SEC v. Jonathan Mimun; and Ronn BenHarav, No. 2:21-cv-01314, District of Nevada (July 13, 2021) — Complaint

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KENNETH W. DONNELLY
(LR IA 11-3 motion to appear pending)
Assistant Chief Litigation Counsel
100 F Street N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549-5949
Email:  [email protected]

Telephone: (202) 551-4946
Fax: (804) 708-6087

Attorney for Plaintiff
Securities and Exchange Commission

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

JONATHAN MIMUN (A/K/A
JONATHAN MAYMON)
and RONN BENHARAV,

Defendants.

2:21-cv-1314

COMPLAINT

 Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) alleges:
SUMMARY OF THE ACTION
1. This case concerns a multi-million dollar scheme to defraud retail
investors in the United States through the unregistered offer and sale of security-
based binary options from at least December 2014 through June 2017 (“Relevant
Period”).  Binary options are high-risk financial instruments with potential payouts or
losses contingent on the future value of an underlying asset that, from approximately
2013 through 2018, were predominantly pitched by fraudsters operating from Israel.

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2. Jonathan (“Yoni”) Mimun (also known as Jonathan (“Yoni”)
Maymon) and Ronn BenHarav
(“Defendants”) fraudulently and without registration
offered and sold binary options through their ownership, operation, and control of
two Internet-based brokers doing business under the names (a) Porter Finance and (b)
Dalton Finance (the “Porter Brokers”)  .  The Porter Brokers—which secretly made
money from investors’ trading losses—were unincorporated brand names that
functioned through a combination of websites, call centers, and straw companies that,
among other things, held bank and credit-card-processing accounts used to facilitate
their operations.  Although they intentionally targeted U.S. investors, neither the
Porter Brokers, websites, call centers, nor straw companies registered with the SEC
as a broker or dealer or were ever associated with a SEC-registered broker or dealer.
3. The Defendants owned and controlled JMRB Media, Ltd. and a number
of other affiliated companies (collectively “JMRB”).  JMRB employed as many as
160 persons at one or more boiler-room-like call centers soliciting investors for the
Porter Brokers (the “Call Center Operations”).  At the Defendants’ direction, JMRB
sales agents solicited investors in the United States to open and fund binary option
trading accounts with the Porter Brokers by, among other things, representing that
they were experienced market professionals providing expert advice and that the
brokers (and the sales agents) only made money when investors made money.  In
reality, the interests of the Porter Brokers and JMRB were not aligned with the
investors’ interests.  The entities controlled by the Defendants made their money
from investors’ losses—they were the counterparty to their clients’ trades—and the
Defendants rigged the trading to maximize the likelihood investors lost their money.
4. Through their ownership and operation of the Porter Brokers and JMRB,
Defendants managed, directed and ultimately controlled the fraudulent solicitation of
tens of thousands of investors in the United States and the selling of tens of thousands
of binary options referencing securities worth tens of millions of dollars to those
investors.  Defendants obtained tens of millions of dollars in deposits from investors

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in the United States, and most of them lost all or most of their deposited money.  The
scheme of Defendants preyed especially on the elderly who, at the direction of JMRB
employees, liquidated retirement accounts to fund accounts with the Porter Brokers.
5. As a result of this conduct, Defendants violated the antifraud provisions
of Sections 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) [15 U.S.C. §
77q(a)] and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”)
[15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) and 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b)], and Rule 10b-5 thereunder [17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b‒5].  Defendants are liable directly for these violations and, with respect to
violations of the Exchange Act, as control persons under Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)] for violations of Sections 10(b) and 15(a) of the
Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)], and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, committed by the
Porter Brokers and JMRB.  Defendants’ offerings of binary options also violated the
registration provisions of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§
77e(a) and 77e(c)].  Defendants are also liable under Section 15(b) of the Securities
Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77o(b)] and Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §
78t(e)] for aiding and abetting violations of the aforementioned antifraud provisions
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act committed by JMRB and its employees.
6. To deter additional fraud, recover fraudulently obtained funds, and
otherwise enforce the federal securities laws that the Defendants and the entities they
controlled violated, the SEC seeks civil monetary penalties as well as remedial
ancillary relief, including Defendants’ disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, prejudgment
interest on ill-gotten gains, a civil injunctive order against further violations of the
federal securities laws, a conduct based injunction, and other appropriate relief.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7. The SEC brings this action pursuant to Sections 20(b), 20(d)(1) and
22(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 77t(d)(1) & 77v(a)] and Sections
21(d)(1), 21(d)(3)(A), 21(e) and 27(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(1),
78u(d)(3)(A), 78u(e) & 78aa(a)].  Defendants, directly or indirectly, have made use of

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the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, of the mails, or of the facilities
of a national securities exchange in connection with the transactions, acts, practices
and courses of business alleged in this Complaint, including by making use of the
Internet to offer securities and sending or receiving interstate email and participating
in interstate voice or video calls.  This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under
Section 22 of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77v], Sections 21(d) and 27 of the
Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d) and 78aa], and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
8. Venue is proper in this district under Section 22(a) of the Securities Act
[15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)] and Section 27(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a)]
because certain of the transactions, acts, practices and courses of conduct constituting
violations of the federal securities laws occurred within this district.  Venue is also
proper here under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3), as each Defendant resides outside of the
United States and therefore venue is proper in any district court in the United States.
DEFENDANTS
9. Jonathan (“Yoni”) Mimun (also known as Jonathan “Yoni” Maymon),
age 34 is a Canadian citizen residing in Israel.  From at least December 2014 through
June 2017, Mimun directly or indirectly co-owned and controlled the Porter Brokers,
including through his part ownership of JMRB.  For most of the Relevant Period, he
owned 50 percent of JMRB through JM Ventures, Ltd.  Mimun, among other things,
supervised the Call Center Operations and trained the sales force to use fraudulent
tactics to solicit investors.  He also owned part of each of the Porter Brokers.
10. Ronn BenHarav, age 41, is a U.S. citizen residing in Israel.  From at
least March 2015 through June 2017, BenHarav directly or indirectly co-owned and
controlled the Porter Brokers, including through his part ownership of JMRB.  For
most of the Relevant Period, BenHarav owned 50 percent of JMRB through
BenHarav Capital, Ltd.  During his tenure, BenHarav was the functional Chief
Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of JMRB, making the key business
decisions.  He also helped supervise Viva Affiliates, Ltd. and Prime Affiliates, Ltd.,

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two JMRB affiliates that retained and paid affiliate marketers to use fraudulent
advertising materials to refer investors to the Porter Brokers.  BenHarav also owned
part of each of the Porter Brokers.
FACTS
I. BINARY OPTIONS GENERALLY
11. A “binary option”   is a financial instrument that expires at a pre-
determined time where the payout is contingent on the outcome of a yes/no (i.e., two
possible outcome) proposition.  If the holder’s prediction is correct, he will receive a
predetermined amount of money.  If incorrect, he will forfeit all or nearly all of his
investment.  In one common form, the holder predicts whether a publicly-traded asset
will be above or below a specific price at a specific time.  The referenced asset can
be, for example, a security, an index of securities, a   currency, or a commodity.
12. The Porter Brokers offered binary options based on all of these asset
classes.  Most pertinent here, they offered binary options based on the price of
common stocks of many companies, including companies whose stock was trading on
United States exchanges, such as Apple Inc., ExxonMobil Corp., JPMorgan Chase
&Co., Yahoo Inc., IBM Corp., McDonalds Corp., Coca-Cola Corp., and CitiGroup
Inc.  They also offered binary options based on various indices of securities, such as
the NASDAQ Composite and the Dow Jones Industrial Average.  Such binary
options (i.e., where the referenced asset is a security or a group or index of securities)
are referred to hereinafter as “security-based”   binary options.
13. The Porter Brokers structured their binary option profit/loss ratio so that,
on any one trade, investors always risked losing more money on an incorrect
prediction than they stood to gain on a   correct prediction.  The Porter Brokers
typically set the ratio at a 70% to 85% profit for correct predictions and a 90% to
100% loss for incorrect predictions.  Given this payout structure, investors trading
over a sufficient period of time will tend to lose all of their investment.

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14. Binary options in which the underlying financial asset is a security or
securities within the meaning of Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §
77b(a)(1)] and Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)]
(including any group or index of securities) are themselves “securities” within the
meaning of those provisions.  The security-based binary options issued, offered,
and/or sold by the Porter Brokers were therefore securities.
15. Under the Securities Act, any offer or sale of securities must be
registered with the SEC unless an exemption applies.  None of the offers or sales of
security-based binary options by JMRB and the Porter Brokers were registered, and
no exemption applied.
II. DEFENDANTS’ BINARY OPTION SCHEME
16. Defendants, through their control and management of the Call Center
Operations, specifically targeted U.S. investors to fund binary option trading accounts
with the Porter Brokers.  The Porter Brokers operated from the following Internet
domains, which were accessible from the United States during the Relevant Period:
www.porterfinance.com and www.daltonfinance.com.  They published these websites
in English.  They obtained Internet-based telephone numbers with U.S. area codes to
make it easy to reach U.S. customers and give the appearance they had a domestic
U.S. presence.  As described further below, Defendants retained affiliate marketers to
solicit U.S. residents to open accounts with the Porter Brokers.  They collected
documentation confirming that the investors lived in the U.S. and took investors’
deposits from credit cards from U.S. issuers.  And, when a service provider prevented
Porter Finance from offering or selling binary options to U.S. investors, the
Defendants quickly switched to a service provider that continued to allow U.S.
investors to use the trading platform.

17. In addition to running call centers to generate investor accounts and
deposits for the Porter Brokers, JMRB handled nearly all of the Porter Brokers’ other
business activities during the Relevant Period, including designing and maintaining

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the Porter Brokers’ websites, interacting with and corresponding with investors,
processing deposits, and paying vendors.  JMRB, in particular, used a web of
international straw corporations owned and/or controlled by the Defendants through
nominees to facilitate the entirety of the operations.  These corporations retained
vendors and opened bank accounts to (a) receive and hold investor deposits, (b) make
payments associated with running the scam, and (c) transfer profits derived from the
scheme to Defendants and their partners.  Defendant BenHarav, who had the
authority to approve all the Porter Broker’s expenses, paid vendors providing services
to the Porter Brokers—including JMRB and its employees—from these accounts and
received authentication codes for accessing the accounts on his mobile telephone.
The nominee corporations also set up credit card processing accounts, which
BenHarav controlled.
18. The straw corporations contracted with the Porter Brokers’ platform
provider, which provided the trading engine and other services essential to offering
and selling binary options online.  In an email to another binary option broker
operator, a Business Development Manager for the platform provider confirmed
BenHarav was its “client,” writing:
Jared, please meet Ronn, a good friend and very talented guy.  I
believe Ronn can assist in recruitment as well as any strategic
planning with regards to your hiring needs.  Ronn, please meet Jared,
a friend and also one of Panda’s clients!  (Emphasis added).
19. These straw corporations—sometimes identified as the operators of the
Porter Brokers on their websites—held bank accounts that acted as the counterparty
to investors’ trades.  Specifically, rather than making money through commissions
(and being largely indifferent to the outcome of investors’ trades), the Porter Brokers
only made money when investors made deposits into their trading accounts and lost
that money trading binary options.  Thus, unlike a traditional broker, the Porter
Brokers’ interests were adverse to the interests of the investors that JMRB and its
sales agents aggressively solicited to open accounts and advised on trading.

