A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
summary
The U.S. Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission jointly enforce the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits corrupt payments to foreign officials and mandates accurate books and records, with penalties including fines and imprisonment.
paragraph
The FCPA, enacted in 1977 and amended in 1988 and 1998, applies broadly to U.S. persons, foreign issuers, and entities using U.S. interstate commerce. Penalties for FCPA violations include criminal fines up to $25 million for corporations and imprisonment up to 5 years for individuals. Enforcement prioritizes self-reporting, cooperation, remediation, and robust compliance programs, as detailed in the 2012 Resource Guide.
narrative
The U.S. Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission jointly enforce the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits corrupt payments to foreign officials and mandates accurate books and records. The FCPA, enacted in 1977 and amended in 1988 and 1998, applies broadly to U.S. persons, foreign issuers, and entities using U.S. interstate commerce. Penalties for FCPA violations include criminal fines up to $25 million for corporations and imprisonment up to 5 years for individuals. Enforcement prioritizes self-reporting, cooperation, remediation, and robust compliance programs, as detailed in the 2012 Resource Guide. The guide emphasizes the importance of voluntary disclosure, cooperation, and robust compliance programs in determining declinations or reduced penalties. Over $2 billion in sanctions have been imposed globally for FCPA violations, with cases involving third parties, disguised payments, falsified records, and successor liability. However, declinations can occur when misconduct is isolated, promptly addressed, and remediated.
Classified fcpa(confidence 100%). No EDGAR filing fingerprint (criminal/DOJ-side scheme). detection rule →
Statutes
15 U S C § 78dd-115 U S C § 78dd-215 U S C § 78dd-322 U.S.C. § 28818 U.S.C. § 328218 U.S.C. § 37118 U.S.C. § 329228 U.S.C. § 246215 U.S.C. § 78m(b)15 U.S.C. § 724115 U.S.C. § 726218 U.S.C. § 195222 U.S.C. § 2751Section 30A of the Securities Exchange ActRule 13a-14
Parties
competitive disadvantagecontinuing priority at the department of justicecontinuing priority at the securities and exchange commissioncriminal division of the u.s. department of justicedoj and sec enforcement practicesenforcement division of the u.s. securities and exchange commissionunprecedented undertaking by doj and sec
Keywords
fcpaforeigncompanybusinessofficialsgovernmentcompaniessecofficialenforcementforeign officialdojbriberycorruptcorruption
Extracted insights
Dollar amounts 50
- $1.60B $1.6 billion ≥$1B
- $1.36B $1.36 billion ≥$1B
- $1.00B $1 billion ≥$1B
- $236.50M $236.5 million $100M–$1B
- $50.00M $50 million $10M–$100M
- $27.00M $27 million $10M–$100M
- $25.00M $25 million $10M–$100M
- $25.00M $25,000,000 $10M–$100M
- $5.00M $5 million $1M–$10M
- $5.00M $5,000,000 $1M–$10M
- $3.50M $3.5 million $1M–$10M
- $2.10M $2.1 million $1M–$10M
Entities 7
- person competitive disadvantage
- agency continuing priority at the department of justice
- agency continuing priority at the securities and exchange commission
- agency criminal division of the u.s. department of justice
- agency doj and sec enforcement practices
- agency enforcement division of the u.s. securities and exchange commission
- agency unprecedented undertaking by doj and sec
Triples 19
- Criminal Division Of The U.S. Department Of Justice prepared A Resource Guide To The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
- Enforcement Division Of The U.S. Securities And Exchange Commission prepared A Resource Guide To The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
- U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act combats corruption around the globe
- corruption undermines public accountability
- corruption diverts public resources
- law-abiding companies placed at competitive disadvantage
- enforcing the FCPA is continuing priority at the Department of Justice
- enforcing the FCPA is continuing priority at the Securities And Exchange Commission
- the Guide benefited from valuable input from the Departments of Commerce and State
- the Guide addresses who and what is covered by the FCPA’s anti-bribery and accounting provisions
- the Guide addresses the definition of a “foreign official”
- the Guide addresses what constitute proper and improper gifts, travel and entertainment expenses
- the Guide addresses the nature of facilitating payments
- the Guide addresses how successor liability applies in the mergers and acquisitions context
- the Guide addresses the hallmarks of an effective corporate compliance program
- the Guide addresses the different types of civil and criminal resolutions available in the FCPA context
- the Guide sets forth the statutory requirements
- the Guide provides insight into DOJ and SEC enforcement practices
- the Guide is unprecedented undertaking by DOJ and SEC
Text layers
Extracted body text (497,484c)
chapter 1
Introduction
FCPA
A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
By the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and
the Enforcement Division of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
This guide is intended to provide information for businesses and individuals regarding the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA). The guide has been prepared by the staff of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the
Enforcement Division of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. It is non-binding, informal, and summary in nature, and
the information contained herein does not constitute rules or regulations. As such, it is not intended to, does not, and may not
be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, that are enforceable at law by any party, in any criminal, civil, or
administrative matter. It is not intended to substitute for the advice of legal counsel on specific issues related to the FCPA. It does
not in any way limit the enforcement intentions or litigating positions of the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, or any other U.S. government agency.
Companies or individuals seeking an opinion concerning specific prospective conduct are encouraged to use the U.S.
Department of Justice’s opinion procedure discussed in Chapter 9 of this guide.
This guide is United States Government property. It is available to the public free of charge online at www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa and www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa.shtml.
A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE
U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
By the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and
the Enforcement Division of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
FOREWORD
We are pleased to announce the publication of A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is a critically important statute for combating corruption around the globe. Corruption has
corrosive effects on democratic institutions, undermining public accountability and diverting public resources from impor-
tant priorities such as health, education, and infrastructure. When business is won or lost based on how much a company is
willing to pay in bribes rather than on the quality of its products and services, law-abiding companies are placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage—and consumers lose. For these and other reasons, enforcing the FCPA is a continuing priority at the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
The Guide is the product of extensive efforts by experts at DOJ and SEC, and has benefited from valuable input from
the Departments of Commerce and State. It endeavors to provide helpful information to enterprises of all shapes and sizes—
from small businesses doing their first transactions abroad to multi-national corporations with subsidiaries around the world.
The Guide addresses a wide variety of topics, including who and what is covered by the FCPA’s anti-bribery and accounting
provisions; the definition of a “foreign official”; what constitute proper and improper gifts, travel and entertainment expenses;
the nature of facilitating payments; how successor liability applies in the mergers and acquisitions context; the hallmarks of
an effective corporate compliance program; and the different types of civil and criminal resolutions available in the FCPA
context. On these and other topics, the Guide takes a multi-faceted approach, setting forth in detail the statutory require-
ments while also providing insight into DOJ and SEC enforcement practices through hypotheticals, examples of enforce-
ment actions and anonymized declinations, and summaries of applicable case law and DOJ opinion releases.
The Guide is an unprecedented undertaking by DOJ and SEC to provide the public with detailed information about
our FCPA enforcement approach and priorities. We are proud of the many lawyers and staff who worked on this project,
and hope that it will be a useful reference for companies, individuals, and others interested in our enforcement of the Act.
November 14, 2012
Lanny A. Breuer
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Robert S. Khuzami
Director of Enforcement
Securities and Exchange Commission
CONTENTS
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
The Costs of Corruption 2
Historical Background 3
National Landscape: Interagency Efforts 4
Department of Justice 4
Securities and Exchange Commission 4
Law Enforcement Partners
5
Departments of Commerce and State 5
International Landscape: Global Anti-Corruption Efforts 7
OECD Working Group on Bribery and the Anti-Bribery Convention
7
U N Convention Against Corruption 8
Other Anti-Corruption Conventions 8
Chapter 2: THE FCPA: ANTI-BRIBERY PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Who Is Covered by the Anti-Bribery Provisions? 10
Issuers—15 U S C § 78dd-1 10
Domestic Concerns—15 U S C § 78dd-2 11
Territorial Jurisdiction—15 U S C § 78dd-3 11
What Jurisdictional Conduct Triggers the Anti-Bribery Provisions? 11
What Is Covered?—The Business Purpose Test 12
What Does “Corruptly” Mean? 14
What Does “Willfully” Mean and When Does It Apply? 14
What Does “Anything of Value” Mean? 14
Cash
15
Gifts, Travel, Entertainment, and Other Things of Value 15
Charitable Contributions 16
Who Is a Foreign Official? 19
Department, Agency, or Instrumentality of a Foreign Government 20
Public International Organizations 21
How Are Payments to Third Parties Treated? 21
What Affirmative Defenses Are Available? 23
The Local Law Defense
23
Reasonable and Bona Fide Expenditures 24
What Are Facilitating or Expediting Payments? 25
Does the FCPA Apply to Cases of Extortion or Duress? 27
Principles of Corporate Liability for Anti-Bribery Violations 27
Parent-Subsidiary Liability 27
Successor Liability
28
Additional Principles of Criminal Liability for Anti-Bribery Violations: Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy 34
Additional Principles of Civil Liability for Anti-Bribery Violations: Aiding and Abetting and Causing 34
What Is the Applicable Statute of Limitations? 34
Statute of Limitations in Criminal Cases
34
Statute of Limitations in Civil Actions 35
Chapter 3: THE FCPA: ACCOUNTING PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
What Is Covered by the Accounting Provisions? 39
Books and Records Provision 39
Internal Controls Provision 40
Potential Reporting and Anti-Fraud Violations 41
What Are Management’s Other Obligations?
42
Who Is Covered by the Accounting Provisions? 42
Civil Liability for Issuers, Subsidiaries, and Affiliates
42
Civil Liability for Individuals and Other Entities 43
Criminal Liability for Accounting Violations 44
Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting Liability 45
Auditor Obligations 45
Chapter 4: OTHER RELATED U .S . LAWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Travel Act 48
Money Laundering 48
Mail and Wire Fraud 49
Certification and Reporting Violations 49
Tax Violations 49
Chapter 5: GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF ENFORCEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
What Does DOJ Consider When Deciding Whether to Open an Investigation or Bring Charges? 52
DOJ Principles of Federal Prosecution
52
DOJ Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 52
What Does SEC Consider When Deciding Whether to Open an Investigation or Bring Charges? 53
Self-Reporting, Cooperation, and Remedial Efforts 54
Criminal Cases 54
Civil Cases 55
Corporate Compliance Program 56
Hallmarks of Effective Compliance Programs 57
Commitment from Senior Management and a Clearly Articulated Policy Against Corruption
57
Code of Conduct and Compliance Policies and Procedures 57
Oversight, Autonomy, and Resources 58
Risk Assessment
58
Training and Continuing Advice
59
Incentives and Disciplinary Measures
59
Third-Party Due Diligence and Payments
60
Confidential Reporting and Internal Investigation 61
Continuous Improvement: Periodic Testing and Review
61
Mergers and Acquisitions: Pre-Acquisition Due Diligence and Post-Acquisition Integration
62
Other Guidance on Compliance and International Best Practices 63
Chapter 6: FCPA PENALTIES, SANCTIONS, AND REMEDIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
What Are the Potential Consequences for Violations of the FCPA? 68
Criminal Penalties 68
U S Sentencing Guidelines 68
Civil Penalties 69
Collateral Consequences 69
Debarment
70
Cross-Debarment by Multilateral Development Banks
70
Loss of Export Privileges 71
When Is a Compliance Monitor or Independent Consultant Appropriate? 71
Chapter 7: RESOLUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
What Are the Different Types of Resolutions with DOJ? 74
Criminal Complaints, Informations, and Indictments 74
Plea Agreements
74
Deferred Prosecution Agreements 74
Non-Prosecution Agreements 75
Declinations
75
What Are the Different Types of Resolutions with SEC? 76
Civil Injunctive Actions and Remedies 76
Civil Administrative Actions and Remedies
76
Deferred Prosecution Agreements 76
Non-Prosecution Agreements
77
Termination Letters and Declinations 77
What Are Some Examples of Past Declinations by DOJ and SEC? 77
Chapter 8: WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS AND PROTECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Chapter 9: DOJ OPINION PROCEDURE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Chapter 10: CONCLUSION
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
APPENDIX: THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
APPENDIX: ENDNOTES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104
Corporate bribery is bad business. In our free market system it is basic that the
sale of products should take place on the basis of price, quality, and service.
Corporate bribery is fundamentally destructive of this basic tenet. Corporate
bribery of foreign officials takes place primarily to assist corporations in gaining
business. Thus foreign corporate bribery affects the very stability of overseas
business. Foreign corporate bribes also affect our domestic competitive climate
when domestic firms engage in such practices as a substitute for healthy com-
petition for foreign business.
1
—United States Senate, 1977
chapter 1
Introduction
2
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA or the Act) in
1977 in response to revelations of widespread bribery of foreign officials by U.S.
companies. The Act was intended to halt those corrupt practices, create a level
playing field for honest businesses, and restore public confidence in the integ-
rity of the marketplace.
2
The FCPA contains both anti-bribery and accounting
provisions. The anti-bribery provisions prohibit U.S. per-
sons and businesses (domestic concerns), U.S. and foreign
public companies listed on stock exchanges in the United
States or which are required to file periodic reports with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (issuers), and
certain foreign persons and businesses acting while in the
territory of the United States (territorial jurisdiction) from
making corrupt payments to foreign officials to obtain or
retain business. The accounting provisions require issuers
to make and keep accurate books and records and to devise
and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting
controls. The accounting provisions also prohibit individu-
als and businesses from knowingly falsifying books and
records or knowingly circumventing or failing to imple-
ment a system of internal controls.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) share FCPA
enforcement authority and are committed to fighting for-
eign bribery through robust enforcement. An important
component of this effort is education, and this resource
guide, prepared by DOJ and SEC staff, aims to provide
businesses and individuals with information to help them
abide by the law, detect and prevent FCPA violations, and
implement effective compliance programs.
The Costs of Corruption
Corruption is a global problem. In the three decades
since Congress enacted the FCPA, the extent of corporate
bribery has become clearer and its ramifications in a trans-
national economy starker. Corruption impedes economic
growth by diverting public resources from important pri-
orities such as health, education, and infrastructure. It
undermines democratic values and public accountability
and weakens the rule of law.
3
And it threatens stability and
security by facilitating criminal activity within and across
3
borders, such as the illegal trafficking of people, weapons,
and drugs.
4
International corruption also undercuts good
governance and impedes U.S. efforts to promote freedom
and democracy, end poverty, and combat crime and terror-
ism across the globe.
5
Corruption is also bad for business. Corruption is
anti-competitive, leading to distorted prices and disadvan-
taging honest businesses that do not pay bribes. It increases
the cost of doing business globally and inflates the cost of
government contracts in developing countries.
6
Corruption
also introduces significant uncertainty into business trans-
actions: Contracts secured through bribery may be legally
unenforceable, and paying bribes on one contract often
results in corrupt officials making ever-increasing demands.
7
Bribery has destructive effects within a business as well,
undermining employee confidence in a company’s manage-
ment and fostering a permissive atmosphere for other kinds
of corporate misconduct, such as employee self-dealing,
embezzlement,
8
financial fraud,
9
and anti-competitive
behavior.
10
Bribery thus raises the risks of doing business,
putting a company’s bottom line and reputation in jeop-
ardy. Companies that pay bribes to win business ultimately
undermine their own long-term interests and the best inter-
ests of their investors.
Historical Background
Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977 after revela-
tions of widespread global corruption in the wake of the
Watergate political scandal. SEC discovered that more than
400 U.S. companies had paid hundreds of millions of dol-
lars in bribes to foreign government officials to secure busi-
ness overseas.
11
SEC reported that companies were using
secret “slush funds” to make illegal campaign contributions
in the United States and corrupt payments to foreign offi-
cials abroad and were falsifying their corporate financial
records to conceal the payments.
12
Congress viewed passage of the FCPA as critical
to stopping corporate bribery, which had tarnished the
image of U.S. businesses, impaired public confidence in
the financial integrity of U.S. companies, and hampered
the efficient functioning of the markets.
13
As Congress
recognized when it passed the FCPA, corruption imposes
enormous costs both at home and abroad, leading to mar-
ket inefficiencies and instability, sub-standard products,
and an unfair playing field for honest businesses.
14
By
enacting a strong foreign bribery statute, Congress sought
to minimize these destructive effects and help companies
resist corrupt demands, while addressing the destruc-
tive foreign policy ramifications of transnational brib-
er y.
15
The Act also prohibited off-the-books accounting
through provisions designed to “strengthen the accuracy
of the corporate books and records and the reliability of
the audit process which constitute the foundations of our
system of corporate disclosure.”
16
In 1988, Congress amended the FCPA to add two
affirmative defenses: (1) the local law defense; and (2) the
reasonable and bona fide promotional expense defense.
17
Congress also requested that the President negotiate an
international treaty with members of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
to prohibit bribery in international business transactions
by many of the United States’ major trading partners.
18
Subsequent negotiations at the OECD culminated in the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials
in International Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery
Convention), which, among other things, required parties
to make it a crime to bribe foreign officials.
19
No problem does more to alienate citizens
from their political leaders and institutions,
and to undermine political stability and
economic development, than endemic
corruption among the government, political
party leaders, judges, and bureaucrats
— USAID Anti-Corruption Strateg y
chapter 1
Introduction
34
In 1998, the FCPA was amended to conform to
the requirements of the Anti-Bribery Convention. These
amendments expanded the FCPA’s scope to: (1) include
payments made to secure “any improper advantage”; (2)
reach certain foreign persons who commit an act in fur-
therance of a foreign bribe while in the United States; (3)
cover public international organizations in the definition
of “foreign official”; (4) add an alternative basis for juris-
diction based on nationality; and (5) apply criminal pen-
alties to foreign nationals employed by or acting as agents
of U.S. companies.
20
The Anti-Bribery Convention came
into force on February 15, 1999, with the United States
as a founding party.
National Landscape: Interagency
Efforts
DOJ and SEC share enforcement authority for the
FCPA’s anti-bribery and accounting provisions.
21
They also
work with many other federal agencies and law enforce-
ment partners to investigate and prosecute FCPA viola-
tions, reduce bribery demands through good governance
programs and other measures, and promote a fair playing
field for U.S. companies doing business abroad.
Department of Justice
DOJ has criminal FCPA enforcement authority
over “issuers” (i.e., public companies) and their officers,
directors, employees, agents, or stockholders acting on the
issuer’s behalf. DOJ also has both criminal and civil enforce-
ment responsibility for the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions
over “domestic concerns”—which include (a) U.S. citizens,
nationals, and residents and (b) U.S. businesses and their
officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders act-
ing on the domestic concern’s behalf—and certain foreign
persons and businesses that act in furtherance of an FCPA
violation while in the territory of the United States. Within
DOJ, the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division has pri-
mary responsibility for all FCPA matters.
22
FCPA matters
are handled primarily by the FCPA Unit within the Fraud
Section, regularly working jointly with U.S. Attorneys’
Offices around the country.
DOJ maintains a website dedicated to the FCPA and
its enforcement at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/. The website provides translations of the FCPA in
numerous languages, relevant legislative history, and selected
documents from FCPA-related prosecutions and resolutions
since 1977, including charging documents, plea agreements,
deferred prosecution agreements, non-prosecution agree-
ments, press releases, and other relevant pleadings and court
decisions. The website also provides copies of opinions issued
in response to requests by companies and individuals under
DOJ’s FCPA opinion procedure. The procedures for submit-
ting a request for an opinion can be found at http://www.
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/frgncrpt.pdf and are
discussed further in Chapter 9. Individuals and companies
wishing to disclose information about potential FCPA viola-
tions are encouraged to contact the FCPA Unit at the tele-
phone number or email address above.
Securities and Exchange Commission
SEC is responsible for civil enforcement of the FCPA
over issuers and their officers, directors, employees, agents,
DOJ Contact Information
Deputy Chief (FCPA Unit)
Fraud Section, Criminal Division
Bond Building
1400 New York Ave, N .W .
Washington, DC 20005
Telephone: (202) 514-7023
Facsimile: (202) 514-7021
Email: FCPA .Fraud@usdoj .gov
5
or stockholders acting on the issuer’s behalf. SEC’s Division
of Enforcement has responsibility for investigating and
prosecuting FCPA violations. In 2010, SEC’s Enforcement
Division created a specialized FCPA Unit, with attorneys
in Washington, D.C. and in regional offices around the
country, to focus specifically on FCPA enforcement. The
Unit investigates potential FCPA violations; facilitates
coordination with DOJ’s FCPA program and with other
federal and international law enforcement partners; uses its
expert knowledge of the law to promote consistent enforce-
ment of the FCPA; analyzes tips, complaints, and referrals
regarding allegations of foreign bribery; and conducts pub-
lic outreach to raise awareness of anti-corruption efforts
and good corporate governance programs.
The FCPA Unit maintains a “Spotlight on FCPA”
section on SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
fcpa.shtml. The website, which is updated regularly, pro-
vides general information about the Act, links to all SEC
enforcement actions involving the FCPA, including both
federal court actions and administrative proceedings, and
contains other useful information.
