SEC v. DANIEL DIRK CODDINGTON; MICHAEL B. COLUMBIA; JESSE W. ERWIN JR; MERLYN CURT GEISLER; MARSHALL D. GUNN; SETH A. LEYTON, et al., No. 1:13-cv-3363, District of Colorado (Dec. 13, 2013)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 
 
Civil Action No.  1:13-cv-3363 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 
   Plaintiff, 
v.        
Daniel Dirk Coddington, 
Michael B. Columbia, 
Jesse W. Erwin Jr., 
Merlyn Curt Geisler, 
Marshall D. Gunn, Jr., CPA, 
Seth A. Leyton, 
Lewis P. Malouf, 
Extreme Capital Ltd., 
Fidelity Asset Services Corp.,  
Geisco FNF, LLC, 
Golden Summit Investors Group Ltd., 
SouthCom Management LLC, 
Stonerock Capital Group LLC, 
 
   Defendants, and, 
Daniel Scott Coddington, 
Coddington Family Trust,  
Joanna I. Columbia also known as Joanna I. Ornowska, 
Vincent G. Farris, 
Vincent G. Farris Co., L.P.A., 
 
   Relief Defendants. 
 
 
COMPLAINT 
 
 Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) alleges: 
1. This case involves a securities offering fraud orchestrated by Daniel Dirk 
Coddington (“Coddington”), who was the principal architect and primary beneficiary of the 

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scheme.  Coddington enlisted the other named defendants to participate in and assist him with 
the scheme, and they also profited substantially from their roles in the scheme.   
2. Coddington’s securities fraud followed the general pattern of “prime bank 
schemes,” in which the perpetrators solicit the investment of cash or securities into a vaguely-
defined and ultimately non-existent trading program, which purportedly involved leveraging the 
investors’ assets to fund securities trading in order to generate promised astronomical profits.  
From in or about January 2010 through at least July 2011, Coddington and the other defendants 
obtained more than $18 million in cash and approximately $14 billion in face, or notional value, 
of securities known as “Collateralized Mortgage Obligations” (“CMOs”) from more than 18 
investors nationwide for Coddington’s program.  CMOs are bonds that are backed by a pool of 
residential or commercial mortgages, and pay monthly interest and principal as provided by the 
terms of the bonds.  CMOs trade in the public securities markets, typically at a market value that 
is a fraction of their face value. 
3. In this fraudulent scheme, the defendants offered investments in what is referred 
to herein as “the CMO Trading Program,”  that would purportedly produce annual returns ranging 
from 250% to 475% using CMOs purchased with investors’ funds or CMOs provided by 
investors.  Specifically, the defendants represented that they had access to financing sources 
whereby they could “hypothecate” or pledge the CMOs to obtain loans of 5% of the current 
value of the CMOs.  Defendants further represented that they would use the leveraged loan 
proceeds to both make distributions of funds back to investors and to earn astronomical profits 
for investors through a purported equities trading platform. 
4. In reality, these representations were false.  The CMO Trading Program did not 
exist.  Defendants did not have access to financing sources to obtain loans with the CMOs, none 

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of the CMOs were hypothecated, investors did not receive distributions of funds, no loan 
proceeds were invested in any equities trading platform, and defendants spent investors’ funds 
and used investors’ CMOs for their own personal purposes.  As a result of the scheme, investors 
suffered total losses of their invested funds and most lost the CMOs they invested in the scheme.   
5. Coddington recruited Lewis P. Malouf (“Malouf”), Merlyn Curt Geisler 
(“Geisler”), and Marshall D. Gunn, Jr. (“Gunn”) to solicit investors for the CMO Trading 
Program.  Malouf, Geisler, and Gunn made false and misleading statements to investors about 
the purported CMO Trading Program.  They each also made false and misleading “lulling” 
statements to investors about purported delays in the CMO T rading Program to prevent investors 
from demanding the return of their funds or CMOs, and from contacting regulatory authorities.  
Malouf, Geisler, and Gunn received investors’ funds from Coddington as a result of their 
participation in the scheme.  
6. Coddington also enlisted his attorney, Jesse W. Erwin, Jr. (“Erwin”), to 
participate in the scheme.  Erwin made false and misleading statements to investors regarding the 
CMO Trading Program, and he received investors’ funds into his attorney trust account and 
improperly distributed the funds to participants in the scheme.  Erwin also sent lulling letters and 
emails to investors containing false and misleading statements about purported delays in the 
CMO T rading Program to prevent investors from demanding return of their funds or CMOs, and 
from contacting regulatory authorities.  Erwin received investors’ funds from Coddington as a 
result of his participation in the scheme.   
7. Coddington also recruited Seth Leyton (“Leyton”), a registered representative and 
owner of the securities brokerage firm named “Viewpoint Securities LLC” (“Viewpoint 
Securities”) to assist with the scheme.  At Coddington’s direction, Leyton opened brokerage 

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accounts to enable investors to transfer their CMOs to the defendants, delayed return of the 
CMOs to investors when Coddington was unable to hypothecate them, sold investors’ CMOs, 
and transferred investors’ CMOs out of Viewpoint Securities brokerage accounts to other 
accounts where they were sold contrary to agreements with investors.  Leyton received investors’ 
funds from Coddington and promises of additional business from Coddington as a result of his 
participation in the scheme.    
8. Coddington also enlisted Michael Columbia (“Columbia”) to liquidate investors’ 
CMOs as part of the scheme.  Columbia sold a portion of the investors’ CMOs for approximately 
$3.4 million and paid a portion of the proceeds back to Coddington.  Columbia and his wife, 
relief defendant Joanna Columbia, misappropriated the balance of the funds from the sale of the 
CMOs to pay their personal expenses. 
9. In addition to their fraudulent conduct, Coddington, Malouf, Geisler, Gunn, and 
entities they controlled acted as unregistered broker-dealers in offering the CMO Trading 
Program to investors, and each offered and sold unregistered securities in violation of the federal 
securities laws. 
10. Finally, Coddington transferred ill-gotten gains to his son, Scott Coddington, the 
Coddington Trust, Vincent G. Farris Co. LPA, and its principal, Vincent G. Farris, without 
receiving any consideration in exchange.  
DEFENDANTS 
11. Defendant Daniel Dirk Coddington (“Coddington”), who was born in 1954, is a 
resident of Colorado Springs, Colorado.  He is the father of Daniel Scott Coddington (“Scott 
Coddington”).   In response to a SEC subpoena seeking his testimony under oath during the 

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investigation of this matter, Coddington refused to answer any questions asserting his right 
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.   
12. Defendant Golden Summit Investors Group Ltd. (“Golden Summit”) was 
incorporated in Nevada on July 26, 1999.  At relevant times, Golden Summit’s principal place of 
business was Colorado Springs, Colorado.  Golden Summit represented that it engaged in asset-
based lending and project funding.  Coddington was the chief executive officer, chief financial 
officer, president, secretary, and director of Golden Summit.    Coddington was a signatory on 
Golden Summit’s bank accounts.  Golden Summit is owned by Coddington and he does business 
as “Golden Summit.” 
13. Defendant Extreme Capital Ltd. (“Extreme Capital”) was incorporated in 
Nevada on July 29, 1999.  Extreme Capital was also incorporated in Colorado in 2010.  At 
relevant times, Extreme Capital’s principal place of business was Colorado Springs, Colorado.  
Coddington and his son, Scott Coddington, were officers or directors of Extreme Capital and 
signatories on its bank accounts.   
14. Defendant Lewis P. Malouf (“Malouf”), who was born in 1943, is a resident of 
Huntington Beach, California.  He was an e xecutive vice president of Extreme Capital.   In 
response to a SEC subpoena seeking his testimony under oath during the investigation of this 
matter, Malouf refused to answer any questions asserting his right against self-incrimination 
under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.   
15. Defendant Merlyn Curt Geisler (“Geisler”), who was born in 1952, is a resident 
of Jacksonville, Florida.   
16. Defendant Marshall D. Gunn, Jr. (“Gunn”), who was born in 1953, is a resident 
of Orange Park, Florida.  Gunn is a certified public accountant licensed with the state of Florida. 

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17. Defendant SouthCom Management LLC (“SouthCom”) is a Florida limited 
liability company formed in December 2009.  Its principal place of business is in Jacksonville, 
Florida.  SouthCom was managed by Gunn and Geisler, who were its members. 
18. Defendant Fidelity Asset Services Corporation (“FASC”) is a Florida 
corporation incorporated in December 2009.  Its principal place of business is Jacksonville, 
Florida.  Gunn was the president and secretary of FASC; and Geisler was a signatory on FASC’s 
bank account at Ironstone Bank.   
19. Defendant Geisco FNF, LLC (“Geisco”) is a Florida limited liability company 
formed in March 2010.  Its principal place of business is Jacksonville, Florida. Geisco was 
established to allow investors to pool their money for investment purposes.  Geisco was managed 
by Geisler and Gunn.   
20. Defendant Jesse W. Erwin, Jr. (“Erwin”), who was born in 1966, is a resident of 
Las Vegas, Nevada.  Erwin is an attorney admitted to practice law in the state of New York.  In 
response to a SEC subpoena seeking his testimony under oath during the investigation of this 
matter, Erwin refused to answer any questions asserting his right against self-incrimination under 
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
21. Defendant Seth A. Leyton (“Leyton”), who was born in 1967, is a resident of San 
Diego, California.  He was a registered representative, chief executive officer, managing 
member, and chief compliance officer of Viewpoint Securities, which was a securities brokerage 
firm with its principal place of business in San Diego, California.  Viewpoint Securities 
withdrew its registration as a broker-dealer with the SEC, which was effective on December 22, 
2012.  On or about October 11, 2013, FINRA barred Leyton from association with any FINRA 
member in any capacity in connection with his conduct alleged in this Complaint.   

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22. Defendant Michael B. Columbia, (“Columbia”),  who was born in 1985, was a 
resident of Arizona at all times relevant to the Complaint.  Columbia is currently being detained  
in Arkansas pending resolution of charges that he violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2(b), for wire 
fraud and aiding and abetting.    
23. Defendant Stonerock Capital Group LLC (“Stonerock”) was a Nevada limited 
liability company created on June 15, 2010, with its principal place of business in Arizona.   Its 
status as a LLC was revoked by the Nevada Secretary of State on May 1, 2013.  Columbia was a 
managing member and listed as the chief executive officer (“CEO”), chairman, and executive 
vice president of Stonerock. 
24. Relief defendant Joanna I. Columbia, also known as Joanna I. Ornowska, is the 
wife of Columbia.  She was listed as a board member and CEO of Stonerock.  She is a resident 
of Arizona. 
25. Relief defendant Daniel Scott Coddington, known as Scott Coddington (“Scott 
Coddington”), was born in 1976, and is a resident of Colorado Springs, Colorado.  He is the son 
of Coddington.  From at least September 11, 2009, Scott Coddington was the vice president, 
treasurer, and director of Golden Summit, and signatory on its bank accounts.  He was an officer 
and director of Extreme Capital, and signatory on its bank accounts.   
26. Relief defendant Coddington Family Trust (“Coddington Trust”) is a trust 
formed in Colorado in or about 2004.  Its principal place of business is Colorado Springs, 
Colorado.  Coddington and Scott Coddington are the trustees of Coddington Trust.  
27. Relief Defendant Vincent G. Farris (“Farris”) is a resident of Ohio.  He is an 
attorney licensed to practice law in Ohio since 1993.  

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28. Relief Defendant Vincent G. Farris Co., LPA (“Farris Co.”) is a limited 
professional association formed in Ohio.  Farris is a partner of Farris Co. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
29. The SEC brings this action under Section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 
(“Securities Act”), and Section 21(d) and (e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange 
Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d) and (e); to restrain and enjoin the defendants from engaging 
in the acts, practices and courses of business described in this Complaint, and acts, practices and 
courses of business of similar purport and object.  The SEC seeks permanent injunctions, 
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains derived from the conduct alleged in the Complaint, and third-tier 
civil penalties under Section 20(d) of the Securities Act and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(d) and 78u(d)(3). 
30. This Court has jurisdiction under Section 22(a) of the Securities Act, and Section 
27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a) and 78aa.   
31. The defendants, directly or indirectly, made use of the means and 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of the mails, in connection with the acts, practices 
and courses of business alleged in the Complaint.  
32. Certain of the acts, practices, and courses of business constituting violations of 
law alleged in the Complaint occurred within the District of Colorado.  In addition, Coddington 
and Scott Coddington reside, and Golden Summit, Extreme Capital and the Coddington Trust 
have their principal place of business in Colorado.  Erwin, Malouf, Leyton, Geisler, Gunn, 
SouthCom, Geisco, FASC, Columbia, and Stonerock engaged in transactions within the District 
of Colorado. 
  

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SCHEME TO DEFRAUD 
33. The primary object of the defendants’ fraudulent offering scheme was to induce 
investors to invest funds or CMOs into the purported CMO Trading Program in order to 
misappropriate funds or misuse the CMOs.  At all times, defendants’ fraudulent scheme involved 
some or all of the following manner and means, including: 
a. Making misleading statements and omissions to investors to induce them to 
invest funds or CMOs into the CMO Trading Program; 
 
b. Misappropriating investors’ funds for the defendants’ own personal uses; 
 
c. Using investors’ CMOs for the defendants’ own personal uses, such as 
misappropriating interest due under the terms of the CMOs or selling the CMOs 
and misappropriating the proceeds; 
 
d. Transferring funds and CMOs contrary to the investment agreements between the 
defendants and investors; and 
 
e. Making lulling statements to investors to prevent them from discovering the 
fraud, seeking a return of their funds or CMOs, or contacting regulatory 
authorities. 
 
34. Although the fraudulent scheme evolved over time, at all times the defendants 
relied upon one or more of the following core representations to solicit funds or CMOs from 
investors, including that: 
a. The defendants possessed specialized knowledge and experience and had access 
to an equities trading platform that provided astronomical returns ranging from 
250% to 475% annually from equities trading; 
 
b. The defendants would use investors’ funds to purchase CMOs to use in the CMO 
Trading Program; 
 
c. The defendants would use CMOs owned by investors, or CMOs purchased with 
investors’ funds, to serve as collateral in order to “hypothecate” the CMOs to 
obtain loan proceeds of 5% of the current value of the CMOs; 
 
d. This hypothecation of CMOs would allow investors to receive advance 
distributions in amounts roughly equal to their initial cash investment or the 
current value of their CMO within 15 to 30 days.  The remaining funds derived 

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through the hypothecation would be pledged to the equities trading platform in 
order to generate the returns ranging from 250% to 475% annually; 
 
e. Investments would be held in the equities trading platform for one year, with 
profit disbursements made weekly or bi-weekly; and 
 
f. No fees or commissions would be paid by investors until the CMOs were 
successfully hypothecated. 
 
35. All of these representations were false.  In fact: 
a. None of the defendants possessed specialized knowledge and experience or had 
access to an equities trading platform that provided astronomical returns ranging 
from 250% to 475% annually from equities trading; 
 
b. The defendants used only a portion of investors’ funds to purchase CMOs;   
 
c. The defendants did not use CMOs owned by investors, or CMOs purchased with 
investors’ funds, to serve as collateral for hypothecation to obtain loans;   
 
d. The defendants did not successfully hypothecate any CMOs, they failed to 
provide any of the promised distributions or profits, and they failed to invest any 
funds into an equities trading platform;  
 
e. The defendants misappropriated investors’ funds prior to even seeking to 
hypothecate CMOs (which ultimately never occurred); and 
 
f. Coddington paid compensation to defendants and others out of investors’ funds 
before the CMOs were hypothecated, loans obtained or any trading occurred. 
 
36. As explained further below, during the period at issue, defendants used variations 
of the above manner and means and misrepresentations to carry out the fraudulent scheme. 
A. The Scheme Began with Coddington, Erwin, and Malouf, Who Then Recruited 
Geisler and Gunn 
 
37. Prior to 2010, Coddington, Malouf, and Erwin had been business associates in 
offering various investment schemes to investors. 
38. This scheme began in or about January 2010, when Coddington and Malouf 
agreed that Malouf would solicit investors into the CMO Trading Program.  

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39. At that time, Coddington and Malouf agreed that they would represent to 
investors that they had the ability to hypothecate or pledge CMOs as collateral to obtain loans 
from a funding source which funds would be used to pay pre-trade distributions to investors and 
to invest in a trading platform that could generate profits of more than 475% within a year.   
40. In or about January 2010, Malouf recruited Geisler, Gunn, and their entity, 
SouthCom, to act as brokers to find investors with CMOs to invest in the purported CMO 
Trading Program.  In telephone conversations and emails, Malouf described the CMO Trading 
Program to Geisler and Gunn with the understanding that they would use this information to 
solicit investors.   
41. In furtherance of the scheme, Malouf sent Geisler and Gunn an email on 
January 25, 2010, in which he explained the steps of the program and sent financial projection 
charts for Geisler and Gunn to give to investors.    
42. Geisler forwarded Malouf’s January 25, 2010 email and charts to Gunn stating, 
“Marshall I thing (sic) we have a home run ... take a look at these pro forma’s (sic).”   
43. The information Malouf provided to Geisler and Gunn about the CMO Trading 
Program was materially false and misleading since Malouf, Coddington and Golden Summit did 
not have the ability to hypothecate the CMOs and obtain loans, to act as a funding source of 
loans, or to make pre-trade distributions to investors.  Nor did they have access to a trading 
platform that could generate the promised profits of 475% per year.  Malouf knew, or was 
reckless in not knowing, that the information he provided to Geisler and Gunn was false.  
Nonetheless, he provided the misleading information to Geisler and Gunn knowing it would be 
communicated to investors.  

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44. Shortly after being contacted by Malouf, in or about January 2010, Geisler, Gunn, 
and SouthCom began soliciting investors through telephone conversations and emails.  In the 
communications with possible investors, Geisler, Gunn, and SouthCom made false and 
misleading statements about the CMO Trading Program using the information that was provided 
to them by Malouf.   
45. In or about January 2010, Geisler and Gunn on behalf of SouthCom had 
conversations with, and sent emails to, at least three investors and falsely represented that: 
a. Malouf or the funding source would hypothecate the investors’ CMOs to obtain 
loans; 
 
b. Malouf or the funding source would pay pre-trade distributions of between 
$500,000 and $1,000,000 to each investor; and  
 
c. Malouf or the funding source would invest the loan proceeds in a trading platform 
that would generate profits of approximately 475%.   
 
46. Geisler, Gunn and SouthCom knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that their 
statements to investors about the CMO Trading Program were false and misleading.  Geisler, 
Gunn, and SouthCom conducted no due diligence or investigation to determine whether 
Malouf’s representations about the structure and profitability of the CMO Trading Program were 
true.  They did no investigation to determine the identity of the purported funding source, to 
verify its financial ability to make loans of tens of millions of dollars, or to determine whether it 
had any experience or success trading securities and generating returns of up to 475% per year. 
47. By means of their false and misleading statements, Geisler, Gunn and Southcom, 
convinced three investors to invest CMOs with total face values of approximately $4.6 billion 
into the CMO Trading Program.  The CMOs were transferred into an account at a securities 
brokerage firm in the name of Golden Summit on or about February 12, 2010. 

