation of a pooled trust sub-account will insure that
[their] settlement proceeds will not be treated as a countable asset for purposes
of qualifying for Medicaid and/or SSI,” and that the Law Firm would “adhere
to proper and approved special needs trust structure and format.” In an email
dated April 11, 2017, Lazarus, in his capacity at the Law Firm, pressured the
mother of a prospective beneficiary: “The purpose of the trust is [to] preserve
Medicaid eligibility. Without the trust, your daughter would lose coverage. . .
. Of course you can decide not to set up the trust and lose Medicaid until the
money is completely gone.”
52. Finally, the Defendants consistently represent to beneficiaries
that the trustee and joinder fees described above are paid to the Foundation as
the trustee. For example, the Administrative Services Agreements that both
EPT and True Link signed that included provisions for deducting and paying
the trustee fees were with the Foundation, not Synergy. Additionally, a
Welcome Kit that beneficiaries receive upon joining states that the trustee –
the Foundation – charges the joinder and annual fees.
53. All of these representations are false. The Foundation is a shell
company with no employees, operations, or even a single email address.
Rather, Lazarus and Prieto have Synergy employees perform all work in
connection with SSNPT or SMNPT – or perform it themselves – without any
19
written agreements with the Foundation or invoices to the Foundation
regarding any such work. Lazarus and Prieto respond to all inquiries from
beneficiaries about trust operations. Other Synergy employees have answered
calls from beneficiaries, as well as exchanged emails with True Link regarding
investment of the trust assets.
54. Synergy: induces beneficiaries to join the SSNPT and SMNPT
based in part on promised investment performance; has had discussions with
individual beneficiaries about investment options; and has the authority to
invest each beneficiary’s funds. Lazarus advises beneficiaries on acquiring
interests in SSNPT and SMNPT. Prieto has advised some beneficiaries on
investments, approved the portfolios by which SSNPT and SMNPT assets were
invested, and primarily handled the reinvestment of SSNPT and SMNPT
assets during the transition from EPT to True Link.
55. Furthermore, the trustee fees purportedly paid to the Foundation
under the Administrative Services Agreements are, in reality, paid directly to
Synergy as part of its for-profit control of SSNPT and SMNPT. To attempt to
justify receiving the trustee fees, Synergy entered into sham agreements with
EPT and True Link pursuant to which each firm was supposed to pay a
marketing fee to Synergy for purportedly marketing EPT or True Link’s
services. The alleged marketing fee in both cases has been equal to the trustee
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fee under the Administrative Service Agreements.
56. In reality, Synergy has done little or no marketing of either EPT
or True Link’s services. For example, the only “marketing” Synergy has done
for True Link is to mention in Synergy’s brochures marketing the trusts to trial
lawyers that True Link is the investment advisor, and to include True Link’s
own previously prepared firm descriptions in the brochures. Furthermore,
there is no separate marketing fee – both EPT and True Link paid only the
trustee fee to Synergy. The marketing agreement was merely a ruse to attempt
to hide the fact that Synergy, not the Foundation, has received all trustee fees.
57. Lazarus confirmed the bogus nature of the marketing fee by email
dated June 4, 2014, telling an EPT representative that Synergy “would get the
trustee fee at inception, which would be collected by [EPT] and then paid over
to Synergy as some sort of marketing arm or something like that.” Synergy’s
internal strategic plans also tout the trustee fees as “significant recurring
revenue” every year over the lifetime of the beneficiaries of SSNPT and
SMNPT.
58. To maintain the façade that SSNPT and SMNPT have a non-profit
trustee, Lazarus and Prieto specifically told Synergy employees not to mention
Synergy when marketing SSNPT and SMNPT. Lazarus instructed a Synergy
employee in a June 1, 2018 email: “Synergy is the marketing arm for the pooled
21
trusts but isn’t involved corporately with the trusts (if that makes sense). The
only corporate entity related to the trusts is the Foundation.”
59. Five days later, Lazarus told True Link in an email to “make sure
that we never reference Synergy on any of the pieces for the pooled trust.
Synergy is the marketing arm for the trusts but that is it.” In a February 6,
2018 email, Prieto told Lazarus that Synergy’s name should be removed from
account statements the trusts sent to SSNPT and SMNPT beneficiaries.
2. The Defendants Make Misrepresentations About Pooled Trust Fees
60. While EPT was trust administrator, the Defendants invested
beneficiaries’ funds in one of seven portfolios comprised of the same set of
equity and fixed-income mutual funds (with varying percentages to reflect
different risk tolerance levels), and a money market balance of 0 to 14 percent.
61. All the mutual fund positions were in a particular class of mutual
fund shares: Class C shares. Class C shares carry the highest of certain kinds
of fees payable to broker-dealers to cover fund distribution and shareholder
service expenses known as 12b-1 Fees. These recurring fees, which are included
in a mutual fund’s total annual fund operating expenses, are approximately
one percent per year and are deducted from the mutual fund’s assets on an
ongoing basis. As a result, 12b-1 Fees are paid by investors in Class C shares.
62. Therefore, from 2015 to 2017, the beneficiaries of SSNPT and
22
SMNPT each year paid approximately one percent of their total assets in fees
due to the Defendants investing their funds in Class C shares. At the time,
EPT wholly owned a registered broker-dealer that collected 12b-1 Fees on the
Class C share holdings and sent them (net of expenses) to EPT as its
compensation for acting as trust administrator for SSNPT and SMNPT.
63. Prieto and Lazarus knew EPT would be compensated for its role
as administrator for the two trusts solely from 12b-1 Fees on Class C shares.
In a May 19, 2014 email discussing EPT becoming trust administrator, EPT
wrote that its proposal would allow for “lower public trustee fees” by using the
fees from their proposed investment portfolios (all of which were comprised of
Class C shares) as compensation to EPT. Furthermore, on January 10, 2017,
Prieto acknowledged EPT was being paid through 12b-1 Fees: “[EPT] is
earning roughly 1% from the funds they use. . . . The end client is not seeing
the fee it is [embedded] into the expense of the funds.”
64. Lazarus, Prieto, and Synergy did not disclose to beneficiaries that
they were, in effect, paying the 12b-1 Fees to EPT. In June 2015, the
Defendants reviewed and approved a notice sent to beneficiaries stating “some
of the many resulting benefits of [EPT] being the administrator are cost
reductions for annual fees and a wider array of investment options. The
annual fee will drop from 2% down to 1%.” Thus, the Defendants only told the
23
beneficiaries they were paying a trustee fee of one percent and a $500 joinder
fee – with no mention of the additional one percent 12b-1 Fees. Nor did the
Defendants provide beneficiaries with prospectuses for the mutual funds or
other fee or class-specific disclosures.
3. The Defendants Misrepresent Their Use of Retained Funds
65. Section 1396p refers indirectly to funds in a beneficiary’s sub-
account being “retained by the trust” upon the death of a beneficiary, but is
silent on the circumstances under which a pooled trust may retain those funds
and the uses to which the trust may put those retained funds. However,
Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) specifies that non-profits granted tax-
exempt status must generally use their funds for charitable purposes or the
express purposes for which the entity was created.
66. As noted above, in its 501(c)(3) application, the Foundation
expressly represented to the IRS on multiple occasions that its specific purpose
is to assist personal injury victims with special needs, and that it would fund
“non-profit organizations operating specifically in the areas of providing
personal injury victims with special needs.” Both the Foundation’s by-laws
and articles of incorporation contain similar descriptions of its purpose.