Individuals and companies with information about
possible FCPA violations by issuers may report them to the
Enforcement Division via SEC’s online Tips, Complaints
and Referral system, http://www.sec.gov/complaint/tip-
scomplaint.shtml. They may also submit information to
SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower through the same online
system or by contacting the Office of the Whistleblower
at (202) 551-4790. Additionally, investors with questions
about the FCPA can call the Office of Investor Education
and Advocacy at (800) SEC-0330.
For more information about SEC’s Whistleblower
Program, under which certain eligible whistleblowers may
be entitled to a monetary award if their information leads to
certain SEC actions, see Chapter 8.
Law Enforcement Partners
DOJ’s FCPA Unit regularly works with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to investigate potential FCPA
violations. The FBI’s International Corruption Unit has pri-
mary responsibility for international corruption and fraud
investigations and coordinates the FBI’s national FCPA
enforcement program. The FBI also has a dedicated FCPA
squad of FBI special agents (located in the Washington
Field Office) that is responsible for investigating many, and
providing support for all, of the FBI’s FCPA investigations.
In addition, the Department of Homeland Security and the
Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation regularly
investigate potential FCPA violations. A number of other
agencies are also involved in the fight against international
corruption, including the Department of Treasury’s Office
of Foreign Assets Control, which has helped lead a number
of FCPA investigations.
Departments of Commerce and State
Besides enforcement efforts by DOJ and SEC,
the U.S. government is also working to address corrup-
tion abroad and level the playing field for U.S. businesses
through the efforts of the Departments of Commerce and
State. Both Commerce and State advance anti-corruption
and good governance initiatives globally and regularly
assist U.S. companies doing business overseas in several
SEC Contact Information
FCPA Unit Chief
Division of Enforcement
U .S . Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, N .E .
Washington, DC 20549
Online: Tips, Complaints, and
Referrals website
http://www .sec .gov/complaint/tipscomplaint .shtml
Office of Investor Education and Advocacy:
(800) SEC-0330
chapter 1
Introduction
56
important ways. Both agencies encourage U.S. businesses
to seek the assistance of U.S embassies when they are con-
fronted with bribe solicitations or other corruption-related
issues overseas.
23
The Department of Commerce offers a num-
ber of important resources for businesses, including the
International Trade Administration’s United States and
Foreign Commercial Service (Commercial Service). The
Commercial Service has export and industry specialists
located in over 100 U.S. cities and 70 countries who are
available to provide counseling and other assistance to U.S.
businesses, particularly small and medium-sized companies,
regarding exporting their products and services. Among
other things, these specialists can help a U.S. company con-
duct due diligence when choosing business partners or agents
overseas. The International Company Profile Program, for
instance, can be part of a U.S. business’ evaluation of poten-
tial overseas business partners.
24
Businesses may contact the
Commercial Service through its website, http://export.gov/
eac/, or directly at its domestic and foreign offices.
25
Additionally, the Department of Commerce’s Office
of the General Counsel maintains a website, http://www.
commerce.gov/os/ogc/transparency-and-anti-bribery-
initiatives, that contains recent articles and speeches, links
to translations of the FCPA, a catalogue of anti-corruption
resources, and a list of international conventions and ini-
tiatives. The Trade Compliance Center in the Department
of Commerce’s International Trade Administration hosts
a website with anti-bribery resources, http://tcc.export.
gov/Bribery. This website contains an online form through
which U.S. companies can report allegations of foreign
bribery by foreign competitors in international business
transactions.
26
The Department of Commerce also pro-
vides information to companies through a number of U.S.
and international publications designed to assist firms in
complying with anti-corruption laws. For example, the
Department of Commerce has included a new anti-corrup-
tion section in its Country Commercial Guides, prepared
by market experts at U.S. embassies worldwide, that contains
information on market conditions for more than 100 coun-
tries, including information on the FCPA for exporters.
27
The Department of Commerce has also published a guide,
Business Ethics: A Manual for Managing a Responsible
Business Enterprise in Emerging Market Economies, which
contains information about corporate compliance pro-
grams for businesses involved in international trade.
28
The Departments of Commerce and State also pro-
vide advocacy support, when determined to be in the
national interest, for U.S. companies bidding for foreign
government contracts. The Department of Commerce’s
Advocacy Center, for example, supports U.S. businesses
competing against foreign companies for international con-
tracts, such as by arranging for the delivery of an advocacy
message by U.S. government officials or assisting with unan-
ticipated problems such as suspected bribery by a competi-
tor.
29
The Department of State’s Bureau of Economic and
Business Affairs (specifically, its Office of Commercial and
Business Affairs) similarly assists U.S. firms doing business
overseas by providing advocacy on behalf of U.S. businesses
and identifying risk areas for U.S. businesses; more infor-
mation is available on its website, http://www.state.gov/e/
eb/cba/. Also, the Department of State’s economic officers
serving overseas provide commercial advocacy and support
for U.S. companies at the many overseas diplomatic posts
where the Commercial Service is not represented.
The Department of State promotes U.S. government
interests in addressing corruption internationally through
country-to-country diplomatic engagement; development
of and follow-through on international commitments relat-
ing to corruption; promotion of high-level political engage-
ment (e.g., the G20 Anticorruption Action Plan); public
outreach in foreign countries; and support for building
the capacity of foreign partners to combat corruption. In
fiscal year 2009, the U.S. government provided more than
$1 billion for anti-corruption and related good governance
assistance abroad.
7
The Department of State’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) manages
U.S. participation in many multilateral anti-corruption
political and legal initiatives at the global and regional level.
INL also funds and coordinates significant efforts to assist
countries with combating corruption through legal reform,
training, and other capacity-building efforts. Inquiries about
the U.S. government’s general anti-corruption efforts and
implementation of global and regional anti-corruption ini-
tiatives may be directed to INL on its website, http://www.
state.gov/j/inl/c/crime/corr/index.htm, or by email to:
[email protected]. In addition, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) has developed several
anti-corruption programs and publications, information
about which can be found at http://www.usaid.gov/what-
we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/promot-
ing-accountability-transparency. Finally, the Department of
State’s brochure “Fighting Global Corruption: Business Risk
Management,” available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/pdfs/
Fighting_Global_Corruption.pdf, provides guidance about
corporate compliance programs as well as international anti-
corruption initiatives.
International Landscape: Global Anti-
Corruption Efforts
In recent years, there has been a growing interna-
tional consensus that corruption must be combated, and the
United States and other countries are parties to a number
of international anti-corruption conventions. Under these
conventions, countries that are parties undertake commit-
ments to adopt a range of preventive and criminal law mea-
sures to combat corruption. The conventions incorporate
review processes that allow the United States to monitor
other countries to ensure that they are meeting their inter-
national obligations. Likewise, these processes in turn permit
other parties to monitor the United States’ anti-corruption
laws and enforcement to ensure that such enforcement and
legal frameworks are consistent with the United States’ treaty
obligations.
30
U.S. officials regularly address the subject of
corruption with our foreign counterparts to raise awareness
of the importance of fighting corruption and urge stronger
enforcement of anti-corruption laws and policies.
OECD Working Group on Bribery and the Anti-
Bribery Convention
The OECD was founded in 1961 to stimulate eco-
nomic progress and world trade. As noted, the Anti-Bribery
Convention requires its parties to criminalize the bribery
of foreign public officials in international business transac-
tions.
31
As of November 1, 2012, there were 39 parties to
the Anti-Bribery Convention: 34 OECD member coun-
tries (including the United States) and five non-OECD
member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, the Russian
Federation, and South Africa). All of these parties are
also members of the OECD Working Group on Bribery
(Working Group).
32
The Working Group is responsible for monitoring the
implementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention, the 2009
Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, and related instruments. Its mem-
bers meet quarterly to review and monitor implementation
of the Anti-Bribery Convention by member states around
the world. Each party undergoes periodic peer review.
33
This peer-review monitoring system is conducted in three
phases. The Phase 1 review includes an in-depth assess-
ment of each country’s domestic laws implementing the
Convention. The Phase 2 review examines the effectiveness
of each country’s laws and anti-bribery efforts. The final
phase is a permanent cycle of peer review (the first cycle of
which is referred to as the Phase 3 review) that evaluates
a country’s enforcement actions and results, as well as the
country’s efforts to address weaknesses identified during the
Phase 2 review.
34
All of the monitoring reports for the par-
ties to the Convention can be found on the OECD website
and can be a useful resource about the foreign bribery laws
of the OECD Working Group member countries.
35
The United States was one of the first countries to
undergo all three phases of review. The reports and appen-
dices can be found on DOJ’s and SEC’s websites.
36
In its
chapter 1
Introduction
78
Phase 3 review of the United States, which was completed
in October 2010, the Working Group commended U.S.
efforts to fight transnational bribery and highlighted a
number of best practices developed by the United States.
The report also noted areas where the United States’ anti-
bribery efforts could be improved, including consolidat-
ing publicly available information on the application of
the FCPA and enhancing awareness among small- and
medium-sized companies about the prevention and detec-
tion of foreign bribery. This guide is, in part, a response to
these Phase 3 recommendations and is intended to help
businesses and individuals better understand the FCPA.
37
U.N. Convention Against Corruption
The United States is a state party to the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC),
which was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on
October 31, 2003, and entered into force on December
14, 2005.
38
The United States ratified the UNCAC on
October 30, 2006. The UNCAC requires parties to crimi-
nalize a wide range of corrupt acts, including domestic and
foreign bribery and related offenses such as money launder-
ing and obstruction of justice. The UNCAC also estab-
lishes guidelines for the creation of anti-corruption bodies,
codes of conduct for public officials, transparent and objec-
tive systems of procurement, and enhanced accounting and
auditing standards for the private sector. A peer review
mechanism assesses the implementation of the UNCAC
by parties to the Convention, with a focus in the first round
on criminalization and law enforcement as well as inter-
national legal cooperation.
39
The United States has been
reviewed under the Pilot Review Programme, the report
of which is available on DOJ’s website. As of November 1,
2012, 163 countries were parties to the UNCAC.
40
Other Anti-Corruption Conventions
The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
(IACAC) was the first international anti-corruption con-
vention, adopted in March 1996 in Caracas, Venezuela,
by members of the Organization of American States.
41
The IACAC requires parties (of which the United States
is one) to criminalize both foreign and domestic brib-
ery. A body known as the Mechanism for Follow-Up on
the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption (MESICIC) monitors parties’ compli-
ance with the IACAC. As of November 1, 2012, 31 coun-
tries were parties to MESICIC.
The Council of Europe established the Group of
States Against Corruption (GRECO) in 1999 to monitor
countries’ compliance with the Council of Europe’s anti-
corruption standards, including the Council of Europe’s
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption.
42
These stan-
dards include prohibitions on the solicitation and receipt of
bribes, as well as foreign bribery. As of November 1, 2012,
GRECO member states, which need not be members of
the Council of Europe, include more than 45 European
countries and the United States.
43
The United States has been reviewed under both
MESICIC and GRECO, and the reports generated by
those reviews are available on DOJ’s website.
chapter 2
The FCPA:
Anti-Bribery Provisions
10
THE FCPA: ANTI-BRIBERY
PROVISIONS
The FCPA addresses the problem of international corruption in two ways: (1)
the anti-bribery provisions, which are discussed below, prohibit individuals
and businesses from bribing foreign government officials in order to obtain
or retain business and (2) the accounting provisions, which are discussed in
Chapter 3, impose certain record keeping and internal control requirements
on issuers, and prohibit individuals and companies from knowingly falsifying
an issuer’s books and records or circumventing or failing to implement an is-
suer’s system of internal controls. Violations of the FCPA can lead to civil and
criminal penalties, sanctions, and remedies, including fines, disgorgement,
and/or imprisonment.
In general, the FCPA prohibits offering to pay, pay-
ing, promising to pay, or authorizing the payment of money
or anything of value to a foreign official in order to influ-
ence any act or decision of the foreign official in his or her
official capacity or to secure any other improper advantage
in order to obtain or retain business.
44
Who Is Covered by the Anti-Bribery Provisions?
The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply broadly to
three categories of persons and entities: (1) “issuers” and
their officers, directors, employees, agents, and sharehold-
ers; (2) “domestic concerns” and their officers, directors,
employees, agents, and shareholders; and (3) certain per-
sons and entities, other than issuers and domestic concerns,
acting while in the territory of the United States.
Issuers—15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1
Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the Exchange Act), which can be found at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-1, contains the anti-bribery provision governing
11
How Can I Tell If My Company Is an “Issuer”?
It is listed on a national securities exchange in the
United States (either stock or American Depository
Receipts); or
The company’s stock trades in the over-the-
counter market in the United States and the
company is required to file SEC reports
To see if your company files SEC reports, go to
SEC’s website at http://www
sec gov/edgar/
searchedgar/webusers
htm
issuers.
45
A company is an “issuer” under the FCPA if it
has a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the
Exchange Act
46
or is required to file periodic and other
reports with SEC under Section 15(d) of the Exchange
Act.
47
In practice, this means that any company with a
class of securities listed on a national securities exchange in
the United States, or any company with a class of securi-
ties quoted in the over-the-counter market in the United
States and required to file periodic reports with SEC, is an
issuer. A company thus need not be a U.S. company to be
an issuer. Foreign companies with American Depository
Receipts that are listed on a U.S. exchange are also issuers.
48
As of December 31, 2011, 965 foreign companies were reg-
istered with SEC.
49
Officers, directors, employees, agents,
or stockholders acting on behalf of an issuer (whether U.S.
or foreign nationals), and any co-conspirators, also can be
prosecuted under the FCPA.
50
Domestic Concerns—15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2
The FCPA also applies to “domestic concerns.”
51
A
domestic concern is any individual who is a citizen, national,
or resident of the United States, or any corporation, part-
nership, association, joint-stock company, business trust,
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship that is
organized under the laws of the United States or its states,
territories, possessions, or commonwealths or that has its
principal place of business in the United States.
52
Officers,
directors, employees, agents, or stockholders acting on
behalf of a domestic concern, including foreign nationals or
companies, are also covered.
53
Territorial Jurisdiction—15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3
The FCPA also applies to certain foreign nationals or
entities that are not issuers or domestic concerns.
54
Since
1998, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions have applied to
foreign persons and foreign non-issuer entities that, either
directly or through an agent, engage in any act in further-
ance of a corrupt payment (or an offer, promise, or authori-
zation to pay) while in the territory of the United States.
55
Also, officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders
acting on behalf of such persons or entities may be subject
to the FCPA’s anti-bribery prohibitions.
56
What Jurisdictional Conduct Triggers the Anti-
Bribery Provisions?
The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions can apply to
conduct both inside and outside the United States. Issuers
and domestic concerns—as well as their officers, directors,
employees, agents, or stockholders—may be prosecuted
for using the U.S. mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce in furtherance of a corrupt payment
to a foreign official. The Act defines “interstate commerce”
as “trade, commerce, transportation, or communication
among the several States, or between any foreign country
and any State or between any State and any place or ship
outside thereof ....”
57
The term also includes the intrastate
use of any interstate means of communication, or any other
interstate instrumentality.
58
Thus, placing a telephone call or
sending an e-mail, text message, or fax from, to, or through
the United States involves interstate commerce—as does
sending a wire transfer from or to a U.S. bank or otherwise
using the U.S. banking system, or traveling across state bor-
ders or internationally to or from the United States.
Those who are not issuers or domestic concerns may
be prosecuted under the FCPA if they directly, or through
an agent, engage in any act in furtherance of a corrupt pay-
ment while in the territory of the United States, regardless of
chapter 2
The FCPA:
Anti-Bribery Provisions
1112
whether they utilize the U.S. mails or a means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce.
59
Thus, for example, a foreign
national who attends a meeting in the United States that fur-
thers a foreign bribery scheme may be subject to prosecution,
as may any co-conspirators, even if they did not themselves
attend the meeting. A foreign national or company may also
be liable under the FCPA if it aids and abets, conspires with,
or acts as an agent of an issuer or domestic concern, regardless
of whether the foreign national or company itself takes any
action in the United States.
60
In addition, under the “alternative jurisdiction” pro-
vision of the FCPA enacted in 1998, U.S. companies or
persons may be subject to the anti-bribery provisions even
if they act outside the United States.
61
The 1998 amend-
ments to the FCPA expanded the jurisdictional coverage of
the Act by establishing an alternative basis for jurisdiction,
that is, jurisdiction based on the nationality principle.
62
In
particular, the 1998 amendments removed the requirement
that there be a use of interstate commerce (e.g., wire, email,
telephone call) for acts in furtherance of a corrupt payment
to a foreign official by U.S. companies and persons occur-
ring wholly outside of the United States.
63
What Is Covered?—The Business
Purpose Test
The FCPA applies only to payments intended to
induce or influence a foreign official to use his or her posi-
tion “in order to assist ... in obtaining or retaining business
for or with, or directing business to, any person.”
64
This
requirement is known as the “business purpose test” and is
broadly interpreted.
65
Not surprisingly, many enforcement actions involve
bribes to obtain or retain government contracts.
66
The
FCPA also prohibits bribes in the conduct of business or
Hypothetical: FCPA Jurisdiction
Company A, a Delaware company with its principal place of business in New York, is a large energy company that
operates globally, including in a number of countries that have a high risk of corruption, such as Foreign Country Company
A’s shares are listed on a national U S stock exchange Company A enters into an agreement with a European company
(EuroCo) to submit a joint bid to the Oil Ministry to build a refinery in Foreign Country EuroCo is not an issuer
Executives of Company A and EuroCo meet in New York to discuss how to win the bid and decide to hire a purported
third-party consultant (Intermediary) and have him use part of his “commission” to bribe high-ranking officials within the
Oil Ministry Intermediary meets with executives at Company A and EuroCo in New York to finalize the scheme Eventually,
millions of dollars in bribes are funneled from the United States and Europe through Intermediary to high-ranking officials
at the Oil Ministry, and Company A and EuroCo win the contract A few years later, a front page article alleging that the
contract was procured through bribery appears in Foreign Country, and DOJ and SEC begin investigating whether the
FCPA was violated
Based on these facts, which entities fall within the FCPA’s jurisdiction?
All of the entities easily fall within the FCPA’s jurisdiction Company A is both an “issuer” and a “domestic concern”
under the FCPA, and Intermediary is an “agent” of Company A EuroCo and Intermediary are also subject to the FCPA’s
territorial jurisdiction provision based on their conduct while in the United States Moreover, even if EuroCo and Intermediary
had never taken any actions in the territory of the United States, they can still be subject to jurisdiction under a traditional
application of conspiracy law and may be subject to substantive FCPA charges under Pinkerton liability, namely, being liable
for the reasonably foreseeable substantive FCPA crimes committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy
13
to gain a business advantage.
67
For example, bribe payments
made to secure favorable tax treatment, to reduce or elimi-
nate customs duties, to obtain government action to pre-
vent competitors from entering a market, or to circumvent
a licensing or permit requirement, all satisfy the business
purpose test.
68
In 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
addressed the business purpose test in United States v. Kay
and held that bribes paid to obtain favorable tax treatment—
which reduced a company’s customs duties and sales taxes
on imports—could constitute payments made to “obtain
or retain” business within the meaning of the FCPA.
69
The
court explained that in enacting the FCPA, “Congress meant
to prohibit a range of payments wider than only those that
directly influence the acquisition or retention of govern-
ment contracts or similar commercial or industrial arrange-
m e n t s .”
70
The Kay court found that “[t]he congressional
target was bribery paid to engender assistance in improving
the business opportunities of the payor or his beneficiary,
irrespective of whether that assistance be direct or indirect,
and irrespective of whether it be related to administering
the law, awarding, extending, or renewing a contract, or
executing or preserving an agreement.”
71
Accordingly, Kay
held that payments to obtain favorable tax treatment can,
under appropriate circumstances, violate the FCPA:
Avoiding or lowering taxes reduces operating costs
and thus increases profit margins, thereby freeing up
funds that the business is otherwise legally obligated
to expend. And this, in turn, enables it to take any
number of actions to the disadvantage of competi-
tors. Bribing foreign officials to lower taxes and cus-
toms duties certainly can provide an unfair advantage
over competitors and thereby be of assistance to the
payor in obtaining or retaining business.
* * *
[W]e hold that Congress intended for the FCPA
to apply broadly to payments intended to assist the
payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining or
retaining business for some person, and that bribes
paid to foreign tax officials to secure illegally reduced
customs and tax liability constitute a type of payment
that can fall within this broad coverage.