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48. Shortly thereafter, Malouf, Geisler and Gunn failed to deliver on the promises 
they made to the three investors relating to the purported CMO Trading Program.   
49. In furtherance of the scheme, from on or about February 17, 2010, through at least 
May 4, 2010, Malouf spoke with, and sent dozens of emails to Geisler and Gunn, in which he 
represented a variety of false excuses for delays in the required payments that were due to the 
three investors.  Malouf made these false and misleading statements to Geisler and Gunn with 
the intention that his statements would be repeated to the investors.  By means of these 
statements, Malouf delayed return of the CMOs until approximately May 2010. 
50. Geisler and Gunn knew or were reckless in not knowing that Malouf’s lulling 
statements were false and misleading.  Yet in furtherance of the scheme, they repeated Malouf’s 
false and misleading statements to the investors, aided the concealment of the fraud, and delayed 
the investors’ requests for return of the CMOs. 
51. Between February 12, and April 30, 2010, by means of Malouf, Geisler and 
Gunn’s false statements to investors, Golden Summit and Coddington obtained approximately 
$131,122 in interest payments paid on the three investors’ CMOs that had been deposited into 
Golden Summit’s brokerage account.  Coddington, as an officer and director of Golden Summit, 
controlled Golden Summit’s brokerage account.   
52. Coddington misappropriated the interest payments from the CMOs to pay for his 
debit card transactions and also made transfers to Golden Summit’s bank account for his 
personal benefit.  
53. In or about May, 2010, Golden Summit and Coddington returned the CMOs to the 
three investors after the investors made demands to the brokerage firm for their return.  As a 
result, the brokerage firm closed Golden Summit’s account.  

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B. Leyton Assists the Scheme Despite Clear Red Flags About the Activities of 
Coddington and Malouf 
 
54. Following the closure of Golden Summit’s first brokerage account, Coddington 
telephoned Leyton, a registered representative and owner of Viewpoint Securities located in San 
Diego, California, to open a new brokerage account for Golden Summit (“Golden Summit’s 
Viewpoint Securities account”) on or about May 21, 2010.  Leyton sent the new account 
documents to Coddington in Colorado.  Coddington was authorized to buy or sell securities, or to 
withdraw funds from Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account.  
55. When Leyton gathered information about Golden Summit to open the account, he 
learned that Golden Summit and Malouf were identified in news articles as participating in the 
Bayou Hedge Fund Group fraud in 2005, through which more than $300 million raised from 
investors was misappropriated by fund managers.  Despite this, he opened the account for 
Golden Summit and Coddington.   
56. On or about June 18, 2010, Leyton became aware of a dispute over the ownership 
of certain CMOs that had been transferred into Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account 
when the owner of the CMOs contacted Viewpoint Securities to locate and regain possession of 
the CMOs.   
57. On June 22, 2010, Golden Summit received a  monthly interest payment of 
$18,051.98 on the CMOs.  Coddington immediately wired $18,000 of that amount to Golden 
Summit’s JP Morgan Chase bank account.  
58. Over the next month, Leyton exchanged several emails with Coddington and the 
owner of the CMOs through which Leyton learned that Coddington misrepresented the details of 
the CMO transaction, and that Malouf misrepresented that the CMOs could not be returned 
because the owner’s brokerage account was closed.  

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59. Subsequently, on or about July 3, 2010, Leyton sent emails to the CMO owner’s 
attorney and Coddington questioning the legality of the transaction, asking whether it was an 
unregistered securities transaction, and indicating that he might contact the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority, Inc. (“FINRA”) and the SEC about the matter. 
60. On or about July 8, 2010, Coddington provided Leyton with an email that falsely 
stated that the owner no longer sought the return of its CMOs, instead preferring to proceed with 
the transaction.  Although Leyton discovered these statements were untrue and designed to 
obstruct or delay return of the CMOs, Leyton nonetheless continued his business relationship 
with Golden Summit. 
61. To smooth over the relationship with Leyton, Coddington emailed Leyton on 
July 9, 2010, that he was about to close on some “Bank of Ireland bonds” and would pay Leyton 
$50,000 as a fee related to the deal.   
62. On July 10, 2010, Leyton emailed the CMO owner’s attorney and Coddington 
about signing a legal release for the delivery of the CMOs.  He stressed that “zero is exactly the 
amount my firm is going to realize from this transaction regardless of anyone’s performance (or 
lack thereof)” and demanded they “ [g]et this bond and this f***ed up, unlicensed, unregistered 
transaction out of my firm.”    
63. Then, on July 15, 2010, Leyton emailed Coddington that he had not received the 
signed release for the CMOs and planned to freeze Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities 
account by noon.  But,  Leyton did not freeze the account.  Instead, at the end of the day he sent 
another email to Coddington, stating:  “Let’s get back on the subject of business.  Golden 
Summit earned [$]18,000 utilizing my firm as a platform.  Viewpoint has incurred fees.  Fair?  
Not even close to being fair.  To be honest it’s so egregiously unfair it’s causing me problems 

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with my business partners.  Problems, I don’t need.  What is in the hopper?  And please be 
specific.”  
64. On July 16, 2010, Coddington emailed a response to Leyton’s overture, stating:  
“On some future business I have some funds coming on Wednesday I was going to pay your firm 
or you $5,000 to help out and for services. . . . Where do you want that paid company or you? 
Please advise so I can make appropriate plans!!! Makes no difference to me you decide.”  
65. On or about July 21, 2010, Leyton received the signed release from Coddington to 
return the CMOs, but delayed processing it until July 22, 2010.  This delay allowed Golden 
Summit to receive an additional monthly interest payment of $18,811.88 from the CMOs.  Upon 
receipt of the interest payment on July 22, 2010, Coddington immediately wired $18,711 to 
Golden Summit’s JP Morgan Chase bank account.   
66. Later on July 22, 2010, Viewpoint Securities transferred the CMOs out of Golden 
Summit’s account and back to the owner. 
67. On July 23, 2010, after the second interest payment had been received on the 
CMO, Coddington wired from Golden Summit’s JP Morgan Chase bank account $9,355.94, 
approximately half of the second interest payment, to a bank account controlled by Leyton under 
the name of Noah Capital LLC.    
68. Subsequently, after receiving the payment from Coddington and the promise of 
future business, Leyton stopped raising questions about the problem CMO transaction and did 
not contact FINRA or the SEC.  As described below, after July 2010, Leyton assisted 
Coddington and others in the scheme and received additional funds from Coddington.  
  

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C. Coddington, Golden Summit, Geisler, Gunn, SouthCom, Geisco, and FASC 
Continue the Scheme with New Investors  
 
69. After successfully finding the initial three investors, Geisler, Gunn, and their 
entities entered into an arrangement with Coddington to continue offering the CMO Trading 
Program, dealing directly with Coddington rather than through Malouf. 
70. On or about July 6, 2010, Geisler spoke by telephone with Coddington in 
Colorado.  They agreed that Geisler, Gunn,  and SouthCom would act as brokers to offer and sell 
investments in the CMO Trading Program to investors.   
71. After the call, Geisler emailed Gunn and stated: “Dan [Coddington] who is the 
managing architect behind the trade programs as well as the real reason Lew [Malouf] exists has 
just approved us to be a principle [sic] trade program manager. . . .  Marshall we have arrived I 
never thought we could stand the pain but because of Lew and his attitude and my background 
we have been invited into the real world of wealth.”   
72. On or about September 22, 2010, Geisler and Gunn signed agreements with 
Coddington and Golden Summit memorializing their verbal agreement to offer and sell 
investments in the CMO Trading Program.  Gunn emailed the agreements to Coddington in 
Colorado.  
73. Geisler and Gunn entered into the agreements despite the fact that they already 
knew that Coddington had failed to deliver on his earlier promises with respect to the investors 
whom they had solicited into the CMO Trading Program through Malouf.   
74. Coddington sent the agreements to his attorney, Erwin.  These documents along 
with his prior business dealings with Coddington and Golden Summit provided Erwin with 
knowledge that Coddington and Golden Summit were obtaining CMOs from investors, which 

18 
 
were to be hypothecated to provide loan proceeds for investment in a trading platform that 
purportedly provided substantial profits.  
75. In telephone calls and emails during September 2010, Coddington, Geisler, and 
Gunn refined their pitch for the CMO Trading Program.  They agreed to solicit funds or CMOs 
from investors by representing to investors that:   
a. Golden Summit and Coddington would obtain loans of 5% of current value of the 
CMOs by hypothecating the CMOs obtained from investors or purchased using 
investor funds, which were to remain in Golden Summit’s brokerage account; 
 
b. Golden Summit and Coddington would pay part of the loan proceeds as a pre-
trade distribution to investors with fifteen days of delivery of the CMOs; 
 
c. Golden Summit and Coddington would invest the balance of the loan proceeds in 
an equities trading platform that would generate profits of at least 1.25% per 
trading tranche with 200 tranches to be completed within a year (for a total return 
of approximately 250%); and 
 
d. Golden Summit and Coddington would return the CMOs to investors a t the 
conclusion of the investment. 
 
76. Coddington knew that Golden Summit and he did not have the ability to serve as 
a funding source to provide loans to the investors, and that they did not have access to a trading 
platform that paid 1.25% per tranche or that could generate returns of approximately 250% 
annually.  
77. Similarly, Geisler, Gunn and SouthCom knew, or were reckless in not knowing, 
that Coddington and Golden Summit could not meet the terms of the proposed investment.  
Geisler and Gunn did no due diligence to determine if Coddington and Golden Summit could do 
so, and were aware of the failure of the CMO trading Program with respect to the investors they 
solicited through Malouf.  

19 
 
78. Geisler and Gunn created an operating agreement for Geisco to pool investors’ 
money and CMOs for the purpose of purchasing and hypothecating CMOS through Golden 
Summit. 
79. In September 2010, Geisler and Gunn on behalf of SouthCom, Geisco and FASC 
created offering documents including a cover letter, program guidelines, and various agreements 
that they sent by email to investors who wanted to invest in the CMO Trading Program ( jointly 
referred to as “the Offering Documents”).  Geisler and Gunn used copies of documents sent to 
them by Coddington as templates for the Offering Documents.   
80. In or about September 2010 until November 2010, Geisler, Gunn, and their 
respective entities solicited investors to invest cash or CMOs into the CMO Trading Program.  In 
so doing, Geisler, Gunn, SouthCom, Geisco, and FASC repeated in the Offering Documents and 
their conversations and emails with investors the false and misleading statements set forth in 
paragraph 75 above.   
81. Geisler and Gunn signed many of the Offering Documents that they gave to 
investors.  Geisler, as the managing director of SouthCom, signed the various agreements sent to 
investors.  Gunn, as the managing director of FASC, signed one form that pertained to the 
intended distribution of proceeds. 
82. As part of the Offering Documents, Geisler, Gunn, SouthCom, Geisco, and FASC 
also provided each of the investors with exhibits that were prepared by Gunn based on 
information provided by Coddington and Golden Summit.  Geisler signed the exhibits.  In these 
exhibits the defendants falsely represented among other things:   
a. The “Loan To Value” rate or amount of the loan to be provided based on the 
estimated value of the investor’s CMOs; 
 

20 
 
b. The pre-trade distribution amount and net loan proceeds to be invested in the 
trading platform; and 
 
c. The investor’s projected gross earnings per trading tranche of 1.25%, net earnings 
per tranche, and total net earnings after 200 tranches. 
 
83. The statements that Geisler, Gunn, SouthCom, Geisco, and FASC made to 
investors in conversations, emails, the Offering Documents; and that they, Coddington, and 
Golden Summit made in the exhibits, were false and misleading.  None of the defendants had the 
ability to successfully hypothecate the investors’ CMOs with third party institutions or 
alternatively to act as a funding source for the program, invest the loan proceeds, and generate 
trading profits of approximately 250%.  Moreover, Geisler, Gunn, SouthCom, Geisco, and FASC 
conducted no due diligence on the CMO Trading Program and had no reasonable basis to believe 
that Golden Summit or Coddington had the ability to do the same. 
84. Between September and November, 2010, Geisler, Gunn, SouthCom, Geisco, 
FASC, Coddington and Golden Summit convinced at least nine investors to invest $8,657,890 in 
funds in the CMO Trading Program.   
85. During October 2010, Geisler and Gunn directed some of these investors to send 
their funds by wire transfers totaling approximately $1,324,982 to Golden Summit’s bank 
account in Colorado.  Out of those funds, Coddington wire transferred: $875,000 to Golden 
Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account and used the funds to purchase a $1 billion face value 
CMO for approximately $808,000; and $75,000 to Erwin’s attorney trust account for Erwin’s 
benefit on November 10, 2010.  Coddington spent the balance of approximately $374,982 for his 
personal expenses. 
86. But in late October 2010, the bank froze Golden Summit’s account because of 
suspicious transactions. 

21 
 
87. To continue with the scheme, Coddington asked his attorney, Erwin, to accept 
deposits of investors’ funds directly into Erwin’s attorney trust account and then distribute them 
as Coddington directed.  Erwin agreed to the arrangement.   
88. Erwin had previously served as a broker for Coddington on various investment 
transactions since at least 2008, and as Coddington’s attorney drafted various investment 
agreements.  Erwin knew that Coddington represented that Golden Summit had developed a 
funding protocol to use CMOs as collateral for project funding, and that Erwin’s role was to 
receive funds from investors who needed to purchase CMOs for collateral.  Erwin knew from his 
preparation and review of documents for Golden Summit, and discussions with Coddington, 
Geisler, and Gunn that investors were sending funds to his attorney trust account solely for 
purchasing CMOs, which were to be hypothecated and the loan proceeds invested in the CMO 
Trading Program. 
89. When Erwin received investors’ funds into his attorney trust account, he deducted 
legal and advisory fees,  and then forwarded the remaining proceeds to third parties as directed by 
Coddington.  He knew the misappropriation of investors’ funds for his legal fees and 
distributions to third parties were contrary to the agreements with investors.   
90. During November 2010, Geisler and Gunn directed some of the nine investors to 
send their funds by wire transfers totaling approximately $7,332,908 to Erwin’s trust account.  
Erwin received an additional wire transfer of $550,000 on December 16, 2010, from another 
investor that he introduced to the scheme.   
91. Of the $7,882,908 in investors’ funds deposited into Erwin’s trust account, 
Coddington directed Erwin to send $4,200,000 to Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities 
account during November 2010.   

22 
 
92. On or about November 24, and 29, 2010, Golden Summit purchased a $1.5 billion 
face value CMO for approximately $2,400,000 and another CMO with a $250 million face value 
for approximately $182,000 respectively.  On or about December 3, 2010, Golden Summit 
purchased a $1 billion face value CMO for approximately $1,475,000.  
93. Contrary to the agreements with investors, Coddington directed Erwin to 
distribute the balance of investors’ funds, approximately $3,682,908, to participants in the 
scheme during November and December 2010, including:  
a. $1,805,966.75 to Extreme Capital’s bank account in Colorado; 
 
b. $500,000 to FASC’s bank account in Florida; of that amount, FASC and Gunn 
transferred $100,000 back to Coddington Trust in Colorado and paid $395,000 to 
SouthCom for the benefit of Gunn and Geisler;   
 
c. $482,000 to Coddington Trust in Colorado;  
 
d. $350,000 to Geisco Holdings International LLC for the benefit of Geisler; on the 
same day, Geisler paid $349,100 to purchase a recreational vehicle;   
 
e. $125,000 to a foreign bank account; and 
 
f. $368,000 to himself, with the balance of investors’ funds paid out of Erwin’s trust 
account for expenses. 
 
94. Between September and November, 2010, Geisler, Gunn, SouthCom, Geisco, 
FASC, Golden Summit,  and Coddington, using the same false and misleading statements, 
Offering Documents and exhibits described above in paragraphs 75 through 82, also obtained 
agreements with three investors, which were entities, to transfer seven CMOs with total face 
values of approximately $8.3 billion into the CMO Trading Program.  
D. Leyton Substantially Assisted Coddington and Golden Summit’s Fraud 
95. To prepare for these new investments, Coddington emailed Leyton on 
September 17, 2010, to advise him that “we are getting ready to bring in some additional CMO’s 

23 
 
(sic) on repo agreements as well as transfer in cash for purchase [of] about [$]5 B[illion] face 
value of the same.  Would like to talk with you about that as we want to move forward on that 
this coming week!  I have approved loans on them as well and will be bringing cash from loan 
proceeds back for you to work on our behalf.”  
96. On or about September 24, 2010, Leyton received a copy of Coddington’s 
September 22, 2010, agreement with Geisler,  Gunn, and SouthCom.  The agreement laid out the 
CMO Trading Program that Coddington was offering to investors and provided Leyton with 
knowledge about the terms of the CMO Trading Program.  
97. On October 1, 2010, Coddington emailed Leyton that CMOs valued at over $1 
billion and along with another $2.3 billion were moving into the Golden Summit Viewpoint 
Securities account.  He stated, “I have a transaction set up for these on a credit facility basis and I 
wanted to give you a heads up that this is taking place... all on a repo basis set up by my 
attorney!” Coddingtons used the term “repo basis” to mean that the CMOs were to be returned to 
the investor at the conclusion of the loan.  Leyton responded, “Right on! We will need for each 
of the securities to be delivered . . . [a]ny and all contracts or agreement which can evidence 
clear ownership or control (no encumbrances).”  
98. Coddington asked Leyton to open brokerage accounts for investors at Viewpoint 
Securities to enable the investors to transfer the CMOs into Golden Summit’s Viewpoint 
Securities account for hypothecation.  Coddington advised Leyton that “I have 3 [clients] ready 
to fill out docs and effect transfers [of CMOs] as we speak!  When I have 2.5 B[illion] in current 
value or more the first loan will be initiated.  Erwin the attorney is putting together the 
transaction docs for you on [this] first wave of files.”  

24 
 
99. On or about October18, 2010, Leyton opened brokerage accounts for two of the 
investors referred by Coddington to enable the investors to transfer their CMOs into Golden 
Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account for hypothecation.  To incentivize Leyton for opening 
the investors’ accounts, Coddington paid Leyton $5,000 on the same day, into an account Leyton 
controlled in the name of Noah Capital LLC.    
100. Contrary to the agreements with investors which provided that the CMOs would 
remain in Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account, Coddington requested that Leyton 
transfer the first investor’s CMOs from the Golden Summit’s account to the account of a third-
party on November 1, 2010.   
101. On November 2, 2010, Leyton sent Coddington information from the Bureau of 
Prison’s website that the owner of this third-party account appeared to have a criminal record.  In 
spite of this information, Coddington directed Leyton to proceed with the transfer.  To 
incentivize Leyton for making the transfer, Coddington paid him $6,500 on November 4, 2010.  
102. On November 19, 2010, Coddington and Golden Summit directed Leyton to sell 
$1 billion in face value of another investor’s CMOs.    Leyton knew, or was reckless in not 
knowing, that these sales were contrary to Coddington’s agreements to hold investors’ CMOs in 
Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account as collateral for a loan t o be made by Golden 
Summit.  Leyton sold the CMOs for approximately $1,007,851.66 and received a commission of 
approximately $45,000.  On the same day, Coddington also paid Leyton $4,975 from Golden 
Summit’s JP Morgan bank account. 
  

