SEC v. SafeMoon LLC; SafeMoon US LLC; Kyle Nagy; Braden John Karony; and Thomas Glenn Smith, No. 1:23-cv-08138, Eastern District of New York (Nov. 1, 2023) — Complaint

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.No.__________
SAFEMOON LLC, SAFEMOON US LLC, KYLE
NAGY, BRADEN JOHN KARONY AND
THOMAS GLENN SMITH,
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Defendants,
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) alleges
as follows:
SUMMARY OF ACTION
1.Beginning in March 2021, SafeMoon LLC, SafeMoon US LLC (together,
“SafeMoon”), SafeMoon LLC’s creator and founder Kyle Nagy (“Nagy”), and SafeMoon’s
Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) John Karony (“Karony”) and Chief Technology Officer
(“CTO”) Thomas Smith (“Smith”) (“Defendants”) perpetrated a massive fraudulent scheme that
generated millions through the unregistered offer and sale of a crypto asset security called the
SafeMoon Token.  During the course of the fraud, the SafeMoon Token’s market capitalization
skyrocketed to billions of dollars in only two months.  That value quickly plummeted when the
scam was discovered, leading to significant losses to investors.  Meanwhile, Defendants profited
by misappropriating from the project crypto assets worth tens of millions of dollars.
2.Between March 12, 2021 and April 20, 2021, the trading volume of the SafeMoon
Token on crypto asset trading platforms also skyrocketed and its market price soared by over

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55,000%.  The total market value of the SafeMoon Token also experienced a meteoric rise to
over $5.7 billion.

Ultimately, more than 2.8 million unique addresses have held SafeMoon Tokens since its
inception on the distributed digital ledger (or “blockchain”) in which it was represented.
3. As part of their scheme, Defendants used a so-called “liquidity pool” through
which SafeMoon Token holders were able to “swap” their SafeMoon Tokens for “BNB Tokens,”
another crypto asset security, which is associated with the “Binance Smart Chain” blockchain
(now known as the BNB Chain).
1
  This exchange would take place through a so-called “liquidity
pool” (the “SafeMoon LP”), which consisted of a “smart contract” (generally speaking, self-
executing computer code) that ran on a so-called “decentralized exchange” known as
PancakeSwap.  The SafeMoon LP allowed users to swap SafeMoon Tokens with BNB Tokens.
In his marketing materials, whitepaper, and website, Nagy represented that each SafeMoon
Token transaction would be subject to a 10% “tax”—5% would be returned to SafeMoon Token

1
 The liquidity pool actually used a “wrapped” token, called “wBNB,” that was compatible
with the BNB Chain.

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holders as a quasi-dividend, and 5% would be deposited and retained in the SafeMoon LP.
Smith and Karony repeated and disseminated these false representations in social media posts
and other communications with the public.
4. Critically, Nagy represented in marketing materials, his whitepaper, and website
that these retained assets would be “locked” and inaccessible for at least four years.  Smith and
Karony repeated and disseminated these false representations in social media posts and other
communications with the public.  According to Defendants, this purported safety feature would
protect assets from being misappropriated (or having the “rug pulled” in crypto asset market
terms).  What the Defendants failed to disclose, however, was that whenever tokens were
deposited to the SafeMoon LP from the 5% tax, the Defendants received “liquidity provider
tokens” (“LP Tokens”) as a result.  Accordingly, as Defendants well knew, the assets in the
SafeMoon LP were not locked because the LP Tokens allowed the Defendants to withdraw
retained assets from the SafeMoon LP at will—which, in fact, is what the Defendants
repeatedly did.
5. In direct contravention to their public representations, the Defendants repeatedly
raided the retained assets from the SafeMoon LP by redeeming LP Tokens they received when
tokens were deposited into the SafeMoon LP as part of the 5% tax on each SafeMoon Token
transaction.  The Defendants claimed in their marketing materials, website, whitepaper, and
public statements, that removing funds from the SafeMoon LP was something that they could not
do.  After Karony and Smith were confronted with their lies, however, they changed their story
and represented that they would not remove funds from the SafeMoon LP without first disclosing
their intended use to the public.  This was also a false statement because they continued to
withdraw assets from the SafeMoon LP without public disclosure.

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6. As the SafeMoon Token grew exponentially in value, the Defendants used their
LP Tokens to redeem tens of millions of dollars’ worth of tokens from the SafeMoon LP, which
they then used for various purposes, including manipulation of the SafeMoon Token market,
business expenses, investments in unrelated companies, and personal uses such as to purchase
luxury homes, McClaren sports cars, and extravagant travel.
7. On or about April 21, 2021, after it became public that the Defendants had the
unfettered ability to remove assets from the SafeMoon LP, the SafeMoon Token price
plummeted nearly 50%.  After this plunge, the Defendants engaged in another scheme to
manipulate the price of the SafeMoon Token through carefully timed asset purchases.
8. By engaging in the conduct alleged in this Complaint, Defendants violated
Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) [15 U.S.C.
§§ 77e(a), 77e(c), 77q(a)]; Sections 9(a)(2) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(“Exchange Act”) [15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(2), 78j(b)]; and Rule 10b-5 thereunder [17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5].  Defendants will continue to violate the federal securities laws unless they are
restrained and enjoined by this Court.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
9. The SEC brings this action pursuant to Sections 20 and 22 of the Securities Act
[15 U.S.C. §§ 77t, 77v] and Sections 21(d) and 27 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), 78aa]
to enjoin Defendants from engaging in the transactions, acts, practices, and courses of business
alleged in this Complaint, and transactions, acts, practices, and courses of business of similar
purport and object.
10. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants and venue is proper in this
District pursuant to Section 22(a) of the Securities Act, [15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)], and Section 27(a)

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of the Exchange Act, [15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a)], because, among other things, some of the acts and
transactions in which Defendants engaged and that constitute violations of the federal securities
laws occurred in this District.  For example, as alleged herein, Defendants offered and sold
securities to investors located in this District in unregistered transactions.
11. In addition, this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because
Defendants engaged in conduct within the United States that constituted significant steps in
furtherance of the violations of the federal securities laws alleged in this Complaint and/or
further because Defendants, whether within or outside of the United States, engaged in conduct
that had a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.
12. In connection with the conduct alleged in this Complaint, Defendants, directly
and indirectly, singly or in concert with others, have made use of the means or instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, the means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce, the mails, and/or the facilities of a national securities exchange—namely,
through Defendants’ use of the Internet and the U.S. banking system when engaging in the acts
and transactions described herein.
DEFENDANTS
13. SafeMoon LLC is a Utah LLC organized on March 18, 2021, with a registered
address in Provo, Utah.  It was formed shortly after the SafeMoon project launched and was used
to conduct early business operations.  The LLC’s members were Karony, Nagy, and Tano LLC,
of which Smith was a 10% owner.  SafeMoon LLC initially operated via a three-person board
consisting of Karony, Nagy, and Smith.  Karony was the registered agent of SafeMoon LLC,
which never registered any class of securities with the Commission.

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14. SafeMoon US LLC is a Utah LLC organized on June 14, 2021, with its principal
place of business in Pleasant Grove, Utah.  SafeMoon US LLC was owned and controlled by
Karony.  After formation, SafeMoon US LLC was used in connection with the SafeMoon Token
operations.  SafeMoon US LLC never registered any class of securities with the Commission.
15. Nagy, age 35, was a resident of Vero Beach, Florida who was responsible for the
creation of the SafeMoon Token and the related whitepaper.  Nagy never voluntarily revealed his
identity, but instead partnered with Smith and Karony to be the public faces of the business.
Nagy controlled the SafeMoon Token smart contract owner
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 address (“SafeMoon Contract
Owner Address”) from its inception in March 2021 until April 2021, and shared control of it
with Karony and Smith once they joined SafeMoon around March 12, 2021.  Nagy has never
been registered with the Commission in any capacity.
16. Karony, age 27, was a resident of Provo, Utah.  Karony has served as SafeMoon’s
CEO since March 2021.  Prior to SafeMoon, Karony operated a small software company.
Karony interacted frequently with the public to promote the SafeMoon Token.  Karony
controlled SafeMoon LLC and SafeMoon US LLC.  In September 2021, the SafeMoon Contract
Owner Address was transferred to a new address under Karony’s sole control.  Karony has never
been registered with the Commission in any capacity.
17. Smith, age 35, was a resident of Bethlehem, New Hampshire who served as
SafeMoon’s first CTO from March 2021 until around November 2021.  Smith also interacted

2
 Smart contracts are self-executing code deployed on a blockchain that perform “if/then”
computations.  Smart contracts can govern the issuance and distribution of tokens on a blockchain,
and typically those who deploy such smart contracts can control them through administrative
access rights.

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frequently with the public to promote the SafeMoon Token.  Smith has never been registered
with the Commission in any capacity.
BACKGROUND ON SECURITIES OFFERINGS
18. Congress enacted the Securities Act nearly a century ago to regulate the offer and
sale of securities.  In contrast to the commercial principle of caveat emptor, Congress established
a regime of full and fair disclosure, requiring those who offer and sell securities to the investing
public to provide sufficient and accurate information to allow investors to make informed
decisions before they invest.
19. Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act require issuers of securities to register
offers and sales of those securities with the SEC when they offer and sell securities to the public.
Registration statements relating to an offering of securities provide investors with important
information about the issuer and the offering, including financial and managerial information,
how the issuer will use offering proceeds, and the risks and trends that affect the enterprise and
an investment in its securities.
20. The Securities Act and Exchange Act also contain anti-fraud provisions to prevent
fraudulent conduct in the offer, sale, and purchase of securities.  Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, for example, seek to ensure honest behavior and fair
dealing in securities transactions.
21. Congress used a broad definition of “security” in the Securities Act and Exchange
Act.  A “security” encompasses a wide range of investments, including investment contracts.
Investment contracts are instruments through which a person invests money in a common
enterprise and reasonably expects profits or returns derived from the entrepreneurial or

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managerial efforts of others.  In this case, SafeMoon offered and sold SafeMoon Tokens
as securities.
BACKGROUND ON CRYPTO ASSETS
22. The term “crypto asset” generally refers to an asset issued and/or transferred using
distributed ledger or blockchain technology, including assets sometimes referred to as
“cryptocurrencies,” “digital assets,” “virtual currencies,” “digital coins,” and “digital tokens.”
23. A blockchain or distributed ledger is a peer-to-peer database spread across a
network of computers that records all transactions in theoretically unchangeable, digitally
recorded data packages.  The system relies on cryptographic techniques for secure recording of
transactions.
24. Blockchains typically employ a consensus mechanism to “validate” transactions,
which, among other things, aims to achieve agreement on a data value or on the state of the
ledger.  Crypto assets may be traded on crypto asset trading platforms in exchange for other
crypto assets or fiat currency (legal tender issued by a country).
25. A blockchain “protocol” is a code, software, or algorithm that governs how a
blockchain, or a feature of a blockchain, operates.
26. On July 25, 2017, the SEC issued the Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section
21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:  The DAO, advising “those who would use . . .
distributed ledger or blockchain-enabled means for capital raising[] to take appropriate steps to
ensure compliance with the U.S. federal securities laws,” and finding that the offering of crypto
assets at issue in that report were offered and sold as investment contracts and, thus, securities.