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20. Over time, the continued viability of this model required (a) that
investors deposit and then lose enough money to cover the enterprise’s expenses and
generate a profit and (b) a constant infusion of new money to replace the money that
investors lost.  This structure provided the Porter Brokers, JMRB, and those that
worked there the incentive to use false and misleading statements and deceptive
devices to lure investors’ deposits and encourage trading losses.
A. The Defendants Controlled JMRB and the Porter Brokers
21. For most of the Relevant Period, Mimun and BenHarav were the sole
owners and/or control persons of JMRB.  Each Defendant also had ownership
interests in each Porter Broker, which they fully controlled through JMRB and the
straw corporations.  Defendants shared profits derived from the operation with third
parties who provided the startup capital for their scam and/or those they recruited to
help run the brokers.  As to Dalton Finance, at times, some of the third parties that
Defendants recruited managed the day-to-day operations of the broker but ultimately
reported to, and were under the control of, Defendants.
22. JMRB operated Porter Finance from late 2014 until at least June 2017.
The Defendants opened Dalton Finance and its website in about February 2016 and,
over time, as Porter Finance garnered unwanted attention and negative reviews,
transitioned operations to Dalton Finance, which JMRB also operated until about
June 2017.
23. The Defendants controlled and managed the Porter Brokers’ solicitation
activities through their ownership of JMRB.  They also controlled the Porter Brokers’
direction and made the key business decisions, including, for example, employee
compensation, credit card processing, paying affiliate marketers, selecting business
partners (i.e., those helping run Dalton Finance),  and hiring new employees.  For at
least some or all of the Relevant Period, they were the only people with their own
offices.  Managers encouraged JMRB sales agents to look busy and work harder
when the Defendants were in the office.  Defendants made speeches at parties.

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During this period, Defendants met constantly with each other and call center
managers to run the Porter Brokers, but they divided their primary responsibilities.
24. Mimun—who previously supervised a call center for another binary
option broker company—oversaw the JMRB sales floors, including hiring, training,
and supervising employees.  He was known by former employees as a “good
salesperson.”  He also recruited his twin brother to oversee the day-to-day operations
of Dalton Finance’s sales floor.
25. Mimun pressured the Call Center Operation to obtain more deposits,
including listening in on JMRB sales agents’ calls with investors and coaching them
on better, more effective ways to obtain deposits.  As a motivational tool, he
announced on the sales floor new large customer deposits.  He also supervised call
center managers who relayed his instructions to JMRB sales agents.  When around
September 2016 JMRB closed the facility running Porter Finance, Mimun arranged
for some of the employees to interview with the facility running Dalton Finance.
26. BenHarav oversaw marketing and served as JMRB’s functional Chief
Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, controlling the company’s finances
and technology.  He received and paid invoices for the Porter Brokers’ expenses and
had control over their bank and credit-card-processing accounts.  He   also managed
affiliate marketing relationships for the Porter Brokers.  One former employee said he
spent 80 percent of his day in the office and sometimes even slept there.
27. As described by a former employee, BenHarav was the “number one” at
JMRB who “bullied” everyone in the office and had almost all the say in how the
company was going to run, especially financially, and where the direction of the
companies was   going to go.  He even brought family members to work at JMRB.
28. At one point, BenHarav feared that people at JMRB were stealing sales
leads from the companies and he forced JMRB employees to take a lie detector test.

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B. The Porter Brokers Attracted Investors with Fraudulent
Affiliate Marketing Campaigns
29. The Porter Brokers found many investors through Internet advertisers
called “affiliate marketers” that both Defendants knew used fraudulent advertising to
draw in investors and targeted U.S. investors.  It was common knowledge at JMRB
that the affiliate marketing campaigns were fraudulent.  For example, employees at
JMRB and Viva Affiliates Ltd. (one of JMRB’s marketing affiliates) who reported to
Defendants often viewed the marketers’ fraudulent solicitation materials to help them
understand what investors were expecting when they opened an account.  Employees
referred to the advertising campaigns as “make-money funnels” because the
advertisements typically told the viewers that “they are going to make money because
of an algorithm that will tell them how to make money” trading binary options.
30. The make-money funnels Defendants used typically advertised “get rich
quick schemes” promising investors access to secret or proprietary systems for
trading binary options that had supposedly generated huge returns for other investors.
The advertising materials included spam emails, elaborately-produced infomercial-
like videos, and misleading websites typically portraying fabricated rags-to-riches
stories.  But the systems advertised did not exist and were simply lures to entice
investors into interactions with JMRB’s Call Center Operations and to open accounts.
31. BenHarav helped supervise the two JMRB-affiliated companies that
marketed for the Porter Brokers.  He negotiated the marketers’ commissions, paid
their invoices, directed Internet traffic among the Porter Brokers, and monitored the
marketers’ conversion rates.  BenHarav also regularly communicated with affiliate
marketers about their campaigns and received the advertising materials directing
investors to fraudulent campaigns and then to one of the Porter Brokers.  He boasted
about being an affiliate marketer and once creating his own binary option marketing
campaign that used fraudulent solicitation materials created by a third party and
called “The Golden Goose Method.”  He also sometimes refused to pay affiliate

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marketers when a large number of the investors they referred initiated credit-card
chargebacks—e.g., claiming charges made by the Porter Brokers were fraudulent.
32. The Porter Brokers paid the affiliate marketers often several hundred
dollars for each investor who opened and funded an account upon viewing the false
advertising.  The Porter Brokers often paid the affiliate marketers more than they
made from investors’ initial deposits and relied on investors making additional
deposits, following conversations with JMRB sales agents, to cover the loss.
C. Deceptive Websites
33. Opening and trading in an account at the Porter Brokers ultimately
occurred through their  English-language websites.  The Porter Brokers’ websites
contained no references to JMRB but rather claimed to be controlled by the straw
corporations.  The straw corporations had no employees or operations of their own
and were themselves controlled and operated entirely by JMRB.  In interactions with
investors and prospects, JMRB sales agents never mentioned JMRB and instead
posed as calling from one of the Porter Brokers.
34. The trading engine embedded in the websites created the appearance of
actual market-oriented trading that looked similar to what an investor would see on a
legitimate broker’s website.  It allowed investors to place “trades,” see “live”   market
quotes  , make deposits, and track trades and balances.  The trading engine referred to
binary options positions as “assets” or “investments” and, in the case of security-
based options, sometimes displayed the logos of the referenced companies.
35. Despite appearances, investors were not purchasing real financial assets
from any real market and were not trading in any market with other investors.  The
so-called trades and investments reflected on an investor’s on-line account statements
were simply book entries reflecting positions facing the Porter Brokers.
36. The account balances investors saw when viewing the trading platform
did not reflect money in any segregated account but instead were, as one former
employee put it, “just numbers on a screen.”  Investors’ deposits were comingled

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with the Porter Brokers’ funds and used to pay JMRB and other expenses incurred
operating the fraud.  The Porter Brokers did not have sufficient money in their bank
accounts to pay the obligations owed to their investors, and therefore needed those
investors to lose their money in order to stay in business.  The Porter Brokers never
disclosed this “counterparty risk”—i.e. that investors’ withdrawals depended on the
Porter Brokers’ ability and willingness to pay investors back and that it could not
afford to pay everyone back what they were owed.
37. The Porter Brokers’ websites falsely suggested that trading binary
options would be profitable, that the Porter Brokers were there to help, and that they
wanted investors to succeed in making money.  By way of one example, at various
times the websites made the following false or misleading statements:
* * *
The company was formed on the principal that knowledge is power and
though knowledge comes success. Launched in 2014, the company
prides itself on excellent service and guarantees the best environment for
success to our traders passing on our knowledge to traders in order to
maximize their trading potential.
* * *
We understand how important it is for traders to work with brokers they
trust.  At Dalton Finance, traders benefit from first-class tailored
education from seasoned professionals.

38. These statements, and other like them on the websites over the Relevant
Period, were false and misleading because investors depositing funds with the Porter
Brokers generally lost their money, the call center employees generally had no
specialized knowledge, financial training, or background, and the Porter Brokers
actually needed investors to lose money trading binary options to stay in business.
D. Fraudulent Call Center Operations
39. JMRB—which at its height collectively employed as many as 160
people—ran Call Center Operations where sales agents were tasked with convincing

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investors to deposit as much money as possible   and to trade with that money often,
with the eventual aim of seeing investors lose their funds.
40. JMRB compensated call center sales agents based on the net deposits
(i.e. deposits minus withdrawals) they obtained from investors.  This undisclosed
compensation structure incentivized the call center sales agents to use false and
misleading tactics to induce investors to deposit funds and to prevent withdrawals.
41. Shortly after registering their binary options trading accounts on one of
the Porter Brokers’ websites, investors typically received a telephone call from
someone at a JMRB call center.  From the outset, these calls were replete with false
and misleading statements designed to earn investors’ trust and portray the call center
sales agents as financial experts that were there to help.
42. For example, as directed or endorsed by Defendants, the sales agents
used aliases instead of real names.  And sales agents were permitted to fabricate   their
titles, choosing ones normally associated with legitimate trading and the provision of
financial advice.  Even though they typically had little or no relevant experience,   they
called themselves “brokers,” “analysts,” “Head of Trading,” “Senior Financial
Advisors,”   and the like.  Some also claimed to have MBAs or membership in the
Chartered Financial Analyst Institute.  JMRB sales agents also often falsely claimed
to have formerly worked at major financial institutions like Bank of America or
JPMorgan Chase.  The sales force also lied about their locations, claiming, for
example, they were based in London, instead of their actual location in Israel.
43. At Mimun’s and BenHarav’s direction and/or with their knowledge and
approval, salespersons used additional false and misleading statements and
manipulative and deceptive practices to persuade investors to make deposits with the
Porter Brokers.  As former JMRB employee  s have put it, on Defendants watch, they
could tell investors whatever they wanted as long as it resulted in a deposit.

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E.    False and Misleading Statements and Deceptive Devices Used to
Obtain Investors’ Deposits
44. Alignment of Interest.  At Defendants’ direction and with their
knowledge, JMRB salespersons told investors making deposits with the Porter
Brokers, in substance, “We only make money when you make money” and
“I’m here to help you make a profit.”  Yet the Porter Brokers profited only
from investor losses, not profits.  Prior to forming JMRB and the Porter
Brokers, Mimun used this fraudulent sales pitch when supervising another
binary option call center, and he later trained employees at JMRB to use it.
45. JMRB sales agents also put this misrepresentation into email.  For
example, a sales agent wrote as follows to an investor:
When open a trade Porter Finance purchases a contract for you from our
market maker, that contract is individual and we don't need that another
client will take the opposite option now if your trade is profitable as you
know 65-81% goes to you and 19-35% goes to Porter.