25 
 
E. Coddington, Gunn, Geisler, and Erwin Concealed the Ongoing Fraud by Making 
Lulling Statements and Payments to Investors  
 
103. By November 2010, the defendants had failed to make the promised pre-trade 
distribution payments to the investors who had invested funds or the seven CMOs in the CMO 
Trading Program.     
104. On or about November 26, 2010, Gunn telephoned a representative for one of the 
entity investors and told him, based on Gunn’s discussions with Coddington and Erwin, that the 
pre-trade distribution payment was late because hypothecation of the CMOs was delayed and the 
advance payments would be delayed until the middle of the week of December 6, 2010.  Gunn 
knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that these statements were false. 
105. On or about December 7, 2010, Gunn telephoned the same representative of one 
of the entity investors and told him there had been further delays in obtaining the funding, but 
that they would wire $100,000 to him as part of the promised pre-trade distribution, with the 
balance to be wired the next week.  Gunn knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that these 
statements were false. 
106. On or about December 7, 2010, Erwin, at Coddington’s direction, telephoned an 
attorney for another of the entity investors and offered the choice between accepting $100,000 of 
the promised pre-distribution payment with the rest of the money to be available on 
December 10, 2010, or the return of the CMOs.  Erwin knew, or was reckless in not knowing, 
that these statements were false. 
107. Each of the entity investors accepted the $100,000 partial payment of the 
promised distribution.  To cover the payments, Coddington transferred $250,000 from the 
$1,007,851.66 in proceeds from the sale of one entity investor’s CMOs discussed in paragraph 
102 above into Golden Summit’s bank account on December 8, 2010.  Then, on December 9, 

26 
 
2010, Coddington transferred $200,000 to Erwin’s trust account, and used the remaining $50,000 
for his personal expenses. 
108. At Coddington’s direction, Erwin paid $100,000 each to the two entity investors 
that invested CMOs in the Trading Program.  
109. Contrary to Erwin’s and Gunn’s statements that the $100,000 paid to each entity 
investor was part of the pre-trade distribution, t  hese funds came from Coddington’s unauthorized 
sale of the investors’ own CMOs, rather than loans from the hypothecation of the CMOs.  As of 
December 8, 2010, Golden Summit and Coddington had not hypothecated any CMOs or 
obtained any loan proceeds, and had not made any investments through a trading platform.   
110. On or about December 14, 2010, Geisler and Gunn made additional lulling 
statements to the two entity investors.  Geisler and Gunn falsely stated in emails sent to the two 
entity investors, “We have been advised that the funds have been wired from the hypothecating 
attorney’s account to the attorney for Golden Summit’s escrow account.  The wire is in excess of 
$10 Million and so is making its way through the various channels.  We anticipate having a letter 
to each of you from the Golden Summit attorney later today.”  Geisler and Gunn had no 
reasonable basis for these false statements.    
111. On or about December 14, 2010, Gunn drafted letters for Erwin to sign, which 
advised the investors that the pre-trading distributions had again been delayed.  Gunn sent the 
draft letter to Coddington, Erwin, and Geisler for review.  Erwin signed the letters without 
substantive change and sent copies to Coddington, Geisler and Gunn for distribution to the 
investors.  In each letter, Erwin wrote, “my law firm is responsible for facilitation of the wire 
transferring of funds in the amount $[ ], representing your pre-investment distribution” and 
entered the pre-trade distribution amount owed to each investor.  He also wrote, “[t]he funds that 

27 
 
are forthcoming are being sent from an offshore Attorney Escrow account and unfortunately 
were not wired by the sending bank last Friday as we were told.”  In each letter, he agreed to 
notify Geisler and Gunn as soon as the funds were posted to his account.  
112. Erwin’s letters to the investors w ere false and misleading because Erwin had no 
reasonable basis for stating the funds would be forthcoming from an offshore attorney’s escrow 
account, because in fact there was no offshore attorney’s escrow account and no funds had been 
wired to him.   
113. In furtherance of the scheme, Coddington, Erwin, Geisler and Gunn used the 
December 14, 2010, letters as deceptive devices to delay the investors’ demands for return of 
their CMOs.  
F. Coddington Enlisted Stonerock and Columbia to Join the Scheme to Liquidate
 CMOs 
 
114. By early December, 2010, Coddington and Golden Summit had failed to comply 
with their agreements to hypothecate any CMOs to obtain loans for investment in the CMO 
Trading Program.  They were facing increasing demands from the investors for payment of the 
pre-trade distributions, proof of hypothecation, or return of the investors’ CMOs.  Contrary to the 
agreements with investors to hold the CMOs in Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account 
for hypothecation, Coddington and Golden Summit began to look for a third party to whom they 
could transfer the remaining CMOs for liquidation. 
115. Coddington identified BAWA Financial Ltd. (“BAWA”) as an entity that could 
receive and liquidate the CMOs.  Columbia was a director of BAWA.    
116. To create the appearance of a legitimate transaction, Coddington and Golden 
Summit entered into three sham agreements with BAWA (hereinafter referred to as “the BAWA 
agreements”) between December 4 and 12, 2010.  In these agreements, among other things, 

28 
 
Coddington and Golden Summit agreed to transfer CMOs with face values of approximately 
$11.2 billion to the brokerage account of Stonerock that was controlled by Columbia, which was 
to hypothecate the CMOs to generate a loan of approximately $1.1 billion and pay a pre-trade 
distribution of $63 million to Golden Summit.  The balance of the loan proceeds purportedly 
were to be invested in a trading platform with profits to be shared fifty-fifty between Golden 
Summit and BAWA.  
117. On or about December 7, 2010, Coddington instructed Leyton and Viewpoint 
Securities to deliver eight CMOs with a total face value of $11.2 billion from Golden Summit’s 
Viewpoint Securities account to Stonerock’s brokerage account.  These CMOs had been 
obtained from investors or purchased using investors’ funds raised in connection with the CMO 
Trading Program.   
118. Leyton acted upon Coddington’s instructions even though he knew from 
discussions with Coddington and his receipt of documents that investors provided the CMOs to 
be held in Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account for hypothecation and then returned to 
investors.   
119. Ultimately, Columbia and Stonerock never hypothecated any of the CMOs to 
obtain a loan for Golden Summit as required under the sham BAWA agreements.  Instead, 
Columbia almost immediately began selling the CMOs for his own benefit and for the benefit of 
Coddington and Golden Summit.  
120. Between on or about December 14, 2010 and July 30, 2011, Columbia and 
Stonerock sold the CMOs with face values of approximately $11.2 billion for approximately 
$3.4 million.   

29 
 
121. Beginning in January 2011, shortly after Columbia started liquidating the CMOs, 
he began making payments to Coddington and Golden Summit out of the CMO sales proceeds.  
Coddington did not disclose these payments to investors.  
a. For example, on January 20, 2011, Columbia withdrew $93,287.97 in cash from 
the Stonerock’s Wells Fargo account and deposited $93,287.97 into Golden 
Summit’s Wells Fargo bank account, which was controlled by Coddington;   
 
b. On January 21, 2011, Columbia withdrew $100,000 in cash from Stonerock’s 
Wells Fargo bank account, and deposited $100,000 into Golden Summit’s Wells 
Fargo bank account; and 
 
c. On February 11, 2011, Columbia withdrew $78,000 in cash from Stonerock’s 
Wells Fargo bank account, and deposited $75,000 into Golden Summit’s Wells 
Fargo bank account.     
 
122. Additionally, Columbia made payments to his wife, Joanna Columbia.  Between 
on or about December 15, 2010, and July 30, 2011, Columbia transferred approximately $3.2 
million from Stonerock’s brokerage account to Stonerock’s bank account for the personal benefit 
of his wife. 
G. Columbia Provided False Information to Coddington and Erwin Which They 
 Used to Lull Investors through Geisler and Gunn 
 
123. During December 2010 and January 2011, Columbia and Stonerock provided 
false information to Coddington and Erwin making it appear that Columbia was complying with 
the stated terms of the sham BAWA agreements to hypothecate the CMOs when in fact they 
were not.  Coddington and Erwin used the false information they obtained from Columbia to lull 
investors by passing the information along to them, through Geisler and Gunn, without 
confirming whether the information was accurate.  
124. For example, on or about December 17, 2010, Columbia prepared a fictitious 
letter that purportedly directed his brokerage firm, Morgan Stanley, to wire approximately $63 
million to Erwin’s trust account for the benefit of Golden Summit as the advance payment due 

30 
 
under the BAWA agreements.   In fact, Columbia and Stonerock did not have $63 million in 
funds.  As part of the scheme, Columbia sent a redacted copy of the fictitious letter to Erwin and 
Coddington, who used the letter to delay investors’ requests for payment without conducting any 
investigation to determine if the letter was valid.    
125. On or about December 18, 2010, Erwin told Geisler and Gunn that Erwin’s bank 
had received an instruction letter and clearance to credit his bank account with the $63 million.  
Erwin had no reasonable basis for this false statement.  Erwin provided the false information to 
Geisler and Gunn knowing that it would be passed along to investors.  
126. On or about December 29, 2010, Erwin sent an email to Gunn, Geisler, and 
SouthCom, with a copy to Coddington, falsely confirming that funds had been sent to Golden 
Summit and that he expected outgoing wires to investors the next morning.  Erwin had no 
reasonable basis for this false statement.  Erwin provided the false information to Geisler and 
Gunn knowing that it would be passed along to investors.  
127. On or about January 21, 2011, Columbia sent an email to Erwin stating that he 
had received an incoming wire, and attached a computer screen shot of a Wells Fargo bank 
account statement falsely showing a deposit of approximately $111 million on January 21, 2011.  
Columbia had fabricated the bank statement.   
128. On January 31, 2011, Erwin sent an email to Geisler attaching the Wells Fargo 
bank statement he had received from Columbia.  Erwin falsely represented in the email that, 
“This letter shall serve as confirmation that the Wells Fargo redacted account statement that you 
have been provided references a pending wire transfer ... of $111,431,769.94.  $63MM of said 
wire transfer belongs to my client Golden Summit . . . and from said $63MM USD, you are to 

31 
 
receive $43MM USD.”  Erwin had no reasonable basis for these false statements.   Erwin 
provided the false information to Geisler knowing that it would be passed along to investors. 
H. Leyton Ignored   Investors’ Complaints 
129. In March 2011, two investors each alerted Leyton to concerns about their dealings 
with Geisco and Golden Summit after the defendants failed to deliver on their promises.  On or 
about March 3, 2011, the first investor provided Leyton with a copy of her contract with Geisco 
supporting her claim that she had provided Golden Summit with $250,000 to purchase CMOs for 
hypothecation.  Similarly on or about March 10, 2011, the second investor provided documents 
to Leyton that supported his claims that his funds were transferred to Golden Summit’s 
Viewpoint Securities account. 
130. Leyton took no meaningful action to investigate the investors’ complaints 
concerning their providing funds or securities to Golden Summit, what Golden Summit did with 
those funds or securities, or why Golden Summit failed to hypothecate the CMOs.  On or about 
March 17, 2011, and despite the concerns raised by the investors, Leyton approved a wire 
transfer of $19,000 from Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account to a Golden Summit 
bank account.  The next day, Golden Summit wired $5,000 from the same Golden Summit bank 
account to Leyton’s Noah Capital LLC account. 
I. Coddington and Erwin Continued the Scheme with another Investor  
131. In the spring of 2011, Coddington and Erwin continued to offer investments in a 
variation of the CMO Trading Program using false and misleading statements.   
132. To assist Coddington with these transactions, Leyton opened a second brokerage 
account for Golden Summit at Viewpoint (“Golden Summit Viewpoint II account”).  Leyton 

32 
 
opened the account although he had received at least three investors’ complaints about Golden 
Summit and Coddington not performing on their investor agreements. 
133. In or about April 2011, Golden Summit, Coddington and Erwin were introduced 
to an entity investor.   In or about April 2011, Coddington and Erwin held a telephone conference 
call with the principals of the investor.  During the telephone call, Coddington and Erwin offered 
an investment wherein they would use $9 million from the investor to purchase six CMOs that 
Golden Summit would pledge as collateral for a loan of $60 million for the investor’s benefit.   
134. Coddington, Erwin and Golden Summit misrepresented that Golden Summit 
would hypothecate the CMOs itself and make a $60 million loan from its own credit lines to the 
investor.  Coddington failed to disclose that Golden Summit had never successfully hypothecated 
a CMO and that he and others in the scheme had misappropriated funds.  Coddington knew, and 
Erwin knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Golden Summit did not have the financial 
ability to make a loan of $60 million or to otherwise hypothecate the CMOs.  
135. To allay the investor’s concerns about Golden Summit’s ability to perform the 
transaction, Erwin sent a misleading letter on April 19, 2011, to the investor responding to its 
questions about a lawsuit that was previously filed against Golden Summit.  He stated that 
“Coddington has an earned reputation for excellence and veracity of the highest nature in the 
financing world. . . .   He does what he says he will do and he does it without excuses or 
complaint.  Mr. Coddington is ready to produce the results that you seek for your particular 
financing matter.”  Erwin failed to disclose the material facts that he knew about Coddington 
having not performed on multiple transactions during 2010 and 2011.  
136. On or about April 20, 2011, Coddington as the CEO and Erwin as the attorney for 
Golden Summit entered into formal agreements with the investor to consummate the investment. 

33 
 
137. On or about April 20, 2011, the investor sent a wire transfer of $9 million to 
Golden Summit’s bank account for the purchase of CMOs under the agreements.  
138. On or about April 21, 2011, Coddington transferred $7 million of the investor’s 
funds to Golden Summit’s Viewpoint II account.     
139. On or about April 25, 2011, Coddington and Golden Summit purchased CMOs 
for approximately $6.2 million.  Coddington misappropriated the remaining investor funds of 
approximately $2.8 million.  
140. On or about April 26, 2011, Coddington and Golden Summit sent the investor 
false confirmations representing that the purchase price of the CMOs was a total of $9 million, 
and that the hypothecation amount of $60 million was to be paid in three banking days, despite 
the fact that the purchase price of the CMOs was only approximately $6.2 million and 
Coddington had misappropriated the balance of the funds.  
141. Because Coddington and Golden Summit did not have the ability to fulfill the 
terms of its agreement to make a loan of $60 million, they entered into another sham agreement 
with BAWA purportedly to hypothecate the CMOs. 
142. On or about April 28, 2011, Coddington requested that Leyton transfer the CMOs 
that it had purchased for the investor from Golden Summit’s Viewpoint II account to BAWA’s 
brokerage account at Viewpoint.   
143. To assist Coddington, Leyton prepared a letter stating, “The following securities 
will be posting to the credit facility account today, April 28, 2011.”  Coddington sent Leyton’s 
letter to the investor to make it appear that he had hypothecated the CMOs by transferring them 
to BAWA.   

34 
 
144. When sending Leyton’s letter, Coddington did not disclose material facts to the 
investor about his previous agreements with BAWA; that Stonerock and Columbia had sold 
investors’ CMOs; and that Columbia and Coddington misappropriated the sales proceeds.  
145. Subsequently, Viewpoint Securities’ clearing broker refused to transfer the CMOs 
to BAWA’s account because it was a foreign third party that recently opened the account.  
Leyton attempted to overcome the objections and provided assistance to Coddington’s transfer of 
the investor’s CMOs to BAWA.  Leyton provided a copy of Golden Summit’s agreement with 
BAWA and misled the clearing broker by stating that “We are facilitating the transfer as an 
accommodation of Golden Summit as they are a customer of the firm.  The only compensation 
we have received is in the form of commissions from the sale of securities to Golden Summit.”  
Leyton did not disclose his arrangement with Coddington to receive undisclosed compensation in 
addition to his brokerage commissions.  Leyton was unsuccessful in transferring the CMOs to 
BAWA. 
146. When Golden Summit and Coddington were unable to transfer the CMOs to 
BAWA, they then directed Leyton to sell the CMOs to BAWA for approximately $33,095.17, 
which was a fraction of the purchase price of approximately $6.2 million.  The transaction took 
place on or about May 4, 2011.  
147. At Coddington’s request, on or about May 5, 2011, Leyton wrote a letter to 
Coddington falsely confirming that as of April 29, 2011, the transfer of the CMOs from Golden 
Summit to BAWA was completed.    In fact, Leyton had effected a sale of the CMOs rather than a 
transfer the previous day.   
148. Erwin used Leyton’s letter to lull the investor’s concerns about the delays in 
receiving the $60 million loan that Erwin and Coddington had promised them.  On May 6, 2011, 

35 
 
Erwin sent an email with Leyton’s May 5, 2011 letter to the investor confirming the transfer of 
the CMOs.  Erwin stated “I will have confirmation sometime tomorrow regarding the timing for 
the funds release.  I will call you as soon as I receive word on the disbursement of funds.”  Erwin 
had no reasonable basis to believe there would be any funding release from BAWA. 
149. On or about May 17, 2011, the investor requested that Golden Summit, 
Coddington and Erwin provide documentation on the status of the funding.  In response, 
Coddington sent the investor a copy of BAWA’s May 18, 2011 letter, which stated BAWA had 
entered into an agreement with Golden Summit to provide loan financing using the CMOs 
provided by Golden Summit as collateral.  Coddington knew this letter was false, and provided it 
to the investor as a deceptive device to delay the investor’s request for return of its CMOs.  
Coddington knew he had sold rather than pledged the CMOs as collateral, and that BAWA had 
not provided any loan financing to Golden Summit. 
150. On or about June 2, 2011, the investor filed a formal claim of ownership with 
Leyton and Viewpoint, advising that Golden Summit did not have authority to transfer its CMOs 
to BAWA.  The investor also sent a demand letter to Golden Summit for return of the CMOs.   
151. However, Coddington, Erwin, Golden Summit, and BAWA did not return the 
CMOs to the investor. 
J. Malouf Offered Investments through Extreme Capital in the CMO Trading  
  Program during 2011 
 
152. During 2011, Malouf and Extreme Capital offered variations of the CMO Trading 
Program to at least two investors.  
 The Florida LLC Investor 
153. In or about January 2011, Malouf and Coddington participated in a telephone 
conference call during which they solicited a possible investor that was a Florida limited liability 

36 
 
company to participate in a version of the trading program.  But at that time, the investor refused 
to enter into the transaction.   
154. In or about March 2011, Malouf offered the CMO Trading Program through 
Coddington’s entity, Extreme Capital, to the investor again.  Malouf falsely represented that:   
a. Extreme Capital would hypothecate the CMO through Golden Summit for 4% of 
the market value or approximately $36 million in funds; 
 
b. Golden Summit would pay $1 million to the investor within 10 days plus broker’s 
fees, and provide approximately $32 million as a loan for investment in the 
trading platform; 
 
c. Extreme Capital and Malouf would conduct 105 trades over a one-year period, 
with 10% profit to be made on each trade and a total of $500 million earned; and 
 
d. The $500 million in initial trading profits would be taken to Europe to be invested 
in a second trading platform, with the expected earnings to be $10 billion.   
 
155. Malouf knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that his statements about the CMO 
Trading Program during the two solicitations were false and misleading.  Extreme Capital and 
Golden Summit did not have the financial ability to perform under the terms of the purported 
investment.  
156. In furtherance of the scheme, Malouf used a new letter from Erwin to bolster his 
offer to the investor.  On or about March 20, 2011, Malouf emailed the investor the letter in 
which Erwin falsely stated that the CMOs’ documents had been submitted to the funding source, 
which had funds available for the program, and that the CMOs were approved for funding.  
Erwin also stated that if Extreme Capital was unable to hypothecate the CMOs, they would be 
returned immediately to the investor’s brokerage account.  Both Malouf and Erwin knew, or 
were reckless in not knowing, that the statements in the letter were false.  
157. On or about May 25, 2011, Malouf, on behalf of Extreme Capital, and the 
investor signed an investment agreement.  

37 
 
158. To facilitate the transfer of the investor’s CMOs to Golden Summit, either Malouf 
or Coddington introduced the investor to Leyton, who opened a  brokerage account for the 
investor at Viewpoint Securities on or about May 26, 2011.   
159. On or about June 14, 2011, the investor transferred $1 billion in face value of 
CMOs to Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account.  
160. Between June, and October, 2011, Golden Summit received at least $53,867 in 
interest payments from the investor’s CMOs.  On or about October 10, 2011, the investor’s 
CMOs were delivered out of Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account to a third party. 
161. Contrary to the terms of the agreement with the investor, Extreme Capital, 
Malouf, Golden Summit and Coddington never hypothecated the investor’s CMOs, never 
obtained a loan, and never invested any funds in a trading platform.  They also did not return the 
CMOs to the investor.  
 The Michigan LLC Investor 
162. In or about June 2011, Malouf and Extreme Capital offered Golden Summit’s 
CMO Trading Program to another investor, a Michigan limited liability company.    
163. On or about June 17, 2011, Extreme Capital and Malouf agreed to hypothecate 
this investor’s CMOs with Golden Summit, which was to provide a loan of approximately $32 
million.  Malouf falsely represented that the investor’s CMOs would be transferred to a 
brokerage account of Golden Summit for hypothecation, and the line of credit would become 
available within two weeks.  Malouf represented that if Golden Summit was not able to 
hypothecate the CMOs, it would immediately return the CMOs.  Malouf failed to disclose that 
Extreme Capital, Malouf, Golden Summit and Coddington did not have the ability to 
hypothecate the CMOs and obtain loan proceeds of approximately $32 million.  