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FACTS
A. The History of the SafeMoon Token
27. On March 1, 2021, Nagy launched the SafeMoon Token through the use of a
“smart contract” that he controlled and deployed on the Binance Smart Chain blockchain.  At
launch, Nagy “minted” one quadrillion SafeMoon Tokens, burned 223 trillion of them,
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 and
transferred the remaining 777 trillion to another smart contract that was programmed to conduct
an automated sale of the tokens upon receipt into the smart contract.  Nagy’s purported vision for
SafeMoon, as stated in his marketing materials, was to create a supposedly “entirely community
driven” and “self-regenerating automatic liquidity providing protocol” that would pay out
rewards to token holders and penalize sellers.
28. Nagy, the creator and founder of SafeMoon, initially attracted investors to the
SafeMoon Token through promotional materials for which he had ultimate authority.
Specifically, Nagy had the sole and ultimate authority over the content and dissemination of
SafeMoon’s presale marketing materials, the SafeMoon website, and the SafeMoon whitepaper.
Nagy also promoted SafeMoon’s offering by touting its profitmaking opportunities, which he
dubbed “tokenomics.”  Nagy marketed the SafeMoon Token’s ability to generate profits for
investors through features that, according to the SafeMoon whitepaper and website, would “drive
the price to stratospheric all-time highs” or “Safely to the Moon.”

3
 Burning crypto assets involves transferring them to a blockchain address that cannot be
used for any other purpose than to receive assets.  Burning crypto assets often is done for the
purpose of increasing the market value of those crypto assets by decreasing the supply
in circulation.

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29. For example, SafeMoon publicly touted plans to burn SafeMoon Tokens to “keep
the community rewarded and informed” and to potentially increase the price of the asset by
reducing its circulating supply.
30. In addition, according to its website, SafeMoon “[h]olders can earn passive
income and watch their balance grow indefinetely [sic].”  As stated in the whitepaper:
[T]he  reflect  mechanism  encourages  holders  to  hang  onto  their
tokens   to   garner   higher   kick-backs   which   are   based   upon   a
percentages  [sic]  carried  out  and  dependent  upon  the  total  tokens
held by the owner.  In theory, with the manual burn function ... even
a small holder at the beginning could potentially walk away with big
money at the end of the token’s lifespan.

This mechanism was one of SafeMoon’s central marketing features that the Defendants
actively promoted.
B. The SafeMoon Token Presale and Initial Decentralized Exchange Offer, and its
Rapid Adoption by the Crypto Asset Community

31. Nagy created the SafeMoon LP, which consisted of the token pair SafeMoon
Token and BNB, on a crypto asset trading platform called PancakeSwap.
4
  The SafeMoon LP
was initially funded by a “presale” of the SafeMoon Token, which was open to the public.

4
 Through such a platform, users can create “liquidity pools,” typically consisting of two or
more crypto assets, which are then available for other participants who want to exchange one of
those crypto assets for another.  Depositors to the liquidity pool are generally referred to as
“liquidity providers.”  They typically deposit a number of crypto asset pairs into the liquidity pool
and receive in return a crypto asset, often referred to as a “liquidity provider token” or “LP token,”
which represents their pro rata interest in the liquidity pool and is redeemable at any time for their
slice of the pool, typically including accrued trading fees.  Typically, participants who trade with a
liquidity pool deposit a certain number of crypto asset A and receive a certain number of crypto
asset B.  The exchange rate between A and B is automatically determined according to a preset
formula that is based on the ratio of assets held by the pool and is designed to programmatically
adjust prices to match market prices.  Thus, as the ratio of crypto asset A to crypto asset B increases,
the liquidity pool price of crypto asset A decreases and the price of crypto asset B increases.

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32. The presale was the first step in the offering of SafeMoon Tokens to the public
using a liquidity pool, a process known in the crypto asset industry as an “Initial Decentralized
Exchange Offer” or “IDO.”
33. Presale marketing materials posted on the internet by Nagy under the pseudonym
“SafeMoon Protocol” represented that all presale “profits” would be automatically transferred
into the SafeMoon LP and that SafeMoon Tokens would then be listed on PancakeSwap at four
times the presale price, allowing investors to “walk away with an easy 4x gain.”
34. SafeMoon Tokens were sold in the presale at one trillion SafeMoon Tokens per
BNB.  This meant that, at the then-prevailing market price for BNB, 100 billion SafeMoon
Tokens cost approximately $2.35.
35. During the presale, Nagy purchased three trillion SafeMoon Tokens for 0.3 BNB
(approximately $75 at the time) from the presale smart contract, or $0.0000000000235 per
SafeMoon, the same price as the other presale investors.  Within hours of its March 1, 2021
launch, the presale reached its “hardcap,” i.e., prescribed limit, of 70 BNB (approximately
$16,500 at the time).
36. When the presale closed on March 2, 2021, 30 addresses immediately claimed
about 694 trillion tokens from the presale smart contract, and the presale smart contract
simultaneously transferred 63 trillion SafeMoon Tokens and 61.74 BNB to PancakeSwap to
establish the SafeMoon LP.
37. With this amount of SafeMoon Tokens and BNB deposited in the SafeMoon LP,
one BNB could buy 1.02 SafeMoon Tokens, or $0.00000000024 per SafeMoon Token at then-
prevailing market prices for BNB.  This means that the price of the SafeMoon Tokens was
instantly ten times higher than the amount investors had paid for the tokens hours earlier,

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representing a nearly 1,000% instant return (or 10x) for investors that bought SafeMoon Tokens
in the presale.
38. Once Nagy established the SafeMoon LP on PancakeSwap, anyone could access
PancakeSwap and buy the SafeMoon Token without limitation—the second step in the plan to
distribute the SafeMoon Token to the public.  SafeMoon Tokens were tradable through the
SafeMoon LP and later through other crypto asset trading platforms.
39. No registration statement was filed or in effect at any time as to any offer or sale
of SafeMoon Tokens—not the offers or sales during the presale, nor the offers or sales once the
token was available for trading via the SafeMoon LP.
40. Defendants represented to potential investors that they could expect substantial
returns.  Following the Defendants’ marketing campaign, the price and trading volume of the
SafeMoon Token on crypto asset trading platforms skyrocketed, increasing in price by more than
55,000% from March 12, 2021, when it had a price of $0.00000002, to when it reached its all-
time high of $0.00001118 on April 20, 2021.  The Token’s total market value also experienced a
meteoric rise to over $5.7 billion during this time frame and was held by more than 2.8 million
unique addresses.
C. SafeMoon Tokens were Offered and Sold in a Series of Unregistered Securities
Transactions

41. Defendants offered and sold SafeMoon Tokens as investment contracts and,
therefore, as securities.  SafeMoon Token purchasers invested money in a common enterprise
and reasonably expected profits or returns derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts
of others, in this case, the Defendants.
42. Purchasers obtained SafeMoon Tokens in exchange for an investment of money
in the form of BNB another crypto asset security on the BNB Chain.

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43. Purchasers of SafeMoon Tokens invested into a common enterprise with other
investors.  SafeMoon Tokens are fungible with each other, all investors shared equally in price
increases—or together suffered price decreases—of the SafeMoon Token.  Further, SafeMoon
Token investors received a pro rata distribution of profits in at least two ways based on the
“tokenomics” features of the SafeMoon Token.  First, half of the tax on every SafeMoon Token
transaction was redistributed to existing holders as a “static reward” or “reflection,” which were
dividend-like payments that benefited investors directly in proportion to their ownership of
SafeMoon Tokens.  In addition, SafeMoon represented that they would conduct periodic manual
“burning” of SafeMoon Tokens to deflate the supply of available SafeMoon Tokens, which
purportedly increased the market price of the SafeMoon Tokens, benefitting SafeMoon Token
holders proportionally to their ownership.
44. Moreover, in addition to holding SafeMoon Tokens, Defendants accumulated LP
Tokens generated from “taxes” on SafeMoon transactions, which allowed them to redeem assets
from the SafeMoon LP.  Accordingly, SafeMoon’s financial fortunes were inexorably tied to
SafeMoon Token investors’ financial fortunes.
45. Purchasers of SafeMoon Tokens reasonably expected to profit from the efforts of
others, in this case, the Defendants.  At its inception, SafeMoon’s whitepaper stated that
SafeMoon “tokenomics” would “drive the price to stratospheric all-time highs,” or as its website
proclaimed, “[s]afely to the Moon.”

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46. After the SafeMoon Token launch in early March 2021, Nagy continued to
publicize the offering on the website and the whitepaper, and social media accounts he
controlled, including at X (formerly known as Twitter), Discord, Medium, and Telegram.  The
Defendants took numerous intentional steps to help fuel a dramatic increase in the SafeMoon
Token’s market price, including a social media campaign further touting the SafeMoon Token’s
purported safety from “rug pulls” as well as its price, total market value, and trading volume
increases; the rapidly rising number of token holders and social media followers; and the token’s
standing on the “Top Mover” list on CoinMarketCap, a crypto asset market data website.
47. This publicity campaign, aimed at current and potential investors, promoted a
reasonable expectation for outsized returns based upon the Defendants entrepreneurial and
managerial efforts with respect to the SafeMoon Token.  Exploiting imagery widely understood
in the crypto asset markets to connote astronomical trading gains, SafeMoon tweeted hundreds of
rocketship and moon emojis from their official X account.  The image below is an
illustrative example.

48. SafeMoon also published numerous tweets detailing how the Defendants’ efforts
would allow SafeMoon Token to trade on various crypto asset trading platforms, thereby
increasing SafeMoon Token’s market value:

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49. From his personal X account, Karony further touted SafeMoon’s efforts to bolster
the SafeMoon Token:

50. The Defendants also organized SafeMoon Token giveaways on social media and
developed additional software to assist investors in trading the SafeMoon Token.  SafeMoon
advertised that it retained ownership of the SafeMoon smart contract, which allowed it to execute
privileged functions, such as setting the “tax” rate and liquidity fees.  SafeMoon also claimed
that it would continue to make “strategic plays in regards to long term growth of the community
and the project.”  In addition, SafeMoon publicly announced when they would burn SafeMoon
Tokens, demonstrating their continued involvement with managing its trading price and volume.

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51. SafeMoon also tweeted imagery and language associated with traditional stock
market investments, further linking the SafeMoon Token’s prospects to that of a traditional stock
market investment.