72
Paying Bribes to Customs Officials
In 2010, a global freight forwarding company and
six of its corporate customers in the oil and gas industry
resolved charges that they paid bribes to customs
officials The companies bribed customs officials in more
than ten countries in exchange for such benefits as:
evading customs duties on imported goods
improperly expediting the importation of goods
and equipment
extending drilling contracts and lowering tax
assessments
obtaining false documentation related to
temporary import permits for drilling rigs
enabling the release of drilling rigs and other
equipment from customs officials
In many instances, the improper payments at issue
allowed the company to carry out its existing business,
which fell within the FCPA’s prohibition on corrupt
payments made for the purpose of “retaining” business
The seven companies paid a total of more than $235
million in civil and criminal sanctions and disgorgement
Examples of Actions Taken
to Obtain or Retain Business
Winning a contract
Influencing the procurement process
Circumventing the rules for importation of
products
Gaining access to non-public bid tender
information
Evading taxes or penalties
Influencing the adjudication of lawsuits or
enforcement actions
Obtaining exceptions to regulations
Avoiding contract termination
chapter 2
The FCPA:
Anti-Bribery Provisions
1314
In short, while the FCPA does not cover every type
of bribe paid around the world for every purpose, it does
apply broadly to bribes paid to help obtain or retain busi-
ness, which can include payments made to secure a wide
variety of unfair business advantages.
73
What Does “Corruptly” Mean?
To violate the FCPA, an offer, promise, or authori-
zation of a payment, or a payment, to a government offi-
cial must be made “corruptly.”
74
As Congress noted when
adopting the FCPA, the word “corruptly” means an intent
or desire to wrongfully influence the recipient:
The word “corruptly” is used in order to make clear
that the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be in-
tended to induce the recipient to misuse his official
position; for example, wrongfully to direct business
to the payor or his client, to obtain preferential legis-
lation or regulations, or to induce a foreign official to
fail to perform an official function.
75
Where corrupt intent is present, the FCPA prohibits
paying, offering, or promising to pay money or anything
of value (or authorizing the payment or offer).
76
By focus-
ing on intent, the FCPA does not require that a corrupt
act succeed in its purpose.
77
Nor must the foreign official
actually solicit, accept, or receive the corrupt payment for
the bribe payor to be liable.
78
For example, in one case, a
specialty chemical company promised Iraqi government
officials approximately $850,000 in bribes for an upcoming
contract. Although the company did not, in the end, make
the payment (the scheme was thwarted by the U.S. govern-
ment’s investigation), the company still violated the FCPA
and was held accountable.
79
Also, as long as the offer, promise, authorization, or
payment is made corruptly, the actor need not know the
identity of the recipient; the attempt is sufficient.
80
Thus, an
executive who authorizes others to pay “whoever you need
to” in a foreign government to obtain a contract has violated
the FCPA—even if no bribe is ultimately offered or paid.
What Does “Willfully” Mean and When
Does It Apply?
In order for an individual defendant to be criminally
liable under the FCPA, he or she must act “willfully.”
81
Proof
of willfulness is not required to establish corporate criminal
or civil liability,
82
though proof of corrupt intent is.
The term “willfully” is not defined in the FCPA, but
it has generally been construed by courts to connote an
act committed voluntarily and purposefully, and with a
bad purpose, i.e., with “knowledge that [a defendant] was
doing a ‘bad’ act under the general rules of law.”
83
As the
Supreme Court explained in Bryan v. United States, “[a]s a
general matter, when used in the criminal context, a ‘will-
ful’ act is one undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’ In other
words, in order to establish a ‘willful’ violation of a statute,
‘the Government must prove that the defendant acted with
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.’”
84
Notably, as both the Second Circuit and Fifth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have found, the FCPA does not require
the government to prove that a defendant was specifically
aware of the FCPA or knew that his conduct violated the
F C PA .
85
To be guilty, a defendant must act with a bad pur-
pose, i.e., know generally that his conduct is unlawful.
What Does “Anything of Value” Mean?
In enacting the FCPA, Congress recognized that bribes
can come in many shapes and sizes—a broad range of unfair
benefits
86
—and so the statute prohibits the corrupt “offer,
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of
any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of
the giving of anything of value to” a foreign official.
87
An improper benefit can take many forms. While
cases often involve payments of cash (sometimes in the
guise of “consulting fees” or “commissions” given through
intermediaries), others have involved travel expenses and
15
expensive gifts. Like the domestic bribery statute, the FCPA
does not contain a minimum threshold amount for corrupt
gifts or payments.
88
Indeed, what might be considered a
modest payment in the United States could be a larger and
much more significant amount in a foreign country.
Regardless of size, for a gift or other payment to vio-
late the statute, the payor must have corrupt intent—that is,
the intent to improperly influence the government official.
The corrupt intent requirement protects companies that
engage in the ordinary and legitimate promotion of their
businesses while targeting conduct that seeks to improp-
erly induce officials into misusing their positions. Thus, it
is difficult to envision any scenario in which the provision
of cups of coffee, taxi fare, or company promotional items
of nominal value would ever evidence corrupt intent, and
neither DOJ nor SEC has ever pursued an investigation
on the basis of such conduct. Moreover, as in all areas of
federal law enforcement, DOJ and SEC exercise discre-
tion in deciding which cases promote law enforcement pri-
orities and justify investigation. Certain patterns, however,
have emerged: DOJ’s and SEC’s anti-bribery enforcement
actions have focused on small payments and gifts only when
they comprise part of a systemic or long-standing course of
conduct that evidences a scheme to corruptly pay foreign
officials to obtain or retain business. These assessments are
necessarily fact specific.
Cash
The most obvious form of corrupt payment is large
amounts of cash. In some instances, companies have main-
tained cash funds specifically earmarked for use as bribes.
One U.S. issuer headquartered in Germany disbursed cor-
rupt payments from a corporate “cash desk” and used off-
shore bank accounts to bribe government officials to win
contracts.
89
In another instance, a four-company joint ven-
ture used its agent to pay $5 million in bribes to a Nigerian
political party.
90
The payments were made to the agent in
suitcases of cash (typically in $1 million installments), and,
in one instance, the trunk of a car when the cash did not fit
into a suitcase.
91
Gifts, Travel, Entertainment, and Other Things
of Value
A small gift or token of esteem or gratitude is often
an appropriate way for business people to display respect
for each other. Some hallmarks of appropriate gift-giving
are when the gift is given openly and transparently, properly
recorded in the giver’s books and records, provided only to
reflect esteem or gratitude, and permitted under local law.
Items of nominal value, such as cab fare, reasonable
meals and entertainment expenses, or company promo-
tional items, are unlikely to improperly influence an offi-
cial, and, as a result, are not, without more, items that have
resulted in enforcement action by DOJ or SEC. The larger
or more extravagant the gift, however, the more likely it was
given with an improper purpose. DOJ and SEC enforce-
ment cases thus have involved single instances of large,
extravagant gift-giving (such as sports cars, fur coats, and
other luxury items) as well as widespread gifts of smaller
items as part of a pattern of bribes.
92
For example, in one
case brought by DOJ and SEC, a defendant gave a govern-
ment official a country club membership fee and a genera-
tor, as well as household maintenance expenses, payment
of cell phone bills, an automobile worth $20,000, and lim-
ousine services. The same official also received $250,000
through a third-party agent.
93
In addition, a number of FCPA enforcement actions
have involved the corrupt payment of travel and entertain-
ment expenses. Both DOJ and SEC have brought cases
where these types of expenditures occurred in conjunction
with other conduct reflecting systemic bribery or other
clear indicia of corrupt intent.
A case involving a California-based telecommuni-
cations company illustrates the types of improper travel
and entertainment expenses that may violate the FCPA.
94
Between 2002 and 2007, the company spent nearly $7 mil-
lion on approximately 225 trips for its customers in order to
obtain systems contracts in China, including for employees
of Chinese state-owned companies to travel to popular tour-
ist destinations in the United States.
95
Although the trips
were purportedly for the individuals to conduct training at
chapter 2
The FCPA:
Anti-Bribery Provisions
1516
the company’s facilities, in reality, no training occurred on
many of these trips and the company had no facilities at those
locations. Approximately $670,000 of the $7 million was
falsely recorded as “training” expenses.
96
Likewise, a New Jersey-based telecommunications
company spent millions of dollars on approximately 315
trips for Chinese government officials, ostensibly to inspect
factories and train the officials in using the company’s
equipment.
97
In reality, during many of these trips, the offi-
cials spent little or no time visiting the company’s facilities,
but instead visited tourist destinations such as Hawaii, Las
Vegas, the Grand Canyon, Niagara Falls, Disney World,
Universal Studios, and New York City.
98
Some of the trips
were characterized as “factory inspections” or “training”
with government customers but consisted primarily or
entirely of sightseeing to locations chosen by the officials,
typically lasting two weeks and costing between $25,000
and $55,000 per trip. In some instances, the company gave
the government officials $500 to $1,000 per day in spend-
ing money and paid all lodging, transportation, food,
and entertainment expenses. The company either failed
to record these expenses or improperly recorded them as
“consulting fees” in its corporate books and records. The
Examples of Improper
Travel and Entertainment
a $12,000 birthday trip for a government decision-
maker from Mexico that included visits to wineries
and dinners
$10,000 spent on dinners, drinks, and
entertainment for a government official
a trip to Italy for eight Iraqi government officials
that consisted primarily of sightseeing and
included $1,000 in “pocket money” for each
official
a trip to Paris for a government official and his wife
that consisted primarily of touring activities via a
chauffeur-driven vehicle
company also failed to implement appropriate internal con-
trols to monitor the provision of travel and other things of
value to Chinese government officials.
99
Companies also may violate the FCPA if they give
payments or gifts to third parties, like an official’s family
members, as an indirect way of corruptly influencing a for-
eign official. For example, one defendant paid personal bills
and provided airline tickets to a cousin and close friend of
the foreign official whose influence the defendant sought in
obtaining contracts.
100
The defendant was convicted at trial
and received a prison sentence.
101
As part of an effective compliance program, a com-
pany should have clear and easily accessible guidelines
and processes in place for gift-giving by the company’s
directors, officers, employees, and agents. Though not
necessarily appropriate for every business, many larger
companies have automated gift-giving clearance pro-
cesses and have set clear monetary thresholds for gifts
along with annual limitations, with limited exceptions
for gifts approved by appropriate management. Clear
guidelines and processes can be an effective and efficient
means for controlling gift-giving, deterring improper
gifts, and protecting corporate assets.
The FCPA does not prohibit gift-giving. Rather, just
like its domestic bribery counterparts, the FCPA prohibits
the payments of bribes, including those disguised as gifts.
Charitable Contributions
Companies often engage in charitable giving as part
of legitimate local outreach. The FCPA does not prohibit
charitable contributions or prevent corporations from act-
ing as good corporate citizens. Companies, however, can-
not use the pretense of charitable contributions as a way to
funnel bribes to government officials.
17
For example, a pharmaceutical company used chari-
table donations to a small local castle restoration charity
headed by a foreign government official to induce the offi-
cial to direct business to the company. Although the charity
was a bona fide charitable organization, internal documents
at the pharmaceutical company’s subsidiary established that
the payments were not viewed as charitable contributions
but rather as “dues” the subsidiary was required to pay for
assistance from the government official. The payments con-
stituted a significant portion of the subsidiary’s total pro-
motional donations budget and were structured to allow
the subsidiary to exceed its authorized limits. The payments
Hypothetical: Gifts, Travel, and Entertainment
Company A is a large U S engineering company with global operations in more than 50 countries, including a
number that have a high risk of corruption, such as Foreign Country Company A’s stock is listed on a national U S stock
exchange In conducting its business internationally, Company A’s officers and employees come into regular contact with
foreign officials, including officials in various ministries and state-owned entities At a trade show, Company A has a booth
at which it offers free pens, hats, t-shirts, and other similar promotional items with Company A’s logo Company A also
serves free coffee, other beverages, and snacks at the booth Some of the visitors to the booth are foreign officials
Is Company A in violation of the FCPA?
No These are legitimate, bona fide expenditures made in connection with the promotion, demonstration, or
explanation of Company A’s products or services There is nothing to suggest corrupt intent here The FCPA does not
prevent companies from promoting their businesses in this way or providing legitimate hospitality, including to foreign
officials Providing promotional items with company logos or free snacks as set forth above is an appropriate means of
providing hospitality and promoting business Such conduct has never formed the basis for an FCPA enforcement action
At the trade show, Company A invites a dozen current and prospective customers out for drinks, and pays
the moderate bar tab. Some of the current and prospective customers are foreign officials under the FCPA. Is
Company A in violation of the FCPA?
No Again, the FCPA was not designed to prohibit all forms of hospitality to foreign officials While the cost here may
be more substantial than the beverages, snacks, and promotional items provided at the booth, and the invitees specifically
selected, there is still nothing to suggest corrupt intent
Two years ago, Company A won a long-term contract to supply goods and services to the state-owned Electricity
Commission in Foreign Country. The Electricity Commission is 100% owned, controlled, and operated by the
government of Foreign Country, and employees of the Electricity Commission are subject to Foreign Country’s
domestic bribery laws. Some Company A executives are in Foreign Country for meetings with officials of the
Electricity Commission. The General Manager of the Electricity Commission was recently married, and during the
trip Company A executives present a moderately priced crystal vase to the General Manager as a wedding gift
and token of esteem. Is Company A in violation of the FCPA?
No It is appropriate to provide reasonable gifts to foreign officials as tokens of esteem or gratitude It is important that
such gifts be made openly and transparently, properly recorded in a company’s books and records, and given only where
appropriate under local law, customary where given, and reasonable for the occasion
During the course of the contract described above, Company A periodically provides training to Electricity
Commission employees at its facilities in Michigan. The training is paid for by the Electricity Commission as part of
the contract. Senior officials of the Electricity Commission inform Company A that they want to inspect the faciliti
and ensure that the training is working well. Company A pays for the airfare, hotel, and transportation for the
es
(cont’d)
chapter 2
The FCPA:
Anti-Bribery Provisions
1718
Electricity Commission senior officials to travel to Michigan to inspect Company A’s facilities. Because it is a lengthy
international flight, Company A agrees to pay for business class airfare, to which its own employees are entitled
for lengthy flights. The foreign officials visit Michigan for several days, during which the senior officials perform an
appropriate inspection. Company A executives take the officials to a moderately priced dinner, a baseball game,
and a play. Do any of these actions violate the FCPA?
No Neither the costs associated with training the employees nor the trip for the senior officials to the Company’s
facilities in order to inspect them violates the FCPA Reasonable and bona fide promotional expenditures do not violate
the FCPA Here, Company A is providing training to the Electricity Commission’s employees and is hosting the Electricity
Commission senior officials Their review of the execution and performance of the contract is a legitimate business purpose
Even the provision of business class airfare is reasonable under the circumstances, as are the meals and entertainment,
which are only a small component of the business trip
Would this analysis be different if Company A instead paid for the senior officials to travel first-class with their
spouses for an all-expenses-paid, week-long trip to Las Vegas, where Company A has no facilities?
Yes This conduct almost certainly violates the FCPA because it evinces a corrupt intent Here, the trip does not appear
to be designed for any legitimate business purpose, is extravagant, includes expenses for the officials’ spouses, and therefore
appears to be designed to corruptly curry favor with the foreign government officials Moreover, if the trip were booked as a
legitimate business expense—such as the provision of training at its facilities—Company A would also be in violation of the
FCPA’s accounting provisions Furthermore, this conduct suggests deficiencies in Company A’s internal controls
Company A’s contract with the Electricity Commission is going to expire, and the Electricity Commission is
offering the next contract through its tender process. An employee of the Electricity Commission contacts
Company A and offers to provide Company A with confidential, non-public bid information from Company A’s
competitors if Company A will pay for a vacation to Paris for him and his girlfriend. Employees of Company A
accede to the official’s request, pay for the vacation, receive the confidential bid information, and yet still do not
win the contract. Has Company A violated the FCPA?
Yes Company A has provided things of value to a foreign official for the purpose of inducing the official to misuse
his office and to gain an improper advantage It does not matter that it was the foreign official who first suggested the
illegal conduct or that Company A ultimately was not successful in winning the contract This conduct would also violate
the FCPA’s accounting provisions if the trip were booked as a legitimate business expense and suggests deficiencies in
Company A’s internal controls
19
also were not in compliance with the company’s internal
policies, which provided that charitable donations gener-
ally should be made to healthcare institutions and relate to
the practice of medicine.
102
Proper due diligence and controls are critical for
charitable giving. In general, the adequacy of measures
taken to prevent misuse of charitable donations will depend
on a risk-based analysis and the specific facts at hand. In
Opinion Procedure Release No. 10-02, DOJ described the
due diligence and controls that can minimize the likelihood
of an FCPA violation. In that matter, a Eurasian-based sub-
sidiary of a U.S. non-governmental organization was asked
by an agency of a foreign government to make a grant to
a local microfinance institution (MFI) as a prerequisite to
the subsidiary’s transformation to bank status. The subsid-
iary proposed contributing $1.42 million to a local MFI to
satisfy the request. The subsidiary undertook an extensive,
three-stage due diligence process to select the proposed
grantee and imposed significant controls on the proposed
grant, including ongoing monitoring and auditing, ear-
marking funds for capacity building, prohibiting compen-
sation of board members, and implementing anti-corrup-
tion compliance provisions. DOJ explained that it would
not take any enforcement action because the company’s due
diligence and the controls it planned to put in place sufficed
to prevent an FCPA violation.
Other opinion releases also address charitable-type
grants or donations. Under the facts presented in those
releases, DOJ approved the proposed grant or donation,
103
based on due diligence measures and controls such as:
• certifications by the recipient regarding compliance
with the FCPA;
104
• due diligence to confirm that none of the recipient’s
officers were affiliated with the foreign government
at issue;
105
• a requirement that the recipient provide audited
financial statements;
106
• a written agreement with the recipient restricting
the use of funds;
107
• steps to ensure that the funds were transferred to a
valid bank account;
108
Five Questions to Consider When Making
Charitable Payments in a Foreign Country:
1 What is the purpose of the payment?
2 Is the payment consistent with the company’s
internal guidelines on charitable giving?
3 Is the payment at the request of a foreign official?
4 Is a foreign official associated with the charity
and, if so, can the foreign official make decisions
regarding your business in that country?
5 Is the payment conditioned upon receiving
business or other benefits?
• confirmation that the charity’s commitments were
met before funds were disbursed;
109
and
• on-going monitoring of the efficacy of the
program.
110
Legitimate charitable giving does not violate the
FCPA. Compliance with the FCPA merely requires that
charitable giving not be used as a vehicle to conceal pay-
ments made to corruptly influence foreign officials.
Who Is a Foreign Official?
The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply to corrupt
payments made to (1) “any foreign official”; (2) “any foreign
political party or official thereof ”; (3) “any candidate for
foreign political office”; or (4) any person, while knowing
that all or a portion of the payment will be offered, given, or
promised to an individual falling within one of these three
categories.
111
Although the statute distinguishes between a
“foreign official,” “foreign political party or official thereof,”
and “candidate for foreign political office,” the term “for-
eign official” in this guide generally refers to an individual
falling within any of these three categories.
The FCPA defines “foreign official” to include:
any officer or employee of a foreign government or
any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
chapter 2
The FCPA:
Anti-Bribery Provisions
1920
or of a public international organization, or any per-
son acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of
any such government or department, agency, or in-
strumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public
international organization.
112
As this language makes clear, the FCPA broadly
applies to corrupt payments to “any” officer or employee
of a foreign government and to those acting on the for-
eign government’s behalf.
113
The FCPA thus covers cor-
rupt payments to low-ranking employees and high-level
officials alike.
114
The FCPA prohibits payments to foreign officials, not
to foreign governments.
115
That said, companies contem-
plating contributions or donations to foreign governments
should take steps to ensure that no monies are used for cor-
rupt purposes, such as the personal benefit of individual
foreign officials.
Department, Agency, or Instrumentality of a
Foreign Government
Foreign officials under the FCPA include officers
or employees of a department, agency, or instrumental-
ity of a foreign government. When a foreign government
is organized in a fashion similar to the U.S. system, what
constitutes a government department or agency is typically
clear (e.g., a ministry of energ y, national security agency, or
transportation authority).
116
However, governments can be
organized in very different ways.
117
Many operate through
state-owned and state-controlled entities, particularly in
such areas as aerospace and defense manufacturing, bank-
ing and finance, healthcare and life sciences, energ y and
extractive industries, telecommunications, and transporta-
tion.
118
By including officers or employees of agencies and
instrumentalities within the definition of “foreign official,”
the FCPA accounts for this variability.
The term “instrumentality” is broad and can include
state-owned or state-controlled entities. Whether a particu-
lar entity constitutes an “instrumentality” under the FCPA
requires a fact-specific analysis of an entity’s ownership,
control, status, and function.