38 
 
164. On July 8, 2011, the investor transferred the CMOs from its brokerage account to 
Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account.   
165. On or about July 11, 2011, Malouf emailed the investor that the CMO had arrived 
in the account of the funding source and had cleared so they could commence the hypothecation 
process and make distribution in one week.  
166. On August 3, 2011, Malouf sent an email to the investor stating that “Scott 
[Coddington] met with the ‘bankers and funding sources this afternoon.’  He needs to return in 
the morning to sign all of the updated Funding Agreements.  . . . The target is to have the 
Funding Bank release the funds for our use on Friday [August 5, 2011].”    
167. In fact, Scott Coddington had not met with any bankers or funding sources to 
provide a loan on the investor’s CMOs. 
168. On or about August 5, 2011, Golden Summit received $2,422 in interest from the 
investor’s CMO.  
169. On or about August 5, 2011, Golden Summit transferred the investor’s CMOs 
from its Viewpoint account to a third party. 
170. On or about November 3, 2011, the investor sent an email to Extreme Capital and 
Malouf demanding the return of the CMOs and past interest payments.   
171. Extreme Capital, Malouf, Golden Summit and Coddington did not return the 
investor’s CMOs or interest. 
K. The Use and Misappropriation of Investors’ Funds and Assets during the Scheme 
172. In total, the Defendants raised approximately $18.2 million in investors’ funds 
and $14.9 billion in face value of CMOs.  Coddington used $11.2 million of investors’ funds to 
purchase additional CMOs along with CMOs provided by investors, which were then liquidated 

39 
 
or transferred, for net proceeds of approximately $3.4 million.  The meager proceeds from the 
liquidation of CMOs, combined with the unused investors’ cash, left approximately $10.4 
million.  Ultimately, these investors’ funds were either misappropriated by the proposed 
defendants or transferred to the proposed relief defendants.   
173. Coddington misappropriated approximately $3 million in investors’ funds, CMO 
interest payments, and payments from Columbia (from the liquidation of CMOs).  After 
receiving investors’ funds from Erwin’s trust account, Coddington made significant cash 
withdrawals from Golden Summit’s bank and securities accounts.  He transferred additional 
investors’ funds from Golden Summit to his personal bank accounts and other bank accounts that 
he controlled.  Coddington used at least $234,245 of investors’ funds to purchase seven 
automobiles, and he spent lavishly on restaurants, entertainment and travel. 
174. Erwin misappropriated at least $800,000 in investors’ funds, most of which he 
transferred directly from his attorney trust account to his personal bank accounts.  Erwin used 
investors’ funds for restaurants, entertainment and to lease a condo near Las Vegas. 
175. Malouf received approximately $77,000 in misappropriated investors’ funds.  
Coddington wired funds from Golden Summit’s bank account to Malouf’s personal bank 
account.  Malouf used investors’ funds for restaurants, automobile expenses and travel. 
176. Leyton received approximately $86,000 in misappropriated investors’ funds.  He 
also received commissions of at least $45,000 from the improper sale of investors’ CMOs from 
Golden Summit’s brokerage account.  Leyton used these investors’ funds for restaurants, 
entertainment, travel and clothing.    
177. Geisler received approximately $456,000 in misappropriated investors’ funds.  
Erwin wired investors’ funds from his trust account to bank accounts controlled by Geisco and 

40 
 
Geisler.  Geisler purchased a $349,000 recreational vehicle and a high-end automobile for more 
than $105,000.   
178. Gunn received approximately $400,000 in misappropriated investors’ funds.  
Erwin wired investors’ funds from his trust account to bank accounts controlled by FASC and 
Gunn.   
179. Columbia and Relief Defendant Joanna Columbia misappropriated approximately 
$3.4 million in proceeds from the liquidation of investors’ CMOs and CMOs’ interest payments 
from December 2010 to July 2011.  A significant portion of these funds was transferred to bank 
accounts under Joanna Columbia’s control.  During this time, Michael and Joanna Columbia 
often spent in excess of $10,000 in a single night at restaurants and clubs.  They also used 
investors’ funds to maintain a penthouse apartment in Chicago and a house in the Phoenix area.  
Joanna Columbia provided no consideration for the funds she received from the defendants. 
180. Relief Defendant Coddington Trust received almost $945,000 in investors’ funds 
from Extreme Capital’s bank account for the purchase of a house in the name of the trust.  This 
residence was subsequently sold.  Additional investors’ funds were transferred to the Coddington 
Trust from Erwin’s trust account, the Golden Summit bank account, and other Coddington-
controlled bank accounts.  Coddington Trust provided no consideration for the funds it received 
from the defendants. 
181. Relief Defendant Scott Coddington received at least $640,000 in investors’ funds.  
The funds were originally sent by investors to Erwin’s trust account and then, through a series of 
transfers through Extreme Capital and Coddington Trust from November 2010 to July 2011, 
were transferred into bank accounts over which Scott Coddington had authority to withdraw 
funds.  Once investors’ funds were in bank accounts he controlled, Scott Coddington used the 

41 
 
funds for significant cash withdrawals, restaurants, entertainment, electronics and jewelry.  Scott 
Coddington provided no consideration for the funds he received from the defendants. 
182. Relief Defendants Farris Co. and Farris received approximately $625,000 in 
investors’ funds from Golden Summit; and Farris received approximately $40,000 in investors’ 
funds from Erwin.   Farris Co. and Farris provided no consideration for the funds they received 
from the defendants. 
L. Defendants’ Respective Roles in the Fraudulent Scheme  
183. As alleged herein, Coddington orchestrated the scheme to defraud and in 
furtherance thereof, he committed the following deceptive acts, including but not limited to: 
a. Coddington made false and misleading statements, and failed to disclose 
information, to investors regarding the investments offered in the CMO Trading 
Program; 
 
b. Coddington provided false and misleading information about the CMO Trading 
Program both orally and in writing to Malouf, Geisler, and Gunn to be provided to 
investors that were interested in investing in the CMO Trading Program; 
 
c. Coddington used investors’ funds to purchase CMOs and received CMOs from 
investors but failed to hypothecate the CMOs, provide distributions to investors, 
and failed to invest any funds in an equities trading platform; 
 
d. Coddington misappropriated investors’ funds for his personal benefit; 
 
e. Coddington used investors’ CMOs for his own personal benefit by 
misappropriating interest that was due under the terms of the bonds and by selling 
CMOs in order to misappropriate the proceeds; 
 
f. Coddington made lulling statements to investors, directly or indirectly through 
others, to prevent investors from seeking a return of funds or CMOs, or from 
contacting regulatory authorities;  
 
g. Coddington directed other defendants in the scheme to perform acts in furtherance 
thereof, such as directing the transfer of investors’ funds and CMOs for the 
defendants’ own personal uses; and 
 
h. Coddington caused investors’ funds to be paid to defendants and relief 
defendants. 

42 
 
 
184. As alleged herein, at various times Coddington acted in the name of and through 
his entities, Golden Summit and Extreme Capital.  By virtue of Coddington’s conduct, Golden 
Summit and Extreme Capital are liable as participants in the scheme to defraud. 
185. As alleged herein, Malouf participated in the scheme to defraud by soliciting 
investors to invest in the CMO Trading Program, and in furtherance of the scheme, he committed 
the following deceptive acts, including but not limited to: 
a. Malouf made false and misleading statements, and failed to disclose information,  
to investors regarding investments in the CMO Trading Program; 
 
b. Malouf provided false and misleading information about the CMO Trading 
Program both orally and in writing to Geisler and Gunn to be provided to 
investors that were interested in investing in the CMO Trading Program; 
 
c. Malouf made false and misleading lulling statements to investors, directly or 
indirectly through others, to prevent investors from seeking a return of funds or 
CMOs, or from contacting regulatory authorities; and 
 
d. Malouf received and spent investors’ funds for his personal benefit. 
 
186. As alleged herein, Geisler participated in the scheme to defraud by soliciting 
investors to invest in the CMO Trading Program, and in furtherance of the scheme, he committed 
the following deceptive acts, including but not limited to: 
a. Geisler made false and misleading statements, and failed to disclose information,  
to investors regarding investments in the CMO Trading Program; 
 
b. Geisler made false and misleading lulling statements to investors to prevent them 
from seeking a return of funds or CMOs, or from contacting regulatory 
authorities; and 
 
c. Geisler received and spent investors’ funds for his personal benefit. 
187. As alleged herein, Gunn participated in the scheme to defraud by soliciting 
investors to invest in the CMO Trading Program, and in furtherance of the scheme, he committed 
the following deceptive acts, including but not limited to: 

43 
 
a. Gunn made false and misleading statements, and failed to disclose information,  
to investors regarding investments in the CMO Trading Program; 
 
b. Gunn made false and misleading lulling statements to investors to prevent them 
from seeking a return of funds or CMOs, or from contacting regulatory 
authorities; and 
 
c. Gunn received and spent investors’ funds for his own personal benefit. 
 
188. As alleged herein, at various times Geisler and Gunn acted in the name of and 
through their entities; SouthCom, FASC, and Geisco.  By virtue of Geisler’s and Gunn’s 
conduct, SouthCom, FASC, and Geisco are each liable as participants in the scheme to defraud. 
189. As alleged herein, Erwin participated in the scheme to defraud, and in furtherance 
thereof,  committed the following deceptive acts, including but not limited to: 
a. Erwin made false and misleading statements, and failed to disclose information,  
to investors regarding investments in the CMO Trading Program; 
 
b. Erwin received investors’ funds into his attorney trust account and distributed 
those funds at Coddington’s direction for the benefit of participants in the scheme;  
 
c. Erwin received and spent investors’ funds for his personal benefit;  
 
d. Erwin executed an investment agreement as the attorney of record for Golden 
Summit; and 
 
e. Erwin made false and misleading lulling statements to investors, directly or 
indirectly through others, to prevent investors from seeking a return of funds or 
CMOs, or from contacting regulatory authorities. 
 
190. As alleged herein, Leyton aided and abetted the scheme to defraud, and in 
furtherance thereof, provided the following substantial assistance, including but not limited to: 
a. Leyton opened brokerage accounts to enable investors to transfer their CMOs to 
the defendants to invest in the purported CMO Trading Program; 
 
b. Leyton transferred CMOs out of brokerage accounts at Viewpoint Securities 
contrary to agreements between defendants and investors; 
 
c. Leyton helped delay the return of CMOs to investors; 
 

44 
 
d. Leyton ignored investors’ complaints;  
 
e. Leyton provided false information to third parties; 
 
f. Leyton facilitated the liquidation of investors’ CMOs; 
 
g. Leyton facilitated Coddington’s misappropriation of CMOs’ interest; and 
 
h. Leyton received and spent investors’ funds for his personal benefit. 
 
191. As alleged herein, Columbia aided and abetted the scheme to defraud, and in 
furtherance thereof, provided the following substantial assistance, including but not limited to: 
a. Columbia liquidated CMOs contrary to agreements between defendants and 
investors; 
 
b. Columbia used proceeds from the sales of CMOs for his personal benefit and 
made payments of proceeds for the benefit of his wife; 
 
c. Columbia paid proceeds from the sale of CMOs back to Coddington and to others 
at Coddington’s direction; and  
 
d. Columbia provided false information to other defendants that they used to make 
false and misleading lulling statements to investors. 
 
192. As alleged herein, at various times Columbia acted in the name of and through his 
entity, Stonerock.  By virtue of Columbia’s conduct, Stonerock aided and abetted the fraudulent 
scheme. 
REGISTRATION VIOLATIONS 
193. Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, 
SouthCom, and Geisco, offered and sold investment contracts in the CMO Trading Program 
which are securities.  In addition, these defendants solicited investors’ funds which were used to 
purchase CMOs, which are securities in the form of bonds.  

45 
 
194. Investors pooled their funds or CMOs for participation in the CMO Trading 
Program with the expectation that they would receive profits from the efforts of Golden Summit, 
Coddington, Extreme Capital, Malouf, SouthCom, Geisco, Geisler or Gunn. 
195. These defendants offered and sold the securities by means of interstate commerce 
by placing telephone calls, sending emails and requesting wire transfers of funds or securities. 
196. During 2010 and 2011, no registration statement was filed or in effect with the 
SEC for the defendants’ offers or sales of CMOs or investments in the CMO Trading Program. 
BROKER-DEALER REGISTRATION VIOLATIONS 
197. From at least January 1, 2010, Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden 
Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom and Geisco engaged in the business of inducing or 
attempting to induce the purchase or sale of securities relating to the CMO Trading Program.  
198. Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom 
and Geisco each used interstate commerce, sending emails and speaking by telephone with 
investors about the CMO Trading Program.  
199. Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom 
and Geisco each were to receive transaction-based compensation. 
200. Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom 
and Geisco were not registered as brokers or dealers, or associated with a broker-dealer 
registered with the SEC while they induced or attempted to induce the purchase or sale of 
securities. 
  

46 
 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Offer and Sale of Unregistered Securities  
In Violation of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act  
[15 U.S.C. §§ 77e (a) and 77e(c)] 
 
201. Paragraphs 1 through 200 are hereby realleged and incorporated by reference. 
202. The investments that defendants offered and sold in the CMO Trading Program 
and the CMOs that the defendants offered to purchase or invest in the CMO Trading Program, 
are “securities” as that term is defined in Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act and Section 
3(a)(10) the Exchange Act, 15 U.S. C. §§ 77b(a)(1) and 78c(a)(10). 
203. Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, 
SouthCom, and Geisco, directly or indirectly, singly or in concert, made use of the means or 
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell 
securities through the use or medium of a prospectus or otherwise, or caused to be carried 
through the mails or in interstate commerce by any means or instruments of transportation, 
securities for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale when no registration statement was in 
effect as to those securities. 
204. Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom 
and Geisco, directly or indirectly, singly or in concert, made use of the means or instruments of 
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to 
buy securities through the use or medium of a prospectus or otherwise, when no registration 
statement had been filed for those securities.  
205. By virtue of this conduct, Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, 
Extreme Capital, SouthCom and Geisco have each violated and, unless restrained and enjoined, 
will continue to violate Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act , 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and 
77e(c). 

47 
 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Fraud – Violations of Securities Act Section 17(a) 
[15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)] 
206. The SEC realleges paragraphs 1 through 200 above. 
207. Coddington, Erwin, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, 
SouthCom, Geisco, and FASC, directly and indirectly, in the offer or sale of securities, by use of 
the means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of 
the mails:  (a) employed a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud with scienter; (b) obtained 
money or property by means of untrue statements of material fact or omissions to state material 
facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading; or (c) engaged in transactions, practices, or courses of business 
which have been or are operating as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers of the securities. 
208. Columbia, Leyton, and Stonerock aided and abetted violations of Securities Act 
Section 17(a) by Coddington and Golden Summit.  
209. Alternatively, Coddington and Erwin aided and abetted violations of Securities 
Act Section 17(a) by Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, FASC, Geisco, and SouthCom.  
210. By virtue of this conduct, Coddington, Columbia, Erwin, Geisler, Gunn, Leyton, 
Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom, Geisco and Stonerock violated, or aided 
and abetted violations, and unless restrained and enjoined will in the future violate, or aid and 
abet violations of, Securities Act Section 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a). 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Fraud – Violations of Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
[15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5] 
211. The SEC realleges paragraphs 1 through 200 above. 
212. Coddington, Erwin, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, 
SouthCom, Geisco, and FASC, directly or indirectly, with scienter, in connection with the 

48 
 
purchase or sale of securities, by the use of means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 
the mails, or any facility of a national securities exchange:  (a) employed devices, schemes, or 
artifices to defraud; (b) made untrue statements of material fact or omitted to state material facts 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading; or (c) engaged in acts, practices, or courses of business which 
operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person; in violation of Exchange Act 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
213. Columbia, Leyton, and Stonerock aided and abetted violations of Exchange Act 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by Coddington and Golden Summit.  
214. Alternatively, Coddington and Erwin aided and abetted violations of Exchange 
Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, FASC, Geisco, and SouthCom. 
215. By virtue of this conduct, Coddington, Columbia, Erwin, Geisler, Gunn, Leyton, 
Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom, Geisco and Stonerock violated, or aided 
and abetted violations, and unless restrained and enjoined will in the future violate, or aid and 
abet violations of, Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
 Acting As an Unregistered Broker-Dealers  
 in Violation of Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act 
 [15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)] 
  
216. Paragraphs 1 through 200 are hereby realleged and incorporated by reference. 
217. In connection with their offer and sale of the securities, Coddington, Geisler, 
Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom, and Geisco acted as brokers or 
dealers engaged in the regular business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of 
others, or buying and selling securities for their own accounts.   

49 
 
218. Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, 
SouthCom, and Geisco made use of the mails or the means or instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce to effect transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of 
securities w hile they were not registered with the SEC as a broker-dealer or associated with a 
broker-dealer. 
219. By virtue of this conduct, Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, 
Extreme Capital, SouthCom, and Geisco have each violated and, unless restrained and enjoined, 
will continue to violate Section 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1). 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Unjust Enrichment of Relief Defendants 
220. Paragraphs 1 through 200 are hereby realleged and incorporated by reference. 
221. Scott Coddington, Coddington Trust, Joanna Columbia also known as Joanna I. 
Ornowska, Farris Co., and Farris obtained funds as part, and in furtherance of the securities 
violations alleged above without a legitimate claim to the funds, and under those circumstances it 
is not just, equitable or conscionable for them to retain the funds.   
222. Scott Coddington, Coddington Trust, Joanna Columbia also known as Joanna I. 
Ornowska, Farris Co., and Farris were unjustly enriched. 
223. By virtue of this conduct, Scott Coddington, Coddington Trust, Joanna Columbia 
also known as Joanna I. Ornowska, Farris Co., and Farris should be ordered to disgorge the funds 
they received as a result of the defendants’ violations of the federal securities laws. 
  

50 
 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
 WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court: 
I. 
 Find that the Defendants, and each of them, committed the violations alleged. 
II. 
 Enter an Order of Permanent Injunction as to each defendant, in a form consistent with 
Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, enjoining each defendant from further 
violations of the provisions of law and rules alleged in this Complaint. 
III. 
Enter an Order requiring the defendants and relief defendants to prepare an accounting of 
the proceeds they obtained from the offers and sales of the CMOs.   
IV.  
Enter an Order requiring defendants to disgorge all ill-gotten gains resulting from their 
participation in the conduct described above, including pre-judgment and post judgment interest. 
V. 
 Enter an Order requiring all defendants to pay third-tier civil penalties pursuant to 
Section 20(d) of the Securities Act and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
77t(d) and 78u(d)(3).  
VI. 
Enter an Order requiring Scott Coddington, Coddington Trust, Joanna Columbia also 
known as Joanna I. Ornowska, Farris Co., and Farris to disgorge funds that they received that 
were the proceeds of illegal activities of other defendants.  

51 
 
VII. 
Grant such further equitable relief as this Court deems appropriate and necessary. 
 
Dated:  December 12, 2013. 
      Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
      s/ Leslie J. Hughes     
      Leslie J. Hughes 
Colorado Bar No. 15043 
 
Attorney for the United States  
      Securities and Exchange Commission 
      Denver Regional Office 
      1801 California Street, Suite 1500 
      Denver, CO  80202-2656 
      Telephone: 303-844-1000 
      Fax: 303-844-1068 
      E-mail: [email protected]
 

1 
 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

 
Civil Action No.  1:13-cv-3363 

Securities and Exchange Commission, 

   Plaintiff, 

v.        