67. In addition, Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto have represented in
numerous documents sent to actual and prospective beneficiaries that they
24
would use a beneficiary’s retained funds expressly to further the trusts’
mission of serving people with disabilities. For example, the joinder
agreements beneficiaries sign to join the trusts allow beneficiaries to choose
among several options of what will happen to any funds still in their sub-
accounts when they die. Among the options is allowing the trust to retain the
funds, in which case the joinder agreement states the trust will use the funds
“to help the Settlement Solutions National Pooled Trust with its important
non-profit mission of serving individuals with disabilities.”
68. Similarly, letters Lazarus writes to lawyers for beneficiaries
considering joining one of the trusts attach a client intake form, which includes
several options for funds remaining in a sub-account. The “retained funds
option” states: “if money is left in the sub-account when the trust Beneficiary
passes away then the funds shall be retained by the Trust to help the
Settlement Solutions National Pooled Trust with its important non-profit
mission of serving individuals with disabilities.”
69. The Welcome Kit the Defendants send to new beneficiaries
includes a “Schedule C – Authorized Representative and Remainder
Beneficiary Designation.” The “Retained By Trust” option has identical
language to the client intake form attached to Lazarus’ letters.
70. Lazarus sent an email to colleagues at Synergy on May 18, 2016,
25
attaching a proposed marketing brochure to send to trial lawyers. The
brochure states in relevant part that “SSNPT was created for the singular
purpose of assisting injury victims to remain eligible for needs-based public
assistance benefits,” and “our trust makes it possible for remaining assets to
be returned to the family at death in certain situations, or remain in the trust
for the benefit of other persons with disabilities.”
71. Although a one-page information sheet about both SSNPT and
SNMPT the Defendants sent to some potential beneficiaries states that the
Foundation was created both to assist people with disabilities and to give back
to the civil justice system, this representation directly contradicts statements
in the Foundation’s 501(c)(3) application, articles of incorporation, by-laws,
and numerous other trust documents the Defendants sent to beneficiaries.
72. Contrary to their representations, Lazarus, Prieto, and Synergy
have not used a significant portion of retained funds to help the disabled or
other people with special needs. Instead, Synergy has diverted all of the funds
from the SSNPT operating account to a separate bank account in the name of
the Foundation, from where Lazarus and Prieto have used funds largely to
further their own, for-profit interests.
73. Since August 2018, Synergy has used at least $132,000 to pay trust
administrative expenses, when it already collected the one percent trustee fee
26
purportedly to pay those same expenses. Synergy financial statements
indicate that since 2015 the annual trustee fee has exceeded the trusts’
administrative expenses – leaving no need for use of retained funds to pay
those expenses. Synergy’s use of retained funds to purportedly cover expenses,
while also collecting the one percent trustee fee, did not reduce the amounts
charged to beneficiaries for administrative costs.
74. The Defendants also used retained funds to pay administrative
expenses that had nothing to do with the trusts. For example, they used
retained funds to pay the premiums on a Synergy business insurance policy.
75. In addition, Synergy has spent at least $300,000 on donations to
trial lawyers’ organizations or charities of which the Defendants are a member
or have friends and acquaintances who serve in important positions in them
that have nothing to do with assisting disabled persons. Some organizations
were not even 501(c)(3) non-profits. Numerous emails among Lazarus, Prieto
and their Synergy partners make it clear that the main criteria for choosing
recipients of the beneficiaries’ retained funds was to promote Synergy’s for-
profit business interests. Among the recipients of Synergy’s largesse with
retained funds have been golf tournaments, beach parties, and a holiday party
organized by legal friends, clients, and acquaintances of Lazarus and his
Synergy partners.
27
76. Lazarus and Prieto have confirmed the purpose of these
disbursements of retained funds in internal emails. For example, Lazarus
wrote in a December 10, 2015 email that Synergy should sponsor an event at
the request of a fellow lawyer because “this is targeted to the legal community
so it does give us good bang for the buck.” In another instance, Prieto agreed
to contribute $1,000 to a golf tournament organized by a lawyer who another
Synergy lawyer described as “my best client” who had recently arranged for
money to be spent on Synergy financial products.
77. Other examples include:
a. In June 2015, Synergy used retained funds to pay $15,000 to a group
of trial lawyers who had achieved large settlements. In March 2015,
Lazarus had sent the group’s founder, a client of Lazarus, a proposal
for an “exclusive annual sponsorship” by which Synergy could attend
group social events, provide webinars, and be recognized as a sponsor
in membership emails and “business partner” on the group’s website.
Soon after Synergy’s $15,000 payment, in November 2015, Prieto
prepared a presentation for Lazarus to make to that group about all
of Synergy’s lines of business titled “Synergy Settlement Services:
Allowing Trial Lawyers to Focus on What They Do Best.”
b. In January 2016, Synergy used retained funds to pay the professional
28
dues for Synergy employees to be named as sponsoring fellows of a
think tank created by trial lawyers.
c. From 2015 through 2018, Synergy used retained funds to pay for a
named sponsorship at a holiday event for the lawyer alumni group of
a private high school in Tampa. Synergy made the payments at the
request of a lawyer who frequently refers business to Synergy.
d. In June 2015, June 2016 and July 2017, Synergy used retained funds
to pay for a named sponsorship at judicial luncheons hosted by a legal
mentoring organization for worker’s compensation lawyers.
e. In August 2015, July 2016 and July 2017, Synergy used retained
funds to pay for a named sponsorship at a beach party held by a trial
lawyer association unrelated to the disabled community.
f. In November 2015, Synergy sponsored a project involving a trial
lawyer for construction activities in a Berber village in Morocco
unrelated to the disabled community.
V. VIOLATIONS ALLEGED
COUNT I
Violations of Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act
(Against All Defendants)
78. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
29
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
79. From no later than May 2015 to the present, the Defendants, in
the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails,
directly or indirectly, knowingly or severely recklessly, employed any device,
scheme or artifice to defraud.
80. By reason of the foregoing, the Defendants violated, and, unless
enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 17(a)(1) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1).
COUNT II
Violations of Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act
(Against All Defendants)
81. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
82. From no later than May 2015 through the present, the Defendants,
in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails,
directly or indirectly, negligently obtained money or property by means of
untrue statements of material facts or omissions to state material facts
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
30
which they were made, not misleading.
83. By reason of the foregoing, the Defendants violated, and, unless
enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 17(a)(2) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2).
COUNT III
Violations of Section 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act
(Against All Defendants)
84. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
85. From no later than May 2015 through the present, the Defendants,
in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails,
directly or indirectly, negligently engaged in transactions, practices and
courses of business which operated or would have operated as a fraud or deceit
upon the purchasers and prospective purchasers of such securities.
86. By reason of the foregoing, the Defendants violated, and, unless
enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 17(a)(3) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3).
31
COUNT IV
Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(a) of the Exchange Act
(Against All Defendants)
87. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
88. From no later than May 2015 through the present, the Defendants,
directly and indirectly, by use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails, knowingly or severely recklessly employed any
device, scheme or artifice to defraud in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
89. By reason of the foregoing, the Defendants violated, and, unless
enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a).