119
A number of courts have
approved final jury instructions providing a non-exclusive
list of factors to be considered:
• the foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity;
• the foreign state’s degree of control over the entity
(including whether key officers and directors of
the entity are, or are appointed by, government
officials);
• the foreign state’s characterization of the entity and
its employees;
• the circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation;
• the purpose of the entity’s activities;
• the entity’s obligations and privileges under the
foreign state’s law;
• the exclusive or controlling power vested in the
entity to administer its designated functions;
• the level of financial support by the foreign
state (including subsidies, special tax treatment,
government-mandated fees, and loans);
• the entity’s provision of services to the jurisdiction’s
residents;
• whether the governmental end or purpose sought
to be achieved is expressed in the policies of the
foreign government; and
• the general perception that the entity is performing
official or governmental functions.
120
Companies should consider these factors when eval-
uating the risk of FCPA violations and designing compli-
ance programs.
DOJ and SEC have pursued cases involving instru-
mentalities since the time of the FCPA’s enactment and
have long used an analysis of ownership, control, status,
and function to determine whether a particular entity is
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign government.
For example, the second-ever FCPA case charged by DOJ
involved a California company that paid bribes through a
Mexican corporation to two executives of a state-owned
21
Mexican national oil company.
121
And in the early 1980s,
DOJ and SEC brought cases involving a $1 million bribe to
the chairman of Trinidad and Tobago’s racing authority.
122
DOJ and SEC continue to regularly bring FCPA
cases involving bribes paid to employees of agencies and
instrumentalities of foreign governments. In one such
case, the subsidiary of a Swiss engineering company paid
bribes to officials of a state-owned and controlled electric-
ity commission. The commission was created by, owned
by, and controlled by the Mexican government, and it had
a monopoly on the transmission and distribution of elec-
tricity in Mexico. Many of the commission’s board mem-
bers were cabinet-level government officials, and the direc-
tor was appointed by Mexico’s president.
123
Similarly, in
another recent case, Miami telecommunications executives
were charged with paying bribes to employees of Haiti’s
state-owned and controlled telecommunications company.
The telecommunications company was 97% owned and
100% controlled by the Haitian government, and its direc-
tor was appointed by Haiti’s president.
124
While no one factor is dispositive or necessarily more
important than another, as a practical matter, an entity is
unlikely to qualify as an instrumentality if a government
does not own or control a majority of its shares. However,
there are circumstances in which an entity would qualify
as an instrumentality absent 50% or greater foreign gov-
ernment ownership, which is reflected in the limited num-
ber of DOJ or SEC enforcement actions brought in such
situations. For example, in addition to being convicted of
funneling millions of dollars in bribes to two sitting presi-
dents in two different countries, a French issuer’s three
subsidiaries were convicted of paying bribes to employees
of a Malaysian telecommunications company that was 43%
owned by Malaysia’s Ministry of Finance. There, notwith-
standing its minority ownership stake in the company, the
Ministry held the status of a “special shareholder,” had veto
power over all major expenditures, and controlled impor-
tant operational decisions.
125
In addition, most senior
company officers were political appointees, including the
Chairman and Director, the Chairman of the Board of the
Tender Committee, and the Executive Director.
126
Thus,
despite the Malaysian government having a minority share-
holder position, the company was an instrumentality of the
Malaysian government as the government nevertheless had
substantial control over the company.
Companies and individuals should also remember
that, whether an entity is an instrumentality of a foreign
government or a private entity, commercial (i.e., private-
to-private) bribery may still violate the FCPA’s accounting
provisions, the Travel Act, anti-money laundering laws, and
other federal or foreign laws. Any type of corrupt payment
thus carries a risk of prosecution.
Public International Organizations
In 1998, the FCPA was amended to expand the defini-
tion of “foreign official” to include employees and representa-
tives of public international organizations.
127
A “public inter-
national organization” is any organization designated as such
by Executive Order under the International Organizations
Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288, or any other organization
that the President so designates.
128
Currently, public interna-
tional organizations include entities such as the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, the World Intellectual
Property Organization, the World Trade Organization, the
OECD, the Organization of American States, and numer-
ous others. A comprehensive list of organizations designated
as “public international organizations” is contained in 22
U.S.C. § 288 and can also be found on the U.S. Government
Printing Office website at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.
How Are Payments to Third Parties
Treated?
The FCPA expressly prohibits corrupt payments
made through third parties or intermediaries.
129
Specifically,
it covers payments made to “any person, while knowing
that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will
be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly,”
130
to a
foreign official. Many companies doing business in a foreign
country retain a local individual or company to help them
conduct business. Although these foreign agents may pro-
vide entirely legitimate advice regarding local customs and
procedures and may help facilitate business transactions,
chapter 2
The FCPA:
Anti-Bribery Provisions
2122
companies should be aware of the risks involved in engag-
ing third-party agents or intermediaries. The fact that a
bribe is paid by a third party does not eliminate the poten-
tial for criminal or civil FCPA liability.
131
For instance, a four-company joint venture used
two agents—a British lawyer and a Japanese trading
company—to bribe Nigerian government officials in
order to win a series of liquefied natural gas construc-
tion projects.
132
Together, the four multi-national cor-
porations and the Japanese trading company paid a
combined $1.7 billion in civil and criminal sanctions
for their decade-long bribery scheme. In addition, the
subsidiary of one of the companies pleaded guilty and a
number of individuals, including the British lawyer and
the former CEO of one of the companies’ subsidiaries,
received significant prison terms.
Similarly, a medical device manufacturer entered into
a deferred prosecution agreement as the result of corrupt
payments it authorized its local Chinese distributor to pay
to Chinese officials.
133
Another company, a manufacturer
of specialty chemicals, committed multiple FCPA viola-
tions through its agents in Iraq: a Canadian national and
the Canadian’s companies. Among other acts, the Canadian
national paid and promised to pay more than $1.5 million
in bribes to officials of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil to secure
sales of a fuel additive. Both the company and the Canadian
national pleaded guilty to criminal charges and resolved
civil enforcement actions by SEC.
134
In another case, the U.S. subsidiary of a Swiss freight
forwarding company was charged with paying bribes on
behalf of its customers in several countries.
135
Although the
U.S. subsidiary was not an issuer under the FCPA, it was an
“agent” of several U.S. issuers and was thus charged directly
with violating the FCPA. Charges against the freight for-
warding company and seven of its customers resulted in
over $236.5 million in sanctions.
136
Because Congress anticipated the use of third-party
agents in bribery schemes—for example, to avoid actual
knowledge of a bribe—it defined the term “knowing” in a
way that prevents individuals and businesses from avoiding
liability by putting “any person” between themselves and
the foreign officials.
137
Under the FCPA, a person’s state of
mind is “knowing” with respect to conduct, a circumstance,
or a result if the person:
• is aware that [he] is engaging in such conduct,
that such circumstance exists, or that such result is
substantially certain to occur; or
• has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or
that such result is substantially certain to occur.
138
Thus, a person has the requisite knowledge when he is
aware of a high probability of the existence of such circum-
stance, unless the person actually believes that such circum-
stance does not exist.
139
As Congress made clear, it meant to
impose liability not only on those with actual knowledge
of wrongdoing, but also on those who purposefully avoid
actual knowledge:
[T]he so-called “head-in-the-sand” problem—vari-
ously described in the pertinent authorities as “con-
scious disregard,” “willful blindness” or “deliberate
ignorance”—should be covered so that management
officials could not take refuge from the Act’s prohi-
bitions by their unwarranted obliviousness to any
action (or inaction), language or other “signaling de-
vice” that should reasonably alert them of the “high
probability” of an FCPA violation.
140
Common red flags associated with third parties include:
• excessive commissions to third-party agents or
consultants;
• unreasonably large discounts to third-party
distributors;
• third-party “consulting agreements” that include
only vaguely described services;
• the third-party consultant is in a different line of
business than that for which it has been engaged;
• the third party is related to or closely associated
with the foreign official;
23
• the third party became part of the transaction at
the express request or insistence of the foreign
official;
• the third party is merely a shell company incorpo-
rated in an offshore jurisdiction; and
• the third party requests payment to offshore
bank accounts.
Businesses may reduce the FCPA risks associated
with third-party agents by implementing an effective com-
pliance program, which includes due diligence of any pro-
spective foreign agents.
What Affirmative Defenses Are
Available?
The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions contain two affir-
mative defenses: (1) that the payment was lawful under the
written laws of the foreign country (the “local law” defense),
and (2) that the money was spent as part of demonstrating a
product or performing a contractual obligation (the “reason-
able and bona fide business expenditure” defense). Because
these are affirmative defenses, the defendant bears the burden
of proving them.
The Local Law Defense
For the local law defense to apply, a defendant must
establish that “the payment, gift, offer, or promise of any-
thing of value that was made, was lawful under the writ-
ten laws and regulations of the foreign official’s, political
party’s, party official’s, or candidate’s country.”
141
The defen-
dant must establish that the payment was lawful under the
foreign country’s written laws and regulations at the time
of the offense. In creating the local law defense in 1988,
Congress sought “to make clear that the absence of written
laws in a foreign official’s country would not by itself be suf-
ficient to satisfy this defense.”
142
Thus, the fact that bribes
may not be prosecuted under local law is insufficient to
establish the defense. In practice, the local law defense arises
infrequently, as the written laws and regulations of coun-
tries rarely, if ever, permit corrupt payments. Nevertheless,
if a defendant can establish that conduct that otherwise
falls within the scope of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions
was lawful under written, local law, he or she would have a
defense to prosecution.
In United States v. Kozeny, the defendant unsuccess-
fully sought to assert the local law defense regarding the law
of Azerbaijan. The parties disputed the contents and appli-
cability of Azeri law, and each presented expert reports and
testimony on behalf of their conflicting interpretations. The
court ruled that the defendant could not invoke the FCPA’s
affirmative defense because Azeri law did not actually legal-
ize the bribe payment. The court concluded that an excep-
tion under Azeri law relieving bribe payors who voluntarily
United States v. Kozeny, et al.
In December 2011, the U S Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit upheld a conscious avoidance
instruction given during the 2009 trial of a businessman
who was convicted of conspiring to violate the FCPA’s
anti-bribery provisions by agreeing to make payments to
Azeri officials in a scheme to encourage the privatization
of the Azerbaijan Republic’s state oil company The
court of appeals found that the instruction did not lack
a factual predicate, citing evidence and testimony at
trial demonstrating that the defendant knew corruption
was pervasive in Azerbaijan; that he was aware of his
business partner’s reputation for misconduct; that he
had created two U S companies in order to shield
himself and other investors from potential liability for
payments made in violation of the FCPA; and that the
defendant expressed concerns during a conference call
about whether his business partner and company were
bribing officials
The court of appeals also rejected the defendant’s
contention that the conscious avoidance charge had
improperly permitted the jury to convict him based on
negligence, explaining that ample evidence in the record
showed that the defendant had “serious concerns”
about the legality of his partner’s business practices
“and worked to avoid learning exactly what [he] was
doing,” and noting that the district court had specifically
instructed the jury not to convict based on negligence
chapter 2
The FCPA:
Anti-Bribery Provisions
2324
whether a particular expenditure is appropriate or may risk
violating the FCPA:
• Do not select the particular officials who will par-
ticipate in the party’s proposed trip or program
147
or else select them based on pre-determined, merit-
based criteria.
148
• Pay all costs directly to travel and lodging vendors
and/or reimburse costs only upon presentation of a
receipt.
149
• Do not advance funds or pay for reimbursements
in cash.
150
• Ensure that any stipends are reasonable approxima-
tions of costs likely to be incurred
151
and/or that
expenses are limited to those that are necessary and
reasonable.
152
• Ensure the expenditures are transparent,
both within the company and to the foreign
government.
153
• Do not condition payment of expenses on any
action by the foreign official.
154
• Obtain written confirmation that payment of the
expenses is not contrary to local law.
155
• Provide no additional compensation, stipends, or
spending money beyond what is necessary to pay
for actual expenses incurred.
156
• Ensure that costs and expenses on behalf of the
foreign officials will be accurately recorded in the
company’s books and records.
157
In sum, while certain expenditures are more likely to
raise red flags, they will not give rise to prosecution if they
are (1) reasonable, (2) bona fide, and (3) directly related
to (4) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of
products or services or the execution or performance of
a contract.
158
disclose bribe payments to the authorities of criminal liabil-
ity did not make the bribes legal.
143
Reasonable and Bona Fide Expenditures
The FCPA allows companies to provide reasonable
and bona fide travel and lodging expenses to a foreign
official, and it is an affirmative defense where expenses
are directly related to the promotion, demonstration, or
explanation of a company’s products or services, or are
related to a company’s execution or performance of a con-
tract with a foreign government or agency.
144
Trips that
are primarily for personal entertainment purposes, how-
ever, are not bona fide business expenses and may violate
the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.
145
Moreover, when
expenditures, bona fide or not, are mischaracterized in a
company’s books and records, or where unauthorized or
improper expenditures occur due to a failure to imple-
ment adequate internal controls, they may also violate
the FCPA’s accounting provisions. Purposeful mischarac-
terization of expenditures may also, of course, indicate a
corrupt intent.
DOJ and SEC have consistently recognized that busi-
nesses, both foreign and domestic, are permitted to pay for
reasonable expenses associated with the promotion of their
products and services or the execution of existing contracts.
In addition, DOJ has frequently provided guidance about
legitimate promotional and contract-related expenses—
addressing travel and lodging expenses in particular—
through several opinion procedure releases. Under the cir-
cumstances presented in those releases,
146
DOJ opined that
the following types of expenditures on behalf of foreign
officials did not warrant FCPA enforcement action:
• travel and expenses to visit company facilities or
operations;
• travel and expenses for training ; and
• product demonstration or promotional activities,
including travel and expenses for meetings.
Whether any particular payment is a bona fide expen-
diture necessarily requires a fact-specific analysis. But the
following non-exhaustive list of safeguards, compiled from
several releases, may be helpful to businesses in evaluating
25
What Are Facilitating or Expediting
Payments?
The FCPA’s bribery prohibition contains a narrow
exception for “facilitating or expediting payments” made in
furtherance of routine governmental action.
159
The facili-
tating payments exception applies only when a payment is
made to further “routine governmental action” that involves
non-discretionary acts.
160
Examples of “routine governmen-
tal action” include processing visas, providing police pro-
tection or mail service, and supplying utilities like phone
service, power, and water. Routine government action does
not include a decision to award new business or to continue
business with a particular party.
161
Nor does it include acts
that are within an official’s discretion or that would consti-
tute misuse of an official’s office.
162
Thus, paying an official a
small amount to have the power turned on at a factory might
be a facilitating payment; paying an inspector to ignore the
fact that the company does not have a valid permit to operate
the factory would not be a facilitating payment.
Whether a payment falls within the exception is not
dependent on the size of the payment, though size can be
telling, as a large payment is more suggestive of corrupt
intent to influence a non-routine governmental action. But,
like the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions more generally, the
facilitating payments exception focuses on the purpose of the
payment rather than its value. For instance, an Oklahoma-
based corporation violated the FCPA when its subsidiary
paid Argentine customs officials approximately $166,000
to secure customs clearance for equipment and materials
that lacked required certifications or could not be imported
under local law and to pay a lower-than-applicable duty
rate. The company’s Venezuelan subsidiary had also paid
Venezuelan customs officials approximately $7,000 to permit
the importation and exportation of equipment and materials
not in compliance with local regulations and to avoid a full
inspection of the imported goods.
163
In another case, three
subsidiaries of a global supplier of oil drilling products and
services were criminally charged with authorizing an agent to
make at least 378 corrupt payments (totaling approximately
$2.1 million) to Nigerian Customs Service officials for pref-
erential treatment during the customs process, including the
reduction or elimination of customs duties.
164
Labeling a bribe as a “facilitating payment” in a com-
pany’s books and records does not make it one. A Swiss
offshore drilling company, for example, recorded pay-
ments to its customs agent in the subsidiary’s “facilitat-
ing payment” account, even though company personnel
believed the payments were, in fact, bribes. The company
was charged with violating both the FCPA’s anti-bribery
and accounting provisions.
165
Although true facilitating payments are not ille-
gal under the FCPA, they may still violate local law in the
countries where the company is operating, and the OECD’s
Working Group on Bribery recommends that all countries
encourage companies to prohibit or discourage facilitating
payments, which the United States has done regularly.
166
In addition, other countries’ foreign bribery laws, such as
the United Kingdom’s, may not contain an exception for
facilitating payments.
167
Individuals and companies should
therefore be aware that although true facilitating payments
Examples of “Routine Governmental Action”
An action which is ordinarily and commonly
performed by a foreign official in—
obtaining permits, licenses, or other official
documents to qualify a person to do business in a
foreign country;
processing governmental papers, such as visas and
work orders;
providing police protection, mail pickup and
delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with
contract performance or inspections related to
transit of goods across country;
providing phone service, power and water supply,
loading and unloading cargo, or protecting
perishable products or commodities from
deterioration; or
actions of a similar nature
chapter 2
The FCPA:
Anti-Bribery Provisions
2526
are permissible under the FCPA, they may still subject a
company or individual to sanctions. As with any expenditure,
facilitating payments may still violate the FCPA if they are
not properly recorded in an issuer’s books and records.
168
Hypothetical: Facilitating Payments
Company A is a large multi-national mining company with operations in Foreign Country, where it recently identified
a significant new ore deposit It has ready buyers for the new ore but has limited capacity to get it to market In order to
increase the size and speed of its ore export, Company A will need to build a new road from its facility to the port that can
accommodate larger trucks Company A retains an agent in Foreign Country to assist it in obtaining the required permits,
including an environmental permit, to build the road The agent informs Company A’s vice president for international
operations that he plans to make a one-time small cash payment to a clerk in the relevant government office to ensure
that the clerk files and stamps the permit applications expeditiously, as the agent has experienced delays of three months
when he has not made this “grease” payment The clerk has no discretion about whether to file and stamp the permit
applications once the requisite filing fee has been paid The vice president authorizes the payment
A few months later, the agent tells the vice president that he has run into a problem obtaining a necessary environmental
permit It turns out that the planned road construction would adversely impact an environmentally sensitive and protected
local wetland While the problem could be overcome by rerouting the road, such rerouting would cost Company A $1
million more and would slow down construction by six months It would also increase the transit time for the ore and
reduce the number of monthly shipments The agent tells the vice president that he is good friends with the director of
Foreign Country’s Department of Natural Resources and that it would only take a modest cash payment to the director
and the “problem would go away ” The vice president authorizes the payment, and the agent makes it After receiving the
payment, the director issues the permit, and Company A constructs its new road through the wetlands
Was the payment to the clerk a violation of the FCPA?
No Under these circumstances, the payment to the clerk would qualify as a facilitating payment, since it is a one-time,
small payment to obtain a routine, non-discretionary governmental service that Company A is entitled to receive (i e , the
stamping and filing of the permit application) However, while the payment may qualify as an exception to the FCPA’s
anti-bribery provisions, it may violate other laws, both in Foreign Country and elsewhere In addition, if the payment is not
accurately recorded, it could violate the FCPA’s books and records provision
Was the payment to the director a violation of the FCPA?
Yes The payment to the director of the Department of Natural Resources was in clear violation of the FCPA, since it
was designed to corruptly influence a foreign official into improperly approving a permit The issuance of the environmental
permit was a discretionary act, and indeed, Company A should not have received it Company A, its vice president, and the
local agent may all be prosecuted for authorizing and paying the bribe
27
Does the FCPA Apply to Cases of
Extortion or Duress?
Situations involving extortion or duress will not give
rise to FCPA liability because a payment made in response to
true extortionate demands under imminent threat of physical
harm cannot be said to have been made with corrupt intent
or for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business.
169
In
enacting the FCPA, Congress recognized that real-world
situations might arise in which a business is compelled to pay
an official in order to avoid threats to health and safety. As
Congress explained, “a payment to an official to keep an oil
rig from being dynamited should not be held to be made with
the requisite corrupt purpose.”
170
Mere economic coercion, however, does not amount to
extortion. As Congress noted when it enacted the FCPA:
“The defense that the payment was demanded on the part of
a government official as a price for gaining entry into a mar-
ket or to obtain a contract would not suffice since at some
point the U.S. company would make a conscious decision
whether or not to pay a bribe.”
171
The fact that the payment
was “first proposed by the recipient ... does not alter the cor-
rupt purpose on the part of the person paying the bribe.”
172
This distinction between extortion and economic coer-
cion was recognized by the court in United States v. Kozeny.
There, the court concluded that although an individual who
makes a payment under duress (i.e., upon threat of physi-
cal harm) will not be criminally liable under the FCPA,
173
a
bribe payor who claims payment was demanded as a price for
gaining market entry or obtaining a contract “cannot argue
that he lacked the intent to bribe the official because he made
the ‘conscious decision’ to pay the official.”
174
While the
bribe payor in this situation “could have turned his back and
walked away,” in the oil rig example, “he could not.”
175
Businesses operating in high-risk countries may face
real threats of violence or harm to their employees, and
payments made in response to imminent threats to health
or safety do not violate the FCPA.
176
If such a situation
arises, and to ensure the safety of its employees, companies
should immediately contact the appropriate U.S. embassy
for assistance.