Daniel Dirk Coddington, 
Michael B. Columbia, 
Jesse W. Erwin Jr., 
Merlyn Curt Geisler, 
Marshall D. Gunn, Jr., CPA, 
Seth A. Leyton, 
Lewis P. Malouf, 
Extreme Capital Ltd., 
Fidelity Asset Services Corp.,  
Geisco FNF, LLC, 
Golden Summit Investors Group Ltd., 
SouthCom Management LLC, 
Stonerock Capital Group LLC, 
 
   Defendants, and, 

Daniel Scott Coddington, 
Coddington Family Trust,  
Joanna I. Columbia also known as Joanna I. Ornowska, 
Vincent G. Farris, 
Vincent G. Farris Co., L.P.A., 
 
   Relief Defendants. 
 
 

COMPLAINT 
 

 Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) alleges: 

1. This case involves a securities offering fraud orchestrated by Daniel Dirk 

Coddington (“Coddington”), who was the principal architect and primary beneficiary of the 



2 
 

scheme.  Coddington enlisted the other named defendants to participate in and assist him with 

the scheme, and they also profited substantially from their roles in the scheme.   

2. Coddington’s securities fraud followed the general pattern of “prime bank 

schemes,” in which the perpetrators solicit the investment of cash or securities into a vaguely-

defined and ultimately non-existent trading program, which purportedly involved leveraging the 

investors’ assets to fund securities trading in order to generate promised astronomical profits.  

From in or about January 2010 through at least July 2011, Coddington and the other defendants 

obtained more than $18 million in cash and approximately $14 billion in face, or notional value, 

of securities known as “Collateralized Mortgage Obligations” (“CMOs”) from more than 18 

investors nationwide for Coddington’s program.  CMOs are bonds that are backed by a pool of 

residential or commercial mortgages, and pay monthly interest and principal as provided by the 

terms of the bonds.  CMOs trade in the public securities markets, typically at a market value that 

is a fraction of their face value. 

3. In this fraudulent scheme, the defendants offered investments in what is referred 

to herein as “the CMO Trading Program,” that would purportedly produce annual returns ranging 

from 250% to 475% using CMOs purchased with investors’ funds or CMOs provided by 

investors.  Specifically, the defendants represented that they had access to financing sources 

whereby they could “hypothecate” or pledge the CMOs to obtain loans of 5% of the current 

value of the CMOs.  Defendants further represented that they would use the leveraged loan 

proceeds to both make distributions of funds back to investors and to earn astronomical profits 

for investors through a purported equities trading platform. 

4. In reality, these representations were false.  The CMO Trading Program did not 

exist.  Defendants did not have access to financing sources to obtain loans with the CMOs, none 



3 
 

of the CMOs were hypothecated, investors did not receive distributions of funds, no loan 

proceeds were invested in any equities trading platform, and defendants spent investors’ funds 

and used investors’ CMOs for their own personal purposes.  As a result of the scheme, investors 

suffered total losses of their invested funds and most lost the CMOs they invested in the scheme.  

5. Coddington recruited Lewis P. Malouf (“Malouf”), Merlyn Curt Geisler 

(“Geisler”), and Marshall D. Gunn, Jr. (“Gunn”) to solicit investors for the CMO Trading 

Program.  Malouf, Geisler, and Gunn made false and misleading statements to investors about 

the purported CMO Trading Program.  They each also made false and misleading “lulling” 

statements to investors about purported delays in the CMO Trading Program to prevent investors 

from demanding the return of their funds or CMOs, and from contacting regulatory authorities.  

Malouf, Geisler, and Gunn received investors’ funds from Coddington as a result of their 

participation in the scheme.  

6. Coddington also enlisted his attorney, Jesse W. Erwin, Jr. (“Erwin”), to 

participate in the scheme.  Erwin made false and misleading statements to investors regarding the 

CMO Trading Program, and he received investors’ funds into his attorney trust account and 

improperly distributed the funds to participants in the scheme.  Erwin also sent lulling letters and 

emails to investors containing false and misleading statements about purported delays in the 

CMO Trading Program to prevent investors from demanding return of their funds or CMOs, and 

from contacting regulatory authorities.  Erwin received investors’ funds from Coddington as a 

result of his participation in the scheme.   

7. Coddington also recruited Seth Leyton (“Leyton”), a registered representative and 

owner of the securities brokerage firm named “Viewpoint Securities LLC” (“Viewpoint 

Securities”) to assist with the scheme.  At Coddington’s direction, Leyton opened brokerage 



4 
 

accounts to enable investors to transfer their CMOs to the defendants, delayed return of the 

CMOs to investors when Coddington was unable to hypothecate them, sold investors’ CMOs, 

and transferred investors’ CMOs out of Viewpoint Securities brokerage accounts to other 

accounts where they were sold contrary to agreements with investors.  Leyton received investors’ 

funds from Coddington and promises of additional business from Coddington as a result of his 

participation in the scheme.    

8. Coddington also enlisted Michael Columbia (“Columbia”) to liquidate investors’ 

CMOs as part of the scheme.  Columbia sold a portion of the investors’ CMOs for approximately 

$3.4 million and paid a portion of the proceeds back to Coddington.  Columbia and his wife, 

relief defendant Joanna Columbia, misappropriated the balance of the funds from the sale of the 

CMOs to pay their personal expenses. 

9. In addition to their fraudulent conduct, Coddington, Malouf, Geisler, Gunn, and 

entities they controlled acted as unregistered broker-dealers in offering the CMO Trading 

Program to investors, and each offered and sold unregistered securities in violation of the federal 

securities laws. 

10. Finally, Coddington transferred ill-gotten gains to his son, Scott Coddington, the 

Coddington Trust, Vincent G. Farris Co. LPA, and its principal, Vincent G. Farris, without 

receiving any consideration in exchange.  

DEFENDANTS 

11. Defendant Daniel Dirk Coddington (“Coddington”), who was born in 1954, is a 

resident of Colorado Springs, Colorado.  He is the father of Daniel Scott Coddington (“Scott 

Coddington”).  In response to a SEC subpoena seeking his testimony under oath during the 



5 
 

investigation of this matter, Coddington refused to answer any questions asserting his right 

against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.   

12. Defendant Golden Summit Investors Group Ltd. (“Golden Summit”) was 

incorporated in Nevada on July 26, 1999.  At relevant times, Golden Summit’s principal place of 

business was Colorado Springs, Colorado.  Golden Summit represented that it engaged in asset-

based lending and project funding.  Coddington was the chief executive officer, chief financial 

officer, president, secretary, and director of Golden Summit.  Coddington was a signatory on 

Golden Summit’s bank accounts.  Golden Summit is owned by Coddington and he does business 

as “Golden Summit.” 

13. Defendant Extreme Capital Ltd. (“Extreme Capital”) was incorporated in 

Nevada on July 29, 1999.  Extreme Capital was also incorporated in Colorado in 2010.  At 

relevant times, Extreme Capital’s principal place of business was Colorado Springs, Colorado.  

Coddington and his son, Scott Coddington, were officers or directors of Extreme Capital and 

signatories on its bank accounts.   

14. Defendant Lewis P. Malouf (“Malouf”), who was born in 1943, is a resident of 

Huntington Beach, California.  He was an executive vice president of Extreme Capital.  In 

response to a SEC subpoena seeking his testimony under oath during the investigation of this 

matter, Malouf refused to answer any questions asserting his right against self-incrimination 

under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.   

15. Defendant Merlyn Curt Geisler (“Geisler”), who was born in 1952, is a resident 

of Jacksonville, Florida.   

16. Defendant Marshall D. Gunn, Jr. (“Gunn”), who was born in 1953, is a resident 

of Orange Park, Florida.  Gunn is a certified public accountant licensed with the state of Florida. 



6 
 

17. Defendant SouthCom Management LLC (“SouthCom”) is a Florida limited 

liability company formed in December 2009.  Its principal place of business is in Jacksonville, 

Florida.  SouthCom was managed by Gunn and Geisler, who were its members. 

18. Defendant Fidelity Asset Services Corporation (“FASC”) is a Florida 

corporation incorporated in December 2009.  Its principal place of business is Jacksonville, 

Florida.  Gunn was the president and secretary of FASC; and Geisler was a signatory on FASC’s 

bank account at Ironstone Bank.   

19. Defendant Geisco FNF, LLC (“Geisco”) is a Florida limited liability company 

formed in March 2010.  Its principal place of business is Jacksonville, Florida. Geisco was 

established to allow investors to pool their money for investment purposes.  Geisco was managed 

by Geisler and Gunn.   

20. Defendant Jesse W. Erwin, Jr. (“Erwin”), who was born in 1966, is a resident of 

Las Vegas, Nevada.  Erwin is an attorney admitted to practice law in the state of New York.  In 

response to a SEC subpoena seeking his testimony under oath during the investigation of this 

matter, Erwin refused to answer any questions asserting his right against self-incrimination under 

the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 

21. Defendant Seth A. Leyton (“Leyton”), who was born in 1967, is a resident of San 

Diego, California.  He was a registered representative, chief executive officer, managing 

member, and chief compliance officer of Viewpoint Securities, which was a securities brokerage 

firm with its principal place of business in San Diego, California.  Viewpoint Securities 

withdrew its registration as a broker-dealer with the SEC, which was effective on December 22, 

2012.  On or about October 11, 2013, FINRA barred Leyton from association with any FINRA 

member in any capacity in connection with his conduct alleged in this Complaint.   



7 
 

22. Defendant Michael B. Columbia, (“Columbia”), who was born in 1985, was a 

resident of Arizona at all times relevant to the Complaint.  Columbia is currently being detained  

in Arkansas pending resolution of charges that he violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2(b), for wire 

fraud and aiding and abetting.   

23. Defendant Stonerock Capital Group LLC (“Stonerock”) was a Nevada limited 

liability company created on June 15, 2010, with its principal place of business in Arizona.  Its 

status as a LLC was revoked by the Nevada Secretary of State on May 1, 2013.  Columbia was a 

managing member and listed as the chief executive officer (“CEO”), chairman, and executive 

vice president of Stonerock. 

24. Relief defendant Joanna I. Columbia, also known as Joanna I. Ornowska, is the 

wife of Columbia.  She was listed as a board member and CEO of Stonerock.  She is a resident 

of Arizona. 

25. Relief defendant Daniel Scott Coddington, known as Scott Coddington (“Scott 

Coddington”), was born in 1976, and is a resident of Colorado Springs, Colorado.  He is the son 

of Coddington.  From at least September 11, 2009, Scott Coddington was the vice president, 

treasurer, and director of Golden Summit, and signatory on its bank accounts.  He was an officer 

and director of Extreme Capital, and signatory on its bank accounts.   

26. Relief defendant Coddington Family Trust (“Coddington Trust”) is a trust 

formed in Colorado in or about 2004.  Its principal place of business is Colorado Springs, 

Colorado.  Coddington and Scott Coddington are the trustees of Coddington Trust.  

27. Relief Defendant Vincent G. Farris (“Farris”) is a resident of Ohio.  He is an 

attorney licensed to practice law in Ohio since 1993.  



8 
 

28. Relief Defendant Vincent G. Farris Co., LPA (“Farris Co.”) is a limited 

professional association formed in Ohio.  Farris is a partner of Farris Co. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

29. The SEC brings this action under Section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 

(“Securities Act”), and Section 21(d) and (e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange 

Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d) and (e); to restrain and enjoin the defendants from engaging 

in the acts, practices and courses of business described in this Complaint, and acts, practices and 

courses of business of similar purport and object.  The SEC seeks permanent injunctions, 

disgorgement of ill-gotten gains derived from the conduct alleged in the Complaint, and third-tier 

civil penalties under Section 20(d) of the Securities Act and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange 

Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(d) and 78u(d)(3). 

30. This Court has jurisdiction under Section 22(a) of the Securities Act, and Section 

27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a) and 78aa.   

31. The defendants, directly or indirectly, made use of the means and 

instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of the mails, in connection with the acts, practices 

and courses of business alleged in the Complaint.  

32. Certain of the acts, practices, and courses of business constituting violations of 

law alleged in the Complaint occurred within the District of Colorado.  In addition, Coddington 

and Scott Coddington reside, and Golden Summit, Extreme Capital and the Coddington Trust 

have their principal place of business in Colorado.  Erwin, Malouf, Leyton, Geisler, Gunn, 

SouthCom, Geisco, FASC, Columbia, and Stonerock engaged in transactions within the District 

of Colorado. 

  



9 
 

SCHEME TO DEFRAUD 

33. The primary object of the defendants’ fraudulent offering scheme was to induce 

investors to invest funds or CMOs into the purported CMO Trading Program in order to 

misappropriate funds or misuse the CMOs.  At all times, defendants’ fraudulent scheme involved 

some or all of the following manner and means, including: 

a. Making misleading statements and omissions to investors to induce them to 
invest funds or CMOs into the CMO Trading Program; 

 
b. Misappropriating investors’ funds for the defendants’ own personal uses; 

 
c. Using investors’ CMOs for the defendants’ own personal uses, such as 

misappropriating interest due under the terms of the CMOs or selling the CMOs 
and misappropriating the proceeds; 

 
d. Transferring funds and CMOs contrary to the investment agreements between the 

defendants and investors; and 
 

e. Making lulling statements to investors to prevent them from discovering the 
fraud, seeking a return of their funds or CMOs, or contacting regulatory 
authorities. 

 
34. Although the fraudulent scheme evolved over time, at all times the defendants 

relied upon one or more of the following core representations to solicit funds or CMOs from 

investors, including that: 

a. The defendants possessed specialized knowledge and experience and had access 
to an equities trading platform that provided astronomical returns ranging from 
250% to 475% annually from equities trading; 

 
b. The defendants would use investors’ funds to purchase CMOs to use in the CMO 

Trading Program; 
 
c. The defendants would use CMOs owned by investors, or CMOs purchased with 

investors’ funds, to serve as collateral in order to “hypothecate” the CMOs to 
obtain loan proceeds of 5% of the current value of the CMOs; 

 
d. This hypothecation of CMOs would allow investors to receive advance 

distributions in amounts roughly equal to their initial cash investment or the 
current value of their CMO within 15 to 30 days.  The remaining funds derived 



10 
 

through the hypothecation would be pledged to the equities trading platform in 
order to generate the returns ranging from 250% to 475% annually; 

 
e. Investments would be held in the equities trading platform for one year, with 

profit disbursements made weekly or bi-weekly; and 
 
f. No fees or commissions would be paid by investors until the CMOs were 

successfully hypothecated. 
 

35. All of these representations were false.  In fact: 

a. None of the defendants possessed specialized knowledge and experience or had 
access to an equities trading platform that provided astronomical returns ranging 
from 250% to 475% annually from equities trading; 

 
b. The defendants used only a portion of investors’ funds to purchase CMOs;   

 
c. The defendants did not use CMOs owned by investors, or CMOs purchased with 

investors’ funds, to serve as collateral for hypothecation to obtain loans;   
 

d. The defendants did not successfully hypothecate any CMOs, they failed to 
provide any of the promised distributions or profits, and they failed to invest any 
funds into an equities trading platform;  

 
e. The defendants misappropriated investors’ funds prior to even seeking to 

hypothecate CMOs (which ultimately never occurred); and 
 

f. Coddington paid compensation to defendants and others out of investors’ funds 
before the CMOs were hypothecated, loans obtained or any trading occurred. 
 

36. As explained further below, during the period at issue, defendants used variations 

of the above manner and means and misrepresentations to carry out the fraudulent scheme. 

A. The Scheme Began with Coddington, Erwin, and Malouf, Who Then Recruited 
Geisler and Gunn 
 

37. Prior to 2010, Coddington, Malouf, and Erwin had been business associates in 

offering various investment schemes to investors. 

38. This scheme began in or about January 2010, when Coddington and Malouf 

agreed that Malouf would solicit investors into the CMO Trading Program.  



11 
 

39. At that time, Coddington and Malouf agreed that they would represent to 

investors that they had the ability to hypothecate or pledge CMOs as collateral to obtain loans 

from a funding source which funds would be used to pay pre-trade distributions to investors and 

to invest in a trading platform that could generate profits of more than 475% within a year.  

40. In or about January 2010, Malouf recruited Geisler, Gunn, and their entity, 

SouthCom, to act as brokers to find investors with CMOs to invest in the purported CMO 

Trading Program.  In telephone conversations and emails, Malouf described the CMO Trading 

Program to Geisler and Gunn with the understanding that they would use this information to 

solicit investors.   

41. In furtherance of the scheme, Malouf sent Geisler and Gunn an email on 

January 25, 2010, in which he explained the steps of the program and sent financial projection 

charts for Geisler and Gunn to give to investors.  

42. Geisler forwarded Malouf’s January 25, 2010 email and charts to Gunn stating, 

“Marshall I thing (sic) we have a home run ... take a look at these pro forma’s (sic).”   

43. The information Malouf provided to Geisler and Gunn about the CMO Trading 

Program was materially false and misleading since Malouf, Coddington and Golden Summit did 

not have the ability to hypothecate the CMOs and obtain loans, to act as a funding source of 

loans, or to make pre-trade distributions to investors.  Nor did they have access to a trading 

platform that could generate the promised profits of 475% per year.  Malouf knew, or was 

reckless in not knowing, that the information he provided to Geisler and Gunn was false.  

Nonetheless, he provided the misleading information to Geisler and Gunn knowing it would be 

communicated to investors.  



12 
 

44. Shortly after being contacted by Malouf, in or about January 2010, Geisler, Gunn, 

and SouthCom began soliciting investors through telephone conversations and emails.  In the 

communications with possible investors, Geisler, Gunn, and SouthCom made false and 

misleading statements about the CMO Trading Program using the information that was provided 

to them by Malouf.   

45. In or about January 2010, Geisler and Gunn on behalf of SouthCom had 

conversations with, and sent emails to, at least three investors and falsely represented that: 

a. Malouf or the funding source would hypothecate the investors’ CMOs to obtain 
loans; 

 
b. Malouf or the funding source would pay pre-trade distributions of between 

$500,000 and $1,000,000 to each investor; and  
 

c. Malouf or the funding source would invest the loan proceeds in a trading platform 
that would generate profits of approximately 475%.   

 
46. Geisler, Gunn and SouthCom knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that their 

statements to investors about the CMO Trading Program were false and misleading.  Geisler, 

Gunn, and SouthCom conducted no due diligence or investigation to determine whether 

Malouf’s representations about the structure and profitability of the CMO Trading Program were 

true.  They did no investigation to determine the identity of the purported funding source, to 

verify its financial ability to make loans of tens of millions of dollars, or to determine whether it 

had any experience or success trading securities and generating returns of up to 475% per year. 

47. By means of their false and misleading statements, Geisler, Gunn and Southcom, 

convinced three investors to invest CMOs with total face values of approximately $4.6 billion 

into the CMO Trading Program.  The CMOs were transferred into an account at a securities 

brokerage firm in the name of Golden Summit on or about February 12, 2010. 



13 
 

48. Shortly thereafter, Malouf, Geisler and Gunn failed to deliver on the promises 

they made to the three investors relating to the purported CMO Trading Program.   

49. In furtherance of the scheme, from on or about February 17, 2010, through at least 

May 4, 2010, Malouf spoke with, and sent dozens of emails to Geisler and Gunn, in which he 

represented a variety of false excuses for delays in the required payments that were due to the 

three investors.  Malouf made these false and misleading statements to Geisler and Gunn with 

the intention that his statements would be repeated to the investors.  By means of these 

statements, Malouf delayed return of the CMOs until approximately May 2010. 

50. Geisler and Gunn knew or were reckless in not knowing that Malouf’s lulling 

statements were false and misleading.  Yet in furtherance of the scheme, they repeated Malouf’s 

false and misleading statements to the investors, aided the concealment of the fraud, and delayed 

the investors’ requests for return of the CMOs. 