COUNT V
Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) of the Exchange Act
(Against All Defendants)
90. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
91. From no later than May 2015 through the present, the Defendants,
directly and indirectly, by use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
32
commerce, or of the mails, knowingly or severely recklessly made untrue
statements of material facts and omitted to state material facts necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
92. By reason of the foregoing, the Defendants violated, and, unless
enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
COUNT VI
Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(c) of the Exchange Act
(Against All Defendants)
93. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
94. From no later than May 2015 through the present, the Defendants,
directly and indirectly, by use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails, knowingly or severely recklessly engaged in acts,
practices and courses of business which operated or would have operated as a
fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
95. By reason of the foregoing, the Defendants violated, and, unless
33
enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5(c) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c).
COUNT VII
Violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act
(Against Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto)
96. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 64 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
97. From no later than May 2015 through the present, Synergy,
Lazarus and Prieto, directly or indirectly, have made use of the means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of
the mails to sell securities, when no registration statement was in effect with
the Commission as to such securities, and have made use of the means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of
the mails to offer to sell such securities when no registration statement had
been filed with the Commission as to such securities.
98. There were no applicable exemptions from registration.
99. By reason of the foregoing, Synergy, Lazarus and Prieto violated,
and, unless enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to vi
olate, Sections 5(a)
and 5(c) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (c).
34
COUNT VIII
Violations of Section 206(1) of the Advisers Act
(Against Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto)
100. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
101. From no later than May 2015 through the present, Synergy,
Lazarus and Prieto, by engaging in the conduct set forth above, directly or
indirectly, knowingly or severely recklessly, through use of the mails or the
means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and while engaged in the
business of advising others for compensation as to the advisability of investing
in, purchasing, or selling securities, employed devices, schemes, or artifices to
defraud.
102. By reason of the foregoing, Synergy, Lazarus and Prieto violated,
and, unless enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 206(1)
of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1).
COUNT IX
Violations of Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act
(Against Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto)
103. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
35
104. From no later than May 2015 through the present, Synergy,
Lazarus and Prieto, by engaging in the conduct set forth above, directly or
indirectly, knowingly or severely recklessly, through use of the mails or the
means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and while engaged in the
business of advising others for compensation as to the advisability of investing
in, purchasing, or selling securities, engaged in acts, practices, or courses of
business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon clients or
prospective clients.
105. By reason of the foregoing, Synergy, Lazarus and Prieto violated,
and, unless enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 206(2)
of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2).
COUNT X
Violations of Section 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-8 of the Advisers Act
(Against Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto)
106. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
107. From no later than May 2015 through the present, Synergy,
Lazarus and Prieto each acted as investment advisers, as defined by Section
202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11), to SSNPT and SMNPT
and their beneficiaries.
36
108. At all relevant times, SSNPT and SMNPT operated as a pooled
investment vehicle, as defined by Rule 206(4)-8(b) under the Advisers Act, 17
C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(b).
109. Synergy, Lazarus and Prieto, by engaging in the acts and conduct
alleged above, while acting as investment advisers to a pooled investment
vehicle, by use of the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and
of the mails, made untrue statements of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, to any investor or
prospective investor in SSNPT and SMNPT, and otherwise engaged in acts,
practices or courses of business that were fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative with respect to any investor or prospective investor in SSNPT
and SMNPT.
110. By reason of the foregoing, Synergy, Lazarus and Prieto violated,
and, unless enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 206(4)
of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4), and Rule 206(4)-8 thereunder, 17
C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8.
VI. RELIEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests the Court find
the Defendants committed the violations alleged, and:
37
A.
Permanent Injunction
Issue a Permanent Injunction restraining and enjoining the Defendants,
their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them, and each of them, from violating the federal
securities laws alleged in this Complaint.
B.
Disgorgement
Issue an Order directing the Defendants to disgorge all ill-gotten gains,
including prejudgment interest, resulting from the acts or courses of conduct
alleged in this Complaint.
C.
Penalties
Issue an Order directing Synergy, Special Needs Law Firm, Lazarus and
Prieto to pay civil money penalties pursuant to Section 20(d) of the Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d), Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d),
and Section 209(e) of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e).
D.
Further Relief
Grant such other and further relief as may be necessary and appropriate.
38
E.
Retention of Jurisdiction
Further, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court retain
jurisdiction over this action and over the Defendants in order to implement
and carry out the terms of all orders and decrees that may hereby be entered,
or to entertain any suitable application or motion by the Commission for
additional relief within the jurisdiction of this Court.
VII. JURY TRIAL DEMAND
The Commission demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
Dated: May 2, 2022 By: s/Robert K. Levenson
Robert K. Levenson
Senior Trial Counsel
Fla. Bar No. 0089771
Telephone: (305) 982-6341
Facsimile: (305) 536-4154
E-mail: [email protected]
Alice Sum
Trial Counsel
Fla. Bar No. 354510
Telephone: (305) 416-6293
Facsimile: (305) 536-4154
E-mail: [email protected]
A
TTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
S
ECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
801 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1950
Miami, Florida 33131UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
CASE NO. ____________
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
SYNERGY SETTLEMENT SERVICES, INC.,
FOUNDATION FOR THOSE WITH SPECIAL
NEEDS INC.,
SPECIAL NEEDS LAW FIRM PLLC,
JASON D. LAZARUS, and
ANTHONY F. PRIETO, JR.
Defendants.
_________________________________________________/
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission alleges:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The Commission brings this action to enjoin the Defendants’
fraudulent operation of two purportedly charitable pooled investment trusts
with $46 million in assets and more than 380 trust members, most of whom
are disabled recipients of Medicaid or Social Security Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”) benefits.
2. Section 1917 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, allows
Case 6:22-cv-00820 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 1 of 38 PageID 1
2
Medicaid and SSI recipients to remain eligible for benefits despite receiving
assets (such as awards or settlements in personal injury lawsuits) that would
otherwise disqualify them from receiving that government assistance, as long
as they place those assets in an irrevocable trust established and managed by
a non-profit association.
3. From no later than May 2015 through the present, the Defendants
have marketed, sold investments in, and operated two pooled investment
trusts purportedly established and managed by a non-profit entity as required
by Section 1396p. In reality, however, the entity named as the trustee of the
two trusts, Defendant Foundation for Those with Special Needs, Inc.,
(“Foundation”) is a shell corporation with no operations or employees.
4. Defendants Synergy Settlement Services, Inc. (“Synergy”), Jason
D. Lazarus, and Anthony F. Prieto, Jr. have installed the Foundation as a
nominee trustee to attempt to hide the fact that Synergy, a for-profit
corporation, Lazarus and Prieto perform all the trustee functions and profit
from the trusts’ operations by collecting all fees and other funds stemming from
operating the trusts.
5. The Defendants’ operation of the pooled trusts has violated the
antifraud and registration provisions of the federal securities laws in several
ways. First, Synergy, Lazarus, Prieto, and Defendant Special Needs Law
Case 6:22-cv-00820 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 2 of 38 PageID 2
3
Firm, PLLC (“the Law Firm”) have misrepresented to potential trust
beneficiaries that they would be joining a trust managed by a non-profit
association under Section 1396p, and therefore would remain eligible for
Medicaid and SSI benefits. To the contrary, because Synergy, Lazarus, and
Prieto operated and managed the trusts for their own profit, they created a
situation where the trust funds could count as beneficiaries’ assets and
jeopardize their Medicaid and SSI benefits.
6. Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto have lied about the for-profit
operation and management of the trusts to beneficiaries, the Internal Revenue
Service, and the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), through emails, firm
brochures, marketing materials, trust documents and operating agreements,
among other documents.
7. In addition, Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto improperly diverted all
trustee fees, which come directly from beneficiaries’ accounts, to Synergy.
These Defendants also improperly used funds from deceased beneficiaries’
accounts to reimburse themselves for employee salaries and other expenses, as
well as to make donations to trial lawyers’ and other organizations that
violated their representations to the IRS and beneficiaries that they would only
use such funds to further the trusts’ mission to help the disabled.
8. Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto have also misled beneficiaries with
Case 6:22-cv-00820 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 3 of 38 PageID 3
4
respect to the investment of the pooled trusts’ assets. From 2015 to 2017, the
Defendants did not tell beneficiaries they were investing their money in a
certain class of mutual fund that doubled the fees the Defendants told the
beneficiaries they were paying.
9. The trusts are invested in securities, and the trust instruments are
securities the Defendants are offering and selling to beneficiaries. Because the
trusts are not operated and managed by a non-profit association, they do not
qualify for exemptions from registration available to charitable organizations
under the securities laws, and the Defendants have violated the registration
requirements by offering and selling investments in the trusts without
registering the offerings with the Commission.
10. As a result of this conduct, the Defendants have violated Sections
5(a), 5(c) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§
77e(a), 77e(c), 77q(a); Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5;
and/or Sections 206(1), 206(2) and 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-8 of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1), (2), (4) and 17
C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8.
11. The Commission requests that the Court enter orders: (i)
permanently restraining and enjoining the Defendants from violating these
Case 6:22-cv-00820 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 4 of 38 PageID 4
5
provisions of the federal securities laws; (ii) directing the Defendants to pay
disgorgement with prejudgment interest; and (iii) directing Synergy, the Law
Firm, Lazarus and Prieto to pay civil money penalties.
II. DEFENDANTS AND OTHER RELEVANT ENTITIES
A. Defendants
12. Synergy is a Florida for-profit corporation with its principal place
of business in Orlando, Florida.
13. Foundation is a Florida non-profit 501(c)(3) private foundation
with its principal place of business in Orlando, Florida.
14. The Law Firm is a Florida professional limited liability
corporation with its principal place of business in Orlando, Florida.
15. Lazarus, age 52, of Orlando, Florida, is an attorney licensed to
practice in the State of Florida. Lazarus is the chief executive officer and
largest shareholder of Synergy, sole owner of and practitioner at the Law Firm,
and president and a director of the Foundation.
16. Prieto, age 48, of Tampa, Florida, is a Certified Financial Planner
and an investment adviser representative of an investment adviser registered
with the Commission. Prieto is president and a minority owner of Synergy,
and a director of the Foundation. Prieto was an officer of the Foundation until
March 2017.
Case 6:22-cv-00820 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 5 of 38 PageID 5
6
B. Other Relevant Entities
17. Settlement Solutions National Pooled Trust (“SSNPT”) is a
special needs pooled trust for disabled individuals that purports to preserve
their Medicaid and SSI benefits pursuant to Section 1396p. As of April 3, 2022,
SSNPT had 316 beneficiaries and total assets of approximately $30.7 million.
Since May 2015, Foundation has been the named trustee of SSNPT.
18. Settlement Management National Pooled Trust (“SMNPT”)
is a pooled trust for personal injury victims, often minors and incompetents in
lieu of guardianship proceedings. Per its master trust agreement, “[t]he
purpose of [SMNPT] is to provide a vehicle for investment management” for its
beneficiaries. The trustee may, in its discretion, place beneficiaries in a
Section 1396p trust to qualify for Medicaid or SSI. As of April 3, 2022, SMNPT
had 65 beneficiaries and total assets of approximately $15.5 million. Since
March 2016, Foundation has been the named trustee of SMNPT.
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
19. The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Sections
20(b), 20(d)(1) and 22(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 77t(d)(1) and
77v(a); Sections 21(d), 21(e) and 27(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d),
78u(e) and 78aa(a); and Sections 209 and 214 of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
80b-9 and 80b-14.
Case 6:22-cv-00820 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 6 of 38 PageID 6
7
20. The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants and
venue is proper in this District because, among other things, the Defendants
reside and transact business in this District. They also participated in the
offer, purchase, or sale of securities in this District, and many of their acts and
transactions constituting the violations alleged in this Complaint occurred in
this District. In addition, venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. §
1391 because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the Commission’s
claims occurred here.
21. In connection with the conduct alleged in this Complaint, the
Defendants, directly and indirectly, singly or in concert with others, have made
use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce, and
of the mails.
IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
A. Special Needs Pooled Trusts
22. Virtually all of the SSNPT or SMNPT beneficiaries are disabled or
incompetent individuals or minors who have received awards or settlements in
personal injury lawsuits. Section 1396p permits Medicaid and SSI recipients
to retain their benefits despite receiving assets from these awards or
settlements that would otherwise place them above the income eligibility limits
Case 6:22-cv-00820 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 7 of 38 PageID 7
8
for the government assistance.
23. To retain eligibility for benefits under Section 1396p, the
beneficiaries must place the assets they receive in an irrevocable pooled trust
established and managed by a non-profit association. The beneficiaries can
then get approval from the trustee to use the assets for certain types of
expenses governed by the statute to supplement their Medicaid or SSI benefits.
24. Section 1396p expressly permits the assets of such trusts to be
pooled for investment purposes, but the assets of each beneficiary must be held
in a separate sub-account to be distributed by the trustee for the sole benefit
of that beneficiary.
25. Upon the beneficiary’s death, the trusts may retain the sub-
account balance (“retained funds”) depending on the requirements of state law,
whether the beneficiaries have designated remainder beneficiaries, and the
language of the trust documents. Trusts that keep retained funds must use
them in keeping with the representations in trust documents and the legal
obligations of special needs pooled trusts and their trustees.
26. The SSA maintains a Program Operations Manual System
(“POMS”) with policy statements, guidelines for Section 1396p pooled trust
operations, and interpretations of relevant laws. The POMS allows non-profit
trustees to use the services of other entities to help manage the trusts.
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However, under the POMS “[i]f a non-profit association employs the services
of a for-profit entity, the non-profit association must maintain ultimate
managerial control over the trust . . . [T]he use of a for-profit entity must
always be subordinate to the non-profit managers.”
27. The POMS identifies various forms of authority “that must vest in
the non-profit association” (i.e., cannot be delegated), including determining
the amount of the trust corpus to invest and making the day-to-day decisions
regarding the health and well-being of pooled trust beneficiaries.
B. The Foundation
28. The Foundation was incorporated in Florida in February 2012. Its
officers and directors have all been principals or employees of Synergy, and it
shares an address with Synergy. Lazarus, the largest shareholder of Synergy
and its CEO, is the president and a director of the Foundation. Prieto, a
minority shareholder and president of Synergy, is a director of the Foundation
and was an officer until 2017. The Foundation’s three other currently listed
officers and directors are owners or employees of Synergy.
29. The Foundation’s by-laws state that “the specific purposes for
which the Corporation is formed is to assist personal injury victims with
special needs, either directly or indirectly.” Its articles of incorporation list the
identical purpose for which the Foundation was formed. Furthermore, the
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Foundation’s articles of incorporation state that “the Corporation shall not
allow any part of the net earnings of the Corporation to inure to the benefit or
be distributable to any private person, member, director or officer of the
Corporation . . .”