Principles of Corporate Liability for
Anti-Bribery Violations
General principles of corporate liability apply to the
FCPA. Thus, a company is liable when its directors, officers,
employees, or agents, acting within the scope of their employ-
ment, commit FCPA violations intended, at least in part, to
benefit the company.
177
Similarly, just as with any other stat-
ute, DOJ and SEC look to principles of parent-subsidiary
and successor liability in evaluating corporate liability.
Parent-Subsidiary Liability
There are two ways in which a parent company may
be liable for bribes paid by its subsidiary. First, a parent may
have participated sufficiently in the activity to be directly
liable for the conduct—as, for example, when it directed its
subsidiary’s misconduct or otherwise directly participated
in the bribe scheme.
Second, a parent may be liable for its subsidiary’s con-
duct under traditional agency principles. The fundamental
characteristic of agency is control.
178
Accordingly, DOJ and
SEC evaluate the parent’s control—including the parent’s
knowledge and direction of the subsidiary’s actions, both
generally and in the context of the specific transaction—
when evaluating whether a subsidiary is an agent of the par-
ent. Although the formal relationship between the parent
and subsidiary is important in this analysis, so are the practi-
cal realities of how the parent and subsidiary actually interact.
If an agency relationship exists, a subsidiary’s actions
and knowledge are imputed to its parent.
179
Moreover,
under traditional principles of respondeat superior, a com-
pany is liable for the acts of its agents, including its employ-
ees, undertaken within the scope of their employment and
intended, at least in part, to benefit the company.
180
Thus,
if an agency relationship exists between a parent and a
subsidiary, the parent is liable for bribery committed by
the subsidiary’s employees. For example, SEC brought an
administrative action against a parent for bribes paid by the
president of its indirect, wholly owned subsidiary. In that
matter, the subsidiary’s president reported directly to the
CEO of the parent issuer, and the issuer routinely identified
chapter 2
The FCPA:
Anti-Bribery Provisions
2728
the president as a member of its senior management in its
annual filing with SEC and in annual reports. Additionally,
the parent’s legal department approved the retention of the
third-party agent through whom the bribes were arranged
despite a lack of documented due diligence and an agency
agreement that violated corporate policy; also, an official of
the parent approved one of the payments to the third-party
agent.
181
Under these circumstances, the parent company
had sufficient knowledge and control of its subsidiary’s
actions to be liable under the FCPA.
Successor Liability
Companies acquire a host of liabilities when they
merge with or acquire another company, including those aris-
ing out of contracts, torts, regulations, and statutes. As a gen-
eral legal matter, when a company merges with or acquires
another company, the successor company assumes the prede-
cessor company’s liabilities.
182
Successor liability is an integral
component of corporate law and, among other things, pre-
vents companies from avoiding liability by reorganizing.
183
Successor liability applies to all kinds of civil and criminal
liabilities,
184
and FCPA violations are no exception. Whether
successor liability applies to a particular corporate transac-
tion depends on the facts and the applicable state, federal,
and foreign law. Successor liability does not, however, create
liability where none existed before. For example, if an issuer
were to acquire a foreign company that was not previously
subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction, the mere acquisition of
that foreign company would not retroactively create FCPA
liability for the acquiring issuer.
DOJ and SEC encourage companies to conduct pre-
acquisition due diligence and improve compliance pro-
grams and internal controls after acquisition for a variety
of reasons. First, due diligence helps an acquiring company
to accurately value the target company. Contracts obtained
through bribes may be legally unenforceable, business
obtained illegally may be lost when bribe payments are
stopped, there may be liability for prior illegal conduct, and
the prior corrupt acts may harm the acquiring company’s
reputation and future business prospects. Identifying these
issues before an acquisition allows companies to better
evaluate any potential post-acquisition liability and thus
properly assess the target’s value.
185
Second, due diligence
reduces the risk that the acquired company will continue to
pay bribes. Proper pre-acquisition due diligence can iden-
tify business and regional risks and can also lay the founda-
tion for a swift and successful post-acquisition integration
into the acquiring company’s corporate control and com-
pliance environment. Third, the consequences of potential
violations uncovered through due diligence can be handled
by the parties in an orderly and efficient manner through
negotiation of the costs and responsibilities for the inves-
tigation and remediation. Finally, comprehensive due dili-
gence demonstrates a genuine commitment to uncovering
and preventing FCPA violations.
In a significant number of instances, DOJ and
SEC have declined to take action against companies
that voluntarily disclosed and remediated conduct
and cooperated with DOJ and SEC in the merger and
acquisition context.
186
And DOJ and SEC have only
taken action against successor companies in limited cir-
cumstances, generally in cases involving egregious and
sustained violations or where the successor company
directly participated in the violations or failed to stop the
misconduct from continuing after the acquisition. In one
case, a U.S.-based issuer was charged with books and records
and internal controls violations for continuing a kickback
scheme originated by its predecessor.
187
Another recent case
involved a merger between two tobacco leaf merchants,
where prior to the merger each company committed
FCPA violations through its foreign subsidiaries, involving
multiple countries over the course of many years. At each
company, the bribes were directed by the parent company’s
senior management. The two issuers then merged to form
a new public company. Under these circumstances—the
merger of two public companies that had each engaged in
29
bribery—both the new entity and the foreign subsidiaries
were liable under the FCPA. The new parent entered into
a non-prosecution agreement with DOJ and settled a civil
action with SEC, while the company’s subsidiaries, which
also merged, pleaded guilty.
188
More often, DOJ and SEC have pursued enforce-
ment actions against the predecessor company (rather
than the acquiring company), particularly when the
acquiring company uncovered and timely remedied the
violations or when the government’s investigation of
the predecessor company preceded the acquisition. In
one such case, an Ohio-based health care company’s due
diligence of an acquisition target uncovered FCPA vio-
lations by the target’s subsidiary, and, before the merger
was completed, the subsidiary’s violations were disclosed
to DOJ and SEC. The subsidiary pleaded guilty and
paid a $2 million criminal fine,
189
the acquisition target
settled with SEC and paid a $500,000 civil penalty,
190
Practical Tips to Reduce FCPA Risk in Mergers and Acquisitions
Companies pursuing mergers or acquisitions can take certain steps to identify and potentially reduce FCPA risks:
M&A Opinion Procedure Release Requests: One option is to seek an opinion from DOJ in anticipation of a
potential acquisition, such as occurred with Opinion Release 08-02 That case involved special circumstances,
namely, severely limited pre-acquisition due diligence available to the potential acquiring company, and, because
it was an opinion release (i e , providing certain assurances by DOJ concerning prospective conduct), it necessarily
imposed demanding standards and prescriptive timeframes in return for specific assurances from DOJ, which
SEC, as a matter of discretion, also honors Thus, obtaining an opinion from DOJ can be a good way to address
specific due diligence challenges, but, because of the nature of such an opinion, it will likely contain more stringent
requirements than may be necessary in all circumstances
M&A Risk-Based FCPA Due Diligence and Disclosure: As a practical matter, most acquisitions will typically not
require the type of prospective assurances contained in an opinion from DOJ DOJ and SEC encourage companies
engaging in mergers and acquisitions to: (1) conduct thorough risk-based FCPA and anti-corruption due diligence
on potential new business acquisitions; (2) ensure that the acquiring company’s code of conduct and compliance
policies and procedures regarding the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws apply as quickly as is practicable to
newly acquired businesses or merged entities; (3) train the directors, officers, and employees of newly acquired
businesses or merged entities, and when appropriate, train agents and business partners, on the FCPA and other
relevant anti-corruption laws and the company’s code of conduct and compliance policies and procedures; (4)
conduct an FCPA-specific audit of all newly acquired or merged businesses as quickly as practicable; and (5) disclose
any corrupt payments discovered as part of its due diligence of newly acquired entities or merged entities DOJ
and SEC will give meaningful credit to companies who undertake these actions, and, in appropriate circumstances,
DOJ and SEC may consequently decline to bring enforcement actions
and no successor liability was sought against the acquir-
ing entity. In another case, a Pennsylvania-based issuer
that supplied heating and air conditioning products and
services was subject to an ongoing investigation by DOJ
and SEC at the time that it was acquired; DOJ and SEC
resolved enforcement actions only against the predecessor
company, which had by that time become a wholly owned
subsidiary of the successor company.
191
DOJ and SEC have also brought actions only against a
predecessor company where its FCPA violations are discov-
ered after acquisition. For example, when a Florida-based
U.S. company discovered in post-acquisition due diligence
that the telecommunications company (a domestic con-
cern) it had acquired had engaged in foreign bribery, the
successor company disclosed the FCPA violations to DOJ.
It then conducted an internal investigation, cooperated
fully with DOJ, and took appropriate remedial action—
including terminating senior management at the acquired
chapter 2
The FCPA:
Anti-Bribery Provisions
2930
company. No enforcement action was taken against the suc-
cessor, but the predecessor company pleaded guilty to one
count of violating the FCPA and agreed to pay a $2 million
fine.
192
Later, four executives from the predecessor company
were convicted of FCPA violations, three of whom received
terms of imprisonment.
193
On occasion, when an enforcement action has
been taken against a predecessor company, the succes-
sor seeks assurances that it will not be subject to a future
enforcement action. In one such case, a Dutch predeces-
sor resolved FCPA charges with DOJ through a deferred
prosecution agreement.
194
While both the predecessor
and successor signed the agreement, which included a
commitment to ongoing cooperation and an improved
compliance program, only the predecessor company was
charged; in signing the agreement, the successor company
gained the certainty of conditional release from criminal
liability, even though it was not being pursued for FCPA
violations.
195
In another case, after a Connecticut-based
company uncovered FCPA violations by a California
company it sought to acquire, both companies voluntarily
disclosed the conduct to DOJ and SEC.
196
The prede-
cessor company resolved its criminal liability through a
non-prosecution agreement with DOJ that included an
$800,000 monetary penalty and also settled with SEC,
paying a total of $1.1 million in disgorgement, pre-judg-
ment interest, and civil penalties. The successor company
proceeded with the acquisition and separately entered
into a non-prosecution agreement with DOJ in which it
agreed, among other things, to ensure full performance of
the predecessor company’s non-prosecution agreement.
This agreement provided certainty to the successor con-
cerning its FCPA liability.
197
Importantly, a successor company’s voluntary disclo-
sure, appropriate due diligence, and implementation of an
effective compliance program may also decrease the likeli-
hood of an enforcement action regarding an acquired com-
pany’s post-acquisition conduct when pre-acquisition due
diligence is not possible.
198
31
Hypothetical: Successor Liability Where Acquired Company Was Not Previously
Subject to the FCPA
Company A is a Delaware corporation with its principal offices in the United States and whose shares are listed on
a national U S exchange Company A is considering acquiring Foreign Company, which is not an issuer or a domestic
concern Foreign Company takes no actions within the United States that would make it subject to territorial jurisdiction
Company A’s proposed acquisition would make Foreign Company a subsidiary of Company A
Scenario 1:
Prior to acquiring Foreign Company, Company A engages in extensive due diligence of Foreign Company, including: (1)
having its legal, accounting, and compliance departments review Foreign Company’s sales and financial data, its customer
contracts, and its third-party and distributor agreements; (2) performing a risk-based analysis of Foreign Company’s customer
base; (3) performing an audit of selected transactions engaged in by Foreign Company; and (4) engaging in discussions
with Foreign Company’s general counsel, vice president of sales, and head of internal audit regarding all corruption risks,
compliance efforts, and any other corruption-related issues that have surfaced at Foreign Company over the past ten years
This due diligence aims to determine whether Foreign Company has appropriate anti-corruption and compliance policies
in place, whether Foreign Company’s employees have been adequately trained regarding those policies, how Foreign
Company ensures that those policies are followed, and what remedial actions are taken if the policies are violated
During the course of its due diligence, Company A learns that Foreign Company has made several potentially
improper payments in the form of an inflated commission to a third-party agent in connection with a government contract
with Foreign Country Immediately after the acquisition, Company A discloses the conduct to DOJ and SEC, suspends
and terminates those employees and the third-party agent responsible for the payments, and makes certain that the
illegal payments have stopped It also quickly integrates Foreign Company into Company A’s own robust internal controls,
including its anti-corruption and compliance policies, which it communicates to its new employees through required online
and in-person training in the local language Company A also requires Foreign Company’s third-party distributors and other
agents to sign anti-corruption certifications, complete training, and sign new contracts that incorporate FCPA and anti-
corruption representations and warranties and audit rights
Based on these facts, could DOJ or SEC prosecute Company A?
No Although DOJ and SEC have jurisdiction over Company A because it is an issuer, neither could pursue Company
A for conduct that occurred prior to its acquisition of Foreign Company As Foreign Company was neither an issuer nor a
domestic concern and was not subject to U S territorial jurisdiction, DOJ and SEC have no jurisdiction over its pre-acquisition
misconduct The acquisition of a company does not create jurisdiction where none existed before
Importantly, Company A’s extensive pre-acquisition due diligence allowed it to identify and halt the corruption As
there was no continuing misconduct post-acquisition, the FCPA was not violated
Scenario 2:
Company A performs only minimal and pro forma pre-acquisition due diligence It does not conduct a risk-based
analysis, and its review of Foreign Company’s data, contracts, and third-party and distributor agreements is cursory
Company A acquires Foreign Company and makes it a wholly owned subsidiary Although Company A circulates its
compliance policies to all new personnel after the acquisition, it does not translate the compliance policies into the local
language or train its new personnel or third-party agents on anti-corruption issues
A few months after the acquisition, an employee in Company A’s international sales office (Sales Employee) learns
from a legacy Foreign Company employee that for years the government contract that generated most of Foreign
Company’s revenues depended on inflated commissions to a third-party agent “to make the right person happy at Foreign
Government Agency ” Sales Employee is told that unless the payments continue the business will likely be lost, which
would mean that Company A’s new acquisition would quickly become a financial failure The payments continue for two
(cont’d)
chapter 2
The FCPA:
Anti-Bribery Provisions
3132
years after the acquisition After another employee of Company A reports the long-running bribe scheme to a director at
Foreign Government Agency, Company A stops the payments and DOJ and SEC investigate
Based on these facts, would DOJ or SEC charge Company A?
Yes DOJ and SEC have prosecuted companies like Company A in similar circumstances Any charges would not,
however, be premised upon successor liability, but rather on Company A’s post-acquisition bribe payments, which
themselves created criminal and civil liability for Company A
Scenario 3:
Under local law, Company A’s ability to conduct pre-acquisition due diligence on Foreign Company is limited In the
due diligence it does conduct, Company A determines that Foreign Company is doing business in high-risk countries
and in high-risk industries but finds no red flags specific to Foreign Company’s operations Post-acquisition, Company
A conducts extensive due diligence and determines that Foreign Company had paid bribes to officials with Foreign
Government Agency Company A takes prompt action to remediate the problem, including following the measures set
forth in Opinion Procedure Release No 08-02 Among other actions, it voluntarily discloses the misconduct to DOJ and
SEC, ensures all bribes are immediately stopped, takes remedial action against all parties involved in the corruption, and
quickly incorporates Foreign Company into a robust compliance program and Company A’s other internal controls
Based on these facts, would DOJ or SEC prosecute Company A?
DOJ and SEC have declined to prosecute companies like Company A in similar circumstances Companies can follow
the measures set forth in Opinion Procedure Release No 08-02, or seek their own opinions, where adequate pre-acquisition
due diligence is not possible
Hypothetical: Successor Liability Where Acquired Company Was Already Subject to
the FCPA
Both Company A and Company B are Delaware corporations with their principal offices in the United States Both
companies’ shares are listed on a national U S exchange
Scenario 1:
Company A is considering acquiring several of Company B’s business lines Prior to the acquisition, Company A engages
in extensive due diligence, including: (1) having its legal, accounting, and compliance departments review Company B’s
sales and financial data, its customer contracts, and its third-party and distributor agreements; (2) performing a risk-based
analysis of Company B’s customer base; (3) performing an audit of selected transactions engaged in by Company B; and
(4) engaging in discussions with Company B’s general counsel, vice president of sales, and head of internal audit regarding
all corruption risks, compliance efforts, and any other major corruption-related issues that have surfaced at Company B
over the past ten years This due diligence aims to determine whether Company B has appropriate anti-corruption and
compliance policies in place, whether Company B’s employees have been adequately trained regarding those policies,
how Company B ensures that those policies are followed, and what remedial actions are taken if the policies are violated
During the course of its due diligence, Company A learns that Company B has made several potentially improper
payments in connection with a government contract with Foreign Country As a condition of the acquisition, Company A
requires Company B to disclose the misconduct to the government Company A makes certain that the illegal payments
(cont’d)
33
have stopped and quickly integrates Company B’s business lines into Company A’s own robust internal controls, including
its anti-corruption and compliance policies, which it communicates to its new employees through required online and in-
person training in the local language Company A also requires Company B’s third-party distributors and other agents to
sign anti-corruption certifications, complete training, and sign new contracts that incorporate FCPA and anti-corruption
representations and warranties and audit rights
Based on these facts, would DOJ or SEC prosecute?
DOJ and SEC have declined to prosecute companies like Company A in similar circumstances DOJ and SEC
encourage companies like Company A to conduct extensive FCPA due diligence By uncovering the corruption, Company
A put itself in a favorable position, and, because the corrupt payments have stopped, Company A has no continuing
liability Whether DOJ and SEC might charge Company B depends on facts and circumstances beyond the scope of this
hypothetical DOJ would consider its Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations and SEC would consider
the factors contained in the Seaboard Report
, both of which are discussed in Chapter 5 In general, the more egregious
and long-standing the corruption, the more likely it is that DOJ and SEC would prosecute Company B In certain limited
circumstances, DOJ and SEC have in the past declined to bring charges against acquired companies, recognizing that
acquiring companies may bear much of the reputational damage and costs associated with such charges
Scenario 2:
Company A plans to acquire Company B Although, as in Scenario 1, Company A conducts extensive due diligence, it
does not uncover the bribery until after the acquisition Company A then makes certain that the illegal payments stop and
voluntarily discloses the misconduct to DOJ and SEC It quickly integrates Company B into Company A’s own robust internal
controls, including its anti-corruption and compliance policies, which it communicates to its new employees through required
online and in-person training in the local language Company A also requires Company B’s third-party distributors and other
agents to sign anti-corruption certifications, complete training, and sign new contracts that incorporate FCPA and anti-
corruption representations and warranties and audit rights
Based on these facts, would DOJ or SEC prosecute?
Absent unusual circumstances not contemplated by this hypothetical, DOJ and SEC are unlikely to prosecute
Company A for the pre-acquisition misconduct of Company B, provided that Company B still exists in a form that would
allow it to be prosecuted separately (e g , Company B is a subsidiary of Company A) DOJ and SEC understand that no
due diligence is perfect and that society benefits when companies with strong compliance programs acquire and improve
companies with weak ones At the same time, however, neither the liability for corruption—nor the harms caused by it—
are eliminated when one company acquires another Whether DOJ and SEC will pursue a case against Company B (or, in
unusual circumstances, Company A) will depend on consideration of all the factors in the Principles of Federal Prosecution
of Business Organizations and the Seaboard Report
, respectively
Scenario 3:
Company A merges with Company B, which is in the same line of business and interacts with the same Foreign
Government customers, and forms Company C Due diligence before the merger reveals that both Company A and
Company B have been engaging in similar bribery In both cases, the bribery was extensive and known by high-level
management within the companies
Based on these facts, would DOJ or SEC prosecute?
Yes DOJ and SEC have prosecuted companies like Company C on the basis of successor liability Company C is a
combination of two companies that both violated the FCPA, and their merger does not eliminate their liability In addition,
since Company C is an ongoing concern, DOJ and SEC may impose a monitorship to ensure that the bribery has ceased
and a compliance program is developed to prevent future misconduct
chapter 2
The FCPA:
Anti-Bribery Provisions
3334
Additional Principles of Criminal
Liability for Anti-Bribery Violations:
Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy
Under federal law, individuals or companies that aid
or abet a crime, including an FCPA violation, are as guilty as
if they had directly committed the offense themselves. The
aiding and abetting statute provides that whoever “commits
an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission,” or “will-
fully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
by him or another would be an offense against the United
States,” is punishable as a principal.
199
Aiding and abetting is
not an independent crime, and the government must prove
that an underlying FCPA violation was committed.
200
Individuals and companies, including foreign nation-
als and companies, may also be liable for conspiring to
violate the FCPA—i.e., for agreeing to commit an FCPA
violation—even if they are not, or could not be, indepen-
dently charged with a substantive FCPA violation. For
instance, a foreign, non-issuer company could be convicted
of conspiring with a domestic concern to violate the FCPA.
Under certain circumstances, it could also be held liable
for the domestic concern’s substantive FCPA violations
under Pinkerton v. United States, which imposes liability on
a defendant for reasonably foreseeable crimes committed
by a co-conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy that the
defendant joined.