51. Between February 12, and April 30, 2010, by means of Malouf, Geisler and 

Gunn’s false statements to investors, Golden Summit and Coddington obtained approximately 

$131,122 in interest payments paid on the three investors’ CMOs that had been deposited into 

Golden Summit’s brokerage account.  Coddington, as an officer and director of Golden Summit, 

controlled Golden Summit’s brokerage account.   

52. Coddington misappropriated the interest payments from the CMOs to pay for his 

debit card transactions and also made transfers to Golden Summit’s bank account for his 

personal benefit.  

53. In or about May, 2010, Golden Summit and Coddington returned the CMOs to the 

three investors after the investors made demands to the brokerage firm for their return.  As a 

result, the brokerage firm closed Golden Summit’s account.  



14 
 

B. Leyton Assists the Scheme Despite Clear Red Flags About the Activities of 
Coddington and Malouf 

 
54. Following the closure of Golden Summit’s first brokerage account, Coddington 

telephoned Leyton, a registered representative and owner of Viewpoint Securities located in San 

Diego, California, to open a new brokerage account for Golden Summit (“Golden Summit’s 

Viewpoint Securities account”) on or about May 21, 2010.  Leyton sent the new account 

documents to Coddington in Colorado.  Coddington was authorized to buy or sell securities, or to 

withdraw funds from Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account.  

55. When Leyton gathered information about Golden Summit to open the account, he 

learned that Golden Summit and Malouf were identified in news articles as participating in the 

Bayou Hedge Fund Group fraud in 2005, through which more than $300 million raised from 

investors was misappropriated by fund managers.  Despite this, he opened the account for 

Golden Summit and Coddington.   

56. On or about June 18, 2010, Leyton became aware of a dispute over the ownership 

of certain CMOs that had been transferred into Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account 

when the owner of the CMOs contacted Viewpoint Securities to locate and regain possession of 

the CMOs.   

57. On June 22, 2010, Golden Summit received a monthly interest payment of 

$18,051.98 on the CMOs.  Coddington immediately wired $18,000 of that amount to Golden 

Summit’s JP Morgan Chase bank account.  

58. Over the next month, Leyton exchanged several emails with Coddington and the 

owner of the CMOs through which Leyton learned that Coddington misrepresented the details of 

the CMO transaction, and that Malouf misrepresented that the CMOs could not be returned 

because the owner’s brokerage account was closed.  



15 
 

59. Subsequently, on or about July 3, 2010, Leyton sent emails to the CMO owner’s 

attorney and Coddington questioning the legality of the transaction, asking whether it was an 

unregistered securities transaction, and indicating that he might contact the Financial Industry 

Regulatory Authority, Inc. (“FINRA”) and the SEC about the matter. 

60. On or about July 8, 2010, Coddington provided Leyton with an email that falsely 

stated that the owner no longer sought the return of its CMOs, instead preferring to proceed with 

the transaction.  Although Leyton discovered these statements were untrue and designed to 

obstruct or delay return of the CMOs, Leyton nonetheless continued his business relationship 

with Golden Summit. 

61. To smooth over the relationship with Leyton, Coddington emailed Leyton on 

July 9, 2010, that he was about to close on some “Bank of Ireland bonds” and would pay Leyton 

$50,000 as a fee related to the deal.   

62. On July 10, 2010, Leyton emailed the CMO owner’s attorney and Coddington 

about signing a legal release for the delivery of the CMOs.  He stressed that “zero is exactly the 

amount my firm is going to realize from this transaction regardless of anyone’s performance (or 

lack thereof)” and demanded they “[g]et this bond and this f***ed up, unlicensed, unregistered 

transaction out of my firm.”    

63. Then, on July 15, 2010, Leyton emailed Coddington that he had not received the 

signed release for the CMOs and planned to freeze Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities 

account by noon.  But, Leyton did not freeze the account.  Instead, at the end of the day he sent 

another email to Coddington, stating:  “Let’s get back on the subject of business.  Golden 

Summit earned [$]18,000 utilizing my firm as a platform.  Viewpoint has incurred fees.  Fair?  

Not even close to being fair.  To be honest it’s so egregiously unfair it’s causing me problems 



16 
 

with my business partners.  Problems, I don’t need.  What is in the hopper?  And please be 

specific.”  

64. On July 16, 2010, Coddington emailed a response to Leyton’s overture, stating:  

“On some future business I have some funds coming on Wednesday I was going to pay your firm 

or you $5,000 to help out and for services. . . . Where do you want that paid company or you? 

Please advise so I can make appropriate plans!!! Makes no difference to me you decide.”  

65. On or about July 21, 2010, Leyton received the signed release from Coddington to 

return the CMOs, but delayed processing it until July 22, 2010.  This delay allowed Golden 

Summit to receive an additional monthly interest payment of $18,811.88 from the CMOs.  Upon 

receipt of the interest payment on July 22, 2010, Coddington immediately wired $18,711 to 

Golden Summit’s JP Morgan Chase bank account.   

66. Later on July 22, 2010, Viewpoint Securities transferred the CMOs out of Golden 

Summit’s account and back to the owner. 

67. On July 23, 2010, after the second interest payment had been received on the 

CMO, Coddington wired from Golden Summit’s JP Morgan Chase bank account $9,355.94, 

approximately half of the second interest payment, to a bank account controlled by Leyton under 

the name of Noah Capital LLC.   

68. Subsequently, after receiving the payment from Coddington and the promise of 

future business, Leyton stopped raising questions about the problem CMO transaction and did 

not contact FINRA or the SEC.  As described below, after July 2010, Leyton assisted 

Coddington and others in the scheme and received additional funds from Coddington.  

  



17 
 

C. Coddington, Golden Summit, Geisler, Gunn, SouthCom, Geisco, and FASC 
Continue the Scheme with New Investors  

 
69. After successfully finding the initial three investors, Geisler, Gunn, and their 

entities entered into an arrangement with Coddington to continue offering the CMO Trading 

Program, dealing directly with Coddington rather than through Malouf. 

70. On or about July 6, 2010, Geisler spoke by telephone with Coddington in 

Colorado.  They agreed that Geisler, Gunn, and SouthCom would act as brokers to offer and sell 

investments in the CMO Trading Program to investors.   

71. After the call, Geisler emailed Gunn and stated: “Dan [Coddington] who is the 

managing architect behind the trade programs as well as the real reason Lew [Malouf] exists has 

just approved us to be a principle [sic] trade program manager. . . .  Marshall we have arrived I 

never thought we could stand the pain but because of Lew and his attitude and my background 

we have been invited into the real world of wealth.”   

72. On or about September 22, 2010, Geisler and Gunn signed agreements with 

Coddington and Golden Summit memorializing their verbal agreement to offer and sell 

investments in the CMO Trading Program.  Gunn emailed the agreements to Coddington in 

Colorado.  

73. Geisler and Gunn entered into the agreements despite the fact that they already 

knew that Coddington had failed to deliver on his earlier promises with respect to the investors 

whom they had solicited into the CMO Trading Program through Malouf.   

74. Coddington sent the agreements to his attorney, Erwin.  These documents along 

with his prior business dealings with Coddington and Golden Summit provided Erwin with 

knowledge that Coddington and Golden Summit were obtaining CMOs from investors, which 



18 
 

were to be hypothecated to provide loan proceeds for investment in a trading platform that 

purportedly provided substantial profits.  

75. In telephone calls and emails during September 2010, Coddington, Geisler, and 

Gunn refined their pitch for the CMO Trading Program.  They agreed to solicit funds or CMOs 

from investors by representing to investors that:   

a. Golden Summit and Coddington would obtain loans of 5% of current value of the 
CMOs by hypothecating the CMOs obtained from investors or purchased using 
investor funds, which were to remain in Golden Summit’s brokerage account; 
 

b. Golden Summit and Coddington would pay part of the loan proceeds as a pre-
trade distribution to investors with fifteen days of delivery of the CMOs; 

 
c. Golden Summit and Coddington would invest the balance of the loan proceeds in 

an equities trading platform that would generate profits of at least 1.25% per 
trading tranche with 200 tranches to be completed within a year (for a total return 
of approximately 250%); and 
 

d. Golden Summit and Coddington would return the CMOs to investors at the 
conclusion of the investment. 

 
76. Coddington knew that Golden Summit and he did not have the ability to serve as 

a funding source to provide loans to the investors, and that they did not have access to a trading 

platform that paid 1.25% per tranche or that could generate returns of approximately 250% 

annually.  

77. Similarly, Geisler, Gunn and SouthCom knew, or were reckless in not knowing, 

that Coddington and Golden Summit could not meet the terms of the proposed investment.  

Geisler and Gunn did no due diligence to determine if Coddington and Golden Summit could do 

so, and were aware of the failure of the CMO trading Program with respect to the investors they 

solicited through Malouf.  



19 
 

78. Geisler and Gunn created an operating agreement for Geisco to pool investors’ 

money and CMOs for the purpose of purchasing and hypothecating CMOS through Golden 

Summit. 

79. In September 2010, Geisler and Gunn on behalf of SouthCom, Geisco and FASC 

created offering documents including a cover letter, program guidelines, and various agreements 

that they sent by email to investors who wanted to invest in the CMO Trading Program (jointly 

referred to as “the Offering Documents”).  Geisler and Gunn used copies of documents sent to 

them by Coddington as templates for the Offering Documents.   

80. In or about September 2010 until November 2010, Geisler, Gunn, and their 

respective entities solicited investors to invest cash or CMOs into the CMO Trading Program.  In 

so doing, Geisler, Gunn, SouthCom, Geisco, and FASC repeated in the Offering Documents and 

their conversations and emails with investors the false and misleading statements set forth in 

paragraph 75 above.   

81. Geisler and Gunn signed many of the Offering Documents that they gave to 

investors.  Geisler, as the managing director of SouthCom, signed the various agreements sent to 

investors.  Gunn, as the managing director of FASC, signed one form that pertained to the 

intended distribution of proceeds. 

82. As part of the Offering Documents, Geisler, Gunn, SouthCom, Geisco, and FASC 

also provided each of the investors with exhibits that were prepared by Gunn based on 

information provided by Coddington and Golden Summit.  Geisler signed the exhibits.  In these 

exhibits the defendants falsely represented among other things:   

a. The “Loan To Value” rate or amount of the loan to be provided based on the 
estimated value of the investor’s CMOs; 

 



20 
 

b. The pre-trade distribution amount and net loan proceeds to be invested in the 
trading platform; and 

 
c. The investor’s projected gross earnings per trading tranche of 1.25%, net earnings 

per tranche, and total net earnings after 200 tranches. 
 
83. The statements that Geisler, Gunn, SouthCom, Geisco, and FASC made to 

investors in conversations, emails, the Offering Documents; and that they, Coddington, and 

Golden Summit made in the exhibits, were false and misleading.  None of the defendants had the 

ability to successfully hypothecate the investors’ CMOs with third party institutions or 

alternatively to act as a funding source for the program, invest the loan proceeds, and generate 

trading profits of approximately 250%.  Moreover, Geisler, Gunn, SouthCom, Geisco, and FASC 

conducted no due diligence on the CMO Trading Program and had no reasonable basis to believe 

that Golden Summit or Coddington had the ability to do the same. 

84. Between September and November, 2010, Geisler, Gunn, SouthCom, Geisco, 

FASC, Coddington and Golden Summit convinced at least nine investors to invest $8,657,890 in 

funds in the CMO Trading Program.   

85. During October 2010, Geisler and Gunn directed some of these investors to send 

their funds by wire transfers totaling approximately $1,324,982 to Golden Summit’s bank 

account in Colorado.  Out of those funds, Coddington wire transferred: $875,000 to Golden 

Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account and used the funds to purchase a $1 billion face value 

CMO for approximately $808,000; and $75,000 to Erwin’s attorney trust account for Erwin’s 

benefit on November 10, 2010.  Coddington spent the balance of approximately $374,982 for his 

personal expenses. 

86. But in late October 2010, the bank froze Golden Summit’s account because of 

suspicious transactions.21 
 

87. To continue with the scheme, Coddington asked his attorney, Erwin, to accept 

deposits of investors’ funds directly into Erwin’s attorney trust account and then distribute them 

as Coddington directed.  Erwin agreed to the arrangement.   

88. Erwin had previously served as a broker for Coddington on various investment 

transactions since at least 2008, and as Coddington’s attorney drafted various investment 

agreements.  Erwin knew that Coddington represented that Golden Summit had developed a 

funding protocol to use CMOs as collateral for project funding, and that Erwin’s role was to 

receive funds from investors who needed to purchase CMOs for collateral.  Erwin knew from his 

preparation and review of documents for Golden Summit, and discussions with Coddington, 

Geisler, and Gunn that investors were sending funds to his attorney trust account solely for 

purchasing CMOs, which were to be hypothecated and the loan proceeds invested in the CMO 

Trading Program. 

89. When Erwin received investors’ funds into his attorney trust account, he deducted 

legal and advisory fees, and then forwarded the remaining proceeds to third parties as directed by 

Coddington.  He knew the misappropriation of investors’ funds for his legal fees and 

distributions to third parties were contrary to the agreements with investors.   

90. During November 2010, Geisler and Gunn directed some of the nine investors to 

send their funds by wire transfers totaling approximately $7,332,908 to Erwin’s trust account.  

Erwin received an additional wire transfer of $550,000 on December 16, 2010, from another 

investor that he introduced to the scheme.   

91. Of the $7,882,908 in investors’ funds deposited into Erwin’s trust account, 

Coddington directed Erwin to send $4,200,000 to Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities 

account during November 2010.   



22 
 

92. On or about November 24, and 29, 2010, Golden Summit purchased a $1.5 billion 

face value CMO for approximately $2,400,000 and another CMO with a $250 million face value 

for approximately $182,000 respectively.  On or about December 3, 2010, Golden Summit 

purchased a $1 billion face value CMO for approximately $1,475,000.  

93. Contrary to the agreements with investors, Coddington directed Erwin to 

distribute the balance of investors’ funds, approximately $3,682,908, to participants in the 

scheme during November and December 2010, including:  

a. $1,805,966.75 to Extreme Capital’s bank account in Colorado; 
 

b. $500,000 to FASC’s bank account in Florida; of that amount, FASC and Gunn 
transferred $100,000 back to Coddington Trust in Colorado and paid $395,000 to 
SouthCom for the benefit of Gunn and Geisler;   

 
c. $482,000 to Coddington Trust in Colorado;  

 
d. $350,000 to Geisco Holdings International LLC for the benefit of Geisler; on the 

same day, Geisler paid $349,100 to purchase a recreational vehicle;   
 

e. $125,000 to a foreign bank account; and 
 

f. $368,000 to himself, with the balance of investors’ funds paid out of Erwin’s trust 
account for expenses. 

 
94. Between September and November, 2010, Geisler, Gunn, SouthCom, Geisco, 

FASC, Golden Summit, and Coddington, using the same false and misleading statements, 

Offering Documents and exhibits described above in paragraphs 75 through 82, also obtained 

agreements with three investors, which were entities, to transfer seven CMOs with total face 

values of approximately $8.3 billion into the CMO Trading Program.  

D. Leyton Substantially Assisted Coddington and Golden Summit’s Fraud 

95. To prepare for these new investments, Coddington emailed Leyton on 

September 17, 2010, to advise him that “we are getting ready to bring in some additional CMO’s 



23 
 

(sic) on repo agreements as well as transfer in cash for purchase [of] about [$]5 B[illion] face 

value of the same.  Would like to talk with you about that as we want to move forward on that 

this coming week!  I have approved loans on them as well and will be bringing cash from loan 

proceeds back for you to work on our behalf.”  

96. On or about September 24, 2010, Leyton received a copy of Coddington’s 

September 22, 2010, agreement with Geisler, Gunn, and SouthCom.  The agreement laid out the 

CMO Trading Program that Coddington was offering to investors and provided Leyton with 

knowledge about the terms of the CMO Trading Program.  

97. On October 1, 2010, Coddington emailed Leyton that CMOs valued at over $1 

billion and along with another $2.3 billion were moving into the Golden Summit Viewpoint 

Securities account.  He stated, “I have a transaction set up for these on a credit facility basis and I 

wanted to give you a heads up that this is taking place... all on a repo basis set up by my 

attorney!” Coddingtons used the term “repo basis” to mean that the CMOs were to be returned to 

the investor at the conclusion of the loan.  Leyton responded, “Right on! We will need for each 

of the securities to be delivered . . . [a]ny and all contracts or agreement which can evidence 

clear ownership or control (no encumbrances).”  

98. Coddington asked Leyton to open brokerage accounts for investors at Viewpoint 

Securities to enable the investors to transfer the CMOs into Golden Summit’s Viewpoint 

Securities account for hypothecation.  Coddington advised Leyton that “I have 3 [clients] ready 

to fill out docs and effect transfers [of CMOs] as we speak!  When I have 2.5 B[illion] in current 

value or more the first loan will be initiated.  Erwin the attorney is putting together the 

transaction docs for you on [this] first wave of files.”  



24 
 

99. On or about October18, 2010, Leyton opened brokerage accounts for two of the 

investors referred by Coddington to enable the investors to transfer their CMOs into Golden 

Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account for hypothecation.  To incentivize Leyton for opening 

the investors’ accounts, Coddington paid Leyton $5,000 on the same day, into an account Leyton 

controlled in the name of Noah Capital LLC.   

100. Contrary to the agreements with investors which provided that the CMOs would 

remain in Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account, Coddington requested that Leyton 

transfer the first investor’s CMOs from the Golden Summit’s account to the account of a third-

party on November 1, 2010.   

101. On November 2, 2010, Leyton sent Coddington information from the Bureau of 

Prison’s website that the owner of this third-party account appeared to have a criminal record.  In 

spite of this information, Coddington directed Leyton to proceed with the transfer.  To 

incentivize Leyton for making the transfer, Coddington paid him $6,500 on November 4, 2010.  

102. On November 19, 2010, Coddington and Golden Summit directed Leyton to sell 

$1 billion in face value of another investor’s CMOs.  Leyton knew, or was reckless in not 

knowing, that these sales were contrary to Coddington’s agreements to hold investors’ CMOs in 

Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account as collateral for a loan to be made by Golden 

Summit.  Leyton sold the CMOs for approximately $1,007,851.66 and received a commission of 

approximately $45,000.  On the same day, Coddington also paid Leyton $4,975 from Golden 

Summit’s JP Morgan bank account. 

  



25 
 

E. Coddington, Gunn, Geisler, and Erwin Concealed the Ongoing Fraud by Making 
Lulling Statements and Payments to Investors  

 
103. By November 2010, the defendants had failed to make the promised pre-trade 

distribution payments to the investors who had invested funds or the seven CMOs in the CMO 

Trading Program.   

104. On or about November 26, 2010, Gunn telephoned a representative for one of the 

entity investors and told him, based on Gunn’s discussions with Coddington and Erwin, that the 

pre-trade distribution payment was late because hypothecation of the CMOs was delayed and the 

advance payments would be delayed until the middle of the week of December 6, 2010.  Gunn 

knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that these statements were false. 

105. On or about December 7, 2010, Gunn telephoned the same representative of one 

of the entity investors and told him there had been further delays in obtaining the funding, but 

that they would wire $100,000 to him as part of the promised pre-trade distribution, with the 

balance to be wired the next week.  Gunn knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that these 

statements were false. 

106. On or about December 7, 2010, Erwin, at Coddington’s direction, telephoned an 

attorney for another of the entity investors and offered the choice between accepting $100,000 of 

the promised pre-distribution payment with the rest of the money to be available on 

December 10, 2010, or the return of the CMOs.  Erwin knew, or was reckless in not knowing, 

that these statements were false. 