D. Nagy Falsely and Repeatedly Represented that the Assets Retained in the
SafeMoon LP Were “Locked” and Inaccessible

52. A significant risk with certain crypto asset offerings is the potential for developers
who control the associated smart contracts, like Nagy, Smith and Karony, to misappropriate
funds held in the associated smart contract.  After he launched SafeMoon, Nagy repeatedly and
falsely represented that the assets retained in the SafeMoon LP were protected from
misappropriation by the project’s developers.  Nagy made these false and misleading statements
in SafeMoon’s presale marketing materials, the SafeMoon website, and the SafeMoon
whitepaper.  Nagy had the ultimate authority over the content and dissemination of the false and
misleading statements in the presale marketing materials, the website, and the whitepaper.
53. SafeMoon’s presale marketing materials, which Nagy started to disseminate to
investors in early March 2021, stated falsely that (1) the liquidity generated from the SafeMoon

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Token presale would be “force lock[ed]” for over four years “to foster trust in the contract”; (2)
“5% of all trades are auto-locked inside [the] liquidity provider on PancakeSwap” and
automatically locked liquidity “guarantees that the token cannot be rugged by the dev[eloper]
simply by removing the [SafeMoon] LP”; and (3) SafeMoon was “Completely Rug Free.”

54. SafeMoon’s website, which Nagy launched on March 6, 2021, stated (1) the
“automatically generating liquidity” contributed by every trade in PancakeSwap was “locked
forever”; (2) “Rug-pull impossible”; and (3) SafeMoon “#safu” (slang for safe).

55. SafeMoon’s whitepaper similarly contained a “Step-by-Step Plan to Ensure 100%
Safety,” which included “LP Locked ...  for 4 years” and “LP Generated With Every Trade &
Locked On Pancake[Swap].”

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56. Nagy knew or was reckless in not knowing that these statements were materially
false and misleading.  Nagy programmed the SafeMoon LP code, meaning that he knew that
there was no such LP Token lock mechanism, as he falsely told the public.
57. The SafeMoon Token smart contract source code, which Nagy posted on GitHub
(a code repository) in early March 2021, also explained that it would “foster trust in the
community by auto-locking liquidity for 4 years” assuring once again “no rug is possible.”
58. Karony and Smith, at various times, also disseminated the false information that
the assets held in the SafeMoon LP were protected from misappropriation.  For example,
Karony, as SafeMoon’s CEO, directed Nagy to send the whitepaper to a SafeMoon employee,
and Smith, in turn, instructed the employee to use the information in the whitepaper to answer
questions from the community.  Karony also represented on occasion to the SafeMoon investor
community that the assets in the SafeMoon LP were protected from misappropriation or
“locked.”  As alleged above, this was not true because the Defendants continuously accumulated
LP Tokens from “taxed” SafeMoon Token transactions, which allowed them improperly to
remove these retained assets from the SafeMoon LP at will.

59. Contrary to these assertions, Nagy did not protect assets in the SafeMoon LP from
misappropriation by the project’s developers.  Within two weeks of the SafeMoon Token launch,
Nagy had already redeemed LP Tokens to transfer more than $500,000 worth of purportedly
“locked” retained assets from the SafeMoon LP to the SafeMoon Contract Owner Address under
his control.
60. Moreover, from the beginning Karony and Smith, like Nagy, knew or recklessly
disregarded, that these statements were materially false and misleading.  As early as March 16,
2021, in a conversation between Karony and Smith, Karony candidly observed, “we could also

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just update the whitepaper [to say SafeMoon LP assets would be used for business development]
... we could literally just put it in the whitepaper and call it a day.”  Smith responded that the
whitepaper could be “much better.”  But neither Karony nor Smith disclosed the truth to public
investors at this time.
E. When Caught, the Defendants Doubled Down on their Misrepresentations and
Misappropriated Assets Held in the SafeMoon LP

61. On April 20, 2021, which turned out to be the date of SafeMoon Token’s all-time
high price, a social media account called “WarOnRugs” tweeted a “Scam Advisory” about
SafeMoon and the SafeMoon Token.  The advisory asserted that the smart contract owner
controlled a majority of the SafeMoon LP and could pull tokens from it.

62. This warning—which was correct—exposed the falsity of Defendants’ public
claims that they could not pilfer assets held in the SafeMoon LP.
63. Instead of acknowledging their fraud, however, the Defendants doubled down.
That same day, Karony responded to a large group of his followers on a separate social media
platform that the post by “WarOnRugs” was “biased, [because] the original poster supports
another coin so what they are saying is biased.”  He went on to reiterate that the “5% LP is Split,
2.5% goes to locked LP, and the other 2.5% is manually locked or left alone if needed for dev

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costs or to SEED DEXS AND EXCHANGES.”  Just minutes later, Nagy wrote privately to
Karony that this statement was wrong.  Nagy explained, candidly and contrary to how he
previously marketed the SafeMoon Token to the public, “5% liquidity is added to the contract
owner address.  2.5% is not ever locked.”
64. The following day, April 21, 2021, Karony sent out a series of tweets where he
admitted that what the Defendants had described as liquidity pool “locking” was not “automatic”
at all, but rather within SafeMoon’s discretion.  Karony also tweeted about the circumstances
where the Defendants would use the SafeMoon LP assets they previously claimed were locked:

65. Karony misleadingly assured his twitter followers that he would alert them before
making use of any funds from the SafeMoon LP, which he falsely represented was a “last resort”
for SafeMoon.

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66. Later that same day, Karony and Smith participated in a question-and-answer
session—colloquially, an “AMA” or “Ask Me Anything”—that was live streamed over the
internet.  During the AMA, Karony clarified that “the LP lock is automated, not automatic.”
Karony repeated that “situations may require the use of the LP” to “seed[] other exchanges” and
“as in the last resort for development costs.”  Karony once again falsely assured his viewers and
listeners, “if we are going to do something with the LP, we’ll tell you.”
67. Smith was viewable on the left side of the live-stream AMA with Karony, who
was viewable on the lower-right section of the screen, and added:  “As John was saying, if
something comes up that makes sense, we’re gonna tell you, and then we’re gonna judge our
reaction based on your reaction.  It’s a perfect symbiosis of the community and what we’re
doing.  It’s awesome.”  Karony indicated his approval of Smith’s comments by stating, “Yeah.
Hundred percent.”
68. Despite Karony and Smith’s attempts at damage control, after it was disclosed on
April 20, 2021 that the SafeMoon LP was not locked as Defendants had described, the SafeMoon
Token price plummeted almost 50% the following day.
69. In further response to the “Scam Advisory,” SafeMoon submitted its token
contract for a third-party audit.  The audit concluded that there was no restriction, or “lock,” as to
the SafeMoon Tokens generated from “taxed” SafeMoon Token transactions.  The auditor
viewed this as a “major risk” that could “have devastating consequences to the project as a
whole.”  Though the audit recommended restricting control of the SafeMoon LP, SafeMoon
instead argued publicly that its team needed “additional control” to make “continued strategic
plays in regards to long term growth” and claimed “[r]isks in regard to rug-pulls” are mitigated
because “every member of SafeMoon would be subject to litigation and likely a swift prison

22

sentence . . . [and] our social lives would be in ruin, and we would not be able to show our faces
in public again, let alone get another job.”
70. Despite assuring their AMA viewers and social media followers on April 21,
2021 that they would “publicly go to the community and let [the community] know if the
[SafeMoon] LP will be used and what for, ahead of time,” just over two weeks later on May 6,
2021, the Defendants transferred more than $1,200,000 worth of BNB and SafeMoon Tokens
from the SafeMoon LP to the SafeMoon Contract Owner Address, without first disclosing to the
community any information about the transaction or its purpose.
71. Notwithstanding the Defendants efforts to lull investors during the April 2021
AMA and related tweets, Karony, Smith and Nagy knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that
any withdrawals from the SafeMoon LP were contrary to SafeMoon’s initial representations to
investors that assets within the SafeMoon LP were locked and inaccessible to the Defendants for
at least four years.
72. Contrary to their explicit representations, not only did the Defendants have
unfettered access to the SafeMoon LP by virtue of their control of LP Tokens, Nagy, Smith, and
Karony in fact redeemed LP Tokens to misappropriate millions of dollars’ worth of assets from
the SafeMoon LP.  In practical terms, Nagy, Smith, and Karony burned their LP Tokens through
PancakeSwap and received in return a portion of the SafeMoon Tokens and BNB that were held
within the SafeMoon LP.  These LP Tokens were generated from a portion of the tax on all
SafeMoon Token transactions.  The Defendants wrongfully redeemed or withdrew the following
tokens between March 5, 2021 and May 11, 2022:

24

purchases of SafeMoon Tokens, driving up their value relative to BNB tokens.  The opportunity
to engage in this manipulation presented itself when PancakeSwap announced in late April 2021
that it would upgrade its standard LP smart contract from version one (“V1”) to version 2
(“V2”).  Because of the upgrade, PancakeSwap would ultimately discontinue support for
liquidity pools created with the V1 smart contract, such as the SafeMoon LP.  Liquidity pools
created with the V1 smart contract, like the SafeMoon LP, needed to “migrate” their liquidity to
a new V2 liquidity pool.  Therefore, it was expected that large volumes of liquidity would be
transferred from the SafeMoon LP V1 (hereinafter, “SafeMoon LPV1”) to a new SafeMoon LP
V2 (“SafeMoon LPV2”).
76. As a general matter, the migration of liquidity from one liquidity pool to another
was a relatively simple process.  To accomplish this, liquidity would need to be removed from a
V1 liquidity pool by redeeming all current LP tokens (the tokens received for adding liquidity) in
exchange for the underlying crypto assets in the liquidity pool.  Those crypto assets would then
need to be paired together and added as liquidity in a new V2 liquidity pool, in exchange for new
LP tokens.
77. In the early morning of May 12, 2021, shortly after midnight, Smith and Karony
initiated the migration from the SafeMoon LPV1 to the SafeMoon LPV2, by removing
approximately 14,800 BNB and 963 billion SafeMoon Tokens from the SafeMoon LPV1, and
shortly thereafter, adding approximately 13,500 BNB and 867 billion SafeMoon Tokens to the
SafeMoon LPV2.
a. The May 12th Manipulation of the SafeMoon Token
78. On May 12, 2021, beginning at approximately 10:00 a.m., Smith and Karony
withdrew approximately 3.8 trillion SafeMoon tokens and 56,940 BNB, worth approximately

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$68.6 million total, from the SafeMoon LPV1 in two transactions.  Rather than add this liquidity
into the SafeMoon LPV2, as the SafeMoon Token investors would have expected, Smith and
Karony sold approximately 4.1 trillion SafeMoon Tokens in exchange for approximately $8.83
million in another crypto asset.  In a private conversation over Discord, Karony and Nagy
discussed a plan to use $830,000 of the proceeds of this transaction for company expenses and to
split the remaining $8 million.
79. None of the Defendants publicly disclosed to the SafeMoon community that they
would withdraw assets from the SafeMoon LPV1 for personal use.
80. Smith used about 58,220 BNB to purchase more SafeMoon Tokens in the
SafeMoon LPV2, causing a dramatic increase in value of the SafeMoon Tokens relative to
BNB.  As Smith informed Karony just after purchasing about 1 trillion SafeMoon Tokens for
13,220 BNB worth more than $7.9 million:
[P]eople are going to geek out over that buy I just did to make up
the difference in a good way ...  I  did  a  13k  bnb  buy  to  make  the
difference on the lost [SafeMoon Tokens from the 10% tax], should
have  shot  the  price  up.  We  have  45376  bnb  remaining.    Clean
$30,222,901.20  in  bnb  on  standby,  $30m  in  usdt  [referring  to  the
crypto asset known as Tether] incoming. It's a pretty good day and
the price is up, win win.