201
A foreign company or individual may be held liable
for aiding and abetting an FCPA violation or for conspiring
to violate the FCPA, even if the foreign company or indi-
vidual did not take any act in furtherance of the corrupt
payment while in the territory of the United States. In con-
spiracy cases, the United States generally has jurisdiction
over all the conspirators where at least one conspirator is
an issuer, domestic concern, or commits a reasonably fore-
seeable overt act within the United States.
202
For example,
if a foreign company or individual conspires to violate the
FCPA with someone who commits an overt act within the
United States, the United States can prosecute the foreign
company or individual for the conspiracy. The same prin-
ciple applies to aiding and abetting violations. For instance,
even though they took no action in the United States,
Japanese and European companies were charged with con-
spiring with and aiding and abetting a domestic concern’s
FCPA violations.
203
Additional Principles of Civil Liability
for Anti-Bribery Violations: Aiding and
Abetting and Causing
Both companies and individuals can be held civilly
liable for aiding and abetting FCPA anti-bribery violations
if they knowingly or recklessly provide substantial assis-
tance to a violator.
204
Similarly, in the administrative pro-
ceeding context, companies and individuals may be held
liable for causing FCPA violations.
205
This liability extends
to the subsidiaries and agents of U.S. issuers.
In one case, the U.S. subsidiary of a Swiss freight for-
warding company was held civilly liable for paying bribes on
behalf of its customers in several countries.
206
Although the
U.S. subsidiary was not an issuer for purposes of the FCPA,
it was an “agent” of several U.S. issuers. By paying bribes on
behalf of its issuers’ customers, the subsidiary both directly
violated and aided and abetted the issuers’ FCPA violations.
What Is the Applicable Statute of
Limitations?
Statute of Limitations in Criminal Cases
The FCPA’s anti-bribery and accounting provisions
do not specify a statute of limitations for criminal actions.
Accordingly, the general five-year limitations period set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3282 applies to substantive criminal
violations of the Act.
207
In cases involving FCPA conspiracies, the govern-
ment may be able to reach conduct occurring before the
five-year limitations period applicable to conspiracies
35
under 18 U.S.C. § 371. For conspiracy offenses, the govern-
ment generally need prove only that one act in furtherance
of the conspiracy occurred during the limitations period,
thus enabling the government to prosecute bribes paid or
accounting violations occurring more than five years prior
to the filing of formal charges.
208
There are at least two ways in which the applicable
limitations period is commonly extended. First, compa-
nies or individuals cooperating with DOJ may enter into
a tolling agreement that voluntarily extends the limitations
period. Second, under 18 U.S.C. § 3292, the government
may seek a court order suspending the statute of limitations
posed in a criminal case for up to three years in order to
obtain evidence from foreign countries. Generally, the sus-
pension period begins when the official request is made by
the U.S. government to the foreign authority and ends on
the date on which the foreign authority takes final action
on the request.
209
Statute of Limitations in Civil Actions
In civil cases brought by SEC, the statute of limita-
tions is set by 28 U.S.C. § 2462, which provides for a five-
year limitation on any “suit or proceeding for the enforce-
ment of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture.” The five-year
period begins to run “when the claim first accrued.” The
five-year limitations period applies to SEC actions seek-
ing civil penalties, but it does not prevent SEC from
seeking equitable remedies, such as an injunction or the
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, for conduct pre-dating
the five-year period. In cases against individuals who are
not residents of the United States, the statute is tolled for
any period when the defendants are not “found within the
United States in order that proper service may be made
t h e r e o n .”
210
Furthermore, companies or individuals coop-
erating with SEC may enter into tolling agreements that
voluntarily extend the limitations period.
chapter 2
The FCPA:
Anti-Bribery Provisions
3536
chapter 3
The FCPA:
Accounting Provisions
38
THE FCPA: ACCOUNTING
PROVISIONS
In addition to the anti-bribery provisions, the FCPA contains accounting provi-
sions applicable to public companies. The FCPA’s accounting provisions op-
erate in tandem with the anti-bribery provisions
211
and prohibit off-the-books
accounting. Company management and investors rely on a company’s financial
statements and internal accounting controls to ensure transparency in the finan-
cial health of the business, the risks undertaken, and the transactions between
the company and its customers and business partners. The accounting provi-
sions are designed to “strengthen the accuracy of the corporate books and
records and the reliability of the audit process which constitute the foundations
of our system of corporate disclosure.”
212
The accounting provisions consist of two primary
components. First, under the “books and records” pro-
vision, issuers must make and keep books, records, and
accounts that, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly
reflect an issuer’s transactions and dispositions of an issu-
er’s assets.
213
Second, under the “internal controls” provi-
sion, issuers must devise and maintain a system of internal
accounting controls sufficient to assure management’s con-
trol, authority, and responsibility over the firm’s assets.
214
These components, and other aspects of the accounting
provisions, are discussed in greater detail below.
Although the accounting provisions were originally
enacted as part of the FCPA, they do not apply only to brib-
ery-related violations. Rather, the accounting provisions
ensure that all public companies account for all of their
assets and liabilities accurately and in reasonable detail,
and they form the backbone for most accounting fraud and
issuer disclosure cases brought by DOJ and SEC.
215
39
What Is Covered by the Accounting
Provisions?
Books and Records Provision
Bribes, both foreign and domestic, are often mischarac-
terized in companies’ books and records. Section 13(b)(2)(A) of
the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)), commonly
called the “books and records” provision, requires issuers
to “make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transac-
tions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”
216
The “in
reasonable detail” qualification was adopted by Congress
“in light of the concern that such a standard, if unqualified,
might connote a degree of exactitude and precision which
is unrealistic.”
217
The addition of this phrase was intended
to make clear “that the issuer’s records should reflect trans-
actions in conformity with accepted methods of recording
economic events and effectively prevent off-the-books slush
funds and payments of bribes.”
218
The term “reasonable detail” is defined in the statute
as the level of detail that would “satisfy prudent officials in
the conduct of their own affairs.”
219
Thus, as Congress noted
when it adopted this definition, “[t]he concept of reasonable-
ness of necessity contemplates the weighing of a number of
relevant factors, including the costs of compliance.”
220
Although the standard is one of reasonable detail,
it is never appropriate to mischaracterize transactions in a
company’s books and records.
221
Bribes are often concealed
In the past, “corporate bribery has
been concealed by the falsification of
corporate books and records” and the
accounting provisions “remove[] this
avenue of coverup ”
Senate Report No. 95-114, at 3 (1977)
under the guise of legitimate payments, such as commis-
sions or consulting fees.
In instances where all the elements of a violation of
the anti-bribery provisions are not met—where, for exam-
ple, there was no use of interstate commerce—companies
nonetheless may be liable if the improper payments are inac-
curately recorded. Consistent with the FCPA’s approach
to prohibiting payments of any value that are made with a
corrupt purpose, there is no materiality threshold under the
books and records provision. In combination with the inter-
nal controls provision, the requirement that issuers main-
tain books and records that accurately and fairly reflect the
corporation’s transactions “assure[s], among other things,
that the assets of the issuer are used for proper corporate
purpose[s].”
222
As with the anti-bribery provisions, DOJ’s
and SEC’s enforcement of the books and records provision
has typically involved misreporting of either large bribe pay-
ments or widespread inaccurate recording of smaller pay-
ments made as part of a systemic pattern of bribery.
Bribes Have Been Mischaracterized As:
Commissions or Royalties
Consulting Fees
Sales and Marketing Expenses
Scientific Incentives or Studies
Travel and Entertainment Expenses
Rebates or Discounts
After Sales Service Fees
Miscellaneous Expenses
Petty Cash Withdrawals
Free Goods
Intercompany Accounts
Supplier / Vendor Payments
Write-offs
“Customs Intervention” Payments
chapter 3
The FCPA:
Accounting Provisions
3940
Internal Controls Provision
The payment of bribes often occurs in companies that
have weak internal control environments. Internal controls
over financial reporting are the processes used by compa-
nies to provide reasonable assurances regarding the reliabil-
ity of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements. They include various components, such as: a
control environment that covers the tone set by the organi-
zation regarding integrity and ethics; risk assessments; con-
trol activities that cover policies and procedures designed
to ensure that management directives are carried out (e.g.,
approvals, authorizations, reconciliations, and segregation
of duties); information and communication; and monitor-
ing. Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(b)(2)(B)), commonly called the “internal controls”
provision, requires issuers to:
devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances
that—
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with man-
agement’s general or specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to per-
mit preparation of financial statements in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles or any
other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II)
to maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance
with management’s general or specific authorization;
and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is com-
pared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals
and appropriate action is taken with respect to any
differences ....
223
Like the “reasonable detail” requirement in the
books and records provision, the Act defines “reasonable
assurances” as “such level of detail and degree of assurance
as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their
own affairs.”
224
The Act does not specify a particular set of controls
that companies are required to implement. Rather, the
internal controls provision gives companies the flexibility
to develop and maintain a system of controls that is appro-
priate to their particular needs and circumstances.
An effective compliance program is a critical com-
ponent of an issuer’s internal controls. Fundamentally,
the design of a company’s internal controls must take into
account the operational realities and risks attendant to the
company’s business, such as: the nature of its products or
services; how the products or services get to market; the
nature of its work force; the degree of regulation; the extent
of its government interaction; and the degree to which it
has operations in countries with a high risk of corruption. A
company’s compliance program should be tailored to these
differences. Businesses whose operations expose them to a
high risk of corruption will necessarily devise and employ
different internal controls than businesses that have a lesser
exposure to corruption, just as a financial services company
would be expected to devise and employ different internal
controls than a manufacturer.
A 2008 case against a German manufacturer of indus-
trial and consumer products illustrates a systemic internal
controls problem involving bribery that was unprecedented
in scale and geographic reach. From 2001 to 2007, the com-
pany created elaborate payment schemes—including slush
Companies with ineffective internal
controls often face risks of embezzlement
and self-dealing by employees, commercial
bribery, export control problems, and
violations of other U S and local laws
41
funds, off-the-books accounts, and systematic payments to
business consultants and other intermediaries—to facilitate
bribery. Payments were made in ways that obscured their
purpose and the ultimate recipients of the money. In some
cases, employees obtained large amounts of cash from cash
desks and then transported the cash in suitcases across inter-
national borders. Authorizations for some payments were
placed on sticky notes and later removed to avoid any perma-
nent record. The company made payments totaling approxi-
mately $1.36 billion through various mechanisms, including
$805.5 million as bribes and $554.5 million for unknown
purposes.
225
The company was charged with internal controls
and books and records violations, along with anti-bribery
violations, and paid over $1.6 billion to resolve the case with
authorities in the United States and Germany.
226
The types of internal control failures identified in the
above example exist in many other cases where companies
were charged with internal controls violations.
227
A 2010
case against a multi-national automobile manufacturer
involved bribery that occurred over a long period of time in
multiple countries.
228
In that case, the company used doz-
ens of ledger accounts, known internally as “internal third
party accounts,” to maintain credit balances for the ben-
efit of government officials.
229
The accounts were funded
through several bogus pricing mechanisms, such as “price
surcharges,” “price inclusions,” or excessive commissions.
230
The company also used artificial discounts or rebates on
sales contracts to generate the money to pay the bribes.
231
The bribes also were made through phony sales intermedi-
aries and corrupt business partners, as well as through the
use of cash desks.
232
Sales executives would obtain cash from
the company in amounts as high as hundreds of thousands
of dollars, enabling the company to obscure the purpose
and recipients of the money paid to government officials.
233
In addition to bribery charges, the company was charged
with internal controls and books and records violations.
Good internal controls can prevent not only FCPA
violations, but also other illegal or unethical conduct by the
company, its subsidiaries, and its employees. DOJ and SEC
have repeatedly brought FCPA cases that also involved
other types of misconduct, such as financial fraud,
234
commercial bribery,
235
export controls violations,
236
and
embezzlement or self-dealing by company employees.
237
Potential Reporting and Anti-Fraud Violations
Issuers have reporting obligations under Section
13(a) of the Exchange Act, which requires issuers to file
an annual report that contains comprehensive information
about the issuer. Failure to properly disclose material infor-
mation about the issuer’s business, including material rev-
enue, expenses, profits, assets, or liabilities related to bribery
of foreign government officials, may give rise to anti-fraud
and reporting violations under Sections 10(b) and 13(a) of
the Exchange Act.
For example, a California-based technolog y company
was charged with reporting violations, in addition to viola-
tions of the FCPA’s anti-bribery and accounting provisions,
when its bribery scheme led to material misstatements in its
SEC filings.
238
The company was awarded contracts procured
through bribery of Chinese officials that generated material
revenue and profits. The revenue and profits helped the com-
pany offset losses incurred to develop new products expected
to become the company’s future source of revenue growth.
The company improperly recorded the bribe payments as
sales commission expenses in its books and records.
Companies engaged in bribery may also be engaged
in activity that violates the anti-fraud and reporting provi-
sions. For example, an oil and gas pipeline company and
its employees engaged in a long-running scheme to use the
company’s petty cash accounts in Nigeria to make a vari-
ety of corrupt payments to Nigerian tax and court officials
using false invoices.
239
The company and its employees also
engaged in a fraudulent scheme to minimize the company’s
tax obligations in Bolivia by using false invoices to claim
false offsets to its value-added tax obligations. The scheme
resulted in material overstatements of the company’s net
income in the company’s financial statements, which vio-
lated the Exchange Act’s anti-fraud and reporting provi-
sions. Both schemes also violated the books and records
and internal controls provisions.
chapter 3
The FCPA:
Accounting Provisions
4142
What Are Management’s Other Obligations?
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
In 2002, in response to a series of accounting scandals
involving U.S. companies, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (Sarbanes-Oxley or SOX),
240
which strength-
ened the accounting requirements for issuers. All issuers
must comply with Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirements, several
of which have FCPA implications.
SOX Section 302 (15 U.S.C. § 7241)—Responsibility
of Corporate Officers for the Accuracy and Validity of
Corporate Financial Reports
Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires that a com-
pany’s “principal officers” (typically the Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO)) take
responsibility for and certify the integrity of their compa-
ny’s financial reports on a quarterly basis. Under Exchange
Act Rule 13a-14, which is commonly called the “SOX cer-
tification” rule, each periodic report filed by an issuer must
include a certification signed by the issuer’s principal execu-
tive officer and principal financial officer that, among other
things, states that: (i) based on the officer’s knowledge, the
report contains no material misstatements or omissions;
(ii) based on the officer’s knowledge, the relevant financial
statements are accurate in all material respects; (iii) inter-
nal controls are properly designed; and (iv) the certifying
officers have disclosed to the issuer’s audit committee and
auditors all significant internal control deficiencies.
SOX Section 404 (15 U.S.C. § 7262)—Reporting
on the State of a Company’s Internal Controls over
Financial Reporting
Sarbanes-Oxley also strengthened a company’s
required disclosures concerning the state of its internal con-
trol over financial reporting. Under Section 404, issuers are
required to present in their annual reports management’s
conclusion regarding the effectiveness of the company’s
internal controls over financial reporting. This statement
must also assess the effectiveness of such internal controls
and procedures. In addition, the company’s independent
auditor must attest to and report on its assessment of the
effectiveness of the company’s internal controls over finan-
cial reporting.
As directed by Section 404, SEC has adopted
rules requiring issuers and their independent auditors to
report to the public on the effectiveness of the compa-
ny’s internal controls over financial reporting.
241
These
internal controls include those related to illegal acts and
fraud—including acts of bribery—that could result in a
material misstatement of the company’s financial state-
ments.
242
In 2007, SEC issued guidance on controls over
financial reporting.
243
SOX Section 802 (18 U.S.C. §§ 1519 and 1520)—
Criminal Penalties for Altering Documents
Section 802 of Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits altering,
destroying, mutilating, concealing, or falsifying records,
documents, or tangible objects with the intent to obstruct,
impede, or influence a potential or actual federal investiga-
tion. This section also prohibits any accountant from know-
ingly and willfully violating the requirement that all audit
or review papers be maintained for a period of five years.
Who Is Covered by the Accounting
Provisions?
Civil Liability for Issuers, Subsidiaries, and Affiliates
The FCPA’s accounting provisions apply to every
issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to
Section 12 of the Exchange Act or that is required to file
annual or other periodic reports pursuant to Section 15(d)
of the Exchange Act.
244
These provisions apply to any issuer
whose securities trade on a national securities exchange in
the United States, including foreign issuers with exchange-
traded American Depository Receipts.
245
They also apply
43
to companies whose stock trades in the over-the-counter
market in the United States and which file periodic reports
with the Commission, such as annual and quarterly reports.
Unlike the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, the accounting
provisions do not apply to private companies.
246
Although the FCPA’s accounting requirements are
directed at “issuers,” an issuer’s books and records include
those of its consolidated subsidiaries and affiliates. An issu-
er’s responsibility thus extends to ensuring that subsidiaries
or affiliates under its control, including foreign subsidiaries
and joint ventures, comply with the accounting provisions.
For instance, DOJ and SEC brought enforcement actions
against a California company for violating the FCPA’s
accounting provisions when two Chinese joint ventures in
which it was a partner paid more than $400,000 in bribes
over a four-year period to obtain business in China.
247
Sales
personnel in China made the illicit payments by obtaining
cash advances from accounting personnel, who recorded
the payments on the books as “business fees” or “travel and
entertainment” expenses. Although the payments were made
exclusively in China by Chinese employees of the joint ven-
ture, the California company failed to have adequate internal
controls and failed to act on red flags indicating that its affili-
ates were engaged in bribery. The California company paid
$1.15 million in civil disgorgement and a criminal monetary
penalty of $1.7 million.
Companies may not be able to exercise the same
level of control over a minority-owned subsidiary or
affiliate as they do over a majority or wholly owned entity.
Therefore, if a parent company owns 50% or less of a
subsidiary or affiliate, the parent is only required to use
good faith efforts to cause the minority-owned subsid-
iary or affiliate to devise and maintain a system of inter-
nal accounting controls consistent with the issuer’s own
obligations under the FCPA.
248
In evaluating an issuer’s
good faith efforts, all the circumstances—including “the
relative degree of the issuer’s ownership of the domestic
or foreign firm and the laws and practices governing the
business operations of the country in which such firm is
located”—are taken into account.
249
Civil Liability for Individuals and Other Entities
Companies (including subsidiaries of issuers) and
individuals may also face civil liability for aiding and abet-
ting or causing an issuer’s violation of the accounting pro-
visions.
250
For example, in April 2010, SEC charged four
individuals—a Country Manager, a Senior Vice President
of Sales, a Regional Financial Director, and an International
Controller of a U.S. issuer—for their roles in schemes to
bribe Kyrg yz and Thai government officials to purchase
tobacco from their employer. The complaint alleged that,
among other things, the individuals aided and abetted the
issuer company’s violations of the books and records and
internal controls provisions by “knowingly provid[ing ]
substantial assistance to” the parent company.
251
All four
executives settled the charges against them, consenting to
the entry of final judgments permanently enjoining them
from violating the accounting and anti-bribery provisions,
with two executives paying civil penalties.
252
As in other
areas of federal securities law, corporate officers also can be
held liable as control persons.
253
Similarly, in October 2011, SEC brought an admin-
istrative action against a U.S. water valve manufacturer and
a former employee of the company’s Chinese subsidiary
for violations of the FCPA’s accounting provisions.
254
The
Chinese subsidiary had made improper payments to employ-
ees of certain design institutes to create design specifications
that favored the company’s valve products. The payments
were disguised as sales commissions in the subsidiary’s books
and records, thereby causing the U.S. issuer’s books and
records to be inaccurate. The general manager of the subsid-
iary, who approved the payments and knew or should have
known that they were improperly recorded, was ordered to
cease-and-desist from committing or causing violations of
the accounting provisions, among other charges.
255
Additionally, individuals and entities can be held
directly civilly liable for falsifying an issuer’s books and
records or for circumventing internal controls. Exchange
Act Rule 13b2-1 provides: “No person shall, directly or
indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record
or account subject to [the books and records provision] of
the Securities Exchange Act.”
256
And Section 13(b)(5) of
chapter 3
The FCPA:
Accounting Provisions
4344
the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5)) provides that
“[n]o person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail
to implement a system of internal accounting controls or
knowingly falsify any book, record, or account ....”
257
The
Exchange Act defines “person” to include a “natural person,
company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality of a government.”
258
An issuer’s officers and directors may also be held civ-
illy liable for making false statements to a company’s audi-
tor. Exchange Act Rule 13b2-2 prohibits officers and direc-
tors from making (or causing to be made) materially false
or misleading statements, including an omission of material
facts, to an accountant. This liability arises in connection
with any audit, review, or examination of a company’s finan-
cial statements or in connection with the filing of any docu-
ment with SEC.