107. Each of the entity investors accepted the $100,000 partial payment of the 

promised distribution.  To cover the payments, Coddington transferred $250,000 from the 

$1,007,851.66 in proceeds from the sale of one entity investor’s CMOs discussed in paragraph 

102 above into Golden Summit’s bank account on December 8, 2010.  Then, on December 9, 



26 
 

2010, Coddington transferred $200,000 to Erwin’s trust account, and used the remaining $50,000 

for his personal expenses. 

108. At Coddington’s direction, Erwin paid $100,000 each to the two entity investors 

that invested CMOs in the Trading Program.  

109. Contrary to Erwin’s and Gunn’s statements that the $100,000 paid to each entity 

investor was part of the pre-trade distribution, these funds came from Coddington’s unauthorized 

sale of the investors’ own CMOs, rather than loans from the hypothecation of the CMOs.  As of 

December 8, 2010, Golden Summit and Coddington had not hypothecated any CMOs or 

obtained any loan proceeds, and had not made any investments through a trading platform.   

110. On or about December 14, 2010, Geisler and Gunn made additional lulling 

statements to the two entity investors.  Geisler and Gunn falsely stated in emails sent to the two 

entity investors, “We have been advised that the funds have been wired from the hypothecating 

attorney’s account to the attorney for Golden Summit’s escrow account.  The wire is in excess of 

$10 Million and so is making its way through the various channels.  We anticipate having a letter 

to each of you from the Golden Summit attorney later today.”  Geisler and Gunn had no 

reasonable basis for these false statements.    

111. On or about December 14, 2010, Gunn drafted letters for Erwin to sign, which 

advised the investors that the pre-trading distributions had again been delayed.  Gunn sent the 

draft letter to Coddington, Erwin, and Geisler for review.  Erwin signed the letters without 

substantive change and sent copies to Coddington, Geisler and Gunn for distribution to the 

investors.  In each letter, Erwin wrote, “my law firm is responsible for facilitation of the wire 

transferring of funds in the amount $[ ], representing your pre-investment distribution” and 

entered the pre-trade distribution amount owed to each investor.  He also wrote, “[t]he funds that 



27 
 

are forthcoming are being sent from an offshore Attorney Escrow account and unfortunately 

were not wired by the sending bank last Friday as we were told.”  In each letter, he agreed to 

notify Geisler and Gunn as soon as the funds were posted to his account.  

112. Erwin’s letters to the investors were false and misleading because Erwin had no 

reasonable basis for stating the funds would be forthcoming from an offshore attorney’s escrow 

account, because in fact there was no offshore attorney’s escrow account and no funds had been 

wired to him.   

113. In furtherance of the scheme, Coddington, Erwin, Geisler and Gunn used the 

December 14, 2010, letters as deceptive devices to delay the investors’ demands for return of 

their CMOs.  

F. Coddington Enlisted Stonerock and Columbia to Join the Scheme to Liquidate
 CMOs 
 
114. By early December, 2010, Coddington and Golden Summit had failed to comply 

with their agreements to hypothecate any CMOs to obtain loans for investment in the CMO 

Trading Program.  They were facing increasing demands from the investors for payment of the 

pre-trade distributions, proof of hypothecation, or return of the investors’ CMOs.  Contrary to the 

agreements with investors to hold the CMOs in Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account 

for hypothecation, Coddington and Golden Summit began to look for a third party to whom they 

could transfer the remaining CMOs for liquidation. 

115. Coddington identified BAWA Financial Ltd. (“BAWA”) as an entity that could 

receive and liquidate the CMOs.  Columbia was a director of BAWA.    

116. To create the appearance of a legitimate transaction, Coddington and Golden 

Summit entered into three sham agreements with BAWA (hereinafter referred to as “the BAWA 

agreements”) between December 4 and 12, 2010.  In these agreements, among other things, 



28 
 

Coddington and Golden Summit agreed to transfer CMOs with face values of approximately 

$11.2 billion to the brokerage account of Stonerock that was controlled by Columbia, which was 

to hypothecate the CMOs to generate a loan of approximately $1.1 billion and pay a pre-trade 

distribution of $63 million to Golden Summit.  The balance of the loan proceeds purportedly 

were to be invested in a trading platform with profits to be shared fifty-fifty between Golden 

Summit and BAWA.  

117. On or about December 7, 2010, Coddington instructed Leyton and Viewpoint 

Securities to deliver eight CMOs with a total face value of $11.2 billion from Golden Summit’s 

Viewpoint Securities account to Stonerock’s brokerage account.  These CMOs had been 

obtained from investors or purchased using investors’ funds raised in connection with the CMO 

Trading Program.   

118. Leyton acted upon Coddington’s instructions even though he knew from 

discussions with Coddington and his receipt of documents that investors provided the CMOs to 

be held in Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account for hypothecation and then returned to 

investors.   

119. Ultimately, Columbia and Stonerock never hypothecated any of the CMOs to 

obtain a loan for Golden Summit as required under the sham BAWA agreements.  Instead, 

Columbia almost immediately began selling the CMOs for his own benefit and for the benefit of 

Coddington and Golden Summit.  

120. Between on or about December 14, 2010 and July 30, 2011, Columbia and 

Stonerock sold the CMOs with face values of approximately $11.2 billion for approximately 

$3.4 million.   



29 
 

121. Beginning in January 2011, shortly after Columbia started liquidating the CMOs, 

he began making payments to Coddington and Golden Summit out of the CMO sales proceeds.  

Coddington did not disclose these payments to investors.  

a. For example, on January 20, 2011, Columbia withdrew $93,287.97 in cash from 
the Stonerock’s Wells Fargo account and deposited $93,287.97 into Golden 
Summit’s Wells Fargo bank account, which was controlled by Coddington;   
 

b. On January 21, 2011, Columbia withdrew $100,000 in cash from Stonerock’s 
Wells Fargo bank account, and deposited $100,000 into Golden Summit’s Wells 
Fargo bank account; and 
 

c. On February 11, 2011, Columbia withdrew $78,000 in cash from Stonerock’s 
Wells Fargo bank account, and deposited $75,000 into Golden Summit’s Wells 
Fargo bank account.   
 

122. Additionally, Columbia made payments to his wife, Joanna Columbia.  Between 

on or about December 15, 2010, and July 30, 2011, Columbia transferred approximately $3.2 

million from Stonerock’s brokerage account to Stonerock’s bank account for the personal benefit 

of his wife. 

G. Columbia Provided False Information to Coddington and Erwin Which They 
 Used to Lull Investors through Geisler and Gunn 
 
123. During December 2010 and January 2011, Columbia and Stonerock provided 

false information to Coddington and Erwin making it appear that Columbia was complying with 

the stated terms of the sham BAWA agreements to hypothecate the CMOs when in fact they 

were not.  Coddington and Erwin used the false information they obtained from Columbia to lull 

investors by passing the information along to them, through Geisler and Gunn, without 

confirming whether the information was accurate.  

124. For example, on or about December 17, 2010, Columbia prepared a fictitious 

letter that purportedly directed his brokerage firm, Morgan Stanley, to wire approximately $63 

million to Erwin’s trust account for the benefit of Golden Summit as the advance payment due 



30 
 

under the BAWA agreements.  In fact, Columbia and Stonerock did not have $63 million in 

funds.  As part of the scheme, Columbia sent a redacted copy of the fictitious letter to Erwin and 

Coddington, who used the letter to delay investors’ requests for payment without conducting any 

investigation to determine if the letter was valid.   

125. On or about December 18, 2010, Erwin told Geisler and Gunn that Erwin’s bank 

had received an instruction letter and clearance to credit his bank account with the $63 million.  

Erwin had no reasonable basis for this false statement.  Erwin provided the false information to 

Geisler and Gunn knowing that it would be passed along to investors.  

126. On or about December 29, 2010, Erwin sent an email to Gunn, Geisler, and 

SouthCom, with a copy to Coddington, falsely confirming that funds had been sent to Golden 

Summit and that he expected outgoing wires to investors the next morning.  Erwin had no 

reasonable basis for this false statement.  Erwin provided the false information to Geisler and 

Gunn knowing that it would be passed along to investors.  

127. On or about January 21, 2011, Columbia sent an email to Erwin stating that he 

had received an incoming wire, and attached a computer screen shot of a Wells Fargo bank 

account statement falsely showing a deposit of approximately $111 million on January 21, 2011.  

Columbia had fabricated the bank statement.   

128. On January 31, 2011, Erwin sent an email to Geisler attaching the Wells Fargo 

bank statement he had received from Columbia.  Erwin falsely represented in the email that, 

“This letter shall serve as confirmation that the Wells Fargo redacted account statement that you 

have been provided references a pending wire transfer … of $111,431,769.94.  $63MM of said 

wire transfer belongs to my client Golden Summit . . . and from said $63MM USD, you are to 



31 
 

receive $43MM USD.”  Erwin had no reasonable basis for these false statements.   Erwin 

provided the false information to Geisler knowing that it would be passed along to investors. 

H. Leyton Ignored Investors’ Complaints 

129. In March 2011, two investors each alerted Leyton to concerns about their dealings 

with Geisco and Golden Summit after the defendants failed to deliver on their promises.  On or 

about March 3, 2011, the first investor provided Leyton with a copy of her contract with Geisco 

supporting her claim that she had provided Golden Summit with $250,000 to purchase CMOs for 

hypothecation.  Similarly on or about March 10, 2011, the second investor provided documents 

to Leyton that supported his claims that his funds were transferred to Golden Summit’s 

Viewpoint Securities account. 

130. Leyton took no meaningful action to investigate the investors’ complaints 

concerning their providing funds or securities to Golden Summit, what Golden Summit did with 

those funds or securities, or why Golden Summit failed to hypothecate the CMOs.  On or about 

March 17, 2011, and despite the concerns raised by the investors, Leyton approved a wire 

transfer of $19,000 from Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account to a Golden Summit 

bank account.  The next day, Golden Summit wired $5,000 from the same Golden Summit bank 

account to Leyton’s Noah Capital LLC account. 

I. Coddington and Erwin Continued the Scheme with another Investor  

131. In the spring of 2011, Coddington and Erwin continued to offer investments in a 

variation of the CMO Trading Program using false and misleading statements.   

132. To assist Coddington with these transactions, Leyton opened a second brokerage 

account for Golden Summit at Viewpoint (“Golden Summit Viewpoint II account”).  Leyton 



32 
 

opened the account although he had received at least three investors’ complaints about Golden 

Summit and Coddington not performing on their investor agreements. 

133. In or about April 2011, Golden Summit, Coddington and Erwin were introduced 

to an entity investor.  In or about April 2011, Coddington and Erwin held a telephone conference 

call with the principals of the investor.  During the telephone call, Coddington and Erwin offered 

an investment wherein they would use $9 million from the investor to purchase six CMOs that 

Golden Summit would pledge as collateral for a loan of $60 million for the investor’s benefit.   

134. Coddington, Erwin and Golden Summit misrepresented that Golden Summit 

would hypothecate the CMOs itself and make a $60 million loan from its own credit lines to the 

investor.  Coddington failed to disclose that Golden Summit had never successfully hypothecated 

a CMO and that he and others in the scheme had misappropriated funds.  Coddington knew, and 

Erwin knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Golden Summit did not have the financial 

ability to make a loan of $60 million or to otherwise hypothecate the CMOs.  

135. To allay the investor’s concerns about Golden Summit’s ability to perform the 

transaction, Erwin sent a misleading letter on April 19, 2011, to the investor responding to its 

questions about a lawsuit that was previously filed against Golden Summit.  He stated that 

“Coddington has an earned reputation for excellence and veracity of the highest nature in the 

financing world. . . .   He does what he says he will do and he does it without excuses or 

complaint.  Mr. Coddington is ready to produce the results that you seek for your particular 

financing matter.”  Erwin failed to disclose the material facts that he knew about Coddington 

having not performed on multiple transactions during 2010 and 2011.  

136. On or about April 20, 2011, Coddington as the CEO and Erwin as the attorney for 

Golden Summit entered into formal agreements with the investor to consummate the investment. 



33 
 

137. On or about April 20, 2011, the investor sent a wire transfer of $9 million to 

Golden Summit’s bank account for the purchase of CMOs under the agreements.  

138. On or about April 21, 2011, Coddington transferred $7 million of the investor’s 

funds to Golden Summit’s Viewpoint II account.   

139. On or about April 25, 2011, Coddington and Golden Summit purchased CMOs 

for approximately $6.2 million.  Coddington misappropriated the remaining investor funds of 

approximately $2.8 million.  

140. On or about April 26, 2011, Coddington and Golden Summit sent the investor 

false confirmations representing that the purchase price of the CMOs was a total of $9 million, 

and that the hypothecation amount of $60 million was to be paid in three banking days, despite 

the fact that the purchase price of the CMOs was only approximately $6.2 million and 

Coddington had misappropriated the balance of the funds.  

141. Because Coddington and Golden Summit did not have the ability to fulfill the 

terms of its agreement to make a loan of $60 million, they entered into another sham agreement 

with BAWA purportedly to hypothecate the CMOs. 

142. On or about April 28, 2011, Coddington requested that Leyton transfer the CMOs 

that it had purchased for the investor from Golden Summit’s Viewpoint II account to BAWA’s 

brokerage account at Viewpoint.   

143. To assist Coddington, Leyton prepared a letter stating, “The following securities 

will be posting to the credit facility account today, April 28, 2011.”  Coddington sent Leyton’s 

letter to the investor to make it appear that he had hypothecated the CMOs by transferring them 

to BAWA.   



34 
 

144. When sending Leyton’s letter, Coddington did not disclose material facts to the 

investor about his previous agreements with BAWA; that Stonerock and Columbia had sold 

investors’ CMOs; and that Columbia and Coddington misappropriated the sales proceeds.  

145. Subsequently, Viewpoint Securities’ clearing broker refused to transfer the CMOs 

to BAWA’s account because it was a foreign third party that recently opened the account.  

Leyton attempted to overcome the objections and provided assistance to Coddington’s transfer of 

the investor’s CMOs to BAWA.  Leyton provided a copy of Golden Summit’s agreement with 

BAWA and misled the clearing broker by stating that “We are facilitating the transfer as an 

accommodation of Golden Summit as they are a customer of the firm.  The only compensation 

we have received is in the form of commissions from the sale of securities to Golden Summit.”  

Leyton did not disclose his arrangement with Coddington to receive undisclosed compensation in 

addition to his brokerage commissions.  Leyton was unsuccessful in transferring the CMOs to 

BAWA. 

146. When Golden Summit and Coddington were unable to transfer the CMOs to 

BAWA, they then directed Leyton to sell the CMOs to BAWA for approximately $33,095.17, 

which was a fraction of the purchase price of approximately $6.2 million.  The transaction took 

place on or about May 4, 2011.  

147. At Coddington’s request, on or about May 5, 2011, Leyton wrote a letter to 

Coddington falsely confirming that as of April 29, 2011, the transfer of the CMOs from Golden 

Summit to BAWA was completed.  In fact, Leyton had effected a sale of the CMOs rather than a 

transfer the previous day.   

148. Erwin used Leyton’s letter to lull the investor’s concerns about the delays in 

receiving the $60 million loan that Erwin and Coddington had promised them.  On May 6, 2011, 



35 
 

Erwin sent an email with Leyton’s May 5, 2011 letter to the investor confirming the transfer of 

the CMOs.  Erwin stated “I will have confirmation sometime tomorrow regarding the timing for 

the funds release.  I will call you as soon as I receive word on the disbursement of funds.”  Erwin 

had no reasonable basis to believe there would be any funding release from BAWA. 

149. On or about May 17, 2011, the investor requested that Golden Summit, 

Coddington and Erwin provide documentation on the status of the funding.  In response, 

Coddington sent the investor a copy of BAWA’s May 18, 2011 letter, which stated BAWA had 

entered into an agreement with Golden Summit to provide loan financing using the CMOs 

provided by Golden Summit as collateral.  Coddington knew this letter was false, and provided it 

to the investor as a deceptive device to delay the investor’s request for return of its CMOs.  

Coddington knew he had sold rather than pledged the CMOs as collateral, and that BAWA had 

not provided any loan financing to Golden Summit. 

150. On or about June 2, 2011, the investor filed a formal claim of ownership with 

Leyton and Viewpoint, advising that Golden Summit did not have authority to transfer its CMOs 

to BAWA.  The investor also sent a demand letter to Golden Summit for return of the CMOs.   

151. However, Coddington, Erwin, Golden Summit, and BAWA did not return the 

CMOs to the investor. 

J. Malouf Offered Investments through Extreme Capital in the CMO Trading  
  Program during 2011 

 
152. During 2011, Malouf and Extreme Capital offered variations of the CMO Trading 

Program to at least two investors.  

 The Florida LLC Investor 

153. In or about January 2011, Malouf and Coddington participated in a telephone 

conference call during which they solicited a possible investor that was a Florida limited liability 



36 
 

company to participate in a version of the trading program.  But at that time, the investor refused 

to enter into the transaction.   

154. In or about March 2011, Malouf offered the CMO Trading Program through 

Coddington’s entity, Extreme Capital, to the investor again.  Malouf falsely represented that:   

a. Extreme Capital would hypothecate the CMO through Golden Summit for 4% of 
the market value or approximately $36 million in funds; 

 
b. Golden Summit would pay $1 million to the investor within 10 days plus broker’s 

fees, and provide approximately $32 million as a loan for investment in the 
trading platform; 

 
c. Extreme Capital and Malouf would conduct 105 trades over a one-year period, 

with 10% profit to be made on each trade and a total of $500 million earned; and 
 

d. The $500 million in initial trading profits would be taken to Europe to be invested 
in a second trading platform, with the expected earnings to be $10 billion.   
 

155. Malouf knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that his statements about the CMO 

Trading Program during the two solicitations were false and misleading.  Extreme Capital and 

Golden Summit did not have the financial ability to perform under the terms of the purported 

investment.  

156. In furtherance of the scheme, Malouf used a new letter from Erwin to bolster his 

offer to the investor.  On or about March 20, 2011, Malouf emailed the investor the letter in 

which Erwin falsely stated that the CMOs’ documents had been submitted to the funding source, 

which had funds available for the program, and that the CMOs were approved for funding.  

Erwin also stated that if Extreme Capital was unable to hypothecate the CMOs, they would be 

returned immediately to the investor’s brokerage account.  Both Malouf and Erwin knew, or 

were reckless in not knowing, that the statements in the letter were false.  

157. On or about May 25, 2011, Malouf, on behalf of Extreme Capital, and the 

investor signed an investment agreement.  



37 
 

158. To facilitate the transfer of the investor’s CMOs to Golden Summit, either Malouf 

or Coddington introduced the investor to Leyton, who opened a brokerage account for the 

investor at Viewpoint Securities on or about May 26, 2011.   

159. On or about June 14, 2011, the investor transferred $1 billion in face value of 

CMOs to Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account.  

160. Between June, and October, 2011, Golden Summit received at least $53,867 in 

interest payments from the investor’s CMOs.  On or about October 10, 2011, the investor’s 

CMOs were delivered out of Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account to a third party. 

161. Contrary to the terms of the agreement with the investor, Extreme Capital, 

Malouf, Golden Summit and Coddington never hypothecated the investor’s CMOs, never 

obtained a loan, and never invested any funds in a trading platform.  They also did not return the 

CMOs to the investor.  

 The Michigan LLC Investor 

162. In or about June 2011, Malouf and Extreme Capital offered Golden Summit’s 

CMO Trading Program to another investor, a Michigan limited liability company.   

163. On or about June 17, 2011, Extreme Capital and Malouf agreed to hypothecate 

this investor’s CMOs with Golden Summit, which was to provide a loan of approximately $32 

million.  Malouf falsely represented that the investor’s CMOs would be transferred to a 

brokerage account of Golden Summit for hypothecation, and the line of credit would become 

available within two weeks.  Malouf represented that if Golden Summit was not able to 

hypothecate the CMOs, it would immediately return the CMOs.  Malouf failed to disclose that 

Extreme Capital, Malouf, Golden Summit and Coddington did not have the ability to 

hypothecate the CMOs and obtain loan proceeds of approximately $32 million.  