30. Shortly after its incorporation, in August 2012, the Foundation
applied to the IRS for non-profit, tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code. Lazarus signed the application as director and
president of the Foundation. In the section of the application entitled
“Narrative Description of Your Activities” the Foundation reiterated:
The specific purpose for which the Foundation was formed is to provide:
(i) personal injury victims with special needs, through individual grants,
supplemental assistance needed to obtain the care and services necessary for
recovery/rehabilitation/education, helping to alleviate financial difficulties and (ii)
funding of 501(c)(3) non-profit organizations operating specifically in the areas of
providing personal injury victims with special needs, assistance to obtain the care
and services necessary for recovery/rehabilitation/education.
31. The application further described what organizations the
Foundation would donate money to and the process by which the corporation
would decide on its donations:
Foundation Directors will research potential recipients, the personal injury
suffered and the special needs of each.
The Foundation plans to provide recipients with supplemental assistance to
obtain the care and services necessary for recovery/rehabilitation/education
helping to alleviate financial difficulties.
Foundation Directors will research potential recipient 501(c)(3) non-profit
organizations operating specifically in the areas of providing personal injury
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victims with special needs, assistance to obtain the care and services necessary
for recovery/rehabilitation/education . . . .
The Foundation will be providing assistance to (i) personal injury victims with
special needs and (ii) 501(c)(3) non-profit organizations operating specifically in
the areas of providing personal injury victims with special needs, assistance to
obtain the care and services necessary for recovery/rehabilitation/education.
32. The application also stated that the Foundation: (i) had no
arrangements with related entities; (ii) followed a conflict-of-interest policy,
including consideration of alternative service providers; and (iii) had no
revenue-sharing joint ventures.
33. Based on these representations, the IRS granted the Foundation
501(c)(3) status, a decision the SSA relied on in accepting the Foundation as a
valid non-profit association that purportedly operated and managed SSNPT
under Section 1396p. During the SSA’s review of SSNPT’s master trust
agreement in 2016, Synergy represented that SSNPT operated in accordance
with the terms of the agreement – that the Foundation was a legitimate
501(c)(3) entity and managed SSNPT as trustee.
34. Foundation became the SSNPT trustee in 2015. On May 15, 2015,
Prieto signed the master trust agreement for SSNPT on behalf of the
Foundation as the named trustee. Prieto signed subsequent amendments to
the SSNPT master trust agreement in March 2016 and December 2016 on
behalf of the Foundation. Similarly, on March 16, 2016, Prieto signed the
master trust agreement for SMNPT on behalf of the Foundation as the named
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trustee.
35. Both the SSNPT and SMNPT master trust agreements
represented that the Foundation was the trustee and is a “501(c)(3) non-profit
corporation,” and that the pooled trust property “is to be administered and
distributed by” the Foundation.
C. Marketing, Selling, And Operating The Trusts
36. Synergy is a for-profit company that offers a host of structured
financial products, including SSNPT and SNMPT. Synergy’s main source of
business is personal injury trial lawyers whose clients frequently are disabled,
minors, and/or have guardians, and who receive funds from personal injury
and other legal proceedings. Synergy, largely through Lazarus and The Law
Firm, aggressively markets SSNPT and SNMPT to these lawyers.
37. To that end, Synergy, Lazarus, and the Law Firm send a variety
of marketing and other documents containing information about the trusts.
Among these documents are a joinder agreement that each beneficiary
enrolling in a trust must sign, in which they acknowledge and adopt the trust’s
master trust agreement and agree that they are placing assets irrevocably into
the trust they are joining. There are also marketing brochures describing the
benefits of joining a trust (i.e., retaining Medicaid and SSI benefits), uses of
and limitations on the trusts (such as how and for what types of expenses
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beneficiaries can receive distributions); what happens to any remaining funds
in the trusts upon the death of a beneficiary; and purported options for
investing funds in the trusts.
38. When recruiting new beneficiaries for SSNPT and SMNPT,
Lazarus cross-sells the legal services of the Law Firm to represent the
beneficiaries in joining the trusts. The Law Firm charges each client $1,500
for its services in helping them join SSNPT and SMNPT. The Law Firm’s
invoice for the $1,500 fee describes the legal representation as “regarding
establishment of pooled settlement trust,” including “all consultations and
communications regarding the Trust [and] preparation and drafting of the
Trust.”
39. In 2015, Synergy signed an agreement with an unaffiliated for-
profit firm, National Trust and Fiduciary Services Company, Inc., d/b/a
Eastern Point Trust Company (“EPT”) to act as the administrator for SSNPT
and SMNPT. In practice, Lazarus, Prieto, and Synergy delegated almost all
authority over the trust administration to EPT. EPT developed several model
investment portfolios for beneficiaries and handled all aspects of investing
trust assets in securities. In addition, Lazarus, Prieto, and Synergy delegated
the sole discretion to respond to and approve or deny distribution requests from
beneficiaries. EPT only conferred with Synergy (through Lazarus, Prieto, and
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other Synergy employees) on a handful of distribution requests which, in EPT’s
judgment, required further consideration.
40. In 2017, Synergy and EPT terminated their relationship. Synergy
then found another unaffiliated for-profit investment adviser, True Link
Financial Advisors, LLC, to handle the investment and asset management
functions for both SSNPT and SMNPT. Since 2017, Synergy has controlled
beneficiary distributions and other day-to-day decisions involving SSNPT and
SMNPT, while True Link has handled the investment of trust assets.
41. In addition to the $1,500 fee to the Law Firm, beneficiaries pay a
$500 or $550 “joinder fee” (the amount has varied over time). A portion of that
fee has gone to either EPT or True Link, and the remainder has gone to
Synergy, even though the Defendants represent that the Foundation charges
the joinder fee. Also as described in more detail below, beneficiaries have paid
an annual trustee fee of either one percent (when EPT was the administrator)
or .75 percent (when True Link was the administrator) of the value of the
assets in their sub-account. The administrator deducts the fee directly from
each sub-account and sends it to Synergy. From 2015 through 2019, Synergy
earned in excess of $675,000 from trustee fees, and has earned more since then.
Synergy has earned more than $100,000 from the joinder fee.
42. The Defendants offer and sell the pooled trusts to beneficiaries as
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investment contracts. Beneficiaries are provided membership in the trusts in
exchange for them transferring funds from their monetary settlements or
awards irrevocably into the trusts. As allowed under Section 1396p, the trusts
pool investor funds together for investment purposes. The success of the
investments depends on the efforts of the Defendants and their chosen
investment advisers. Once they join the trusts and select an investment model
developed by the Defendants and their investment advisers, the beneficiaries
have no involvement in the investment of their funds.
43. Although beneficiaries have sought to join SSNPT in part to
preserve their Medicaid and SSI benefits, the Defendants also market the
trusts in brochures as “getting more than just protection of public benefits.”
They promise beneficiaries advantages “including high quality investment
management services” and “better interest rates.” The Defendants also claim
the trusts are superior to other pooled trusts because “the sub-accounts are
actively managed by professional money managers,” which “allows for a higher
rate of return than would be possible if funds were invested separately . . . The
sub-account funds, like other investments . . . may lose value. There is no
guarantee that the money will grow or be secure.” Lawyers for potential
beneficiaries have frequently asked Lazarus and Prieto how the funds will be
invested or if they will earn interest.