259
Finally, the principal executive and principal finan-
cial officer, or persons performing similar functions, can
be held liable for violating Exchange Act Rule 13a-14 by
signing false personal certifications required by SOX.
Thus, for example, in January 2011, SEC charged the for-
mer CEO of a U.S. issuer for his role in schemes to bribe
Iraqi government officials in connection with the United
Nations Oil-For-Food Programme and to bribe Iraqi and
Indonesian officials to purchase the company’s fuel addi-
tives. There, the company used false invoices and sham con-
sulting contracts to support large bribes that were passed
on to foreign officials through an agent, and the bribes were
mischaracterized as legitimate commissions and travel fees
in the company’s books and records. The officer directed
and authorized the bribe payments and their false recording
in the books and records. He also signed annual and quar-
terly SOX certifications in which he falsely represented that
the company’s financial statements were fairly presented
and the company’s internal controls sufficiently designed,
as well as annual representations to the company’s external
auditors where he falsely stated that he complied with the
company’s code of ethics and was unaware of any violations
of the code of ethics by anyone else. The officer was charged
with aiding and abetting violations of the books and records
and internal controls provisions, circumventing internal
controls, falsifying books and records, making false state-
ments to accountants, and signing false certifications.
260
He
consented to the entry of an injunction and paid disgorge-
ment and a civil penalty.
261
He also later pleaded guilty in
the United Kingdom to conspiring to corrupt Iraqi and
Indonesian officials.
262
Criminal Liability for Accounting Violations
Criminal liability can be imposed on companies
and individuals for knowingly failing to comply with the
FCPA’s books and records or internal controls provisions.
263
As with the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, individuals are
only subject to the FCPA’s criminal penalties for violations
of the accounting provisions if they acted “willfully.”
264
For example, a French company was criminally
charged with failure to implement internal controls and
failure to keep accurate books and records, among other
violations.
265
As part of its deferred prosecution agreement,
the company admitted to numerous internal control fail-
ures, including failure to implement sufficient anti-bribery
compliance policies, maintain a sufficient system for the
selection and approval of consultants, and conduct appro-
priate audits of payments to purported “business consul-
t a n t s .”
266
Likewise, a German company pleaded guilty to
internal controls and books and records violations where,
from 2001 through 2007, it made payments totaling
approximately $1.36 billion through various mechanisms,
including $805.5 million as bribes and $554.5 million for
unknown purposes.
267
Individuals can be held criminally liable for accounting
violations. For example, a former managing director of a U.S.
bank’s real estate business in China pleaded guilty to conspir-
ing to evade internal accounting controls in order to trans-
fer a multi-million dollar ownership interest in a Shanghai
building to himself and a Chinese public official with whom
45
he had a personal friendship. The former managing director
repeatedly made false representations to his employer about
the transaction and the ownership interests involved.
268
Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting Liability
As with the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, compa-
nies (including subsidiaries of issuers) and individuals may
face criminal liability for conspiring to commit or for aid-
ing and abetting violations of the accounting provisions.
For example, the subsidiary of a Houston-based
company pleaded guilty both to conspiring to commit and
to aiding and abetting the company’s books and records
and anti-bribery violations.
269
The subsidiary paid bribes
of over $4 million and falsely characterized the payments
as “commissions,” “fees,” or “legal services,” consequently
causing the company’s books and records to be inaccurate.
Although the subsidiary was not an issuer and therefore
could not be charged directly with an accounting violation,
it was criminally liable for its involvement in the parent
company’s accounting violation.
Similarly, a U.S. subsidiary of a Swiss freight for-
warding company that was not an issuer was charged with
conspiring to commit and with aiding and abetting the
books and records violations of its customers, who were
issuers and therefore subject to the FCPA’s accounting
provisions.
270
The U.S. subsidiary substantially assisted the
issuer-customers in violating the FCPA’s books and records
provision by masking the true nature of the bribe payments
in the invoices it submitted to the issuer-customers.
271
The
subsidiary thus faced criminal liability for its involvement
in the issuer-customers’ FCPA violations even though it
was not itself subject to the FCPA’s accounting provisions.
Auditor Obligations
All public companies in the United States must file
annual financial statements that have been prepared in
conformity with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (U.S. GAAP). These accounting principles are
among the most comprehensive in the world. U.S. GAAP
requires an accounting of all assets, liabilities, revenue, and
expenses as well as extensive disclosures concerning the
company’s operations and financial condition. A company’s
financial statements should be complete and fairly repre-
sent the company’s financial condition.
272
Thus, under U.S.
GAAP, any payments to foreign government officials must
be properly accounted for in a company’s books, records,
and financial statements.
U.S. laws, including SEC Rules, require issuers to
undergo an annual external audit of their financial statements
and to make those audited financial statements available to
the public by filing them with SEC. SEC Rules and the rules
and standards issued by the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) under SEC oversight, require
external auditors to be independent of the companies that
they audit. Independent auditors must comply with the rules
and standards set forth by the PCAOB when they perform
an audit of a public company. These audit standards govern,
for example, the auditor’s responsibility concerning material
errors, irregularities, or illegal acts by a client and its officers,
directors, and employees. Additionally, the auditor has a
responsibility to obtain an understanding of an entity’s inter-
nal controls over financial reporting as part of its audit and
must communicate all significant deficiencies and material
weaknesses identified during the audit to management and
the audit committee.
273
Under Section 10A of the Exchange Act, indepen-
dent auditors who discover an illegal act, such as the pay-
ment of bribes to domestic or foreign government officials,
have certain obligations in connection with their audits of
public companies.
274
Generally, Section 10A requires audi-
tors who become aware of illegal acts to report such acts to
appropriate levels within the company and, if the company
fails to take appropriate action, to notify SEC.
chapter 3
The FCPA:
Accounting Provisions
4546
chapter 4
Other Related
U.S. Laws
48
OTHER RELATED U.S. LAWS
Businesses and individuals should be aware that conduct that violates the
FCPA’s anti-bribery or accounting provisions may also violate other statutes or
regulations. Moreover, payments to foreign government officials and intermedi-
aries may violate these laws even if all of the elements of an FCPA violation
are not present.
Travel Act
The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, prohibits travel
in interstate or foreign commerce or using the mail or any
facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with the intent
to distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity or to
promote, manage, establish, or carry on any unlawful activ-
i t y.
275
“Unlawful activity” includes violations of not only
the FCPA, but also state commercial bribery laws. Thus,
bribery between private commercial enterprises may, in
some circumstances, be covered by the Travel Act. Said dif-
ferently, if a company pays kickbacks to an employee of a
private company who is not a foreign official, such private-
to-private bribery could possibly be charged under the
Travel Act.
DOJ has previously charged both individual and
corporate defendants in FCPA cases with violations of
the Travel Act.
276
For instance, an individual investor was
convicted of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the Travel
Act in 2009 where the relevant “unlawful activity” under
the Travel Act was an FCPA violation involving a bribery
scheme in Azerbaijan.
277
Also in 2009, a California com-
pany that engaged in both bribery of foreign officials in vio-
lation of the FCPA and commercial bribery in violation of
California state law pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate
the FCPA and the Travel Act, among other charges.
278
Money Laundering
Many FCPA cases also involve violations of anti-
money laundering statutes.
279
For example, two Florida
executives of a Miami-based telecommunications company
were convicted of FCPA and money laundering conduct
where they conducted financial transactions involving the
proceeds of specified unlawful activities—violations of the
FCPA, the criminal bribery laws of Haiti, and wire fraud—
in order to conceal and disguise these proceeds. Notably,
although foreign officials cannot be prosecuted for FCPA
49
violations,
280
three former Haitian officials involved in the
same scheme were convicted of money laundering.
281
Mail and Wire Fraud
The mail and wire fraud statutes may also apply. In
2006, for example, a wholly owned foreign subsidiary of
a U.S. issuer pleaded guilty to both FCPA and wire fraud
counts where the scheme included overbilling the sub-
sidiary’s customers—both government and private—and
using part of the overcharged money to pay kickbacks to the
customers’ employees. The wire fraud charges alleged that
the subsidiary had funds wired from its parent’s Oregon
bank account to off-the-books bank accounts in South
Korea that were controlled by the subsidiary. The funds,
amounting to almost $2 million, were then paid to manag-
ers of state-owned and private steel production companies
in China and South Korea as illegal commission payments
and kickbacks that were disguised as refunds, commissions,
and other seemingly legitimate expenses.
282
Certification and Reporting Violations
Certain other licensing, certification, and reporting
requirements imposed by the U.S. government can also be
implicated in the foreign bribery context. For example, as
a condition of its facilitation of direct loans and loan guar-
antees to a foreign purchaser of U.S. goods and services,
the Export-Import Bank of the United States requires the
U.S. supplier to make certifications concerning commis-
sions, fees, or other payments paid in connection with the
financial assistance and that it has not and will not violate
the FCPA.
283
A false certification may give rise to criminal
liability for false statements.
284
Similarly, manufacturers, exporters, and brokers of
certain defense articles and services are subject to regis-
tration, licensing, and reporting requirements under the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2751, et
seq., and its implementing regulations, the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. § 120, et
seq. For example, under AECA and ITAR, all manufactur-
ers and exporters of defense articles and services must reg-
ister with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. The
sale of defense articles and services valued at $500,000 or
more triggers disclosure requirements concerning fees and
commissions, including bribes, in an aggregate amount of
$100,000 or more.
285
Violations of AECA and ITAR can
result in civil and criminal penalties.
286
Tax Violations
Individuals and companies who violate the FCPA may
also violate U.S. tax law, which explicitly prohibits tax deduc-
tions for bribes, such as false sales “commissions” deductions
intended to conceal corrupt payments.
287
Internal Revenue
Service-Criminal Investigation has been involved in a num-
ber of FCPA investigations involving tax violations, as well as
other financial crimes like money laundering.
chapter 4
Other Related
U.S. Laws
4950
chapter 5
Guiding Principles
of Enforcement
52
GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF
ENFORCEMENT
What Does DOJ Consider When
Deciding Whether to Open an
Investigation or Bring Charges?
Whether and how DOJ will commence, decline,
or otherwise resolve an FCPA matter is guided by the
Principles of Federal Prosecution in the case of individu-
als, and the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations in the case of companies.
DOJ Principles of Federal Prosecution
The Principles of Federal Prosecution, set forth in
Chapter 9-27.000 of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual,
288
pro-
vide guidance for DOJ prosecutors regarding initiating
or declining prosecution, selecting charges, and plea-bar-
gaining. The Principles of Federal Prosecution provide that
prosecutors should recommend or commence federal pros-
ecution if the putative defendant’s conduct constitutes a
federal offense and the admissible evidence will probably be
sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction unless (1) no
substantial federal interest would be served by prosecution;
(2) the person is subject to effective prosecution in another
jurisdiction; or (3) an adequate non-criminal alternative to
prosecution exists. In assessing the existence of a substantial
federal interest, the prosecutor is advised to “weigh all rel-
evant considerations,” including the nature and seriousness
of the offense; the deterrent effect of prosecution; the per-
son’s culpability in connection with the offense; the per-
son’s history with respect to criminal activity; the person’s
willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecu-
tion of others; and the probable sentence or other conse-
quences if the person is convicted. The Principles of Federal
Prosecution also set out the considerations to be weighed
when deciding whether to enter into a plea agreement with
an individual defendant, including the nature and serious-
ness of the offense and the person’s willingness to cooperate,
as well as the desirability of prompt and certain disposition
of the case and the expense of trial and appeal.
289
DOJ Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations
The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations, set forth in Chapter 9-28.000 of the U.S.
torney’s Manual,
290
provide guidance regarding the resolu-
n of cases involving corporate wrongdoing. The Principles
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations recognize
At
tio
of
that resolution of corporate criminal cases by means other
53
than indictment, including non-prosecution and deferred
prosecution agreements, may be appropriate in certain cir-
cumstances. Nine factors are considered in conducting an
investigation, determining whether to charge a corporation,
and negotiating plea or other agreements:
• the nature and seriousness of the offense, including
the risk of harm to the public;
• the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corpo-
ration, including the complicity in, or the condon-
ing of, the wrongdoing by corporate management;
• the corporation’s history of similar misconduct,
including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory
enforcement actions against it;
• the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents;
• the existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s
pre-existing compliance program;
• the corporation’s remedial actions, including any
efforts to implement an effective corporate compli-
ance program or improve an existing one, replace
responsible management, discipline or terminate
wrongdoers, pay restitution, and cooperate with the
relevant government agencies;
• collateral consequences, including whether there
is disproportionate harm to shareholders, pension
holders, employees, and others not proven person-
ally culpable, as well as impact on the public arising
from the prosecution;
• the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals
responsible for the corporation’s malfeasance; and
• the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory
enforcement actions.
As these factors illustrate, in many investigations it
will be appropriate for a prosecutor to consider a corpora-
tion’s pre-indictment conduct, including voluntary disclo-
sure, cooperation, and remediation, in determining whether
to seek an indictment. In assessing a corporation’s coopera-
tion, prosecutors are prohibited from requesting attorney-
client privileged materials with two exceptions—when a
corporation or its employee asserts an advice-of-counsel
defense and when the attorney-client communications were
in furtherance of a crime or fraud. Otherwise, an organi-
zation’s cooperation may only be assessed on the basis of
whether it disclosed the relevant facts underlying an inves-
tigation—and not on the basis of whether it has waived its
attorney-client privilege or work product protection.
291
What Does SEC Consider When
Deciding Whether to Open an
Investigation or Bring Charges?
SEC’s Enforcement Manual, published by SEC’s
Enforcement Division and available on SEC’s website,
292
sets forth information about how SEC conducts inves-
tigations, as well as the guiding principles that SEC staff
considers when determining whether to open or close an
investigation and whether civil charges are merited. There
are various ways that potential FCPA violations come to
the attention of SEC staff, including : tips from informants
or whistleblowers; information developed in other inves-
tigations; self-reports or public disclosures by companies;
referrals from other offices or agencies; public sources, such
as media reports and trade publications; and proactive
investigative techniques, including risk-based initiatives.
Investigations can be formal, such as where SEC has issued
a formal order of investigation that authorizes its staff to
issue investigative subpoenas for testimony and documents,
or informal, such as where the staff proceeds with the inves-
tigation without the use of investigative subpoenas.
In determining whether to open an investigation and,
if so, whether an enforcement action is warranted, SEC
staff considers a number of factors, including : the statutes
or rules potentially violated; the egregiousness of the poten-
tial violation; the potential magnitude of the violation;
whether the potentially harmed group is particularly vul-
nerable or at risk; whether the conduct is ongoing ; whether
the conduct can be investigated efficiently and within the
statute of limitations period; and whether other authorities,
including federal or state agencies or regulators, might be
better suited to investigate the conduct. SEC staff also may
chapter 5
Guiding Principles
of Enforcement
5354
consider whether the case involves a possibly widespread
industry practice that should be addressed, whether the
case involves a recidivist, and whether the matter gives SEC
an opportunity to be visible in a community that might not
otherwise be familiar with SEC or the protections afforded
by the securities laws.
For more information about the Enforcement
Division’s procedures concerning investigations, enforce-
ment actions, and cooperation with other regulators, see
the Enforcement Manual at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
enforce.shtml.
Self-Reporting, Cooperation, and
Remedial Efforts
While the conduct underlying any FCPA investiga-
tion is obviously a fundamental and threshold consider-
ation in deciding what, if any, action to take, both DOJ
and SEC place a high premium on self-reporting, along
with cooperation and remedial efforts, in determining the
appropriate resolution of FCPA matters.
Criminal Cases
Under DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations, federal prosecutors
company’s cooperation in determining how
corporate criminal case. Specifically, prosecut
whether the company made a voluntary an
closure as well as the company’s willingness to
consider a
to resolve a
ors consider
d timely dis-
provide rel-
evant information and evidence and identify relevant actors
inside and outside the company, including senior execu-
tives. In addition, prosecutors may consider a company’s
remedial actions, including efforts to improve an existing
compliance program or appropriate disciplining of wrong-
doers.
293
A company’s remedial measures should be mean-
ingful and illustrate its recognition of the seriousness of the
misconduct, for example, by taking steps to implement the
personnel, operational, and organizational changes neces-
sary to establish an awareness among employees that crimi-
nal conduct will not be tolerated.
294
The Principles of Federal Prosecution similarly provide
that prosecutors may consider an individual’s willingness
to cooperate in deciding whether a prosecution should
be undertaken and how it should be resolved. Although a
willingness to cooperate will not, by itself, generally relieve
a person of criminal liability, it may be given “serious con-
sideration” in evaluating whether to enter into a plea agree-
ment with a defendant, depending on the nature and value
of the cooperation offered.
295
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines similarly take into
account an individual defendant’s cooperation and volun-
tary disclosure. Under § 5K1.1, a defendant’s cooperation,
if sufficiently substantial, may justify the government filing
a motion for a reduced sentence. And under § 5K2.16, a
defendant’s voluntary disclosure of an offense prior to its
discovery—if the offense was unlikely to have been discov-
ered otherwise—may warrant a downward departure in
certain circumstances.
Chapter 8 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which gov-
erns the sentencing of organizations, takes into account an
organization’s remediation as part of an “effective compli-
ance and ethics program.” One of the seven elements of
such a program provides that after the detection of crimi-
nal conduct, “the organization shall take reasonable steps
to respond appropriately to the criminal conduct and to
prevent further similar criminal conduct, including mak-
ing any necessary modifications to the organization’s
compliance and ethics program.”
296
Having an effective
compliance and ethics program may lead to a three-point
reduction in an organization’s culpability score under
§ 8C2.5, which affects the fine calculation under the
Guidelines. Similarly, an organization’s self-reporting,
cooperation, and acceptance of responsibility may lead to
fine reductions under § 8C2.5(g ) by decreasing the culpa-
bility score. Conversely, an organization will not qualify
for the compliance program reduction when it unreason-
ably delayed reporting the offense.
297
Similar to § 5K1.1
55
for individuals, organizations can qualify for departures
pursuant to § 8C4.1 of the Guidelines for cooperating in
the prosecution of others.
Civil Cases
SEC’s Framework for Evaluating Cooperation by
Companies
SEC’s framework for evaluating cooperation by com-
panies is set forth in its 2001 Report of Investigation Pursuant
to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to
Agency Enforcement Decisions, which is commonly known
as the Seaboard Report.
298
The report, which explained the
Commission’s decision not to take enforcement action
against a public company for certain accounting violations
caused by its subsidiary, details the many factors SEC consid-
ers in determining whether, and to what extent, it grants leni-
ency to companies for cooperating in its investigations and
for related good corporate citizenship. Specifically, the report
identifies four broad measures of a company’s cooperation:
• self-policing prior to the discovery of the miscon-
duct, including establishing effective compliance
procedures and an appropriate tone at the top;
• self-reporting of misconduct when it is discovered,
including conducting a thorough review of the
nature, extent, origins, and consequences of the mis-
conduct, and promptly, completely, and effectively
disclosing the misconduct to the public, to regula-
tory agencies, and to self-regulatory organizations;
• remediation, including dismissing or appropriately
disciplining wrongdoers, modifying and improv-
ing internal controls and procedures to prevent
recurrence of the misconduct, and appropriately
compensating those adversely affected; and
• cooperation with law enforcement authorities,
including providing SEC staff with all informa-
tion relevant to the underlying violations and the
company’s remedial efforts.
Since every enforcement matter is different, this ana-
lytical framework sets forth general principles but does not
limit SEC’s broad discretion to evaluate every case indi-
vidually on its own unique facts and circumstances. Similar
to SEC’s treatment of cooperating individuals, credit
for cooperation by companies may range from taking no
enforcement action to pursuing reduced sanctions in con-
nection with enforcement actions.
SEC’s Framework for Evaluating Cooperation by
Individuals
In 2010, SEC announced a new cooperation program
for individuals.
299
SEC staff has a wide range of tools to
facilitate and reward cooperation by individuals, from tak-
ing no enforcement action to pursuing reduced sanctions in
connection with enforcement actions. Although the evalu-
ation of cooperation depends on the specific circumstances,
SEC generally evaluates four factors to determine whether,
to what extent, and in what manner to credit cooperation
by individuals:
• the assistance provided by the cooperating indi-
vidual in SEC’s investigation or related enforce-
ment actions, including, among other things: the
value and timeliness of the cooperation, including
whether the individual was the first to report the
misconduct to SEC or to offer his or her coopera-
tion; whether the investigation was initiated based
upon the information or other cooperation by the
individual; the quality of the cooperation, includ-
ing whether the individual was truthful and the
cooperation was complete; the time and resources
conserved as a result of the individual’s coopera-
tion; and the nature of the cooperation, such as the
type of assistance provided;
• the importance of the matter in which the indi-
vidual provided cooperation;
• the societal interest in ensuring that the cooperat-
ing individual is held accountable for his or her
misconduct, including the severity of the individ-
ual’s misconduct, the culpability of the individual,
and the efforts undertaken by the individual to
remediate the harm; and
chapter 5
Guiding Principles
of Enforcement
5556
• the appropriateness of a cooperation credit in light
of the profile of the cooperating individual.