81. Indeed, SafeMoon’s investors immediately noticed the dramatic price impact of
Smith’s large trades.  Less than an hour later, Smith used 22,500 BNB worth approximately
$13.5 million to purchase about 1.5 trillion SafeMoon from the SafeMoon V2LP.  Two minutes
later, Smith used another 22,500 BNB worth an additional approximately $13.5 million to buy
1.28 trillion additional SafeMoon Tokens.

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82. Through this series of transactions on May 12, Karony and Smith created the
artificial appearance of active trading and attempted to raise the price of the SafeMoon Tokens,
for the purpose of inducing the purchase of SafeMoon Tokens by others.
b. The May 19th Manipulation of the SafeMoon Token
83. On May 19, 2021, Smith messaged Karony on Discord that Smith could “move
all the available” liquidity from SafeMoon LPV1 to SafeMoon LPV2.  Smith suggested that they
instead could remove liquidity from SafeMoon LPV1 and use the resulting BNB to purchase
SafeMoon Tokens from SafeMoon LPV2, as they had done the week prior on May 12th.  Karony
wrote to Smith, “do a v2 bnb buy,” meaning, purchase SafeMoon Tokens from SafeMoon LPV2
using BNB removed from SafeMoon LPV1, “if that will increase the price.”
84. Karony asked Smith if “we can do it a little slower this time around?”  Smith
assured Karony that he would “plug it through the day starting when I get back all the way to
midnight.”  This in contrast to Smith’s conduct on May 12 when he bought nearly $35 million in
SafeMoon Tokens in about one hour.
85. Karony gave Smith detailed instructions on how to trade the SafeMoon
Token.  For example, Karony told Smith, “lets create a price floor[.]”  Karony also asked Smith,
“how big of a yeet [purchase of SafeMoon Token] is needed to pump [the price] to 5.”  Smith
assured Karony that he “can just thrash it [i.e., purchase SafeMoon Tokens] just under the
diminishing returns until we hit 5 Np [no problem].”  Karony replied hopefully, “[i]n all Reality
the best thing to do would to be to counter all the sells.  Then add 26% [to the price].”
86. Karony told Smith how much SafeMoon Tokens to purchase and when, including
detailed instructions such as “50bnb buy [of SafeMoon Token] every 5 minutes” initially, then

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“200bnb x 3 then 50bnb x till done.”  These instructions were followed by corresponding
transactions in which Smith executed the manipulative strategy discussed with Karony.
87. In total the Defendants used about 58,221 BNB removed from the LPV1 to
purchase SafeMoon Tokens from LPV2, with the intent of manipulating the price of the
SafeMoon Tokens higher and, as their internal private conversations show, in order to attract
investors to buying SafeMoon Tokens.
88. None of the Defendants publicly disclosed to the SafeMoon community that they
would withdraw assets from the SafeMoon LPV1 to purchase additional SafeMoon Tokens or
manipulate its market price.
COUNT I – FRAUD
Violations of Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act
[15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1)]
(Against All Defendants)
89. Paragraphs 1 through 88 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.
90. Defendants, knowingly or recklessly, acting with scienter, in the offer or sale of
securities and by the use of means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly, employed a device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud.
91. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants, directly and indirectly, have violated and,
unless enjoined, will continue to violate Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a)(1)].

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COUNT II – FRAUD

Violations of Sections 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act
[15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(2)]
(Against Defendant Nagy)
92. Paragraphs 1 through 88 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.
93. Defendants, acting knowingly, recklessly, or negligently in the offer or sale of
securities and by the use of means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly, obtained money or property by means of
untrue statements of material fact or by omitting to state material facts necessary in order to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.
94. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants, directly and indirectly, have violated and,
unless enjoined, will continue to violate Sections 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§
77q(a)(2) and 77q(a)(3)].
COUNT III – FRAUD

Violations of Sections 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act
[15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(3)]
(Against All Defendants)

95. Paragraphs 1 through 88 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.
96. Defendants, acting knowingly, recklessly, or negligently in the offer or sale of
securities and by the use of means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly, engaged in transactions, practices, or a
course of business which operated or would have operated as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
97. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants, directly and indirectly, have violated and,
unless enjoined, will continue to violate Sections 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§
77q(a)(2) and 77q(a)(3)].

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COUNT IV – FRAUD
Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder
[15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5]
(Rule 10(b)-5(a) and (c) Against All Defendants)
98. Paragraphs 1 through 88 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein
99. Defendants, knowingly or recklessly, acting with scienter and in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities and by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
or by use of the mails or any facility of any national securities exchange, directly or indirectly, (a)
employed a device, scheme, and artifice to defraud, and (c) engaged in acts, practices, or a course of
business which operated or would have operated as a fraud or deceit upon sellers, purchasers, or
prospective purchasers of securities.
100. By engaging in the conduct described above, Defendants violated, and unless
enjoined will continue to violate, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)
thereunder [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) and (c)].
COUNT V – FRAUD
Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Rules 10b-5(b)thereunder
[15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5]
(Rule 10(b)-5(b) Against Nagy)
101. Paragraphs 1 through 88 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein.
102. Defendant Nagy, knowingly or recklessly, acting with scienter, and in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities and by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or by use of the mails or any facility of any national securities exchange, directly or
indirectly, (b) made untrue statements of material fact or omitted to state material facts necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading.

30

103. By engaging in the conduct described above, Defendant Nagy violated, and unless
enjoined will continue to violate, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(b) thereunder
[15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)].
COUNT VI – FRAUD
Violations of Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act
[15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2)]
(Against Defendants Karony, Smith, SafeMoon LLC, and SafeMoon US LLC)

104. Paragraphs 1 through 88 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.
105. By virtue of the foregoing, Defendants, directly or indirectly, by use of the means or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the facilities of a national securities exchange or the
mail, effected, alone or with one of more persons, a series of transactions in a security registered on
a national securities exchange, a security not so registered, or in connection with a security-based
swap or security-based swap agreement with respect to such security creating actual or apparent
active trading in such security, or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the purpose of
inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.
106. By engaging in the conduct described above, Defendants violated, and unless
enjoined will continue to violate, Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2)].
COUNT VII – UNREGISTERED OFFERS AND SALES OF SECURITIES
Violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act
[15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and 77e(c)]
(Against All Defendants)
107. Paragraphs 1 through 88 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein.
108. By virtue of the foregoing, without a registration statement in effect as to any offers
or sales of the SafeMoon Token, Defendants, directly and indirectly, (a) made use of the means and
instruments of transportation or communications in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell
securities through the use of medium of any prospectus or otherwise; (b) carried or caused to be

31

carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation,
any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale; and (c) made use of the means
and instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer
to sell through the use or medium of a prospectus or otherwise, securities as to which no registration
statement had been filed.
109. By engaging in the conduct described herein, Defendants violated, and unless
enjoined will continue to violate, Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a)
and 77e(c)].
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The SEC respectfully requests that the Court enter a Final Judgment:
1. Finding that Defendants committed the violations alleged in this Complaint;
2. Permanently restraining and enjoining Defendants from violations of the
following provisions:  Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a),
77e(c), 77q(a)], Sections 9(a)(2) and 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(2), 78j(b)],
and Rule 10b-5 thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5];
3. Permanently prohibiting Defendants, pursuant to Section 20(b) of the Securities
Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t] and Sections 21(d)(1) and 21(d)(5) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C.
§§ 78u(d)(1) and 78u(d)(5)], from (i) participating, directly or indirectly, including, but not
limited to, through any entity controlled by [Defendants], in any offering of crypto asset
securities; provided, however, that such injunction shall not prevent [Defendant] from
purchasing or selling any crypto asset security, for [his] own personal account;

32

4. Ordering Defendants to disgorge all ill-gotten gains from the illegal conduct
alleged in this Complaint, plus pay prejudgment interest, pursuant to Sections 21(d)(3), (5), and
(7) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(3), (5), (7)];
5. Ordering Defendants to pay civil penalties pursuant to Section 20(d) of the
Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)]
in an amount to be determined by the Court; and
6. Granting any other and further relief this Court may deem just and proper.

33

JURY TRIAL DEMAND
The SEC demands a trial by jury as to all issues that may be so tried.

Dated:  November 1, 2023             Respectfully            submitted,
     /s/ Oren Gleich
     Oren Gleich (New York Bar No. 4460135)
                                                            Securities            and            Exchange            Commission
                                                            New            York            Regional            Office
100 Pearl Street, Suite 20-100
New York, NY 10004-2616
Tel: (212) 336-0190
[email protected]

                                                            Dean            M.            Conway*
                                                            Securities            and            Exchange            Commission
                                                            100            F            Street            NE
                                                            Washington,            DC            20549
                                                            Tel:            (202)            551-4412
                                                            [email protected]

                                                            Attorneys            for            Plaintiff

*Pending admission pro hac vice

Of Counsel
John Lucas
John S. Crimmins
Pamela Sawhney
Securities and Exchange
Commission

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff,

v. No. __________ 

SAFEMOON LLC, SAFEMOON US LLC, KYLE 
NAGY, BRADEN JOHN KARONY AND 
THOMAS GLENN SMITH, 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

Defendants,

COMPLAINT 

Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) alleges 

as follows: 

SUMMARY OF ACTION 

1. Beginning in March 2021, SafeMoon LLC, SafeMoon US LLC (together,

“SafeMoon”), SafeMoon LLC’s creator and founder Kyle Nagy (“Nagy”), and SafeMoon’s 

Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) John Karony (“Karony”) and Chief Technology Officer 

(“CTO”) Thomas Smith (“Smith”) (“Defendants”) perpetrated a massive fraudulent scheme that 

generated millions through the unregistered offer and sale of a crypto asset security called the 

SafeMoon Token.  During the course of the fraud, the SafeMoon Token’s market capitalization 

skyrocketed to billions of dollars in only two months.  That value quickly plummeted when the 

scam was discovered, leading to significant losses to investors.  Meanwhile, Defendants profited 

by misappropriating from the project crypto assets worth tens of millions of dollars.  