38 
 

164. On July 8, 2011, the investor transferred the CMOs from its brokerage account to 

Golden Summit’s Viewpoint Securities account.   

165. On or about July 11, 2011, Malouf emailed the investor that the CMO had arrived 

in the account of the funding source and had cleared so they could commence the hypothecation 

process and make distribution in one week.  

166. On August 3, 2011, Malouf sent an email to the investor stating that “Scott 

[Coddington] met with the ‘bankers and funding sources this afternoon.’  He needs to return in 

the morning to sign all of the updated Funding Agreements.  . . . The target is to have the 

Funding Bank release the funds for our use on Friday [August 5, 2011].”   

167. In fact, Scott Coddington had not met with any bankers or funding sources to 

provide a loan on the investor’s CMOs. 

168. On or about August 5, 2011, Golden Summit received $2,422 in interest from the 

investor’s CMO.  

169. On or about August 5, 2011, Golden Summit transferred the investor’s CMOs 

from its Viewpoint account to a third party. 

170. On or about November 3, 2011, the investor sent an email to Extreme Capital and 

Malouf demanding the return of the CMOs and past interest payments.   

171. Extreme Capital, Malouf, Golden Summit and Coddington did not return the 

investor’s CMOs or interest. 

K. The Use and Misappropriation of Investors’ Funds and Assets during the Scheme 

172. In total, the Defendants raised approximately $18.2 million in investors’ funds 

and $14.9 billion in face value of CMOs.  Coddington used $11.2 million of investors’ funds to 

purchase additional CMOs along with CMOs provided by investors, which were then liquidated 



39 
 

or transferred, for net proceeds of approximately $3.4 million.  The meager proceeds from the 

liquidation of CMOs, combined with the unused investors’ cash, left approximately $10.4 

million.  Ultimately, these investors’ funds were either misappropriated by the proposed 

defendants or transferred to the proposed relief defendants.   

173. Coddington misappropriated approximately $3 million in investors’ funds, CMO 

interest payments, and payments from Columbia (from the liquidation of CMOs).  After 

receiving investors’ funds from Erwin’s trust account, Coddington made significant cash 

withdrawals from Golden Summit’s bank and securities accounts.  He transferred additional 

investors’ funds from Golden Summit to his personal bank accounts and other bank accounts that 

he controlled.  Coddington used at least $234,245 of investors’ funds to purchase seven 

automobiles, and he spent lavishly on restaurants, entertainment and travel. 

174. Erwin misappropriated at least $800,000 in investors’ funds, most of which he 

transferred directly from his attorney trust account to his personal bank accounts.  Erwin used 

investors’ funds for restaurants, entertainment and to lease a condo near Las Vegas. 

175. Malouf received approximately $77,000 in misappropriated investors’ funds.  

Coddington wired funds from Golden Summit’s bank account to Malouf’s personal bank 

account.  Malouf used investors’ funds for restaurants, automobile expenses and travel. 

176. Leyton received approximately $86,000 in misappropriated investors’ funds.  He 

also received commissions of at least $45,000 from the improper sale of investors’ CMOs from 

Golden Summit’s brokerage account.  Leyton used these investors’ funds for restaurants, 

entertainment, travel and clothing.    

177. Geisler received approximately $456,000 in misappropriated investors’ funds.  

Erwin wired investors’ funds from his trust account to bank accounts controlled by Geisco and 



40 
 

Geisler.  Geisler purchased a $349,000 recreational vehicle and a high-end automobile for more 

than $105,000.   

178. Gunn received approximately $400,000 in misappropriated investors’ funds.  

Erwin wired investors’ funds from his trust account to bank accounts controlled by FASC and 

Gunn.   

179. Columbia and Relief Defendant Joanna Columbia misappropriated approximately 

$3.4 million in proceeds from the liquidation of investors’ CMOs and CMOs’ interest payments 

from December 2010 to July 2011.  A significant portion of these funds was transferred to bank 

accounts under Joanna Columbia’s control.  During this time, Michael and Joanna Columbia 

often spent in excess of $10,000 in a single night at restaurants and clubs.  They also used 

investors’ funds to maintain a penthouse apartment in Chicago and a house in the Phoenix area.  

Joanna Columbia provided no consideration for the funds she received from the defendants. 

180. Relief Defendant Coddington Trust received almost $945,000 in investors’ funds 

from Extreme Capital’s bank account for the purchase of a house in the name of the trust.  This 

residence was subsequently sold.  Additional investors’ funds were transferred to the Coddington 

Trust from Erwin’s trust account, the Golden Summit bank account, and other Coddington-

controlled bank accounts.  Coddington Trust provided no consideration for the funds it received 

from the defendants. 

181. Relief Defendant Scott Coddington received at least $640,000 in investors’ funds.  

The funds were originally sent by investors to Erwin’s trust account and then, through a series of 

transfers through Extreme Capital and Coddington Trust from November 2010 to July 2011, 

were transferred into bank accounts over which Scott Coddington had authority to withdraw 

funds.  Once investors’ funds were in bank accounts he controlled, Scott Coddington used the41 
 

funds for significant cash withdrawals, restaurants, entertainment, electronics and jewelry.  Scott 

Coddington provided no consideration for the funds he received from the defendants. 

182. Relief Defendants Farris Co. and Farris received approximately $625,000 in 

investors’ funds from Golden Summit; and Farris received approximately $40,000 in investors’ 

funds from Erwin.  Farris Co. and Farris provided no consideration for the funds they received 

from the defendants. 

L. Defendants’ Respective Roles in the Fraudulent Scheme  

183. As alleged herein, Coddington orchestrated the scheme to defraud and in 

furtherance thereof, he committed the following deceptive acts, including but not limited to: 

a. Coddington made false and misleading statements, and failed to disclose 
information, to investors regarding the investments offered in the CMO Trading 
Program; 

 
b. Coddington provided false and misleading information about the CMO Trading 

Program both orally and in writing to Malouf, Geisler, and Gunn to be provided to 
investors that were interested in investing in the CMO Trading Program; 

 
c. Coddington used investors’ funds to purchase CMOs and received CMOs from 

investors but failed to hypothecate the CMOs, provide distributions to investors, 
and failed to invest any funds in an equities trading platform; 

 
d. Coddington misappropriated investors’ funds for his personal benefit; 

 
e. Coddington used investors’ CMOs for his own personal benefit by 

misappropriating interest that was due under the terms of the bonds and by selling 
CMOs in order to misappropriate the proceeds; 

 
f. Coddington made lulling statements to investors, directly or indirectly through 

others, to prevent investors from seeking a return of funds or CMOs, or from 
contacting regulatory authorities;  

 
g. Coddington directed other defendants in the scheme to perform acts in furtherance 

thereof, such as directing the transfer of investors’ funds and CMOs for the 
defendants’ own personal uses; and 

 
h. Coddington caused investors’ funds to be paid to defendants and relief 

defendants. 



42 
 

 
184. As alleged herein, at various times Coddington acted in the name of and through 

his entities, Golden Summit and Extreme Capital.  By virtue of Coddington’s conduct, Golden 

Summit and Extreme Capital are liable as participants in the scheme to defraud. 

185. As alleged herein, Malouf participated in the scheme to defraud by soliciting 

investors to invest in the CMO Trading Program, and in furtherance of the scheme, he committed 

the following deceptive acts, including but not limited to: 

a. Malouf made false and misleading statements, and failed to disclose information,  
to investors regarding investments in the CMO Trading Program; 
 

b. Malouf provided false and misleading information about the CMO Trading 
Program both orally and in writing to Geisler and Gunn to be provided to 
investors that were interested in investing in the CMO Trading Program; 
 

c. Malouf made false and misleading lulling statements to investors, directly or 
indirectly through others, to prevent investors from seeking a return of funds or 
CMOs, or from contacting regulatory authorities; and 
 

d. Malouf received and spent investors’ funds for his personal benefit. 
 

186. As alleged herein, Geisler participated in the scheme to defraud by soliciting 

investors to invest in the CMO Trading Program, and in furtherance of the scheme, he committed 

the following deceptive acts, including but not limited to: 

a. Geisler made false and misleading statements, and failed to disclose information,  
to investors regarding investments in the CMO Trading Program; 
 

b. Geisler made false and misleading lulling statements to investors to prevent them 
from seeking a return of funds or CMOs, or from contacting regulatory 
authorities; and 
 

c. Geisler received and spent investors’ funds for his personal benefit. 

187. As alleged herein, Gunn participated in the scheme to defraud by soliciting 

investors to invest in the CMO Trading Program, and in furtherance of the scheme, he committed 

the following deceptive acts, including but not limited to: 



43 
 

a. Gunn made false and misleading statements, and failed to disclose information,  
to investors regarding investments in the CMO Trading Program; 
 

b. Gunn made false and misleading lulling statements to investors to prevent them 
from seeking a return of funds or CMOs, or from contacting regulatory 
authorities; and 
 

c. Gunn received and spent investors’ funds for his own personal benefit. 
 

188. As alleged herein, at various times Geisler and Gunn acted in the name of and 

through their entities; SouthCom, FASC, and Geisco.  By virtue of Geisler’s and Gunn’s 

conduct, SouthCom, FASC, and Geisco are each liable as participants in the scheme to defraud. 

189. As alleged herein, Erwin participated in the scheme to defraud, and in furtherance 

thereof, committed the following deceptive acts, including but not limited to: 

a. Erwin made false and misleading statements, and failed to disclose information,  
to investors regarding investments in the CMO Trading Program; 
 

b. Erwin received investors’ funds into his attorney trust account and distributed 
those funds at Coddington’s direction for the benefit of participants in the scheme;  
 

c. Erwin received and spent investors’ funds for his personal benefit;  
 

d. Erwin executed an investment agreement as the attorney of record for Golden 
Summit; and 
 

e. Erwin made false and misleading lulling statements to investors, directly or 
indirectly through others, to prevent investors from seeking a return of funds or 
CMOs, or from contacting regulatory authorities. 
 

190. As alleged herein, Leyton aided and abetted the scheme to defraud, and in 

furtherance thereof, provided the following substantial assistance, including but not limited to: 

a. Leyton opened brokerage accounts to enable investors to transfer their CMOs to 
the defendants to invest in the purported CMO Trading Program; 
 

b. Leyton transferred CMOs out of brokerage accounts at Viewpoint Securities 
contrary to agreements between defendants and investors; 
 

c. Leyton helped delay the return of CMOs to investors; 
 



44 
 

d. Leyton ignored investors’ complaints;  
 

e. Leyton provided false information to third parties; 
 

f. Leyton facilitated the liquidation of investors’ CMOs; 
 

g. Leyton facilitated Coddington’s misappropriation of CMOs’ interest; and 
 

h. Leyton received and spent investors’ funds for his personal benefit. 
 

191. As alleged herein, Columbia aided and abetted the scheme to defraud, and in 

furtherance thereof, provided the following substantial assistance, including but not limited to: 

a. Columbia liquidated CMOs contrary to agreements between defendants and 
investors; 
 

b. Columbia used proceeds from the sales of CMOs for his personal benefit and 
made payments of proceeds for the benefit of his wife; 
 

c. Columbia paid proceeds from the sale of CMOs back to Coddington and to others 
at Coddington’s direction; and  
 

d. Columbia provided false information to other defendants that they used to make 
false and misleading lulling statements to investors. 
 

192. As alleged herein, at various times Columbia acted in the name of and through his 

entity, Stonerock.  By virtue of Columbia’s conduct, Stonerock aided and abetted the fraudulent 

scheme. 

REGISTRATION VIOLATIONS 

193. Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, 

SouthCom, and Geisco, offered and sold investment contracts in the CMO Trading Program 

which are securities.  In addition, these defendants solicited investors’ funds which were used to 

purchase CMOs, which are securities in the form of bonds.  



45 
 

194. Investors pooled their funds or CMOs for participation in the CMO Trading 

Program with the expectation that they would receive profits from the efforts of Golden Summit, 

Coddington, Extreme Capital, Malouf, SouthCom, Geisco, Geisler or Gunn. 

195. These defendants offered and sold the securities by means of interstate commerce 

by placing telephone calls, sending emails and requesting wire transfers of funds or securities. 

196. During 2010 and 2011, no registration statement was filed or in effect with the 

SEC for the defendants’ offers or sales of CMOs or investments in the CMO Trading Program. 

BROKER-DEALER REGISTRATION VIOLATIONS 

197. From at least January 1, 2010, Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden 

Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom and Geisco engaged in the business of inducing or 

attempting to induce the purchase or sale of securities relating to the CMO Trading Program.  

198. Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom 

and Geisco each used interstate commerce, sending emails and speaking by telephone with 

investors about the CMO Trading Program.  

199. Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom 

and Geisco each were to receive transaction-based compensation. 

200. Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom 

and Geisco were not registered as brokers or dealers, or associated with a broker-dealer 

registered with the SEC while they induced or attempted to induce the purchase or sale of 

securities. 

  



46 
 

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Offer and Sale of Unregistered Securities  

In Violation of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act  
[15 U.S.C. §§ 77e (a) and 77e(c)] 

 
201. Paragraphs 1 through 200 are hereby realleged and incorporated by reference. 

202. The investments that defendants offered and sold in the CMO Trading Program 

and the CMOs that the defendants offered to purchase or invest in the CMO Trading Program, 

are “securities” as that term is defined in Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act and Section 

3(a)(10) the Exchange Act, 15 U.S. C. §§ 77b(a)(1) and 78c(a)(10). 

203. Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, 

SouthCom, and Geisco, directly or indirectly, singly or in concert, made use of the means or 

instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell 

securities through the use or medium of a prospectus or otherwise, or caused to be carried 

through the mails or in interstate commerce by any means or instruments of transportation, 

securities for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale when no registration statement was in 

effect as to those securities. 

204. Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom 

and Geisco, directly or indirectly, singly or in concert, made use of the means or instruments of 

transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to 

buy securities through the use or medium of a prospectus or otherwise, when no registration 

statement had been filed for those securities.  

205. By virtue of this conduct, Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, 

Extreme Capital, SouthCom and Geisco have each violated and, unless restrained and enjoined, 

will continue to violate Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act , 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and 

77e(c). 



47 
 

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Fraud – Violations of Securities Act Section 17(a) 

[15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)] 

206. The SEC realleges paragraphs 1 through 200 above. 

207. Coddington, Erwin, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, 

SouthCom, Geisco, and FASC, directly and indirectly, in the offer or sale of securities, by use of 

the means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of 

the mails:  (a) employed a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud with scienter; (b) obtained 

money or property by means of untrue statements of material fact or omissions to state material 

facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which 

they were made, not misleading; or (c) engaged in transactions, practices, or courses of business 

which have been or are operating as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers of the securities. 

208. Columbia, Leyton, and Stonerock aided and abetted violations of Securities Act 

Section 17(a) by Coddington and Golden Summit.  

209. Alternatively, Coddington and Erwin aided and abetted violations of Securities 

Act Section 17(a) by Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, FASC, Geisco, and SouthCom.  

210. By virtue of this conduct, Coddington, Columbia, Erwin, Geisler, Gunn, Leyton, 

Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom, Geisco and Stonerock violated, or aided 

and abetted violations, and unless restrained and enjoined will in the future violate, or aid and 

abet violations of, Securities Act Section 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a). 

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Fraud – Violations of Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 

[15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5] 

211. The SEC realleges paragraphs 1 through 200 above. 

212. Coddington, Erwin, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, 

SouthCom, Geisco, and FASC, directly or indirectly, with scienter, in connection with the 



48 
 

purchase or sale of securities, by the use of means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 

the mails, or any facility of a national securities exchange:  (a) employed devices, schemes, or 

artifices to defraud; (b) made untrue statements of material fact or omitted to state material facts 

necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 

were made, not misleading; or (c) engaged in acts, practices, or courses of business which 

operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person; in violation of Exchange Act 

Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 

213. Columbia, Leyton, and Stonerock aided and abetted violations of Exchange Act 

Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by Coddington and Golden Summit.  

214. Alternatively, Coddington and Erwin aided and abetted violations of Exchange 

Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, FASC, Geisco, and SouthCom. 

215. By virtue of this conduct, Coddington, Columbia, Erwin, Geisler, Gunn, Leyton, 

Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom, Geisco and Stonerock violated, or aided 

and abetted violations, and unless restrained and enjoined will in the future violate, or aid and 

abet violations of, Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 17 C.F.R. 

§ 240.10b-5. 

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
 Acting As an Unregistered Broker-Dealers  

 in Violation of Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act 
 [15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)] 

  
216. Paragraphs 1 through 200 are hereby realleged and incorporated by reference. 

217. In connection with their offer and sale of the securities, Coddington, Geisler, 

Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, SouthCom, and Geisco acted as brokers or 

dealers engaged in the regular business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of 

others, or buying and selling securities for their own accounts.   



49 
 

218. Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, Extreme Capital, 

SouthCom, and Geisco made use of the mails or the means or instrumentalities of interstate 

commerce to effect transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of 

securities while they were not registered with the SEC as a broker-dealer or associated with a 

broker-dealer. 

219. By virtue of this conduct, Coddington, Geisler, Gunn, Malouf, Golden Summit, 

Extreme Capital, SouthCom, and Geisco have each violated and, unless restrained and enjoined, 

will continue to violate Section 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1). 

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Unjust Enrichment of Relief Defendants 

220. Paragraphs 1 through 200 are hereby realleged and incorporated by reference. 

221. Scott Coddington, Coddington Trust, Joanna Columbia also known as Joanna I. 

Ornowska, Farris Co., and Farris obtained funds as part, and in furtherance of the securities 

violations alleged above without a legitimate claim to the funds, and under those circumstances it 

is not just, equitable or conscionable for them to retain the funds.   

222. Scott Coddington, Coddington Trust, Joanna Columbia also known as Joanna I. 

Ornowska, Farris Co., and Farris were unjustly enriched. 

223. By virtue of this conduct, Scott Coddington, Coddington Trust, Joanna Columbia 

also known as Joanna I. Ornowska, Farris Co., and Farris should be ordered to disgorge the funds 

they received as a result of the defendants’ violations of the federal securities laws. 

  



50 
 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

 WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court: 

I. 

 Find that the Defendants, and each of them, committed the violations alleged. 

II. 

 Enter an Order of Permanent Injunction as to each defendant, in a form consistent with 

Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, enjoining each defendant from further 

violations of the provisions of law and rules alleged in this Complaint. 

III. 

Enter an Order requiring the defendants and relief defendants to prepare an accounting of 

the proceeds they obtained from the offers and sales of the CMOs.  

IV.  

Enter an Order requiring defendants to disgorge all ill-gotten gains resulting from their 

participation in the conduct described above, including pre-judgment and post judgment interest. 

V. 

 Enter an Order requiring all defendants to pay third-tier civil penalties pursuant to 

Section 20(d) of the Securities Act and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 

77t(d) and 78u(d)(3).  

VI. 

Enter an Order requiring Scott Coddington, Coddington Trust, Joanna Columbia also 

known as Joanna I. Ornowska, Farris Co., and Farris to disgorge funds that they received that 

were the proceeds of illegal activities of other defendants.  



51 
 

VII. 

Grant such further equitable relief as this Court deems appropriate and necessary. 

 

Dated:  December 12, 2013. 

      Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
      s/ Leslie J. Hughes     
      Leslie J. Hughes 

Colorado Bar No. 15043 
 
Attorney for the United States  

      Securities and Exchange Commission 
      Denver Regional Office 
      1801 California Street, Suite 1500 
      Denver, CO  80202-2656 
      Telephone: 303-844-1000 
      Fax: 303-844-1068 
      E-mail: [email protected]