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44. No registration statement has been in effect for the pooled trusts
during the time of the events set forth in this Complaint. Furthermore, no
exemptions from registration are available, including exemptions for
charitable organizations under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the
Advisers Act, and the Investment Company Act.
D. The Defendants’ Misrepresentations And Omissions
1. The Defendants Misrepresent That The Foundation Manages The Trusts
45. Lazarus, Prieto, and Synergy, in marketing materials, trust
documents, emails, letters, websites, and elsewhere, repeatedly have stated to
potential beneficiaries they should join SSNPT because it is a Section 1396p
trust established and managed by a non-profit association - the Foundation.
46. For example, in November 2015, Lazarus gave a presentation
touting “How is the SSNPT different from other pooled trusts?” with such
details as “Foundation…is Non-Profit Trustee” and “Lowest fees nationally” of
just $550 at inception and “Annual trustee fee – 1% of assets held in trust”
(emphasis in original).
47. In another example, Lazarus directed a March 2018 Synergy blog
post stating a pooled settlement trust “is managed by a non-profit entity who
created it and acts as trustee. As a result of this arrangement, it is a low-cost
way for a client to set up a trust for their benefit. . . . The trustee of the SMNPT
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is the Foundation for Those with Special Needs a 501(c)(3) non-profit created
specifically to act as trustee for trusts such as this.”
48. In an email dated May 17, 2018, Lazarus told a prospective
beneficiary: “I am not the trustee. Under Federal Law, the trustee must be a
non-profit. In this case it is the Foundation.” Also, by email dated October 1,
2018, Lazarus told a prospective beneficiary that SSNPT “is administered by
a non-profit called the Foundation.”
49. Prieto made similar statements. On April 19, 2018, he presented
a webinar stating special needs pooled trusts must be “managed by Not for
Profit Trustee pursuant to federal law,” with SSNPT and SMNPT identified as
“available trust solutions.” By email dated August 23, 2018, Prieto told a
representative of a prospective beneficiary “The Trustee [of SSNPT] is The
Foundation for Those with Special Needs, Inc.”
50. Additionally, SSNPT’s website has stated: “Under federal law, a
pooled special needs trust must be created and managed by a non-profit
trustee. SSNPT is managed by [Foundation] who acts as the trustee. . . . While
this is a difficult reality to face, turning your settlement over to a trustee of a
special needs trust, it is what is required by federal/state law to remain eligible
for needs based benefits.”
51. In their retainer letter, the Law Firm and Lazarus assure
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beneficiaries that “[t]he creation of a pooled trust sub-account will insure that
[their] settlement proceeds will not be treated as a countable asset for purposes
of qualifying for Medicaid and/or SSI,” and that the Law Firm would “adhere
to proper and approved special needs trust structure and format.” In an email
dated April 11, 2017, Lazarus, in his capacity at the Law Firm, pressured the
mother of a prospective beneficiary: “The purpose of the trust is [to] preserve
Medicaid eligibility. Without the trust, your daughter would lose coverage. . .
. Of course you can decide not to set up the trust and lose Medicaid until the
money is completely gone.”
52. Finally, the Defendants consistently represent to beneficiaries
that the trustee and joinder fees described above are paid to the Foundation as
the trustee. For example, the Administrative Services Agreements that both
EPT and True Link signed that included provisions for deducting and paying
the trustee fees were with the Foundation, not Synergy. Additionally, a
Welcome Kit that beneficiaries receive upon joining states that the trustee –
the Foundation – charges the joinder and annual fees.
53. All of these representations are false. The Foundation is a shell
company with no employees, operations, or even a single email address.
Rather, Lazarus and Prieto have Synergy employees perform all work in
connection with SSNPT or SMNPT – or perform it themselves – without any
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written agreements with the Foundation or invoices to the Foundation
regarding any such work. Lazarus and Prieto respond to all inquiries from
beneficiaries about trust operations. Other Synergy employees have answered
calls from beneficiaries, as well as exchanged emails with True Link regarding
investment of the trust assets.
54. Synergy: induces beneficiaries to join the SSNPT and SMNPT
based in part on promised investment performance; has had discussions with
individual beneficiaries about investment options; and has the authority to
invest each beneficiary’s funds. Lazarus advises beneficiaries on acquiring
interests in SSNPT and SMNPT. Prieto has advised some beneficiaries on
investments, approved the portfolios by which SSNPT and SMNPT assets were
invested, and primarily handled the reinvestment of SSNPT and SMNPT
assets during the transition from EPT to True Link.
55. Furthermore, the trustee fees purportedly paid to the Foundation
under the Administrative Services Agreements are, in reality, paid directly to
Synergy as part of its for-profit control of SSNPT and SMNPT. To attempt to
justify receiving the trustee fees, Synergy entered into sham agreements with
EPT and True Link pursuant to which each firm was supposed to pay a
marketing fee to Synergy for purportedly marketing EPT or True Link’s
services. The alleged marketing fee in both cases has been equal to the trustee
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fee under the Administrative Service Agreements.
56. In reality, Synergy has done little or no marketing of either EPT
or True Link’s services. For example, the only “marketing” Synergy has done
for True Link is to mention in Synergy’s brochures marketing the trusts to trial
lawyers that True Link is the investment advisor, and to include True Link’s
own previously prepared firm descriptions in the brochures. Furthermore,
there is no separate marketing fee – both EPT and True Link paid only the
trustee fee to Synergy. The marketing agreement was merely a ruse to attempt
to hide the fact that Synergy, not the Foundation, has received all trustee fees.
57. Lazarus confirmed the bogus nature of the marketing fee by email
dated June 4, 2014, telling an EPT representative that Synergy “would get the
trustee fee at inception, which would be collected by [EPT] and then paid over
to Synergy as some sort of marketing arm or something like that.” Synergy’s
internal strategic plans also tout the trustee fees as “significant recurring
revenue” every year over the lifetime of the beneficiaries of SSNPT and
SMNPT.
58. To maintain the façade that SSNPT and SMNPT have a non-profit
trustee, Lazarus and Prieto specifically told Synergy employees not to mention
Synergy when marketing SSNPT and SMNPT. Lazarus instructed a Synergy
employee in a June 1, 2018 email: “Synergy is the marketing arm for the pooled
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trusts but isn’t involved corporately with the trusts (if that makes sense). The
only corporate entity related to the trusts is the Foundation.”
59. Five days later, Lazarus told True Link in an email to “make sure
that we never reference Synergy on any of the pieces for the pooled trust.
Synergy is the marketing arm for the trusts but that is it.” In a February 6,
2018 email, Prieto told Lazarus that Synergy’s name should be removed from
account statements the trusts sent to SSNPT and SMNPT beneficiaries.
2. The Defendants Make Misrepresentations About Pooled Trust Fees
60. While EPT was trust administrator, the Defendants invested
beneficiaries’ funds in one of seven portfolios comprised of the same set of
equity and fixed-income mutual funds (with varying percentages to reflect
different risk tolerance levels), and a money market balance of 0 to 14 percent.
61. All the mutual fund positions were in a particular class of mutual
fund shares: Class C shares. Class C shares carry the highest of certain kinds
of fees payable to broker-dealers to cover fund distribution and shareholder
service expenses known as 12b-1 Fees. These recurring fees, which are included
in a mutual fund’s total annual fund operating expenses, are approximately
one percent per year and are deducted from the mutual fund’s assets on an
ongoing basis. As a result, 12b-1 Fees are paid by investors in Class C shares.