46. This statement is also false because there was not “market maker;”
Porter Finance was the counterparty to the investor’s trades.
47. When a JMRB employee told Mimun and BenHarav these types
of statements were “over the top,”   inappropriate, and should stop, the
Defendants dismissed the concerns and the fraudulent solicitations continued.
48. JMRB sales agents knew how JMRB and they made their money, and
thus routinely lied when representing that their job was to help investors make
money.  By way of example, typical of this form of fraud, one investor received the
following welcome email after opening an account:
Porter Finance - As part of our ongoing efforts to equip you with all the
tools necessary for successful trading, we’re pleased to provide you
with the much anticipated Porter Finance trading guide available in our
website’s Education section . . . . We wish you a successful trading
experience with Porter Finance. (Emphasis added).

49. And an investor received this email after making a deposit:

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My name is Kendrick Scott and I am The Head Trader at Porter Finance -
In light of your recent deposit, I am attempting to get in touch with you,
with the purpose of assisting you in making your trading experience
with us a profitable one. I would like to be able to assist you in custom
building a program that most suits your needs. (Emphasis added).

50. In another example, an investor received the following email from
a so-called “senior analyst” and “broker” at Porter Finance:
Your account was added to my portfolio.  My job is to assist you with
making money through trading and to provide you with all the necessary
tools in order to become successful and most of all profitable trader.  I
will provide you with the timely signals, strategies with the goal to bring
your winning ratio to at least 75-80% and to make at least up to 10,000
dollars a profit on a monthly basis.

51. Salespersons also described the transactions to clients as
“investments” to further the illusion they were engaged with legitimate
financial firms and investing in real assets traded in real financial markets.  In
reality, the so-called investments were just a rigged gamble against the house.
52. Win button.  Mimun and BenHarav together devised a “win button” that
the sales force could use to attract more deposits by making investors believe that
they were making money in binary options.  When activated, the button helped to
produce winning trades.  JMRB employees used the button to create a track record of
recommending or placing winning trades for an investor.  Following those trades,
sales agents solicited additional deposits with pitches like “just think how much we
could be making if we were working with more capital and placing larger trades.”
53. BenHarav requested the win button functionality in a meeting between
him, Mimun and the Porter Brokers’ platform provider.  At his request, the platform
provider installed the mechanism, which JMRB operated.  Investors were never told
if their winning trades resulted from this rigged system.  Investors who deposited
additional funds after experiencing winning trades placed at their “broker’s” direction
typically lost their money once they stopped making additional deposits.

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54. By way of examples, one investor opened his account by depositing
$600.  After winning his first half dozen trades, he deposited another $10,000 later
that same day.  Another investor, shortly after winning some small early trades,
deposited another $25,000.  A third investor said he made an initial $250 deposit and
then watched a salesperson generate “a lot of money”   in early trading.  Based on
those early wins, the investor deposited another $44,000 that he obtained by
liquidating blue-chip stocks he held in a genuine brokerage account.
55. Withdrawals.  The Porter Brokers’ websites touted the ease of making
withdrawals.  For example, the Dalton Finance website stated:
Withdrawing funds is quick and effective, with minimal effort required.
Clients simply choose the currency they wish their funds to be deposited
in and select a secure method for withdrawal.  Funds will then be
dispatched and will appear in the customer’s account within 5 business
days of their initial request.
Salespersons often told investors that they could withdraw funds on demand.
56. In reality, the employee compensation structure encouraged the JMRB
sales agents to use deceptive tactics to obtain the largest deposits possible and
discourage or prevent customers from making withdrawals.  Numerous tricks—
including recommending that customers enter into long-term trades and accept
bonuses (described below)—were used by the sales agents to lock up investor funds
and prevent withdrawals.  When investors insisted on withdrawing their money, their
repeated requests were denied or knowingly ignored.  Some investors were unable to
get their money back because the Porter Brokers shut their websites down and
stopped responding to communications despite holding the investors’ funds.
57. False claims of supposed past success.  The salesforce also routinely
lied to clients about their supposed past successes in making money by trading binary
options.  For example, one salesman told an investor that he typically generated 70-
80 percent returns.  A different salesperson told another investor that he guaranteed
80-85 percent returns.  In reality, most Porter Finance clients lost some or all of their

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money, and the JMRB sales agents lost money out of their own pay checks if they
helped investors earn money at the Porter Brokers’ expense or allowed withdrawals.
58. Baseless promises of future trading profits.  The salespersons also
typically provided baseless projections as to how much customers would earn trading
binary options.  As an example, in one email, a salesman said he would “focus on at
least 20-35% growth every month.  That’s just about 5% growth a week.  Is that ok
with you?”  Another investor received an email saying that trading should provide
returns of $48,000 to $55,000 in April and another $85,000 in May.  Salespersons—
sometimes with the help of the win button—also falsely told investors they would
reap greater profits if they invested greater amounts, which led to increased deposits.
But again, most clients lost some or all of their deposits, and by Defendants’ design
JMRB sales agents were penalized when investors gained or withdrew money.
59. Risk-free trades and bonuses.  Investors were frequently misled that the
Porter Brokers would provide “risk-free trades” (in which the broker would cover the
customer’s costs of losing trades) and “bonuses” (in which the broker would match a
new deposit dollar-for-dollar).  Such representations induced investors to make
additional deposits.  For example, one investor deposited $30,000 after his broker
offered a “100% bonus,” which supposedly increased his account balance to $60,000.
A broker told another investor that a $25,000 deposit made him eligible to receive “5
risk free trades.”  And another investor withdrew $100,000 from his IRA after a
salesman claimed he would match that amount as a bonus.
60. The Porter Brokers pitched these gimmicks as benefits, but their main
purpose was to induce and then lock up large investor deposits.  Specifically, bonuses
and risk-free trades/insurance—bonuses in disguise—came with trade turnover
conditions ranging from 30 to 50 times the bonus amount.  Investors could not
withdraw any funds from their account—not just the bonus funds—until meeting the
turnover requirement.  Because on any one trade an investor always risked losing
more money if he lost it  than he could earn if he won it, assuming a 50 percent

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success rate, the turnover requirements virtually guaranteed the investor lost most or
all of his or her money prior to unlocking their funds.
61. While the trading requirements were sometimes disclosed in “Bonus
Agreements” and in the “terms and conditions” available on the Porter Brokers’
website, JMRB sales agents often pressured investors to sign the agreements.  JMRB
sales agents either misled investors to believe funds could be withdrawn on demand,
did not explain the ramifications of the trading requirements, or assured investors
they would help them meet the requirements—an assurance that carried more weight
given the manufactured credentials, track records, and the “win button.”
62. For example, typical of this tactic, following a $100,000 deposit, one
investor received the following email from his “broker”:
A deposit of $100,000 will be made to [the investor’s] Porter Finance
account and Porter Finance will add $100,000 to the account. Both of
these (totaling $200,000) will be insured. [Investor] will withdraw
$25,000 during September, 2016 and $250,000 during December, 2016.
63. VIP Tiers/Perks.  The Porter Brokers’ website and JMRB salespersons
held out illusory “perks” supposedly available to investors if they deposited enough
money to reach certain “tiers,” including as follows:
Investment Tier Minimum Total Deposit Purported Benefit to Investors
“Starter Package”
$1,000 20% bonus
“Silver”
$5,000 30% bonus; 1 risk free trade; weekly
trading signals
“Gold”
$10,000 45% bonus; 3 risk-free trades; daily trading
signals; dedicated broker.
“Platinum”
$25,000 60% bonus; 5 risk free trades; same-day
withdrawals; daily trading signals;
dedicated broker and managed account.
“Diamond”
$50,000 80% bonus; 10 risk free trades; expedited
withdrawals; daily signals; dedicated
broker and managed account.
“Royal”
$100,000 up to 50% insurance; expedited
withdrawals; dedicated broker and account
manager, and an “exotic vacation of your
choice”

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64. Dedicated brokers and entry into supposed exclusive trading groups
proved to be one of the tiers’ most effective lures.  For example, one investor was
told if he deposited another $250,000 he would have access to his Porter Finance
broker’s “p  ersonal trading group,” which was claimed to average 50-60% monthly in
returns.  This broker made the following promises in return for the deposit:
Decreas[e] the trading volume [requirement] from $15,000,000 to
$10,000,000.  With this we will be able to get your account liquid in the
next three months of work and during the 3 months you will get 3
withdrawals of:
First month – 50,000
Second month – 100,000
Third month – 200,000

From there, after calculations and withdrawals the account should be at
$1,000,000, we will discuss together how to proceed in a way that will be
suitable and comfortable for you.

** If by any chance you will need to make a withdrawal of the total
additional investment, you will be able to get it at any given time.  From
the moment you told me it shouldn't take more than 2-3 business days
until you will see the funds reflected in your bank account.
With this 3 months program [investor], on the 4th month you should have
already the total investment back in your bank plus profits on top of that,
looking forward for it [investor].
65. Another JMRB sales agent wrote to an investor: “[O]nce [your account
is] managed, I will be able to trade on your behalf. . . . Meaning higher profits and
more trading volume being created with bigger returns!”
66. In reality, the supposed perks available in these “tiers” existed solely to
induce larger deposits and lock those deposits up with bonus funds.
67. Targeting Retirement Accounts.  As part of a discussion about the
investor’s financial objectives, JMRB encouraged sales agents to ask about the
location of other invested funds and to confidently tell investors to liquidate their
other investments—including their retirement funds—because binary options trading
could generate far greater returns.