2. Between March 12, 2021 and April 20, 2021, the trading volume of the SafeMoon

Token on crypto asset trading platforms also skyrocketed and its market price soared by over 

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55,000%.  The total market value of the SafeMoon Token also experienced a meteoric rise to 

over $5.7 billion. 

 

Ultimately, more than 2.8 million unique addresses have held SafeMoon Tokens since its 

inception on the distributed digital ledger (or “blockchain”) in which it was represented. 

3. As part of their scheme, Defendants used a so-called “liquidity pool” through 

which SafeMoon Token holders were able to “swap” their SafeMoon Tokens for “BNB Tokens,” 

another crypto asset security, which is associated with the “Binance Smart Chain” blockchain 

(now known as the BNB Chain).1  This exchange would take place through a so-called “liquidity 

pool” (the “SafeMoon LP”), which consisted of a “smart contract” (generally speaking, self-

executing computer code) that ran on a so-called “decentralized exchange” known as 

PancakeSwap.  The SafeMoon LP allowed users to swap SafeMoon Tokens with BNB Tokens.  

In his marketing materials, whitepaper, and website, Nagy represented that each SafeMoon 

Token transaction would be subject to a 10% “tax”—5% would be returned to SafeMoon Token 

 
1 The liquidity pool actually used a “wrapped” token, called “wBNB,” that was compatible 

with the BNB Chain. 

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holders as a quasi-dividend, and 5% would be deposited and retained in the SafeMoon LP.  

Smith and Karony repeated and disseminated these false representations in social media posts 

and other communications with the public.     

4. Critically, Nagy represented in marketing materials, his whitepaper, and website 

that these retained assets would be “locked” and inaccessible for at least four years.  Smith and 

Karony repeated and disseminated these false representations in social media posts and other 

communications with the public.  According to Defendants, this purported safety feature would 

protect assets from being misappropriated (or having the “rug pulled” in crypto asset market 

terms).  What the Defendants failed to disclose, however, was that whenever tokens were 

deposited to the SafeMoon LP from the 5% tax, the Defendants received “liquidity provider 

tokens” (“LP Tokens”) as a result.  Accordingly, as Defendants well knew, the assets in the 

SafeMoon LP were not locked because the LP Tokens allowed the Defendants to withdraw 

retained assets from the SafeMoon LP at will—which, in fact, is what the Defendants 

repeatedly did.        

5. In direct contravention to their public representations, the Defendants repeatedly 

raided the retained assets from the SafeMoon LP by redeeming LP Tokens they received when 

tokens were deposited into the SafeMoon LP as part of the 5% tax on each SafeMoon Token 

transaction.  The Defendants claimed in their marketing materials, website, whitepaper, and 

public statements, that removing funds from the SafeMoon LP was something that they could not 

do.  After Karony and Smith were confronted with their lies, however, they changed their story 

and represented that they would not remove funds from the SafeMoon LP without first disclosing 

their intended use to the public.  This was also a false statement because they continued to 

withdraw assets from the SafeMoon LP without public disclosure. 

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6. As the SafeMoon Token grew exponentially in value, the Defendants used their 

LP Tokens to redeem tens of millions of dollars’ worth of tokens from the SafeMoon LP, which 

they then used for various purposes, including manipulation of the SafeMoon Token market, 

business expenses, investments in unrelated companies, and personal uses such as to purchase 

luxury homes, McClaren sports cars, and extravagant travel.   

7. On or about April 21, 2021, after it became public that the Defendants had the 

unfettered ability to remove assets from the SafeMoon LP, the SafeMoon Token price 

plummeted nearly 50%.  After this plunge, the Defendants engaged in another scheme to 

manipulate the price of the SafeMoon Token through carefully timed asset purchases.  

8. By engaging in the conduct alleged in this Complaint, Defendants violated 

Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) [15 U.S.C. 

§§ 77e(a), 77e(c), 77q(a)]; Sections 9(a)(2) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 

(“Exchange Act”) [15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(2), 78j(b)]; and Rule 10b-5 thereunder [17 C.F.R.  

§ 240.10b-5].  Defendants will continue to violate the federal securities laws unless they are 

restrained and enjoined by this Court. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

9. The SEC brings this action pursuant to Sections 20 and 22 of the Securities Act 

[15 U.S.C. §§ 77t, 77v] and Sections 21(d) and 27 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), 78aa] 

to enjoin Defendants from engaging in the transactions, acts, practices, and courses of business 

alleged in this Complaint, and transactions, acts, practices, and courses of business of similar 

purport and object.   

10. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants and venue is proper in this 

District pursuant to Section 22(a) of the Securities Act, [15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)], and Section 27(a) 

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of the Exchange Act, [15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a)], because, among other things, some of the acts and 

transactions in which Defendants engaged and that constitute violations of the federal securities 

laws occurred in this District.  For example, as alleged herein, Defendants offered and sold 

securities to investors located in this District in unregistered transactions.       

11. In addition, this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because 

Defendants engaged in conduct within the United States that constituted significant steps in 

furtherance of the violations of the federal securities laws alleged in this Complaint and/or 

further because Defendants, whether within or outside of the United States, engaged in conduct 

that had a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States. 

12. In connection with the conduct alleged in this Complaint, Defendants, directly 

and indirectly, singly or in concert with others, have made use of the means or instrumentalities 

of interstate commerce, the means or instruments of transportation or communication in 

interstate commerce, the mails, and/or the facilities of a national securities exchange—namely, 

through Defendants’ use of the Internet and the U.S. banking system when engaging in the acts 

and transactions described herein.   

DEFENDANTS 

13. SafeMoon LLC is a Utah LLC organized on March 18, 2021, with a registered 

address in Provo, Utah.  It was formed shortly after the SafeMoon project launched and was used 

to conduct early business operations.  The LLC’s members were Karony, Nagy, and Tano LLC, 

of which Smith was a 10% owner.  SafeMoon LLC initially operated via a three-person board 

consisting of Karony, Nagy, and Smith.  Karony was the registered agent of SafeMoon LLC, 

which never registered any class of securities with the Commission. 

 

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14. SafeMoon US LLC is a Utah LLC organized on June 14, 2021, with its principal 

place of business in Pleasant Grove, Utah.  SafeMoon US LLC was owned and controlled by 

Karony.  After formation, SafeMoon US LLC was used in connection with the SafeMoon Token  

operations.  SafeMoon US LLC never registered any class of securities with the Commission.  

15. Nagy, age 35, was a resident of Vero Beach, Florida who was responsible for the 

creation of the SafeMoon Token and the related whitepaper.  Nagy never voluntarily revealed his 

identity, but instead partnered with Smith and Karony to be the public faces of the business.  

Nagy controlled the SafeMoon Token smart contract owner2 address (“SafeMoon Contract 

Owner Address”) from its inception in March 2021 until April 2021, and shared control of it 

with Karony and Smith once they joined SafeMoon around March 12, 2021.  Nagy has never 

been registered with the Commission in any capacity. 

16. Karony, age 27, was a resident of Provo, Utah.  Karony has served as SafeMoon’s 

CEO since March 2021.  Prior to SafeMoon, Karony operated a small software company.  

Karony interacted frequently with the public to promote the SafeMoon Token.  Karony 

controlled SafeMoon LLC and SafeMoon US LLC.  In September 2021, the SafeMoon Contract 

Owner Address was transferred to a new address under Karony’s sole control.  Karony has never 

been registered with the Commission in any capacity.   

17. Smith, age 35, was a resident of Bethlehem, New Hampshire who served as 

SafeMoon’s first CTO from March 2021 until around November 2021.  Smith also interacted  

 

 
 2 Smart contracts are self-executing code deployed on a blockchain that perform “if/then” 
computations.  Smart contracts can govern the issuance and distribution of tokens on a blockchain, 
and typically those who deploy such smart contracts can control them through administrative 
access rights. 

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frequently with the public to promote the SafeMoon Token.  Smith has never been registered 

with the Commission in any capacity.  

BACKGROUND ON SECURITIES OFFERINGS 

18. Congress enacted the Securities Act nearly a century ago to regulate the offer and 

sale of securities.  In contrast to the commercial principle of caveat emptor, Congress established 

a regime of full and fair disclosure, requiring those who offer and sell securities to the investing 

public to provide sufficient and accurate information to allow investors to make informed 

decisions before they invest. 

19. Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act require issuers of securities to register 

offers and sales of those securities with the SEC when they offer and sell securities to the public.  

Registration statements relating to an offering of securities provide investors with important 

information about the issuer and the offering, including financial and managerial information, 

how the issuer will use offering proceeds, and the risks and trends that affect the enterprise and 

an investment in its securities. 

20. The Securities Act and Exchange Act also contain anti-fraud provisions to prevent 

fraudulent conduct in the offer, sale, and purchase of securities.  Section 17(a) of the Securities 

Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, for example, seek to ensure honest behavior and fair 

dealing in securities transactions. 

21. Congress used a broad definition of “security” in the Securities Act and Exchange 

Act.  A “security” encompasses a wide range of investments, including investment contracts.  

Investment contracts are instruments through which a person invests money in a common 

enterprise and reasonably expects profits or returns derived from the entrepreneurial or  

 

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managerial efforts of others.  In this case, SafeMoon offered and sold SafeMoon Tokens 

as securities. 

BACKGROUND ON CRYPTO ASSETS 

22. The term “crypto asset” generally refers to an asset issued and/or transferred using 

distributed ledger or blockchain technology, including assets sometimes referred to as 

“cryptocurrencies,” “digital assets,” “virtual currencies,” “digital coins,” and “digital tokens.” 

23. A blockchain or distributed ledger is a peer-to-peer database spread across a 

network of computers that records all transactions in theoretically unchangeable, digitally 

recorded data packages.  The system relies on cryptographic techniques for secure recording of 

transactions. 

24. Blockchains typically employ a consensus mechanism to “validate” transactions, 

which, among other things, aims to achieve agreement on a data value or on the state of the 

ledger.  Crypto assets may be traded on crypto asset trading platforms in exchange for other 

crypto assets or fiat currency (legal tender issued by a country). 

25. A blockchain “protocol” is a code, software, or algorithm that governs how a 

blockchain, or a feature of a blockchain, operates.  

26. On July 25, 2017, the SEC issued the Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 

21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:  The DAO, advising “those who would use . . . 

distributed ledger or blockchain-enabled means for capital raising[] to take appropriate steps to  

ensure compliance with the U.S. federal securities laws,” and finding that the offering of crypto 

assets at issue in that report were offered and sold as investment contracts and, thus, securities. 