62. Therefore, from 2015 to 2017, the beneficiaries of SSNPT and
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SMNPT each year paid approximately one percent of their total assets in fees
due to the Defendants investing their funds in Class C shares. At the time,
EPT wholly owned a registered broker-dealer that collected 12b-1 Fees on the
Class C share holdings and sent them (net of expenses) to EPT as its
compensation for acting as trust administrator for SSNPT and SMNPT.
63. Prieto and Lazarus knew EPT would be compensated for its role
as administrator for the two trusts solely from 12b-1 Fees on Class C shares.
In a May 19, 2014 email discussing EPT becoming trust administrator, EPT
wrote that its proposal would allow for “lower public trustee fees” by using the
fees from their proposed investment portfolios (all of which were comprised of
Class C shares) as compensation to EPT. Furthermore, on January 10, 2017,
Prieto acknowledged EPT was being paid through 12b-1 Fees: “[EPT] is
earning roughly 1% from the funds they use. . . . The end client is not seeing
the fee it is [embedded] into the expense of the funds.”
64. Lazarus, Prieto, and Synergy did not disclose to beneficiaries that
they were, in effect, paying the 12b-1 Fees to EPT. In June 2015, the
Defendants reviewed and approved a notice sent to beneficiaries stating “some
of the many resulting benefits of [EPT] being the administrator are cost
reductions for annual fees and a wider array of investment options. The
annual fee will drop from 2% down to 1%.” Thus, the Defendants only told the
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beneficiaries they were paying a trustee fee of one percent and a $500 joinder
fee – with no mention of the additional one percent 12b-1 Fees. Nor did the
Defendants provide beneficiaries with prospectuses for the mutual funds or
other fee or class-specific disclosures.
3. The Defendants Misrepresent Their Use of Retained Funds
65. Section 1396p refers indirectly to funds in a beneficiary’s sub-
account being “retained by the trust” upon the death of a beneficiary, but is
silent on the circumstances under which a pooled trust may retain those funds
and the uses to which the trust may put those retained funds. However,
Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) specifies that non-profits granted tax-
exempt status must generally use their funds for charitable purposes or the
express purposes for which the entity was created.
66. As noted above, in its 501(c)(3) application, the Foundation
expressly represented to the IRS on multiple occasions that its specific purpose
is to assist personal injury victims with special needs, and that it would fund
“non-profit organizations operating specifically in the areas of providing
personal injury victims with special needs.” Both the Foundation’s by-laws
and articles of incorporation contain similar descriptions of its purpose.
67. In addition, Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto have represented in
numerous documents sent to actual and prospective beneficiaries that they
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would use a beneficiary’s retained funds expressly to further the trusts’
mission of serving people with disabilities. For example, the joinder
agreements beneficiaries sign to join the trusts allow beneficiaries to choose
among several options of what will happen to any funds still in their sub-
accounts when they die. Among the options is allowing the trust to retain the
funds, in which case the joinder agreement states the trust will use the funds
“to help the Settlement Solutions National Pooled Trust with its important
non-profit mission of serving individuals with disabilities.”
68. Similarly, letters Lazarus writes to lawyers for beneficiaries
considering joining one of the trusts attach a client intake form, which includes
several options for funds remaining in a sub-account. The “retained funds
option” states: “if money is left in the sub-account when the trust Beneficiary
passes away then the funds shall be retained by the Trust to help the
Settlement Solutions National Pooled Trust with its important non-profit
mission of serving individuals with disabilities.”
69. The Welcome Kit the Defendants send to new beneficiaries
includes a “Schedule C – Authorized Representative and Remainder
Beneficiary Designation.” The “Retained By Trust” option has identical
language to the client intake form attached to Lazarus’ letters.
70. Lazarus sent an email to colleagues at Synergy on May 18, 2016,
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attaching a proposed marketing brochure to send to trial lawyers. The
brochure states in relevant part that “SSNPT was created for the singular
purpose of assisting injury victims to remain eligible for needs-based public
assistance benefits,” and “our trust makes it possible for remaining assets to
be returned to the family at death in certain situations, or remain in the trust
for the benefit of other persons with disabilities.”
71. Although a one-page information sheet about both SSNPT and
SNMPT the Defendants sent to some potential beneficiaries states that the
Foundation was created both to assist people with disabilities and to give back
to the civil justice system, this representation directly contradicts statements
in the Foundation’s 501(c)(3) application, articles of incorporation, by-laws,
and numerous other trust documents the Defendants sent to beneficiaries.
72. Contrary to their representations, Lazarus, Prieto, and Synergy
have not used a significant portion of retained funds to help the disabled or
other people with special needs. Instead, Synergy has diverted all of the funds
from the SSNPT operating account to a separate bank account in the name of
the Foundation, from where Lazarus and Prieto have used funds largely to
further their own, for-profit interests.
73. Since August 2018, Synergy has used at least $132,000 to pay trust
administrative expenses, when it already collected the one percent trustee fee
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purportedly to pay those same expenses. Synergy financial statements
indicate that since 2015 the annual trustee fee has exceeded the trusts’
administrative expenses – leaving no need for use of retained funds to pay
those expenses. Synergy’s use of retained funds to purportedly cover expenses,
while also collecting the one percent trustee fee, did not reduce the amounts
charged to beneficiaries for administrative costs.
74. The Defendants also used retained funds to pay administrative
expenses that had nothing to do with the trusts. For example, they used
retained funds to pay the premiums on a Synergy business insurance policy.
75. In addition, Synergy has spent at least $300,000 on donations to
trial lawyers’ organizations or charities of which the Defendants are a member
or have friends and acquaintances who serve in important positions in them
that have nothing to do with assisting disabled persons. Some organizations
were not even 501(c)(3) non-profits. Numerous emails among Lazarus, Prieto
and their Synergy partners make it clear that the main criteria for choosing
recipients of the beneficiaries’ retained funds was to promote Synergy’s for-
profit business interests. Among the recipients of Synergy’s largesse with
retained funds have been golf tournaments, beach parties, and a holiday party
organized by legal friends, clients, and acquaintances of Lazarus and his
Synergy partners.
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76. Lazarus and Prieto have confirmed the purpose of these
disbursements of retained funds in internal emails. For example, Lazarus
wrote in a December 10, 2015 email that Synergy should sponsor an event at
the request of a fellow lawyer because “this is targeted to the legal community
so it does give us good bang for the buck.” In another instance, Prieto agreed
to contribute $1,000 to a golf tournament organized by a lawyer who another
Synergy lawyer described as “my best client” who had recently arranged for
money to be spent on Synergy financial products.
77. Other examples include:
a. In June 2015, Synergy used retained funds to pay $15,000 to a group
of trial lawyers who had achieved large settlements. In March 2015,
Lazarus had sent the group’s founder, a client of Lazarus, a proposal
for an “exclusive annual sponsorship” by which Synergy could attend
group social events, provide webinars, and be recognized as a sponsor
in membership emails and “business partner” on the group’s website.