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68. For example, a JMRB sales agent soliciting for Dalton Finance told an
investor that if he deposited $100,000 they would turn “it into a million dollar
account in just a year or two.”  The JMRB sales agent explained that the investor’s
fund were making “7-8-9% a year, [but] bring that money to your Dalton account and
we will make 25-35% per month.”
69. When a former JMRB sales agent complained to a supervisor about the
pressure placed on customers to liquidate retirement accounts, she was told to “put
your blinders on, do it for six months, then get on with your life.”
70. Early withdrawals.  Salespersons sometimes allowed investors to
withdraw small amounts after early profitable trading, a   ruse designed to give
investors the false impression that withdrawals were easy.  One investor who
withdrew $7,000 after early trading said he gained comfort he could later withdraw
larger amounts.  After his early withdrawal, the investor deposited another $12,000.
This was the only $7,000 the investor received back from the $200,000 he deposited.
71. Ghosting:  All of the misstatements and fraudulent devices described
above had the same objective: to obtain as much money from investors as possible
and prevent withdrawals.  Once those investors informed their “broker” that they
would not deposit more money, JMRB sales agents no longer had any incentive to
speak to the investor.  Consequently, the “broker” stopped communicating and
moved on to others with a greater potential to make additional deposits.  By this
point, the investors were usually restricted from withdrawing funds and, given the
odds, those who traded on their own generally lost all of their money before meeting
the turnover requirements.
F. Defendants’ Fraud Involved the Sale of Security-Based Binary
Options to U.S. Investors and Resulted in Millions in Losses
72. The ability to trade security-based binary options—including those tied
to U.S. household-name issuers—provided an important lure for investors to deposit
funds into their accounts.  For example, while soliciting deposits, one sales agent

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wrote to an investor “I also realize I haven’t told you about our insured Tesla
contracts during our trading session.  I wanted you to know about them before I send
out the email.  They go so quick.”  In another email entitled “2.5k Tesla and Apple
VIP Contracts available only for today!!!” the same so-called broker solicited clients
to make additional $2,500 deposits to take advantage of these “low risk” trades.
73. In another email entitled “Low Risk Trades for April” the so-called
“Education Department” for Porter Finance (also operated by JMRB) recommended
investors place $2,900 trades in more than 20 U.S.-listed stocks including Apple,
Google, McDonalds, Amazon, Disney, Boeing, Walmart, IBM, EBay, Facebook,
Bank of America, Tesla and Microsoft.
74. Between September 2015 and March 2017, the Porter Brokers offered
binary options to more than 14,000 persons in the United States and sold nearly
79,000 binary options referencing securities or securities indices with a notional value
of $55 million to U.S. investors.  On the whole, investors lost money on these trades;
but, win or lose, due to the tactics described, most investors eventually lost most or
all of the money they deposited.
75. Investors residing in the United States funded their trading accounts by
wire and credit card, ultimately losing millions of dollars to the Porter Brokers.  Some
investors made six-figure deposits by wire transfer.  From March 2016 to April 2017,
U.S. investors deposited at least $18 million by credit card.  As evidenced by bank
records, nearly $50 million in investor funds—a significant percentage from the
U.S.—went to the straw companies holding bank accounts used by the Porter Brokers
and controlled by the Defendants through JMRB.  Very little of these funds were
returned to the investors.
G. BenHarav Tries to Cover His Tracks and Hide His Assets
76. Between September and November 2016, BenHarav suffered what one
former employee called a “breakdown.”  He started running about the office “looking
crazy” and telling JMRB employees they could not say certain things to investors.

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Over the next few weeks, he began moving things out of his office, including
computers, and the JMRB call center shut down.  That former employee hypothesized
BenHarav was trying to do damage control, potentially due to an investigation.  The
timing of these events coincides with a September 2016 request for information on
the Porter Brokers that the SEC staff sent to an overseas regulator.
77. On information and belief, BenHarav took other steps to cover his
tracks, including to prevent the seizure of the assets he obtained in defrauding
investors.  For example, publicly-available information indicates that, in December
2018, he was reading a book called “Asset Protection – Concepts & Strategies for
Protecting Your Wealth.”  The book’s description notes that it contains “[s]trategies
that are effective for putting one’s assets safely out of reach.”  The description also
notes that “[i]n today’s increasingly litigious world, the shielding of assets has
become a prominent issue for financial planners, business owners, and high-net-worth
individuals.  Asset Protection details methods that are both legally and morally
legitimate for protecting one’s assets from creditors, lawsuits, and scams.”
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Fraud in the Offer or Sale of Securities
Violations of Section 17(a)(1) and (3) of the Securities Act
78. Paragraphs 1-77 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein.
79. Defendants, by engaging in the conduct described above, directly or
indirectly, in the offer or sale of securities, by the use of means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails: (a)
employed devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud; and (b ) engaged in transactions,
practices, or courses of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon the purchasers of securities.
80. Each of them knew, or was   reckless in not knowing, that he employed
devices, schemes and artifices to defraud and knew, or were reckless or negligent in

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not knowing, that he engaged in transactions, practices, or courses of business which
operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers of securities.
81. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants violated, and unless enjoined
will again violate, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)].
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Fraud in Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Securities
Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)
82. Paragraphs 1-77 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein.
83. Defendants, by engaging in the conduct described above, directly or
indirectly, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, by the use of means
or instrumentalities or interstate commerce, of the mails, or of the facilities of a
national securities exchange, with scienter: (a) employed devices, schemes, or
artifices to defraud; and (b) engaged in acts, practices or courses of business which
operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon other persons.
84. Each of them knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that he employed
devices, schemes and artifices to defraud and engaged in acts, practices or course of
business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon other persons.
85. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants violated, and unless enjoined
will again violate, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rule
10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5].
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Unregistered Offer or Sale of Securities
Violations of Section 5 of the Securities Act
86. Paragraphs 1-77 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein.
87. No registration statement had been filed or was in effect with the SEC
for any of the security-based binary options offered or sold through the Porter
Brokers, their call center and Defendants.

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88. Defendants, by engaging in the conduct described above, directly or
indirectly, made use of means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or to sell such securities.
89. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants violated, and unless enjoined
will again violate, Section 5 of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e].
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Control Person Liability under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the
Porter Brokers’ and Call Centers Operations’ Violations of Section 10(b)
90. Paragraphs 1-77 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein.
91. At all times relevant hereto, each of the Defendants was a control person
of the Porter Brokers and the Call Center Operations for purposes of Section 20(a) of
the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)], directly or indirectly controlling them.
92. The Porter Brokers and the Call Center Operations, directly or indirectly,
by use of the means or instruments of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or the
facility of a national securities exchange, in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, and with knowledge or recklessness: (a) employed devices, schemes, or
artifices to defraud; (b) made untrue statements of material fact or omitted to state
material facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading; and/or (c) engaged in acts, practices, or
courses of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person; and thereby each committed violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
[15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rule 10b-5 thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5].
93. Defendants cannot establish that they did not directly or indirectly
induce the acts of the Porter Brokers and the Call Center Operations that constitute
violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5,    nor that they acted
in good faith.
94. Defendants are therefore liable as controlling persons under
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act to the same extent as the Porter Brokers and their

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call centers would be liable for violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5 thereunder.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Control Person Liability under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the
Porter Brokers’ and Call Centers Operations’ Violations of Section 15(a)
95. Paragraphs 1-77 and 91 are realleged and incorporated by reference
herein.
96. By engaging in the conduct described above, the Porter Brokers and the
call centers: (a) engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others; and (b) directly or indirectly, made use of the mails or the means or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce to effect transactions in, or to induce or
attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, securities without being registered as a
broker or dealer with the SEC or associated with a broker or dealer registered with
the SEC; and thereby each committed violations of Section 15(a) of the Exchange
Act [15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)].
97. Defendants cannot establish that they did not directly or indirectly
induce the acts of the Porter Brokers and the Call Center Operations that constitute
violations of Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act, nor that they acted in good faith.
98. Defendants are therefore liable as controlling persons under
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act to the same extent as Porter Brokers and their call
centers would be liable for violations of Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Aiding and Abetting the Porter Brokers’ and Call Center Operations’
Violations of 10(b) of the Exchange Act
99. Paragraphs 1-77 and 92 are realleged and incorporated by reference
herein.
100. Under Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)], any
person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person

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in violation of a provision of the Exchange Act, or of any rule or regulation issued
thereunder, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same extent as
the person to whom such assistance is provided.
101. Each Defendant knowingly or recklessly provided substantial assistance
to violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10(b)-5 thereunder by
the Porter Brokers and their call centers.
102. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants are liable for violations of
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10(b)-5 by the Porter Brokers and their
call centers to the same extent as each of the Porter Brokers and their call centers
would be liable for their own violations and, unless enjoined, will again violate
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10(b)-5 thereunder.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Aiding and Abetting the Porter Brokers’ and Call Center Operations’
Violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
103. Paragraphs 1-77 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein.
104. The Porter Brokers and their call center, by engaging in the conduct
described above, in the offer or sale of securities, by the use of means or instruments
of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails
directly or indirectly: (a) with scienter, employed devices, schemes, or artifices to
defraud; (b) negligently or with scienter, obtained money or property by means of
untrue statements of a material fact or by omitting to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading; and (c) negligently or with scienter, engaged in
transactions, practices, or courses of business which operated or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon the purchaser of such securities.
105. Under Section 15(b) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77o(b)], any
person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person
in violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)], shall be

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deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom
such assistance is provided.
106. Each Defendant knowingly or recklessly provided substantial assistance
to violations of Section 17(a) by the Porter Brokers and the Call Center Operations.
107. Defendants are therefore liable for violations of Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act to the same extent as each of the Porter Brokers and their call centers
would be liable for their own violations of Section 17(a) and, unless enjoined, will
again violate Section 17(a) of the Securities Act.
RELIEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE, the SEC respectfully requests that this Court:
a) Find that Defendants committed the alleged violations;
b) Order Defendants to disgorge, with prejudgment interest, all ill-gotten
gains they received or derived from the activities set forth in this Complaint, and to
repatriate any ill-gotten funds or assets they caused to be sent overseas;
c) Order Defendants to pay civil penalties under Section 20(d) of the
Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15
U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3];
d) Permanently enjoin Defendants from directly or indirectly violating
Sections 5 and 17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e & 77q(a)] and Sections
10(b) and 15(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b)] and Rule 10b-5 thereunder
[17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5];
e) Permanently enjoin Defendants (including but not limited to, through
any entity they own, operate, manage or control) from: (a) directly or indirectly,
inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale of binary options, security-
based swaps, or other securities over the Internet, via email or other forms of
electronic communication; (b) directly or indirectly causing any person or entity to
engage in any activity that is for the purpose of inducing or attempting to induce the
purchase or sale of binary options, security-based swaps, or other securities over the

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Internet, via email or other forms of electronic communication; (c) deriving
compensation from any activity inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale
of binary options, security-based swaps, or other securities over the Internet, via
email or other forms of electronic communication; and (d) but not prohibiting the
Defendants from buying or selling securities for their own personal accounts.
f) Retain jurisdiction over this action to implement and carry out the terms
of all orders and decrees that it may enter, or to entertain any suitable application or
motion for additional relief within the jurisdiction of this Court; and
g) Grant such other relief as may be necessary or appropriate.
Dated:  July 12, 2021 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ KENNETH W. DONNELLY
Kenneth W. Donnelly
Attorney for Plaintiff
Securities and Exchange Commission

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KENNETH W. DONNELLY 
(LR IA 11-3 motion to appear pending) 
Assistant Chief Litigation Counsel 
100 F Street N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20549-5949 
Email:  [email protected]   
Telephone: (202) 551-4946 
Fax: (804) 708-6087 
 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEVADA 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, 
 

Plaintiff, 
 

v. 
 

JONATHAN MIMUN (A/K/A 
JONATHAN MAYMON) 
and RONN BENHARAV, 
   

Defendants. 

  
 
 

2:21-cv-1314 

 

COMPLAINT   

 

 Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) alleges: 

SUMMARY OF THE ACTION 

1. This case concerns a multi-million dollar scheme to defraud retail 

investors in the United States through the unregistered offer and sale of security-

based binary options from at least December 2014 through June 2017 (“Relevant 

Period”).  Binary options are high-risk financial instruments with potential payouts or 

losses contingent on the future value of an underlying asset that, from approximately 

2013 through 2018, were predominantly pitched by fraudsters operating from Israel.   