  

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FACTS 

A. The History of the SafeMoon Token 

27. On March 1, 2021, Nagy launched the SafeMoon Token through the use of a 

“smart contract” that he controlled and deployed on the Binance Smart Chain blockchain.  At 

launch, Nagy “minted” one quadrillion SafeMoon Tokens, burned 223 trillion of them,3 and 

transferred the remaining 777 trillion to another smart contract that was programmed to conduct 

an automated sale of the tokens upon receipt into the smart contract.  Nagy’s purported vision for 

SafeMoon, as stated in his marketing materials, was to create a supposedly “entirely community 

driven” and “self-regenerating automatic liquidity providing protocol” that would pay out 

rewards to token holders and penalize sellers.  

28. Nagy, the creator and founder of SafeMoon, initially attracted investors to the 

SafeMoon Token through promotional materials for which he had ultimate authority.   

Specifically, Nagy had the sole and ultimate authority over the content and dissemination of 

SafeMoon’s presale marketing materials, the SafeMoon website, and the SafeMoon whitepaper.  

Nagy also promoted SafeMoon’s offering by touting its profitmaking opportunities, which he 

dubbed “tokenomics.”  Nagy marketed the SafeMoon Token’s ability to generate profits for 

investors through features that, according to the SafeMoon whitepaper and website, would “drive 

the price to stratospheric all-time highs” or “Safely to the Moon.”   

 
3 Burning crypto assets involves transferring them to a blockchain address that cannot be 

used for any other purpose than to receive assets.  Burning crypto assets often is done for the 
purpose of increasing the market value of those crypto assets by decreasing the supply 
in circulation.  

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29. For example, SafeMoon publicly touted plans to burn SafeMoon Tokens to “keep 

the community rewarded and informed” and to potentially increase the price of the asset by 

reducing its circulating supply. 

30. In addition, according to its website, SafeMoon “[h]olders can earn passive 

income and watch their balance grow indefinetely [sic].”  As stated in the whitepaper:   

[T]he reflect mechanism encourages holders to hang onto their 
tokens to garner higher kick-backs which are based upon a 
percentages [sic] carried out and dependent upon the total tokens 
held by the owner.  In theory, with the manual burn function … even 
a small holder at the beginning could potentially walk away with big 
money at the end of the token’s lifespan. 
 

This mechanism was one of SafeMoon’s central marketing features that the Defendants 

actively promoted. 

B. The SafeMoon Token Presale and Initial Decentralized Exchange Offer, and its 
Rapid Adoption by the Crypto Asset Community 

 
31. Nagy created the SafeMoon LP, which consisted of the token pair SafeMoon 

Token and BNB, on a crypto asset trading platform called PancakeSwap.4  The SafeMoon LP 

was initially funded by a “presale” of the SafeMoon Token, which was open to the public. 

 
4 Through such a platform, users can create “liquidity pools,” typically consisting of two or 

more crypto assets, which are then available for other participants who want to exchange one of 
those crypto assets for another.  Depositors to the liquidity pool are generally referred to as 
“liquidity providers.”  They typically deposit a number of crypto asset pairs into the liquidity pool 
and receive in return a crypto asset, often referred to as a “liquidity provider token” or “LP token,” 
which represents their pro rata interest in the liquidity pool and is redeemable at any time for their 
slice of the pool, typically including accrued trading fees.  Typically, participants who trade with a 
liquidity pool deposit a certain number of crypto asset A and receive a certain number of crypto 
asset B.  The exchange rate between A and B is automatically determined according to a preset 
formula that is based on the ratio of assets held by the pool and is designed to programmatically 
adjust prices to match market prices.  Thus, as the ratio of crypto asset A to crypto asset B increases, 
the liquidity pool price of crypto asset A decreases and the price of crypto asset B increases. 

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32. The presale was the first step in the offering of SafeMoon Tokens to the public 

using a liquidity pool, a process known in the crypto asset industry as an “Initial Decentralized 

Exchange Offer” or “IDO.”    

33. Presale marketing materials posted on the internet by Nagy under the pseudonym 

“SafeMoon Protocol” represented that all presale “profits” would be automatically transferred 

into the SafeMoon LP and that SafeMoon Tokens would then be listed on PancakeSwap at four 

times the presale price, allowing investors to “walk away with an easy 4x gain.” 

34. SafeMoon Tokens were sold in the presale at one trillion SafeMoon Tokens per 

BNB.  This meant that, at the then-prevailing market price for BNB, 100 billion SafeMoon 

Tokens cost approximately $2.35.   

35. During the presale, Nagy purchased three trillion SafeMoon Tokens for 0.3 BNB 

(approximately $75 at the time) from the presale smart contract, or $0.0000000000235 per 

SafeMoon, the same price as the other presale investors.  Within hours of its March 1, 2021 

launch, the presale reached its “hardcap,” i.e., prescribed limit, of 70 BNB (approximately 

$16,500 at the time). 

36. When the presale closed on March 2, 2021, 30 addresses immediately claimed 

about 694 trillion tokens from the presale smart contract, and the presale smart contract 

simultaneously transferred 63 trillion SafeMoon Tokens and 61.74 BNB to PancakeSwap to 

establish the SafeMoon LP.   

37. With this amount of SafeMoon Tokens and BNB deposited in the SafeMoon LP, 

one BNB could buy 1.02 SafeMoon Tokens, or $0.00000000024 per SafeMoon Token at then-

prevailing market prices for BNB.  This means that the price of the SafeMoon Tokens was 

instantly ten times higher than the amount investors had paid for the tokens hours earlier, 

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representing a nearly 1,000% instant return (or 10x) for investors that bought SafeMoon Tokens 

in the presale.  

38. Once Nagy established the SafeMoon LP on PancakeSwap, anyone could access 

PancakeSwap and buy the SafeMoon Token without limitation—the second step in the plan to 

distribute the SafeMoon Token to the public.  SafeMoon Tokens were tradable through the 

SafeMoon LP and later through other crypto asset trading platforms.  

39. No registration statement was filed or in effect at any time as to any offer or sale 

of SafeMoon Tokens—not the offers or sales during the presale, nor the offers or sales once the 

token was available for trading via the SafeMoon LP. 

40. Defendants represented to potential investors that they could expect substantial 

returns.  Following the Defendants’ marketing campaign, the price and trading volume of the 

SafeMoon Token on crypto asset trading platforms skyrocketed, increasing in price by more than 

55,000% from March 12, 2021, when it had a price of $0.00000002, to when it reached its all-

time high of $0.00001118 on April 20, 2021.  The Token’s total market value also experienced a 

meteoric rise to over $5.7 billion during this time frame and was held by more than 2.8 million 

unique addresses. 

C. SafeMoon Tokens were Offered and Sold in a Series of Unregistered Securities 
Transactions  

 
41. Defendants offered and sold SafeMoon Tokens as investment contracts and, 

therefore, as securities.  SafeMoon Token purchasers invested money in a common enterprise 

and reasonably expected profits or returns derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts 

of others, in this case, the Defendants. 

42. Purchasers obtained SafeMoon Tokens in exchange for an investment of money 

in the form of BNB another crypto asset security on the BNB Chain. 

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43. Purchasers of SafeMoon Tokens invested into a common enterprise with other 

investors.  SafeMoon Tokens are fungible with each other, all investors shared equally in price 

increases—or together suffered price decreases—of the SafeMoon Token.  Further, SafeMoon 

Token investors received a pro rata distribution of profits in at least two ways based on the 

“tokenomics” features of the SafeMoon Token.  First, half of the tax on every SafeMoon Token 

transaction was redistributed to existing holders as a “static reward” or “reflection,” which were 

dividend-like payments that benefited investors directly in proportion to their ownership of 

SafeMoon Tokens.  In addition, SafeMoon represented that they would conduct periodic manual 

“burning” of SafeMoon Tokens to deflate the supply of available SafeMoon Tokens, which 

purportedly increased the market price of the SafeMoon Tokens, benefitting SafeMoon Token 

holders proportionally to their ownership.  

44. Moreover, in addition to holding SafeMoon Tokens, Defendants accumulated LP 

Tokens generated from “taxes” on SafeMoon transactions, which allowed them to redeem assets 

from the SafeMoon LP.  Accordingly, SafeMoon’s financial fortunes were inexorably tied to 

SafeMoon Token investors’ financial fortunes.   

45. Purchasers of SafeMoon Tokens reasonably expected to profit from the efforts of 

others, in this case, the Defendants.  At its inception, SafeMoon’s whitepaper stated that 

SafeMoon “tokenomics” would “drive the price to stratospheric all-time highs,” or as its website 

proclaimed, “[s]afely to the Moon.”   

 

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46. After the SafeMoon Token launch in early March 2021, Nagy continued to 

publicize the offering on the website and the whitepaper, and social media accounts he 

controlled, including at X (formerly known as Twitter), Discord, Medium, and Telegram.  The 

Defendants took numerous intentional steps to help fuel a dramatic increase in the SafeMoon 

Token’s market price, including a social media campaign further touting the SafeMoon Token’s 

purported safety from “rug pulls” as well as its price, total market value, and trading volume 

increases; the rapidly rising number of token holders and social media followers; and the token’s 

standing on the “Top Mover” list on CoinMarketCap, a crypto asset market data website. 

47. This publicity campaign, aimed at current and potential investors, promoted a 

reasonable expectation for outsized returns based upon the Defendants entrepreneurial and 

managerial efforts with respect to the SafeMoon Token.  Exploiting imagery widely understood 

in the crypto asset markets to connote astronomical trading gains, SafeMoon tweeted hundreds of 

rocketship and moon emojis from their official X account.  The image below is an 

illustrative example.   

 

48. SafeMoon also published numerous tweets detailing how the Defendants’ efforts 

would allow SafeMoon Token to trade on various crypto asset trading platforms, thereby 

increasing SafeMoon Token’s market value: 

 

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49. From his personal X account, Karony further touted SafeMoon’s efforts to bolster 

the SafeMoon Token: 

 

50. The Defendants also organized SafeMoon Token giveaways on social media and 

developed additional software to assist investors in trading the SafeMoon Token.  SafeMoon 

advertised that it retained ownership of the SafeMoon smart contract, which allowed it to execute 

privileged functions, such as setting the “tax” rate and liquidity fees.  SafeMoon also claimed 

that it would continue to make “strategic plays in regards to long term growth of the community 

and the project.”  In addition, SafeMoon publicly announced when they would burn SafeMoon 

Tokens, demonstrating their continued involvement with managing its trading price and volume. 

 

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51. SafeMoon also tweeted imagery and language associated with traditional stock 

market investments, further linking the SafeMoon Token’s prospects to that of a traditional stock 

market investment. 