Soon after Synergy’s $15,000 payment, in November 2015, Prieto
prepared a presentation for Lazarus to make to that group about all
of Synergy’s lines of business titled “Synergy Settlement Services:
Allowing Trial Lawyers to Focus on What They Do Best.”
b. In January 2016, Synergy used retained funds to pay the professional
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dues for Synergy employees to be named as sponsoring fellows of a
think tank created by trial lawyers.
c. From 2015 through 2018, Synergy used retained funds to pay for a
named sponsorship at a holiday event for the lawyer alumni group of
a private high school in Tampa. Synergy made the payments at the
request of a lawyer who frequently refers business to Synergy.
d. In June 2015, June 2016 and July 2017, Synergy used retained funds
to pay for a named sponsorship at judicial luncheons hosted by a legal
mentoring organization for worker’s compensation lawyers.
e. In August 2015, July 2016 and July 2017, Synergy used retained
funds to pay for a named sponsorship at a beach party held by a trial
lawyer association unrelated to the disabled community.
f. In November 2015, Synergy sponsored a project involving a trial
lawyer for construction activities in a Berber village in Morocco
unrelated to the disabled community.
V. VIOLATIONS ALLEGED
COUNT I
Violations of Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act
(Against All Defendants)
78. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
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its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
79. From no later than May 2015 to the present, the Defendants, in
the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails,
directly or indirectly, knowingly or severely recklessly, employed any device,
scheme or artifice to defraud.
80. By reason of the foregoing, the Defendants violated, and, unless
enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 17(a)(1) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1).
COUNT II
Violations of Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act
(Against All Defendants)
81. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
82. From no later than May 2015 through the present, the Defendants,
in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails,
directly or indirectly, negligently obtained money or property by means of
untrue statements of material facts or omissions to state material facts
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
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which they were made, not misleading.
83. By reason of the foregoing, the Defendants violated, and, unless
enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 17(a)(2) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2).
COUNT III
Violations of Section 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act
(Against All Defendants)
84. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
85. From no later than May 2015 through the present, the Defendants,
in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails,
directly or indirectly, negligently engaged in transactions, practices and
courses of business which operated or would have operated as a fraud or deceit
upon the purchasers and prospective purchasers of such securities.
86. By reason of the foregoing, the Defendants violated, and, unless
enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 17(a)(3) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3).
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COUNT IV
Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(a) of the Exchange Act
(Against All Defendants)
87. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
88. From no later than May 2015 through the present, the Defendants,
directly and indirectly, by use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails, knowingly or severely recklessly employed any
device, scheme or artifice to defraud in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
89. By reason of the foregoing, the Defendants violated, and, unless
enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a).
COUNT V
Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) of the Exchange Act
(Against All Defendants)
90. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
91. From no later than May 2015 through the present, the Defendants,
directly and indirectly, by use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
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commerce, or of the mails, knowingly or severely recklessly made untrue
statements of material facts and omitted to state material facts necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
92. By reason of the foregoing, the Defendants violated, and, unless
enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
COUNT VI
Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(c) of the Exchange Act
(Against All Defendants)
93. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
94. From no later than May 2015 through the present, the Defendants,
directly and indirectly, by use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails, knowingly or severely recklessly engaged in acts,
practices and courses of business which operated or would have operated as a
fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
95. By reason of the foregoing, the Defendants violated, and, unless
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enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5(c) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c).
COUNT VII
Violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act
(Against Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto)
96. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 64 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
97. From no later than May 2015 through the present, Synergy,
Lazarus and Prieto, directly or indirectly, have made use of the means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of
the mails to sell securities, when no registration statement was in effect with
the Commission as to such securities, and have made use of the means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of
the mails to offer to sell such securities when no registration statement had
been filed with the Commission as to such securities.
98. There were no applicable exemptions from registration.
99. By reason of the foregoing, Synergy, Lazarus and Prieto violated,
and, unless enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Sections 5(a)
and 5(c) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (c).
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COUNT VIII
Violations of Section 206(1) of the Advisers Act
(Against Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto)
100. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
101. From no later than May 2015 through the present, Synergy,
Lazarus and Prieto, by engaging in the conduct set forth above, directly or
indirectly, knowingly or severely recklessly, through use of the mails or the
means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and while engaged in the
business of advising others for compensation as to the advisability of investing
in, purchasing, or selling securities, employed devices, schemes, or artifices to
defraud.
102. By reason of the foregoing, Synergy, Lazarus and Prieto violated,
and, unless enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 206(1)
of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1).
COUNT IX
Violations of Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act
(Against Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto)
103. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
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104. From no later than May 2015 through the present, Synergy,
Lazarus and Prieto, by engaging in the conduct set forth above, directly or
indirectly, knowingly or severely recklessly, through use of the mails or the
means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and while engaged in the
business of advising others for compensation as to the advisability of investing
in, purchasing, or selling securities, engaged in acts, practices, or courses of
business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon clients or
prospective clients.
105. By reason of the foregoing, Synergy, Lazarus and Prieto violated,
and, unless enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 206(2)
of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2).
COUNT X
Violations of Section 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-8 of the Advisers Act
(Against Synergy, Lazarus, and Prieto)
106. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 77 of
its Complaint as if incorporated herein.
107. From no later than May 2015 through the present, Synergy,
Lazarus and Prieto each acted as investment advisers, as defined by Section
202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11), to SSNPT and SMNPT
and their beneficiaries.
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108. At all relevant times, SSNPT and SMNPT operated as a pooled
investment vehicle, as defined by Rule 206(4)-8(b) under the Advisers Act, 17
C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(b).
109. Synergy, Lazarus and Prieto, by engaging in the acts and conduct
alleged above, while acting as investment advisers to a pooled investment
vehicle, by use of the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and
of the mails, made untrue statements of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, to any investor or
prospective investor in SSNPT and SMNPT, and otherwise engaged in acts,
practices or courses of business that were fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative with respect to any investor or prospective investor in SSNPT
and SMNPT.
110. By reason of the foregoing, Synergy, Lazarus and Prieto violated,
and, unless enjoined, are reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 206(4)
of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4), and Rule 206(4)-8 thereunder, 17
C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8.
VI. RELIEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests the Court find
the Defendants committed the violations alleged, and:
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A.
Permanent Injunction
Issue a Permanent Injunction restraining and enjoining the Defendants,
their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them, and each of them, from violating the federal
securities laws alleged in this Complaint.
B.
Disgorgement
Issue an Order directing the Defendants to disgorge all ill-gotten gains,
including prejudgment interest, resulting from the acts or courses of conduct
alleged in this Complaint.
C.
Penalties
Issue an Order directing Synergy, Special Needs Law Firm, Lazarus and
Prieto to pay civil money penalties pursuant to Section 20(d) of the Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d), Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d),
and Section 209(e) of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e).
D.
Further Relief
Grant such other and further relief as may be necessary and appropriate.
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E.
Retention of Jurisdiction
Further, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court retain
jurisdiction over this action and over the Defendants in order to implement
and carry out the terms of all orders and decrees that may hereby be entered,
or to entertain any suitable application or motion by the Commission for
additional relief within the jurisdiction of this Court.
VII. JURY TRIAL DEMAND
The Commission demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
Dated: May 2, 2022 By: s/Robert K. Levenson
Robert K. Levenson
Senior Trial Counsel
Fla. Bar No. 0089771
Telephone: (305) 982-6341
Facsimile: (305) 536-4154
E-mail: [email protected]
Alice Sum
Trial Counsel
Fla. Bar No. 354510
Telephone: (305) 416-6293
Facsimile: (305) 536-4154
E-mail: [email protected]
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
801 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1950
Miami, Florida 33131
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