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2. Jonathan (“Yoni”) Mimun (also known as Jonathan (“Yoni”) 

Maymon) and Ronn BenHarav (“Defendants”) fraudulently and without registration 

offered and sold binary options through their ownership, operation, and control of 

two Internet-based brokers doing business under the names (a) Porter Finance and (b) 

Dalton Finance (the “Porter Brokers”).  The Porter Brokers—which secretly made 

money from investors’ trading losses—were unincorporated brand names that 

functioned through a combination of websites, call centers, and straw companies that, 

among other things, held bank and credit-card-processing accounts used to facilitate 

their operations.  Although they intentionally targeted U.S. investors, neither the 

Porter Brokers, websites, call centers, nor straw companies registered with the SEC 

as a broker or dealer or were ever associated with a SEC-registered broker or dealer. 

3. The Defendants owned and controlled JMRB Media, Ltd. and a number 

of other affiliated companies (collectively “JMRB”).  JMRB employed as many as 

160 persons at one or more boiler-room-like call centers soliciting investors for the 

Porter Brokers (the “Call Center Operations”).  At the Defendants’ direction, JMRB 

sales agents solicited investors in the United States to open and fund binary option 

trading accounts with the Porter Brokers by, among other things, representing that 

they were experienced market professionals providing expert advice and that the 

brokers (and the sales agents) only made money when investors made money.  In 

reality, the interests of the Porter Brokers and JMRB were not aligned with the 

investors’ interests.  The entities controlled by the Defendants made their money 

from investors’ losses—they were the counterparty to their clients’ trades—and the 

Defendants rigged the trading to maximize the likelihood investors lost their money. 

4. Through their ownership and operation of the Porter Brokers and JMRB, 

Defendants managed, directed and ultimately controlled the fraudulent solicitation of 

tens of thousands of investors in the United States and the selling of tens of thousands 

of binary options referencing securities worth tens of millions of dollars to those 

investors.  Defendants obtained tens of millions of dollars in deposits from investors 

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in the United States, and most of them lost all or most of their deposited money.  The 

scheme of Defendants preyed especially on the elderly who, at the direction of JMRB 

employees, liquidated retirement accounts to fund accounts with the Porter Brokers. 

5. As a result of this conduct, Defendants violated the antifraud provisions 

of Sections 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) [15 U.S.C. § 

77q(a)] and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) 

[15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) and 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b)], and Rule 10b-5 thereunder [17 C.F.R. 

§ 240.10b‒5].  Defendants are liable directly for these violations and, with respect to 

violations of the Exchange Act, as control persons under Section 20(a) of the 

Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)] for violations of Sections 10(b) and 15(a) of the 

Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)], and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, committed by the 

Porter Brokers and JMRB.  Defendants’ offerings of binary options also violated the 

registration provisions of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 

77e(a) and 77e(c)].  Defendants are also liable under Section 15(b) of the Securities 

Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77o(b)] and Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 

78t(e)] for aiding and abetting violations of the aforementioned antifraud provisions 

of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act committed by JMRB and its employees. 

6. To deter additional fraud, recover fraudulently obtained funds, and 

otherwise enforce the federal securities laws that the Defendants and the entities they 

controlled violated, the SEC seeks civil monetary penalties as well as remedial 

ancillary relief, including Defendants’ disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, prejudgment 

interest on ill-gotten gains, a civil injunctive order against further violations of the 

federal securities laws, a conduct based injunction, and other appropriate relief. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

7. The SEC brings this action pursuant to Sections 20(b), 20(d)(1) and 

22(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 77t(d)(1) & 77v(a)] and Sections 

21(d)(1), 21(d)(3)(A), 21(e) and 27(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(1), 

78u(d)(3)(A), 78u(e) & 78aa(a)].  Defendants, directly or indirectly, have made use of 

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the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, of the mails, or of the facilities 

of a national securities exchange in connection with the transactions, acts, practices 

and courses of business alleged in this Complaint, including by making use of the 

Internet to offer securities and sending or receiving interstate email and participating 

in interstate voice or video calls.  This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 

Section 22 of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77v], Sections 21(d) and 27 of the 

Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d) and 78aa], and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

8. Venue is proper in this district under Section 22(a) of the Securities Act 

[15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)] and Section 27(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a)] 

because certain of the transactions, acts, practices and courses of conduct constituting 

violations of the federal securities laws occurred within this district.  Venue is also 

proper here under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3), as each Defendant resides outside of the 

United States and therefore venue is proper in any district court in the United States.   

DEFENDANTS 

9. Jonathan (“Yoni”) Mimun (also known as Jonathan “Yoni” Maymon), 

age 34 is a Canadian citizen residing in Israel.  From at least December 2014 through 

June 2017, Mimun directly or indirectly co-owned and controlled the Porter Brokers, 

including through his part ownership of JMRB.  For most of the Relevant Period, he 

owned 50 percent of JMRB through JM Ventures, Ltd.  Mimun, among other things, 

supervised the Call Center Operations and trained the sales force to use fraudulent 

tactics to solicit investors.  He also owned part of each of the Porter Brokers. 

10. Ronn BenHarav, age 41, is a U.S. citizen residing in Israel.  From at 

least March 2015 through June 2017, BenHarav directly or indirectly co-owned and 

controlled the Porter Brokers, including through his part ownership of JMRB.  For 

most of the Relevant Period, BenHarav owned 50 percent of JMRB through 

BenHarav Capital, Ltd.  During his tenure, BenHarav was the functional Chief 

Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of JMRB, making the key business 

decisions.  He also helped supervise Viva Affiliates, Ltd. and Prime Affiliates, Ltd., 

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two JMRB affiliates that retained and paid affiliate marketers to use fraudulent 

advertising materials to refer investors to the Porter Brokers.  BenHarav also owned 

part of each of the Porter Brokers.   

FACTS 

I. BINARY OPTIONS GENERALLY 

11. A “binary option” is a financial instrument that expires at a pre-

determined time where the payout is contingent on the outcome of a yes/no (i.e., two 

possible outcome) proposition.  If the holder’s prediction is correct, he will receive a 

predetermined amount of money.  If incorrect, he will forfeit all or nearly all of his 

investment.  In one common form, the holder predicts whether a publicly-traded asset 

will be above or below a specific price at a specific time.  The referenced asset can 

be, for example, a security, an index of securities, a currency, or a commodity. 

12. The Porter Brokers offered binary options based on all of these asset 

classes.  Most pertinent here, they offered binary options based on the price of 

common stocks of many companies, including companies whose stock was trading on 

United States exchanges, such as Apple Inc., ExxonMobil Corp., JPMorgan Chase 

&Co., Yahoo Inc., IBM Corp., McDonalds Corp., Coca-Cola Corp., and CitiGroup 

Inc.  They also offered binary options based on various indices of securities, such as 

the NASDAQ Composite and the Dow Jones Industrial Average.  Such binary 

options (i.e., where the referenced asset is a security or a group or index of securities) 

are referred to hereinafter as “security-based” binary options. 

13. The Porter Brokers structured their binary option profit/loss ratio so that, 

on any one trade, investors always risked losing more money on an incorrect 

prediction than they stood to gain on a correct prediction.  The Porter Brokers 

typically set the ratio at a 70% to 85% profit for correct predictions and a 90% to 

100% loss for incorrect predictions.  Given this payout structure, investors trading 

over a sufficient period of time will tend to lose all of their investment.   

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14. Binary options in which the underlying financial asset is a security or 

securities within the meaning of Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 

77b(a)(1)] and Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)] 

(including any group or index of securities) are themselves “securities” within the 

meaning of those provisions.  The security-based binary options issued, offered, 

and/or sold by the Porter Brokers were therefore securities. 

15. Under the Securities Act, any offer or sale of securities must be 

registered with the SEC unless an exemption applies.  None of the offers or sales of 

security-based binary options by JMRB and the Porter Brokers were registered, and 

no exemption applied. 

II. DEFENDANTS’ BINARY OPTION SCHEME 

16. Defendants, through their control and management of the Call Center 

Operations, specifically targeted U.S. investors to fund binary option trading accounts 

with the Porter Brokers.  The Porter Brokers operated from the following Internet 

domains, which were accessible from the United States during the Relevant Period: 

www.porterfinance.com and www.daltonfinance.com.  They published these websites 

in English.  They obtained Internet-based telephone numbers with U.S. area codes to 

make it easy to reach U.S. customers and give the appearance they had a domestic 

U.S. presence.  As described further below, Defendants retained affiliate marketers to 

solicit U.S. residents to open accounts with the Porter Brokers.  They collected 

documentation confirming that the investors lived in the U.S. and took investors’ 

deposits from credit cards from U.S. issuers.  And, when a service provider prevented 

Porter Finance from offering or selling binary options to U.S. investors, the 

Defendants quickly switched to a service provider that continued to allow U.S. 

investors to use the trading platform.  

17. In addition to running call centers to generate investor accounts and 

deposits for the Porter Brokers, JMRB handled nearly all of the Porter Brokers’ other 

business activities during the Relevant Period, including designing and maintaining 

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the Porter Brokers’ websites, interacting with and corresponding with investors, 

processing deposits, and paying vendors.  JMRB, in particular, used a web of 

international straw corporations owned and/or controlled by the Defendants through 

nominees to facilitate the entirety of the operations.  These corporations retained 

vendors and opened bank accounts to (a) receive and hold investor deposits, (b) make 

payments associated with running the scam, and (c) transfer profits derived from the 

scheme to Defendants and their partners.  Defendant BenHarav, who had the 

authority to approve all the Porter Broker’s expenses, paid vendors providing services 

to the Porter Brokers—including JMRB and its employees—from these accounts and 

received authentication codes for accessing the accounts on his mobile telephone.  

The nominee corporations also set up credit card processing accounts, which 

BenHarav controlled.   

18. The straw corporations contracted with the Porter Brokers’ platform 

provider, which provided the trading engine and other services essential to offering 

and selling binary options online.  In an email to another binary option broker 

operator, a Business Development Manager for the platform provider confirmed 

BenHarav was its “client,” writing: 

Jared, please meet Ronn, a good friend and very talented guy.  I 
believe Ronn can assist in recruitment as well as any strategic 
planning with regards to your hiring needs.  Ronn, please meet Jared, 
a friend and also one of Panda’s clients!  (Emphasis added). 
19. These straw corporations—sometimes identified as the operators of the 

Porter Brokers on their websites—held bank accounts that acted as the counterparty 

to investors’ trades.  Specifically, rather than making money through commissions 

(and being largely indifferent to the outcome of investors’ trades), the Porter Brokers 

only made money when investors made deposits into their trading accounts and lost 

that money trading binary options.  Thus, unlike a traditional broker, the Porter 

Brokers’ interests were adverse to the interests of the investors that JMRB and its 

sales agents aggressively solicited to open accounts and advised on trading.   

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20. Over time, the continued viability of this model required (a) that 

investors deposit and then lose enough money to cover the enterprise’s expenses and 

generate a profit and (b) a constant infusion of new money to replace the money that 

investors lost.  This structure provided the Porter Brokers, JMRB, and those that 

worked there the incentive to use false and misleading statements and deceptive 

devices to lure investors’ deposits and encourage trading losses.   