 

D. Nagy Falsely and Repeatedly Represented that the Assets Retained in the 
SafeMoon LP Were “Locked” and Inaccessible  

 
52. A significant risk with certain crypto asset offerings is the potential for developers 

who control the associated smart contracts, like Nagy, Smith and Karony, to misappropriate 

funds held in the associated smart contract.  After he launched SafeMoon, Nagy repeatedly and 

falsely represented that the assets retained in the SafeMoon LP were protected from 

misappropriation by the project’s developers.  Nagy made these false and misleading statements 

in SafeMoon’s presale marketing materials, the SafeMoon website, and the SafeMoon 

whitepaper.  Nagy had the ultimate authority over the content and dissemination of the false and 

misleading statements in the presale marketing materials, the website, and the whitepaper.   

53. SafeMoon’s presale marketing materials, which Nagy started to disseminate to 

investors in early March 2021, stated falsely that (1) the liquidity generated from the SafeMoon 

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Token presale would be “force lock[ed]” for over four years “to foster trust in the contract”; (2) 

“5% of all trades are auto-locked inside [the] liquidity provider on PancakeSwap” and 

automatically locked liquidity “guarantees that the token cannot be rugged by the dev[eloper] 

simply by removing the [SafeMoon] LP”; and (3) SafeMoon was “Completely Rug Free.”    

54. SafeMoon’s website, which Nagy launched on March 6, 2021, stated (1) the 

“automatically generating liquidity” contributed by every trade in PancakeSwap was “locked 

forever”; (2) “Rug-pull impossible”; and (3) SafeMoon “#safu” (slang for safe).  

 

55. SafeMoon’s whitepaper similarly contained a “Step-by-Step Plan to Ensure 100% 

Safety,” which included “LP Locked …  for 4 years” and “LP Generated With Every Trade & 

Locked On Pancake[Swap].”   

 

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56. Nagy knew or was reckless in not knowing that these statements were materially 

false and misleading.  Nagy programmed the SafeMoon LP code, meaning that he knew that 

there was no such LP Token lock mechanism, as he falsely told the public. 

57. The SafeMoon Token smart contract source code, which Nagy posted on GitHub 

(a code repository) in early March 2021, also explained that it would “foster trust in the 

community by auto-locking liquidity for 4 years” assuring once again “no rug is possible.” 

58. Karony and Smith, at various times, also disseminated the false information that 

the assets held in the SafeMoon LP were protected from misappropriation.  For example, 

Karony, as SafeMoon’s CEO, directed Nagy to send the whitepaper to a SafeMoon employee, 

and Smith, in turn, instructed the employee to use the information in the whitepaper to answer 

questions from the community.  Karony also represented on occasion to the SafeMoon investor 

community that the assets in the SafeMoon LP were protected from misappropriation or 

“locked.”  As alleged above, this was not true because the Defendants continuously accumulated 

LP Tokens from “taxed” SafeMoon Token transactions, which allowed them improperly to 

remove these retained assets from the SafeMoon LP at will.     

59. Contrary to these assertions, Nagy did not protect assets in the SafeMoon LP from 

misappropriation by the project’s developers.  Within two weeks of the SafeMoon Token launch, 

Nagy had already redeemed LP Tokens to transfer more than $500,000 worth of purportedly 

“locked” retained assets from the SafeMoon LP to the SafeMoon Contract Owner Address under 

his control.   

60. Moreover, from the beginning Karony and Smith, like Nagy, knew or recklessly 

disregarded, that these statements were materially false and misleading.  As early as March 16, 

2021, in a conversation between Karony and Smith, Karony candidly observed, “we could also 

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just update the whitepaper [to say SafeMoon LP assets would be used for business development] 

… we could literally just put it in the whitepaper and call it a day.”  Smith responded that the 

whitepaper could be “much better.”  But neither Karony nor Smith disclosed the truth to public 

investors at this time. 

E. When Caught, the Defendants Doubled Down on their Misrepresentations and 
Misappropriated Assets Held in the SafeMoon LP  

 
61. On April 20, 2021, which turned out to be the date of SafeMoon Token’s all-time 

high price, a social media account called “WarOnRugs” tweeted a “Scam Advisory” about 

SafeMoon and the SafeMoon Token.  The advisory asserted that the smart contract owner 

controlled a majority of the SafeMoon LP and could pull tokens from it.  

 

62. This warning—which was correct—exposed the falsity of Defendants’ public 

claims that they could not pilfer assets held in the SafeMoon LP. 

63. Instead of acknowledging their fraud, however, the Defendants doubled down.  

That same day, Karony responded to a large group of his followers on a separate social media 

platform that the post by “WarOnRugs” was “biased, [because] the original poster supports 

another coin so what they are saying is biased.”  He went on to reiterate that the “5% LP is Split, 

2.5% goes to locked LP, and the other 2.5% is manually locked or left alone if needed for dev 

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costs or to SEED DEXS AND EXCHANGES.”  Just minutes later, Nagy wrote privately to 

Karony that this statement was wrong.  Nagy explained, candidly and contrary to how he 

previously marketed the SafeMoon Token to the public, “5% liquidity is added to the contract 

owner address.  2.5% is not ever locked.”   

64. The following day, April 21, 2021, Karony sent out a series of tweets where he 

admitted that what the Defendants had described as liquidity pool “locking” was not “automatic” 

at all, but rather within SafeMoon’s discretion.  Karony also tweeted about the circumstances 

where the Defendants would use the SafeMoon LP assets they previously claimed were locked: 

 

65. Karony misleadingly assured his twitter followers that he would alert them before 

making use of any funds from the SafeMoon LP, which he falsely represented was a “last resort” 

for SafeMoon. 

 

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66. Later that same day, Karony and Smith participated in a question-and-answer 

session—colloquially, an “AMA” or “Ask Me Anything”—that was live streamed over the 

internet.  During the AMA, Karony clarified that “the LP lock is automated, not automatic.”  

Karony repeated that “situations may require the use of the LP” to “seed[] other exchanges” and 

“as in the last resort for development costs.”  Karony once again falsely assured his viewers and 

listeners, “if we are going to do something with the LP, we’ll tell you.”   

67. Smith was viewable on the left side of the live-stream AMA with Karony, who 

was viewable on the lower-right section of the screen, and added:  “As John was saying, if 

something comes up that makes sense, we’re gonna tell you, and then we’re gonna judge our 

reaction based on your reaction.  It’s a perfect symbiosis of the community and what we’re 

doing.  It’s awesome.”  Karony indicated his approval of Smith’s comments by stating, “Yeah.  

Hundred percent.” 

68. Despite Karony and Smith’s attempts at damage control, after it was disclosed on 

April 20, 2021 that the SafeMoon LP was not locked as Defendants had described, the SafeMoon 

Token price plummeted almost 50% the following day.  

69. In further response to the “Scam Advisory,” SafeMoon submitted its token 

contract for a third-party audit.  The audit concluded that there was no restriction, or “lock,” as to 

the SafeMoon Tokens generated from “taxed” SafeMoon Token transactions.  The auditor 

viewed this as a “major risk” that could “have devastating consequences to the project as a 

whole.”  Though the audit recommended restricting control of the SafeMoon LP, SafeMoon 

instead argued publicly that its team needed “additional control” to make “continued strategic 

plays in regards to long term growth” and claimed “[r]isks in regard to rug-pulls” are mitigated 

because “every member of SafeMoon would be subject to litigation and likely a swift prison 

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sentence . . . [and] our social lives would be in ruin, and we would not be able to show our faces 

in public again, let alone get another job.”  

70. Despite assuring their AMA viewers and social media followers on April 21, 

2021 that they would “publicly go to the community and let [the community] know if the 

[SafeMoon] LP will be used and what for, ahead of time,” just over two weeks later on May 6, 

2021, the Defendants transferred more than $1,200,000 worth of BNB and SafeMoon Tokens 

from the SafeMoon LP to the SafeMoon Contract Owner Address, without first disclosing to the 

community any information about the transaction or its purpose.   

71. Notwithstanding the Defendants efforts to lull investors during the April 2021 

AMA and related tweets, Karony, Smith and Nagy knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that 

any withdrawals from the SafeMoon LP were contrary to SafeMoon’s initial representations to 

investors that assets within the SafeMoon LP were locked and inaccessible to the Defendants for 

at least four years. 

72. Contrary to their explicit representations, not only did the Defendants have 

unfettered access to the SafeMoon LP by virtue of their control of LP Tokens, Nagy, Smith, and 

Karony in fact redeemed LP Tokens to misappropriate millions of dollars’ worth of assets from 

the SafeMoon LP.  In practical terms, Nagy, Smith, and Karony burned their LP Tokens through 

PancakeSwap and received in return a portion of the SafeMoon Tokens and BNB that were held 

within the SafeMoon LP.  These LP Tokens were generated from a portion of the tax on all 

SafeMoon Token transactions.  The Defendants wrongfully redeemed or withdrew the following 

tokens between March 5, 2021 and May 11, 2022: 

 

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purchases of SafeMoon Tokens, driving up their value relative to BNB tokens.  The opportunity 

to engage in this manipulation presented itself when PancakeSwap announced in late April 2021 

that it would upgrade its standard LP smart contract from version one (“V1”) to version 2 

(“V2”).  Because of the upgrade, PancakeSwap would ultimately discontinue support for 

liquidity pools created with the V1 smart contract, such as the SafeMoon LP.  Liquidity pools 

created with the V1 smart contract, like the SafeMoon LP, needed to “migrate” their liquidity to 

a new V2 liquidity pool.  Therefore, it was expected that large volumes of liquidity would be 

transferred from the SafeMoon LP V1 (hereinafter, “SafeMoon LPV1”) to a new SafeMoon LP 

V2 (“SafeMoon LPV2”).  

76. As a general matter, the migration of liquidity from one liquidity pool to another 

was a relatively simple process.  To accomplish this, liquidity would need to be removed from a 

V1 liquidity pool by redeeming all current LP tokens (the tokens received for adding liquidity) in 

exchange for the underlying crypto assets in the liquidity pool.  Those crypto assets would then 

need to be paired together and added as liquidity in a new V2 liquidity pool, in exchange for new 

LP tokens.   

77. In the early morning of May 12, 2021, shortly after midnight, Smith and Karony 

initiated the migration from the SafeMoon LPV1 to the SafeMoon LPV2, by removing 

approximately 14,800 BNB and 963 billion SafeMoon Tokens from the SafeMoon LPV1, and 

shortly thereafter, adding approximately 13,500 BNB and 867 billion SafeMoon Tokens to the 

SafeMoon LPV2.         

a. The May 12th Manipulation of the SafeMoon Token 

78. On May 12, 2021, beginning at approximately 10:00 a.m., Smith and Karony 

withdrew approximately 3.8 trillion SafeMoon tokens and 56,940 BNB, worth approximately 

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$68.6 million total, from the SafeMoon LPV1 in two transactions.  Rather than add this liquidity 

into the SafeMoon LPV2, as the SafeMoon Token investors would have expected, Smith and 

Karony sold approximately 4.1 trillion SafeMoon Tokens in exchange for approximately $8.83 

million in another crypto asset.  In a private conversation over Discord, Karony and Nagy 

discussed a plan to use $830,000 of the proceeds of this transaction for company expenses and to 

split the remaining $8 million.  