A. The Defendants Controlled JMRB and the Porter Brokers 

21. For most of the Relevant Period, Mimun and BenHarav were the sole 

owners and/or control persons of JMRB.  Each Defendant also had ownership 

interests in each Porter Broker, which they fully controlled through JMRB and the 

straw corporations.  Defendants shared profits derived from the operation with third 

parties who provided the startup capital for their scam and/or those they recruited to 

help run the brokers.  As to Dalton Finance, at times, some of the third parties that 

Defendants recruited managed the day-to-day operations of the broker but ultimately 

reported to, and were under the control of, Defendants.   

22. JMRB operated Porter Finance from late 2014 until at least June 2017.  

The Defendants opened Dalton Finance and its website in about February 2016 and, 

over time, as Porter Finance garnered unwanted attention and negative reviews, 

transitioned operations to Dalton Finance, which JMRB also operated until about 

June 2017.   

23. The Defendants controlled and managed the Porter Brokers’ solicitation 

activities through their ownership of JMRB.  They also controlled the Porter Brokers’ 

direction and made the key business decisions, including, for example, employee 

compensation, credit card processing, paying affiliate marketers, selecting business 

partners (i.e., those helping run Dalton Finance), and hiring new employees.  For at 

least some or all of the Relevant Period, they were the only people with their own 

offices.  Managers encouraged JMRB sales agents to look busy and work harder 

when the Defendants were in the office.  Defendants made speeches at parties.  

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During this period, Defendants met constantly with each other and call center 

managers to run the Porter Brokers, but they divided their primary responsibilities.   

24. Mimun—who previously supervised a call center for another binary 

option broker company—oversaw the JMRB sales floors, including hiring, training, 

and supervising employees.  He was known by former employees as a “good 

salesperson.”  He also recruited his twin brother to oversee the day-to-day operations 

of Dalton Finance’s sales floor.   

25. Mimun pressured the Call Center Operation to obtain more deposits, 

including listening in on JMRB sales agents’ calls with investors and coaching them 

on better, more effective ways to obtain deposits.  As a motivational tool, he 

announced on the sales floor new large customer deposits.  He also supervised call 

center managers who relayed his instructions to JMRB sales agents.  When around 

September 2016 JMRB closed the facility running Porter Finance, Mimun arranged 

for some of the employees to interview with the facility running Dalton Finance. 

26. BenHarav oversaw marketing and served as JMRB’s functional Chief 

Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, controlling the company’s finances 

and technology.  He received and paid invoices for the Porter Brokers’ expenses and 

had control over their bank and credit-card-processing accounts.  He also managed 

affiliate marketing relationships for the Porter Brokers.  One former employee said he 

spent 80 percent of his day in the office and sometimes even slept there.  

27. As described by a former employee, BenHarav was the “number one” at 

JMRB who “bullied” everyone in the office and had almost all the say in how the 

company was going to run, especially financially, and where the direction of the 

companies was going to go.  He even brought family members to work at JMRB. 

28. At one point, BenHarav feared that people at JMRB were stealing sales 

leads from the companies and he forced JMRB employees to take a lie detector test. 

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B. The Porter Brokers Attracted Investors with Fraudulent 

Affiliate Marketing Campaigns  

29. The Porter Brokers found many investors through Internet advertisers 

called “affiliate marketers” that both Defendants knew used fraudulent advertising to 

draw in investors and targeted U.S. investors.  It was common knowledge at JMRB 

that the affiliate marketing campaigns were fraudulent.  For example, employees at 

JMRB and Viva Affiliates Ltd. (one of JMRB’s marketing affiliates) who reported to 

Defendants often viewed the marketers’ fraudulent solicitation materials to help them 

understand what investors were expecting when they opened an account.  Employees 

referred to the advertising campaigns as “make-money funnels” because the 

advertisements typically told the viewers that “they are going to make money because 

of an algorithm that will tell them how to make money” trading binary options.   

30. The make-money funnels Defendants used typically advertised “get rich 

quick schemes” promising investors access to secret or proprietary systems for 

trading binary options that had supposedly generated huge returns for other investors.  

The advertising materials included spam emails, elaborately-produced infomercial-

like videos, and misleading websites typically portraying fabricated rags-to-riches 

stories.  But the systems advertised did not exist and were simply lures to entice 

investors into interactions with JMRB’s Call Center Operations and to open accounts.  

31. BenHarav helped supervise the two JMRB-affiliated companies that 

marketed for the Porter Brokers.  He negotiated the marketers’ commissions, paid 

their invoices, directed Internet traffic among the Porter Brokers, and monitored the 

marketers’ conversion rates.  BenHarav also regularly communicated with affiliate 

marketers about their campaigns and received the advertising materials directing 

investors to fraudulent campaigns and then to one of the Porter Brokers.  He boasted 

about being an affiliate marketer and once creating his own binary option marketing 

campaign that used fraudulent solicitation materials created by a third party and 

called “The Golden Goose Method.”  He also sometimes refused to pay affiliate 

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marketers when a large number of the investors they referred initiated credit-card 

chargebacks—e.g., claiming charges made by the Porter Brokers were fraudulent.   

32. The Porter Brokers paid the affiliate marketers often several hundred 

dollars for each investor who opened and funded an account upon viewing the false 

advertising.  The Porter Brokers often paid the affiliate marketers more than they 

made from investors’ initial deposits and relied on investors making additional 

deposits, following conversations with JMRB sales agents, to cover the loss.    

C. Deceptive Websites 

33. Opening and trading in an account at the Porter Brokers ultimately 

occurred through their English-language websites.  The Porter Brokers’ websites 

contained no references to JMRB but rather claimed to be controlled by the straw 

corporations.  The straw corporations had no employees or operations of their own 

and were themselves controlled and operated entirely by JMRB.  In interactions with 

investors and prospects, JMRB sales agents never mentioned JMRB and instead 

posed as calling from one of the Porter Brokers.   

34. The trading engine embedded in the websites created the appearance of 

actual market-oriented trading that looked similar to what an investor would see on a 

legitimate broker’s website.  It allowed investors to place “trades,” see “live” market 

quotes, make deposits, and track trades and balances.  The trading engine referred to 

binary options positions as “assets” or “investments” and, in the case of security-

based options, sometimes displayed the logos of the referenced companies. 

35. Despite appearances, investors were not purchasing real financial assets 

from any real market and were not trading in any market with other investors.  The 

so-called trades and investments reflected on an investor’s on-line account statements 

were simply book entries reflecting positions facing the Porter Brokers.   

36. The account balances investors saw when viewing the trading platform 

did not reflect money in any segregated account but instead were, as one former 

employee put it, “just numbers on a screen.”  Investors’ deposits were comingled 

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with the Porter Brokers’ funds and used to pay JMRB and other expenses incurred 

operating the fraud.  The Porter Brokers did not have sufficient money in their bank 

accounts to pay the obligations owed to their investors, and therefore needed those 

investors to lose their money in order to stay in business.  The Porter Brokers never 

disclosed this “counterparty risk”—i.e. that investors’ withdrawals depended on the 

Porter Brokers’ ability and willingness to pay investors back and that it could not 

afford to pay everyone back what they were owed.   

37. The Porter Brokers’ websites falsely suggested that trading binary 

options would be profitable, that the Porter Brokers were there to help, and that they 

wanted investors to succeed in making money.  By way of one example, at various 

times the websites made the following false or misleading statements:  

* * * 

The company was formed on the principal that knowledge is power and 
though knowledge comes success. Launched in 2014, the company 
prides itself on excellent service and guarantees the best environment for 
success to our traders passing on our knowledge to traders in order to 
maximize their trading potential. 

* * * 

We understand how important it is for traders to work with brokers they 
trust.  At Dalton Finance, traders benefit from first-class tailored 
education from seasoned professionals. 
 
38. These statements, and other like them on the websites over the Relevant 

Period, were false and misleading because investors depositing funds with the Porter 

Brokers generally lost their money, the call center employees generally had no 

specialized knowledge, financial training, or background, and the Porter Brokers 

actually needed investors to lose money trading binary options to stay in business.   

D. Fraudulent Call Center Operations  

39. JMRB—which at its height collectively employed as many as 160 

people—ran Call Center Operations where sales agents were tasked with convincing 

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investors to deposit as much money as possible and to trade with that money often, 

with the eventual aim of seeing investors lose their funds.  

40. JMRB compensated call center sales agents based on the net deposits 

(i.e. deposits minus withdrawals) they obtained from investors.  This undisclosed 

compensation structure incentivized the call center sales agents to use false and 

misleading tactics to induce investors to deposit funds and to prevent withdrawals.   

41. Shortly after registering their binary options trading accounts on one of 

the Porter Brokers’ websites, investors typically received a telephone call from 

someone at a JMRB call center.  From the outset, these calls were replete with false 

and misleading statements designed to earn investors’ trust and portray the call center 

sales agents as financial experts that were there to help.  

42. For example, as directed or endorsed by Defendants, the sales agents 

used aliases instead of real names.  And sales agents were permitted to fabricate their 

titles, choosing ones normally associated with legitimate trading and the provision of 

financial advice.  Even though they typically had little or no relevant experience, they 

called themselves “brokers,” “analysts,” “Head of Trading,” “Senior Financial 

Advisors,” and the like.  Some also claimed to have MBAs or membership in the 

Chartered Financial Analyst Institute.  JMRB sales agents also often falsely claimed 

to have formerly worked at major financial institutions like Bank of America or 

JPMorgan Chase.  The sales force also lied about their locations, claiming, for 

example, they were based in London, instead of their actual location in Israel.   

43. At Mimun’s and BenHarav’s direction and/or with their knowledge and 

approval, salespersons used additional false and misleading statements and 

manipulative and deceptive practices to persuade investors to make deposits with the 

Porter Brokers.  As former JMRB employees have put it, on Defendants watch, they 

could tell investors whatever they wanted as long as it resulted in a deposit. 

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E. False and Misleading Statements and Deceptive Devices Used to 

Obtain Investors’ Deposits  

44. Alignment of Interest.  At Defendants’ direction and with their 

knowledge, JMRB salespersons told investors making deposits with the Porter 

Brokers, in substance, “We only make money when you make money” and 

“I’m here to help you make a profit.”  Yet the Porter Brokers profited only 

from investor losses, not profits.  Prior to forming JMRB and the Porter 

Brokers, Mimun used this fraudulent sales pitch when supervising another 

binary option call center, and he later trained employees at JMRB to use it.  

45. JMRB sales agents also put this misrepresentation into email.  For 

example, a sales agent wrote as follows to an investor: 

When open a trade Porter Finance purchases a contract for you from our 
market maker, that contract is individual and we don't need that another 
client will take the opposite option now if your trade is profitable as you 
know 65-81% goes to you and 19-35% goes to Porter. 

 

46. This statement is also false because there was not “market maker;” 

Porter Finance was the counterparty to the investor’s trades. 

47. When a JMRB employee told Mimun and BenHarav these types 

of statements were “over the top,” inappropriate, and should stop, the 

Defendants dismissed the concerns and the fraudulent solicitations continued.   