79. None of the Defendants publicly disclosed to the SafeMoon community that they 

would withdraw assets from the SafeMoon LPV1 for personal use.  

80. Smith used about 58,220 BNB to purchase more SafeMoon Tokens in the 

SafeMoon LPV2, causing a dramatic increase in value of the SafeMoon Tokens relative to 

BNB.  As Smith informed Karony just after purchasing about 1 trillion SafeMoon Tokens for 

13,220 BNB worth more than $7.9 million: 

[P]eople are going to geek out over that buy I just did to make up 
the difference in a good way …  I did a 13k bnb buy to make the 
difference on the lost [SafeMoon Tokens from the 10% tax], should 
have shot the price up. We have 45376 bnb remaining.  Clean 
$30,222,901.20 in bnb on standby, $30m in usdt [referring to the 
crypto asset known as Tether] incoming. It's a pretty good day and 
the price is up, win win. 
 

81. Indeed, SafeMoon’s investors immediately noticed the dramatic price impact of 

Smith’s large trades.  Less than an hour later, Smith used 22,500 BNB worth approximately 

$13.5 million to purchase about 1.5 trillion SafeMoon from the SafeMoon V2LP.  Two minutes 

later, Smith used another 22,500 BNB worth an additional approximately $13.5 million to buy 

1.28 trillion additional SafeMoon Tokens. 

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82. Through this series of transactions on May 12, Karony and Smith created the 

artificial appearance of active trading and attempted to raise the price of the SafeMoon Tokens, 

for the purpose of inducing the purchase of SafeMoon Tokens by others.   

b. The May 19th Manipulation of the SafeMoon Token 

83. On May 19, 2021, Smith messaged Karony on Discord that Smith could “move 

all the available” liquidity from SafeMoon LPV1 to SafeMoon LPV2.  Smith suggested that they 

instead could remove liquidity from SafeMoon LPV1 and use the resulting BNB to purchase 

SafeMoon Tokens from SafeMoon LPV2, as they had done the week prior on May 12th.  Karony 

wrote to Smith, “do a v2 bnb buy,” meaning, purchase SafeMoon Tokens from SafeMoon LPV2 

using BNB removed from SafeMoon LPV1, “if that will increase the price.” 

84. Karony asked Smith if “we can do it a little slower this time around?”  Smith 

assured Karony that he would “plug it through the day starting when I get back all the way to 

midnight.”  This in contrast to Smith’s conduct on May 12 when he bought nearly $35 million in 

SafeMoon Tokens in about one hour. 

85. Karony gave Smith detailed instructions on how to trade the SafeMoon 

Token.  For example, Karony told Smith, “lets create a price floor[.]”  Karony also asked Smith, 

“how big of a yeet [purchase of SafeMoon Token] is needed to pump [the price] to 5.”  Smith 

assured Karony that he “can just thrash it [i.e., purchase SafeMoon Tokens] just under the 

diminishing returns until we hit 5 Np [no problem].”  Karony replied hopefully, “[i]n all Reality 

the best thing to do would to be to counter all the sells.  Then add 26% [to the price].” 

86. Karony told Smith how much SafeMoon Tokens to purchase and when, including 

detailed instructions such as “50bnb buy [of SafeMoon Token] every 5 minutes” initially, then 

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“200bnb x 3 then 50bnb x till done.”  These instructions were followed by corresponding 

transactions in which Smith executed the manipulative strategy discussed with Karony. 

87. In total the Defendants used about 58,221 BNB removed from the LPV1 to 

purchase SafeMoon Tokens from LPV2, with the intent of manipulating the price of the 

SafeMoon Tokens higher and, as their internal private conversations show, in order to attract 

investors to buying SafeMoon Tokens. 

88. None of the Defendants publicly disclosed to the SafeMoon community that they 

would withdraw assets from the SafeMoon LPV1 to purchase additional SafeMoon Tokens or 

manipulate its market price.  

COUNT I – FRAUD 

Violations of Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act 
[15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1)] 

(Against All Defendants) 

89. Paragraphs 1 through 88 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference. 

90. Defendants, knowingly or recklessly, acting with scienter, in the offer or sale of 

securities and by the use of means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate 

commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly, employed a device, scheme, or artifice to 

defraud. 

91. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants, directly and indirectly, have violated and, 

unless enjoined, will continue to violate Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 

§ 77q(a)(1)]. 

  

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COUNT II – FRAUD 
 

Violations of Sections 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act 
[15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(2)] 

(Against Defendant Nagy) 

92. Paragraphs 1 through 88 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference. 

93. Defendants, acting knowingly, recklessly, or negligently in the offer or sale of 

securities and by the use of means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate 

commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly, obtained money or property by means of 

untrue statements of material fact or by omitting to state material facts necessary in order to make 

the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.  

94. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants, directly and indirectly, have violated and, 

unless enjoined, will continue to violate Sections 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 

77q(a)(2) and 77q(a)(3)]. 

COUNT III – FRAUD 
 

Violations of Sections 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act 
[15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(3)] 
(Against All Defendants) 

 
95. Paragraphs 1 through 88 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference. 

96. Defendants, acting knowingly, recklessly, or negligently in the offer or sale of 

securities and by the use of means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate 

commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly, engaged in transactions, practices, or a 

course of business which operated or would have operated as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 

97. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants, directly and indirectly, have violated and, 

unless enjoined, will continue to violate Sections 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 

77q(a)(2) and 77q(a)(3)]. 

  

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COUNT IV – FRAUD 

Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder 

[15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5] 
(Rule 10(b)-5(a) and (c) Against All Defendants) 

98. Paragraphs 1 through 88 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein 

99. Defendants, knowingly or recklessly, acting with scienter and in connection with the 

purchase or sale of securities and by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce 

or by use of the mails or any facility of any national securities exchange, directly or indirectly, (a) 

employed a device, scheme, and artifice to defraud, and (c) engaged in acts, practices, or a course of 

business which operated or would have operated as a fraud or deceit upon sellers, purchasers, or 

prospective purchasers of securities. 

100. By engaging in the conduct described above, Defendants violated, and unless 

enjoined will continue to violate, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) 

thereunder [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) and (c)]. 

COUNT V – FRAUD 

Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
and Rules 10b-5(b)thereunder 

[15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5] 
(Rule 10(b)-5(b) Against Nagy) 

101. Paragraphs 1 through 88 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein. 

102. Defendant Nagy, knowingly or recklessly, acting with scienter, and in connection 

with the purchase or sale of securities and by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 

commerce or by use of the mails or any facility of any national securities exchange, directly or 

indirectly, (b) made untrue statements of material fact or omitted to state material facts necessary in 

order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 

misleading. 

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103. By engaging in the conduct described above, Defendant Nagy violated, and unless 

enjoined will continue to violate, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(b) thereunder 

[15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)]. 

COUNT VI – FRAUD 

Violations of Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act 
[15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2)] 

(Against Defendants Karony, Smith, SafeMoon LLC, and SafeMoon US LLC) 
 

104. Paragraphs 1 through 88 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference. 

105. By virtue of the foregoing, Defendants, directly or indirectly, by use of the means or 

instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the facilities of a national securities exchange or the 

mail, effected, alone or with one of more persons, a series of transactions in a security registered on 

a national securities exchange, a security not so registered, or in connection with a security-based 

swap or security-based swap agreement with respect to such security creating actual or apparent 

active trading in such security, or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the purpose of 

inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others. 

106. By engaging in the conduct described above, Defendants violated, and unless 

enjoined will continue to violate, Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2)]. 

COUNT VII – UNREGISTERED OFFERS AND SALES OF SECURITIES 

Violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act 
[15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and 77e(c)] 

(Against All Defendants) 

107. Paragraphs 1 through 88 are realleged and incorporated by reference herein. 

108. By virtue of the foregoing, without a registration statement in effect as to any offers 

or sales of the SafeMoon Token, Defendants, directly and indirectly, (a) made use of the means and 

instruments of transportation or communications in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell 

securities through the use of medium of any prospectus or otherwise; (b) carried or caused to be 

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carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, 

any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale; and (c) made use of the means 

and instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer 

to sell through the use or medium of a prospectus or otherwise, securities as to which no registration 

statement had been filed. 

109. By engaging in the conduct described herein, Defendants violated, and unless 

enjoined will continue to violate, Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) 

and 77e(c)].   

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

The SEC respectfully requests that the Court enter a Final Judgment:  

1. Finding that Defendants committed the violations alleged in this Complaint; 

2. Permanently restraining and enjoining Defendants from violations of the 

following provisions:  Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), 

77e(c), 77q(a)], Sections 9(a)(2) and 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(2), 78j(b)], 

and Rule 10b-5 thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5]; 

3. Permanently prohibiting Defendants, pursuant to Section 20(b) of the Securities 

Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t] and Sections 21(d)(1) and 21(d)(5) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 

§§ 78u(d)(1) and 78u(d)(5)], from (i) participating, directly or indirectly, including, but not 

limited to, through any entity controlled by [Defendants], in any offering of crypto asset 

securities; provided, however, that such injunction shall not prevent [Defendant] from 

purchasing or selling any crypto asset security, for [his] own personal account; 

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4. Ordering Defendants to disgorge all ill-gotten gains from the illegal conduct 

alleged in this Complaint, plus pay prejudgment interest, pursuant to Sections 21(d)(3), (5), and 

(7) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(3), (5), (7)]; 

5. Ordering Defendants to pay civil penalties pursuant to Section 20(d) of the 

Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)] 

in an amount to be determined by the Court; and 

6. Granting any other and further relief this Court may deem just and proper. 

  

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JURY TRIAL DEMAND 

The SEC demands a trial by jury as to all issues that may be so tried. 

 

Dated:  November 1, 2023  Respectfully submitted, 

     /s/ Oren Gleich                 
     Oren Gleich (New York Bar No. 4460135) 
     Securities and Exchange Commission 
     New York Regional Office 

100 Pearl Street, Suite 20-100 
New York, NY 10004-2616 
Tel: (212) 336-0190 
[email protected] 

 
     Dean M. Conway* 
     Securities and Exchange Commission 
     100 F Street NE 
     Washington, DC 20549 
     Tel: (202) 551-4412 
     [email protected] 
 
     Attorneys for Plaintiff 
 
*Pending admission pro hac vice 
 
Of Counsel 
John Lucas 
John S. Crimmins 
Pamela Sawhney 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission 

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