48. JMRB sales agents knew how JMRB and they made their money, and 

thus routinely lied when representing that their job was to help investors make 

money.  By way of example, typical of this form of fraud, one investor received the 

following welcome email after opening an account: 

Porter Finance - As part of our ongoing efforts to equip you with all the 
tools necessary for successful trading, we’re pleased to provide you 
with the much anticipated Porter Finance trading guide available in our 
website’s Education section . . . . We wish you a successful trading 
experience with Porter Finance. (Emphasis added). 
 
49. And an investor received this email after making a deposit: 

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My name is Kendrick Scott and I am The Head Trader at Porter Finance - 
In light of your recent deposit, I am attempting to get in touch with you, 
with the purpose of assisting you in making your trading experience 
with us a profitable one. I would like to be able to assist you in custom 
building a program that most suits your needs. (Emphasis added).  
  
50. In another example, an investor received the following email from 

a so-called “senior analyst” and “broker” at Porter Finance: 

Your account was added to my portfolio.  My job is to assist you with 
making money through trading and to provide you with all the necessary 
tools in order to become successful and most of all profitable trader.  I 
will provide you with the timely signals, strategies with the goal to bring 
your winning ratio to at least 75-80% and to make at least up to 10,000 
dollars a profit on a monthly basis. 
 
51. Salespersons also described the transactions to clients as 

“investments” to further the illusion they were engaged with legitimate 

financial firms and investing in real assets traded in real financial markets.  In 

reality, the so-called investments were just a rigged gamble against the house.   

52. Win button.  Mimun and BenHarav together devised a “win button” that 

the sales force could use to attract more deposits by making investors believe that 

they were making money in binary options.  When activated, the button helped to 

produce winning trades.  JMRB employees used the button to create a track record of 

recommending or placing winning trades for an investor.  Following those trades, 

sales agents solicited additional deposits with pitches like “just think how much we 

could be making if we were working with more capital and placing larger trades.”   

53. BenHarav requested the win button functionality in a meeting between 

him, Mimun and the Porter Brokers’ platform provider.  At his request, the platform 

provider installed the mechanism, which JMRB operated.  Investors were never told 

if their winning trades resulted from this rigged system.  Investors who deposited 

additional funds after experiencing winning trades placed at their “broker’s” direction 

typically lost their money once they stopped making additional deposits.  

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54. By way of examples, one investor opened his account by depositing 

$600.  After winning his first half dozen trades, he deposited another $10,000 later 

that same day.  Another investor, shortly after winning some small early trades, 

deposited another $25,000.  A third investor said he made an initial $250 deposit and 

then watched a salesperson generate “a lot of money” in early trading.  Based on 

those early wins, the investor deposited another $44,000 that he obtained by 

liquidating blue-chip stocks he held in a genuine brokerage account.   

55. Withdrawals.  The Porter Brokers’ websites touted the ease of making 

withdrawals.  For example, the Dalton Finance website stated:   

Withdrawing funds is quick and effective, with minimal effort required. 
Clients simply choose the currency they wish their funds to be deposited 
in and select a secure method for withdrawal.  Funds will then be 
dispatched and will appear in the customer’s account within 5 business 
days of their initial request. 

Salespersons often told investors that they could withdraw funds on demand.   

56. In reality, the employee compensation structure encouraged the JMRB 

sales agents to use deceptive tactics to obtain the largest deposits possible and 

discourage or prevent customers from making withdrawals.  Numerous tricks—

including recommending that customers enter into long-term trades and accept 

bonuses (described below)—were used by the sales agents to lock up investor funds 

and prevent withdrawals.  When investors insisted on withdrawing their money, their 

repeated requests were denied or knowingly ignored.  Some investors were unable to 

get their money back because the Porter Brokers shut their websites down and 

stopped responding to communications despite holding the investors’ funds.   

57. False claims of supposed past success.  The salesforce also routinely 

lied to clients about their supposed past successes in making money by trading binary 

options.  For example, one salesman told an investor that he typically generated 70-

80 percent returns.  A different salesperson told another investor that he guaranteed 

80-85 percent returns.  In reality, most Porter Finance clients lost some or all of their 

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money, and the JMRB sales agents lost money out of their own pay checks if they 

helped investors earn money at the Porter Brokers’ expense or allowed withdrawals.   

58. Baseless promises of future trading profits.  The salespersons also 

typically provided baseless projections as to how much customers would earn trading 

binary options.  As an example, in one email, a salesman said he would “focus on at 

least 20-35% growth every month.  That’s just about 5% growth a week.  Is that ok 

with you?”  Another investor received an email saying that trading should provide 

returns of $48,000 to $55,000 in April and another $85,000 in May.  Salespersons—

sometimes with the help of the win button—also falsely told investors they would 

reap greater profits if they invested greater amounts, which led to increased deposits.  

But again, most clients lost some or all of their deposits, and by Defendants’ design 

JMRB sales agents were penalized when investors gained or withdrew money.   

59. Risk-free trades and bonuses.  Investors were frequently misled that the 

Porter Brokers would provide “risk-free trades” (in which the broker would cover the 

customer’s costs of losing trades) and “bonuses” (in which the broker would match a 

new deposit dollar-for-dollar).  Such representations induced investors to make 

additional deposits.  For example, one investor deposited $30,000 after his broker 

offered a “100% bonus,” which supposedly increased his account balance to $60,000.  

A broker told another investor that a $25,000 deposit made him eligible to receive “5 

risk free trades.”  And another investor withdrew $100,000 from his IRA after a 

salesman claimed he would match that amount as a bonus.    

60. The Porter Brokers pitched these gimmicks as benefits, but their main 

purpose was to induce and then lock up large investor deposits.  Specifically, bonuses 

and risk-free trades/insurance—bonuses in disguise—came with trade turnover 

conditions ranging from 30 to 50 times the bonus amount.  Investors could not 

withdraw any funds from their account—not just the bonus funds—until meeting the 

turnover requirement.  Because on any one trade an investor always risked losing 

more money if he lost it than he could earn if he won it, assuming a 50 percent 

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success rate, the turnover requirements virtually guaranteed the investor lost most or 

all of his or her money prior to unlocking their funds. 

61. While the trading requirements were sometimes disclosed in “Bonus 

Agreements” and in the “terms and conditions” available on the Porter Brokers’ 

website, JMRB sales agents often pressured investors to sign the agreements.  JMRB 

sales agents either misled investors to believe funds could be withdrawn on demand, 

did not explain the ramifications of the trading requirements, or assured investors 

they would help them meet the requirements—an assurance that carried more weight 

given the manufactured credentials, track records, and the “win button.”  

62. For example, typical of this tactic, following a $100,000 deposit, one 

investor received the following email from his “broker”: 

A deposit of $100,000 will be made to [the investor’s] Porter Finance 
account and Porter Finance will add $100,000 to the account. Both of 
these (totaling $200,000) will be insured. [Investor] will withdraw 
$25,000 during September, 2016 and $250,000 during December, 2016. 

63. VIP Tiers/Perks.  The Porter Brokers’ website and JMRB salespersons 

held out illusory “perks” supposedly available to investors if they deposited enough 

money to reach certain “tiers,” including as follows:  
Investment Tier Minimum Total Deposit Purported Benefit to Investors 

“Starter Package” $1,000 20% bonus 
“Silver”  $5,000 30% bonus; 1 risk free trade; weekly 

trading signals 
“Gold”  $10,000 45% bonus; 3 risk-free trades; daily trading 

signals; dedicated broker. 
“Platinum”  $25,000 60% bonus; 5 risk free trades; same-day 

withdrawals; daily trading signals; 
dedicated broker and managed account. 

“Diamond”  $50,000 80% bonus; 10 risk free trades; expedited 
withdrawals; daily signals; dedicated 
broker and managed account. 

“Royal” $100,000 up to 50% insurance; expedited 
withdrawals; dedicated broker and account 
manager, and an “exotic vacation of your 
choice” 

 

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64. Dedicated brokers and entry into supposed exclusive trading groups 

proved to be one of the tiers’ most effective lures.  For example, one investor was 

told if he deposited another $250,000 he would have access to his Porter Finance 

broker’s “personal trading group,” which was claimed to average 50-60% monthly in 

returns.  This broker made the following promises in return for the deposit: 

Decreas[e] the trading volume [requirement] from $15,000,000 to 
$10,000,000.  With this we will be able to get your account liquid in the 
next three months of work and during the 3 months you will get 3 
withdrawals of:  
First month – 50,000 
Second month – 100,000 
Third month – 200,000 
 

From there, after calculations and withdrawals the account should be at 
$1,000,000, we will discuss together how to proceed in a way that will be 
suitable and comfortable for you. 
 

** If by any chance you will need to make a withdrawal of the total 
additional investment, you will be able to get it at any given time.  From 
the moment you told me it shouldn't take more than 2-3 business days 
until you will see the funds reflected in your bank account. 
With this 3 months program [investor], on the 4th month you should have 
already the total investment back in your bank plus profits on top of that, 
looking forward for it [investor]. 

65. Another JMRB sales agent wrote to an investor: “[O]nce [your account 

is] managed, I will be able to trade on your behalf. . . . Meaning higher profits and 

more trading volume being created with bigger returns!”   

66. In reality, the supposed perks available in these “tiers” existed solely to 

induce larger deposits and lock those deposits up with bonus funds.  

67. Targeting Retirement Accounts.  As part of a discussion about the 

investor’s financial objectives, JMRB encouraged sales agents to ask about the 

location of other invested funds and to confidently tell investors to liquidate their 

other investments—including their retirement funds—because binary options trading 

could generate far greater returns.   

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68. For example, a JMRB sales agent soliciting for Dalton Finance told an 

investor that if he deposited $100,000 they would turn “it into a million dollar 

account in just a year or two.”  The JMRB sales agent explained that the investor’s 

fund were making “7-8-9% a year, [but] bring that money to your Dalton account and 

we will make 25-35% per month.”   

69. When a former JMRB sales agent complained to a supervisor about the 

pressure placed on customers to liquidate retirement accounts, she was told to “put 

your blinders on, do it for six months, then get on with your life.” 

70. Early withdrawals.  Salespersons sometimes allowed investors to 

withdraw small amounts after early profitable trading, a ruse designed to give 

investors the false impression that withdrawals were easy.  One investor who 

withdrew $7,000 after early trading said he gained comfort he could later withdraw 

larger amounts.  After his early withdrawal, the investor deposited another $12,000.  

This was the only $7,000 the investor received back from the $200,000 he deposited.  

71. Ghosting:  All of the misstatements and fraudulent devices described 

above had the same objective: to obtain as much money from investors as possible 

and prevent withdrawals.  Once those investors informed their “broker” that they 

would not deposit more money, JMRB sales agents no longer had any incentive to 

speak to the investor.  Consequently, the “broker” stopped communicating and 

moved on to others with a greater potential to make additional deposits.  By this 

point, the investors were usually restricted from withdrawing funds and, given the 

odds, those who traded on their own generally lost all of their money before meeting 

the turnover requirements. 

F. Defendants’ Fraud Involved the Sale of Security-Based Binary 

Options to U.S. Investors and Resulted in Millions in Losses  

72. The ability to trade security-based binary options—including those tied 

to U.S. household-name issuers—provided an important lure for investors to deposit 

funds into their accounts.  For example, while soliciting deposits, one sales agent 

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wrote to an investor “I also realize I haven’t told you about our insured Tesla 

contracts during our trading session.  I wanted you to know about them before I send 

out the email.  They go so quick.”  In another email entitled “2.5k Tesla and Apple 

VIP Contracts available only for today!!!” the same so-called broker solicited clients 

to make additional $2,500 deposits to take advantage of these “low risk” trades.   

73. In another email entitled “Low Risk Trades for April” the so-called 

“Education Department” for Porter Finance (also operated by JMRB) recommended 

investors place $2,900 trades in more than 20 U.S.-listed stocks including Apple, 

Google, McDonalds, Amazon, Disney, Boeing, Walmart, IBM, EBay, Facebook, 

Bank of America, Tesla and Microsoft.   

74. Between September 2015 and March 2017, the Porter Brokers offered 

binary options to more than 14,000 persons in the United States and sold nearly 

79,000 binary options referencing securities or securities indices with a notional value 

of $55 million to U.S. investors.  On the whole, investors lost money on these trades; 

but, win or lose, due to the tactics described, most investors eventually lost most or 

all of the money they deposited.  

75. Investors residing in the United States funded their trading accounts by 

wire and credit card, ultimately losing millions of dollars to the Porter Brokers.  Some 

investors made six-figure deposits by wire transfer.  From March 2016 to April 2017, 

U.S. investors deposited at least $18 million by credit card.  As evidenced by bank 

records, nearly $50 million in investor funds—a significant percentage from the 

U.S.—went to the straw companies holding bank accounts used by the Porter Brokers 

and controlled by the Defendants through JMRB.  Very little of these funds were 

returned to the investors.     

G. BenHarav Tries to Cover His Tracks and Hide His Assets  

76. Between September and November 2016, BenHarav suffered what one 

former employee called a “breakdown.”  He started running about the office “looking 

crazy” and telling JMRB employees they could not say certain things to investors.  

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Over the next few weeks, he began moving things out of his office, including 

computers, and the JMRB call center shut down.  That former employee hypothesized 

BenHarav was trying to do damage control, potentially due to an investigation.  The 

timing of these events coincides with a September 2016 request for information on 

the Porter Brokers that the SEC staff sent to an overseas regulator. 

77. On information and belief, BenHarav took other steps to cover his 

tracks, including to prevent the seizure of the assets he obtained in defrauding 

investors.  For example, publicly-available information indicates that, in December 

2018, he was reading a book called “Asset Protection – Concepts & Strategies for 

Protecting Your Wealth.”  The book’s description notes that it contains “[s]trategies 

that are effective for putting one’s assets safely out of reach.”  The description also 

notes that “[i]n today’s increasingly litigious world, the shielding of assets has 

become a prominent issue for financial planners, business owners, and high-net-worth 

individuals.  Asset Protection details methods that are both legally and morally 

legitimate for protecting one’s assets from creditors, lawsuits, and scams.”   

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Fraud in the Offer or Sale of Securities 

Violations of Section 17(a)(1) and (3) of the Securities Act 

78. Paragraphs 1-77 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein. 

79. Defendants, by engaging in the conduct described above, directly or 

indirectly, in the offer or sale of securities, by the use of means or instruments of 

transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails: (a) 

employed devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud; and (b) engaged in transactions, 

practices, or courses of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit 

upon the purchasers of securities. 

80. Each of them knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that he employed 

devices, schemes and artifices to defraud and knew, or were reckless or negligent in 

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not knowing, that he engaged in transactions, practices, or courses of business which 

operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers of securities. 

81. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants violated, and unless enjoined 

will again violate, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)]. 

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

Fraud in Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Securities  

Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) 

82. Paragraphs 1-77 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein. 

83. Defendants, by engaging in the conduct described above, directly or 

indirectly, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, by the use of means 

or instrumentalities or interstate commerce, of the mails, or of the facilities of a 

national securities exchange, with scienter: (a) employed devices, schemes, or 

artifices to defraud; and (b) engaged in acts, practices or courses of business which 

operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon other persons. 

84. Each of them knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that he employed 

devices, schemes and artifices to defraud and engaged in acts, practices or course of 

business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon other persons. 

85. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants violated, and unless enjoined 

will again violate, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rule 

10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5]. 

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

Unregistered Offer or Sale of Securities   

Violations of Section 5 of the Securities Act 

86. Paragraphs 1-77 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein. 

87. No registration statement had been filed or was in effect with the SEC 

for any of the security-based binary options offered or sold through the Porter 

Brokers, their call center and Defendants. 

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88. Defendants, by engaging in the conduct described above, directly or 

indirectly, made use of means or instruments of transportation or communication in 

interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or to sell such securities. 

89. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants violated, and unless enjoined 

will again violate, Section 5 of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e]. 

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF  
Control Person Liability under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the 

Porter Brokers’ and Call Centers Operations’ Violations of Section 10(b)  

90. Paragraphs 1-77 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein. 

91. At all times relevant hereto, each of the Defendants was a control person 

of the Porter Brokers and the Call Center Operations for purposes of Section 20(a) of 

the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)], directly or indirectly controlling them. 

92. The Porter Brokers and the Call Center Operations, directly or indirectly, 

by use of the means or instruments of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or the 

facility of a national securities exchange, in connection with the purchase or sale of 

securities, and with knowledge or recklessness: (a) employed devices, schemes, or 

artifices to defraud; (b) made untrue statements of material fact or omitted to state 

material facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances 

under which they were made, not misleading; and/or (c) engaged in acts, practices, or 

courses of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 

person; and thereby each committed violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 

[15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rule 10b-5 thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5]. 

93. Defendants cannot establish that they did not directly or indirectly 

induce the acts of the Porter Brokers and the Call Center Operations that constitute 

violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, nor that they acted 

in good faith. 

94. Defendants are therefore liable as controlling persons under 

Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act to the same extent as the Porter Brokers and their 

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call centers would be liable for violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and 

Rule 10b-5 thereunder. 

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF  
Control Person Liability under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the 

Porter Brokers’ and Call Centers Operations’ Violations of Section 15(a) 

95. Paragraphs 1-77 and 91 are realleged and incorporated by reference 

herein. 

96. By engaging in the conduct described above, the Porter Brokers and the 

call centers: (a) engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the 

account of others; and (b) directly or indirectly, made use of the mails or the means or 

instrumentalities of interstate commerce to effect transactions in, or to induce or 

attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, securities without being registered as a 

broker or dealer with the SEC or associated with a broker or dealer registered with 

the SEC; and thereby each committed violations of Section 15(a) of the Exchange 

Act [15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)]. 

97. Defendants cannot establish that they did not directly or indirectly 

induce the acts of the Porter Brokers and the Call Center Operations that constitute 

violations of Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act, nor that they acted in good faith. 

98. Defendants are therefore liable as controlling persons under 

Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act to the same extent as Porter Brokers and their call 

centers would be liable for violations of Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act. 

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Aiding and Abetting the Porter Brokers’ and Call Center Operations’  

Violations of 10(b) of the Exchange Act 

99. Paragraphs 1-77 and 92 are realleged and incorporated by reference 

herein. 

100. Under Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)], any 

person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person 

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in violation of a provision of the Exchange Act, or of any rule or regulation issued 

thereunder, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same extent as 

the person to whom such assistance is provided. 

101. Each Defendant knowingly or recklessly provided substantial assistance 

to violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10(b)-5 thereunder by 

the Porter Brokers and their call centers. 

102. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants are liable for violations of 

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10(b)-5 by the Porter Brokers and their 

call centers to the same extent as each of the Porter Brokers and their call centers 

would be liable for their own violations and, unless enjoined, will again violate 

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10(b)-5 thereunder. 

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Aiding and Abetting the Porter Brokers’ and Call Center Operations’  

Violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act 

103. Paragraphs 1-77 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein. 

104. The Porter Brokers and their call center, by engaging in the conduct 

described above, in the offer or sale of securities, by the use of means or instruments 

of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails 

directly or indirectly: (a) with scienter, employed devices, schemes, or artifices to 

defraud; (b) negligently or with scienter, obtained money or property by means of 

untrue statements of a material fact or by omitting to state a material fact necessary in 

order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 

were made, not misleading; and (c) negligently or with scienter, engaged in 

transactions, practices, or courses of business which operated or would operate as a 

fraud or deceit upon the purchaser of such securities. 

105. Under Section 15(b) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77o(b)], any 

person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person 

in violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)], shall be 

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deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom 

such assistance is provided. 

106. Each Defendant knowingly or recklessly provided substantial assistance 

to violations of Section 17(a) by the Porter Brokers and the Call Center Operations. 

107. Defendants are therefore liable for violations of Section 17(a) of the 

Securities Act to the same extent as each of the Porter Brokers and their call centers 

would be liable for their own violations of Section 17(a) and, unless enjoined, will 

again violate Section 17(a) of the Securities Act. 

RELIEF REQUESTED 

WHEREFORE, the SEC respectfully requests that this Court: 

a) Find that Defendants committed the alleged violations; 

b) Order Defendants to disgorge, with prejudgment interest, all ill-gotten 

gains they received or derived from the activities set forth in this Complaint, and to 

repatriate any ill-gotten funds or assets they caused to be sent overseas; 

c) Order Defendants to pay civil penalties under Section 20(d) of the 

Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 

U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3]; 

d) Permanently enjoin Defendants from directly or indirectly violating 

Sections 5 and 17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e & 77q(a)] and Sections 

10(b) and 15(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b)] and Rule 10b-5 thereunder 

[17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5]; 

e) Permanently enjoin Defendants (including but not limited to, through 

any entity they own, operate, manage or control) from: (a) directly or indirectly, 

inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale of binary options, security-

based swaps, or other securities over the Internet, via email or other forms of 

electronic communication; (b) directly or indirectly causing any person or entity to 

engage in any activity that is for the purpose of inducing or attempting to induce the 

purchase or sale of binary options, security-based swaps, or other securities over the 

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Internet, via email or other forms of electronic communication; (c) deriving 

compensation from any activity inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale 

of binary options, security-based swaps, or other securities over the Internet, via 

email or other forms of electronic communication; and (d) but not prohibiting the 

Defendants from buying or selling securities for their own personal accounts.    

f) Retain jurisdiction over this action to implement and carry out the terms 

of all orders and decrees that it may enter, or to entertain any suitable application or 

motion for additional relief within the jurisdiction of this Court; and 

g) Grant such other relief as may be necessary or appropriate. 

Dated:  July 12, 2021 Respectfully submitted,  

 /s/ KENNETH W. DONNELLY 

Kenneth W. Donnelly 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Securities and Exchange Commission 

 

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