Corporate Compliance Program
In a global marketplace, an effective compliance pro-
gram is a critical component of a company’s internal con-
trols and is essential to detecting and preventing FCPA vio-
lations.
300
Effective compliance programs are tailored to the
company’s specific business and to the risks associated with
that business. They are dynamic and evolve as the business
and the markets change.
An effective compliance program promotes “an orga-
nizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a
commitment to compliance with the law.”
301
Such a program
protects a company’s reputation, ensures investor value and
confidence, reduces uncertainty in business transactions, and
secures a company’s assets.
302
A well-constructed, thought-
fully implemented, and consistently enforced compliance
and ethics program helps prevent, detect, remediate, and
report misconduct, including FCPA violations.
In addition to considering whether a company has
self-reported, cooperated, and taken appropriate remedial
actions, DOJ and SEC also consider the adequacy of a
company’s compliance program when deciding what, if any,
action to take. The program may influence whether or not
charges should be resolved through a deferred prosecution
agreement (DPA) or non-prosecution agreement (NPA),
as well as the appropriate length of any DPA or NPA, or
the term of corporate probation. It will often affect the
penalty amount and the need for a monitor or self-report-
ing.
303
As discussed above, SEC’s Seaboard Report focuses,
among other things, on a company’s self-policing prior to
the discovery of the misconduct, including whether it had
established effective compliance procedures.
304
Likewise,
three of the nine factors set forth in DOJ’s Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations relate, either
directly or indirectly, to a compliance program’s design and
implementation, including the pervasiveness of wrongdo-
ing within the company, the existence and effectiveness of
the company’s pre-existing compliance program, and the
company’s remedial actions.
305
DOJ also considers the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines’ elements of an effective compliance
program, as set forth in § 8B2.1 of the Guidelines.
These considerations reflect the recognition that
a company’s failure to prevent every single violation does
not necessarily mean that a particular company’s compli-
ance program was not generally effective. DOJ and SEC
understand that “no compliance program can ever prevent
all criminal activity by a corporation’s employees,”
306
and
they do not hold companies to a standard of perfection. An
assessment of a company’s compliance program, including
its design and good faith implementation and enforcement,
is an important part of the government’s assessment of
whether a violation occurred, and if so, what action should
be taken. In appropriate circumstances, DOJ and SEC may
decline to pursue charges against a company based on the
company’s effective compliance program, or may otherwise
seek to reward a company for its program, even when that
program did not prevent the particular underlying FCPA
violation that gave rise to the investigation.
307
DOJ and SEC have no formulaic requirements
regarding compliance programs. Rather, they employ a
common-sense and pragmatic approach to evaluating com-
pliance programs, making inquiries related to three basic
questions:
• Is the company’s compliance program well
designed?
• Is it being applied in good faith?
• Does it work?
308
This guide contains information regarding some of
the basic elements DOJ and SEC consider when evaluating
compliance programs. Although the focus is on compliance
with the FCPA, given the existence of anti-corruption
laws in many other countries, businesses should consider
designing programs focused on anti-corruption compli-
ance more broadly.
309
57
Hallmarks of Effective Compliance
Programs
Individual companies may have different compliance
needs depending on their size and the particular risks asso-
ciated with their businesses, among other factors. When it
comes to compliance, there is no one-size-fits-all program.
Thus, the discussion below is meant to provide insight into
the aspects of compliance programs that DOJ and SEC
assess, recognizing that companies may consider a variety
of factors when making their own determination of what
is appropriate for their specific business needs.
310
Indeed,
small- and medium-size enterprises likely will have different
compliance programs from large multi-national corpora-
tions, a fact DOJ and SEC take into account when evaluat-
ing companies’ compliance programs.
Compliance programs that employ a “check-the-box”
approach may be inefficient and, more importantly, ineffec-
tive. Because each compliance program should be tailored
to an organization’s specific needs, risks, and challenges,
the information provided below should not be considered
a substitute for a company’s own assessment of the corpo-
rate compliance program most appropriate for that particu-
lar business organization. In the end, if designed carefully,
implemented earnestly, and enforced fairly, a company’s
compliance program—no matter how large or small the
organization—will allow the company generally to prevent
violations, detect those that do occur, and remediate them
promptly and appropriately.
Commitment from Senior Management and a
Clearly Articulated Policy Against Corruption
Within a business organization, compliance begins
with the board of directors and senior executives setting
the proper tone for the rest of the company. Managers and
employees take their cues from these corporate leaders.
Thus, DOJ and SEC consider the commitment of corpo-
rate leaders to a “culture of compliance”
311
and look to see
if this high-level commitment is also reinforced and imple-
mented by middle managers and employees at all levels of
a business. A well-designed compliance program that is
not enforced in good faith, such as when corporate man-
agement explicitly or implicitly encourages employees to
engage in misconduct to achieve business objectives, will be
ineffective. DOJ and SEC have often encountered compa-
nies with compliance programs that are strong on paper but
that nevertheless have significant FCPA violations because
management has failed to effectively implement the pro-
gram even in the face of obvious signs of corruption. This
may be the result of aggressive sales staff preventing com-
pliance personnel from doing their jobs effectively and of
senior management, more concerned with securing a valu-
able business opportunity than enforcing a culture of com-
pliance, siding with the sales team. The higher the financial
stakes of the transaction, the greater the temptation for
management to choose profit over compliance.
A strong ethical culture directly supports a strong
compliance program. By adhering to ethical standards,
senior managers will inspire middle managers to reinforce
those standards. Compliant middle managers, in turn, will
encourage employees to strive to attain those standards
throughout the organizational structure.
312
In short, compliance with the FCPA and ethical rules
must start at the top. DOJ and SEC thus evaluate whether
senior management has clearly articulated company stan-
dards, communicated them in unambiguous terms, adhered
to them scrupulously, and disseminated them throughout
the organization.
Code of Conduct and Compliance Policies and
Procedures
A company’s code of conduct is often the foundation
upon which an effective compliance program is built. As
DOJ has repeatedly noted in its charging documents, the
most effective codes are clear, concise, and accessible to all
employees and to those conducting business on the com-
pany’s behalf. Indeed, it would be difficult to effectively
implement a compliance program if it was not available in
the local language so that employees in foreign subsidiaries
can access and understand it. When assessing a compliance
program, DOJ and SEC will review whether the company
chapter 5
Guiding Principles
of Enforcement
5758
has taken steps to make certain that the code of conduct
remains current and effective and whether a company has
periodically reviewed and updated its code.
Whether a company has policies and procedures that
outline responsibilities for compliance within the company,
detail proper internal controls, auditing practices, and doc-
umentation policies, and set forth disciplinary procedures
will also be considered by DOJ and SEC. These types of
policies and procedures will depend on the size and nature
of the business and the risks associated with the business.
Effective policies and procedures require an in-depth
understanding of the company’s business model, includ-
ing its products and services, third-party agents, custom-
ers, government interactions, and industry and geographic
risks. Among the risks that a company may need to address
include the nature and extent of transactions with foreign
governments, including payments to foreign officials; use
of third parties; gifts, travel, and entertainment expenses;
charitable and political donations; and facilitating and
expediting payments. For example, some companies with
global operations have created web-based approval pro-
cesses to review and approve routine gifts, travel, and enter-
tainment involving foreign officials and private customers
with clear monetary limits and annual limitations. Many of
these systems have built-in flexibility so that senior manage-
ment, or in-house legal counsel, can be apprised of and, in
appropriate circumstances, approve unique requests. These
types of systems can be a good way to conserve corporate
resources while, if properly implemented, preventing and
detecting potential FCPA violations.
Regardless of the specific policies and procedures
implemented, these standards should apply to personnel at
all levels of the company.
Oversight, Autonomy, and Resources
In appraising a compliance program, DOJ and SEC
also consider whether a company has assigned respon-
sibility for the oversight and implementation of a com-
pany’s compliance program to one or more specific senior
executives within an organization.
313
Those individuals
must have appropriate authority within the organization,
adequate autonomy from management, and sufficient
resources to ensure that the company’s compliance program
is implemented effectively.
314
Adequate autonomy gener-
ally includes direct access to an organization’s governing
authority, such as the board of directors and committees
of the board of directors (e.g., the audit committee).
315
Depending on the size and structure of an organization,
it may be appropriate for day-to-day operational responsi-
bility to be delegated to other specific individuals within
a company.
316
DOJ and SEC recognize that the reporting
structure will depend on the size and complexity of an
organization. Moreover, the amount of resources devoted
to compliance will depend on the company’s size, complex-
ity, industry, geographical reach, and risks associated with
the business. In assessing whether a company has reasonable
internal controls, DOJ and SEC typically consider whether
the company devoted adequate staffing and resources to the
compliance program given the size, structure, and risk pro-
file of the business.
Risk Assessment
Assessment of risk is fundamental to developing a
strong compliance program, and is another factor DOJ
and SEC evaluate when assessing a company’s compliance
program.
317
One-size-fits-all compliance programs are
generally ill-conceived and ineffective because resources
inevitably are spread too thin, with too much focus on low-
risk markets and transactions to the detriment of high-risk
areas. Devoting a disproportionate amount of time polic-
ing modest entertainment and gift-giving instead of focus-
ing on large government bids, questionable payments to
third-party consultants, or excessive discounts to resellers
and distributors may indicate that a company’s compli-
ance program is ineffective. A $50 million contract with a
government agency in a high-risk country warrants greater
59
scrutiny than modest and routine gifts and entertainment.
Similarly, performing identical due diligence on all third-
party agents, irrespective of risk factors, is often counter-
productive, diverting attention and resources away from
those third parties that pose the most significant risks.
DOJ and SEC will give meaningful credit to a company
that implements in good faith a comprehensive, risk-based
compliance program, even if that program does not pre-
vent an infraction in a low risk area because greater atten-
tion and resources had been devoted to a higher risk area.
Conversely, a company that fails to prevent an FCPA viola-
tion on an economically significant, high-risk transaction
because it failed to perform a level of due diligence com-
mensurate with the size and risk of the transaction is likely
to receive reduced credit based on the quality and effective-
ness of its compliance program.
As a company’s risk for FCPA violations increases,
that business should consider increasing its compliance
procedures, including due diligence and periodic internal
audits. The degree of appropriate due diligence is fact-spe-
cific and should vary based on industry, country, size, and
nature of the transaction, and the method and amount of
third-party compensation. Factors to consider, for instance,
include risks presented by: the country and industry sector,
the business opportunity, potential business partners, level
of involvement with governments, amount of government
regulation and oversight, and exposure to customs and
immigration in conducting business affairs. When assessing
a company’s compliance program, DOJ and SEC take into
account whether and to what degree a company analyzes
and addresses the particular risks it faces.
Training and Continuing Advice
Compliance policies cannot work unless effectively
communicated throughout a company. Accordingly, DOJ
and SEC will evaluate whether a company has taken steps to
ensure that relevant policies and procedures have been com-
municated throughout the organization, including through
periodic training and certification for all directors, officers,
relevant employees, and, where appropriate, agents and
business partners.
318
For example, many larger companies
have implemented a mix of web-based and in-person train-
ing conducted at varying intervals. Such training typically
covers company policies and procedures, instruction on
applicable laws, practical advice to address real-life scenar-
ios, and case studies. Regardless of how a company chooses
to conduct its training, however, the information should
be presented in a manner appropriate for the targeted audi-
ence, including providing training and training materials
in the local language. For example, companies may want to
consider providing different types of training to their sales
personnel and accounting personnel with hypotheticals
or sample situations that are similar to the situations they
might encounter. In addition to the existence and scope of
a company’s training program, a company should develop
appropriate measures, depending on the size and sophisti-
cation of the particular company, to provide guidance and
advice on complying with the company’s ethics and com-
pliance program, including when such advice is needed
urgently. Such measures will help ensure that the compli-
ance program is understood and followed appropriately at
all levels of the company.
Incentives and Disciplinary Measures
In addition to evaluating the design and implementa-
tion of a compliance program throughout an organization,
enforcement of that program is fundamental to its effec-
tiveness.
319
A compliance program should apply from the
board room to the supply room—no one should be beyond
its reach. DOJ and SEC will thus consider whether, when
enforcing a compliance program, a company has appropri-
ate and clear disciplinary procedures, whether those proce-
dures are applied reliably and promptly, and whether they
are commensurate with the violation. Many companies
have found that publicizing disciplinary actions internally,
where appropriate under local law, can have an important
deterrent effect, demonstrating that unethical and unlawful
actions have swift and sure consequences.
DOJ and SEC recognize that positive incentives can
also drive compliant behavior. These incentives can take many
chapter 5
Guiding Principles
of Enforcement
5960
forms such as personnel evaluations and promotions, rewards
for improving and developing a company’s compliance pro-
gram, and rewards for ethics and compliance leadership.
320
Some organizations, for example, have made adherence to
compliance a significant metric for management’s bonuses so
that compliance becomes an integral part of management’s
everyday concern. Beyond financial incentives, some compa-
nies have highlighted compliance within their organizations
by recognizing compliance professionals and internal audit
staff. Others have made working in the company’s compli-
ance organization a way to advance an employee’s career.
SEC, for instance, has encouraged companies to embrace
methods to incentivize ethical and lawful behavior:
[M]ake integrity, ethics and compliance part of the
promotion, compensation and evaluation processes
as well. For at the end of the day, the most effective
way to communicate that “doing the right thing” is a
priority, is to reward it. Conversely, if employees are
led to believe that, when it comes to compensation
and career advancement, all that counts is short-term
profitability, and that cutting ethical corners is an ac-
ceptable way of getting there, they’ll perform to that
measure. To cite an example from a different walk
of life: a college football coach can be told that the
graduation rates of his players are what matters, but
he’ll know differently if the sole focus of his contract
extension talks or the decision to fire him is his win-
loss record.
321
No matter what the disciplinary scheme or potential
incentives a company decides to adopt, DOJ and SEC will
consider whether they are fairly and consistently applied
across the organization. No executive should be above com-
pliance, no employee below compliance, and no person
within an organization deemed too valuable to be disci-
plined, if warranted. Rewarding good behavior and sanc-
tioning bad behavior reinforces a culture of compliance and
ethics throughout an organization.
Third-Party Due Diligence and Payments
DOJ’s and SEC’s FCPA enforcement actions dem-
onstrate that third parties, including agents, consultants,
and distributors, are commonly used to conceal the pay-
ment of bribes to foreign officials in international business
transactions. Risk-based due diligence is particularly impor-
tant with third parties and will also be considered by DOJ
and SEC in assessing the effectiveness of a company’s com-
pliance program.
Although the degree of appropriate due diligence
may vary based on industry, country, size and nature of the
transaction, and historical relationship with the third-party,
some guiding principles always apply.
First, as part of risk-based due diligence, companies
should understand the qualifications and associations of
its third-party partners, including its business reputation,
and relationship, if any, with foreign officials. The degree of
scrutiny should increase as red flags surface.
Second, companies should have an understanding of
the business rationale for including the third party in the
transaction. Among other things, the company should
understand the role of and need for the third party and
ensure that the contract terms specifically describe the ser-
vices to be performed. Additional considerations include
payment terms and how those payment terms compare to
typical terms in that industry and country, as well as the
timing of the third party’s introduction to the business.
Moreover, companies may want to confirm and document
that the third party is actually performing the work for
which it is being paid and that its compensation is com-
mensurate with the work being provided.
Third, companies should undertake some form of
ongoing monitoring of third-party relationships.
322
Where
appropriate, this may include updating due diligence peri-
odically, exercising audit rights, providing periodic train-
ing, and requesting annual compliance certifications by the
third party.
In addition to considering a company’s due dili-
gence on third parties, DOJ and SEC also assess whether
the company has informed third parties of the company’s
61
compliance program and commitment to ethical and law-
ful business practices and, where appropriate, whether it
has sought assurances from third parties, through certifica-
tions and otherwise, of reciprocal commitments. These can
be meaningful ways to mitigate third-party risk.
Confidential Reporting and Internal Investigation
An effective compliance program should include a
mechanism for an organization’s employees and others to
report suspected or actual misconduct or violations of the
company’s policies on a confidential basis and without fear of
retaliation.
323
Companies may employ, for example, anony-
mous hotlines or ombudsmen. Moreover, once an allegation
is made, companies should have in place an efficient, reliable,
Compliance Program Case Study
Recent DOJ and SEC actions relating to a financial institution’s real estate transactions with a government agency
in China illustrate the benefits of implementing and enforcing a comprehensive risk-based compliance program The
case involved a joint venture real estate investment in the Luwan District of Shanghai, China, between a U S -based
financial institution and a state-owned entity that functioned as the District’s real estate arm The government entity
conducted the transactions through two special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”), with the second SPV purchasing a 12%
stake in a real estate project
The financial institution, through a robust compliance program, frequently trained its employees, imposed a
comprehensive payment-approval process designed to prevent bribery, and staffed a compliance department with
a direct reporting line to the board of directors As appropriate given the industry, market, and size and structure of
the transactions, the financial institution (1) provided extensive FCPA training to the senior executive responsible for
the transactions and (2) conducted extensive due diligence on the transactions, the local government entity, and the
SPVs Due diligence on the entity included reviewing Chinese government records; speaking with sources familiar
with the Shanghai real estate market; checking the government entity’s payment records and credit references;
conducting an on-site visit and placing a pretextual telephone call to the entity’s offices; searching media sources;
and conducting background checks on the entity’s principals The financial institution vetted the SPVs by obtaining
a letter with designated bank account information from a Chinese official associated with the government entity (the
“Chinese Official”); using an international law firm to request and review 50 documents from the SPVs’ Canadian
attorney; interviewing the attorney; and interviewing the SPVs’ management
Notwithstanding the financial institution’s robust compliance program and good faith enforcement of it, the
company failed to learn that the Chinese Official personally owned nearly 50% of the second SPV (and therefore a
nearly 6% stake in the joint venture) and that the SPV was used as a vehicle for corrupt payments This failure was
due, in large part, to misrepresentations by the Chinese Official, the financial institution’s executive in charge of
the project, and the SPV’s attorney that the SPV was 100% owned and controlled by the government entity DOJ
and SEC declined to take enforcement action against the financial institution, and its executive pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s internal control provisions and also settled with SEC
and properly funded process for investigating the allegation
and documenting the company’s response, including any
disciplinary or remediation measures taken. Companies will
want to consider taking “lessons learned” from any reported
violations and the outcome of any resulting investigation to
update their internal controls and compliance program and
focus future training on such issues, as appropriate.
Continuous Improvement: Periodic Testing and
Review
Finally, a good compliance program should constantly
evolve. A company’s business changes over time, as do the
environments in which it operates, the nature of its custom-
ers, the laws that govern its actions, and the standards of its
chapter 5
Guiding Principles
of Enforcement
6162
industry. In addition, compliance programs that do not just
exist on paper but are followed in practice will inevitably
uncover compliance weaknesses and require enhancements.
Consequently, DOJ and SEC evaluate whether companies
regularly review and improve their compliance programs
and not allow them to become stale.
According to one survey, 64% of general counsel whose
companies are subject to the FCPA say there is room for
improvement in their FCPA training and compliance pro-
grams.
324
An organization should take the time to review and
test its controls, and it should think critically about its poten-
tial weaknesses and risk areas. For example, some companies
have undertaken employee surveys to measure their compli-
ance culture and strength of internal controls, identify best
practices, and detect new risk areas. Other companies period-
ically test their internal controls with targeted audits to make
certain that controls on paper are working in practice. DOJ
and SEC will give meaningful credit to thoughtful efforts
to create a sustainable compliance program if a problem is
later discovered. Similarly, undertaking proactive evaluations
before a problem strikes can lower the applicable penalty
range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
325
Although the
nature and the frequency of proactive evaluations may vary
depending on the size and complexity of an organization, the
idea behind such efforts is the same: continuous improve-
ment and sustainability.
326
Mergers and Acquisitions: Pre-Acquisition Due
Diligence and Post-Acquisition Integration
In the context of the FCPA, mergers and acquisi-
tions present both risks and opportunities. A company
that does not perform adequate FCPA due diligence prior
to a merger or acquisition may face both legal and business
risks.
327
Perhaps most commonly, inadequate due diligence
can allow a course of bribery to continue—with all the
attendant harms to a business’s profitability and reputation,
as well as potential civil and criminal liability.
In contrast, companies that conduct effective FCPA
due diligence on their acquisition targets are able to evalu-
ate more accurately each target’s value and negotiate for the
costs of the bribery to be borne by the target. In addition,
such actions demonstrate to DOJ and SEC a company’s
commitment to compliance and are taken into account
when evaluating any potential enforcement action. For
example, DOJ and SEC declined to take enforcement
action against an acquiring issuer when the issuer, among
other things, uncovered the corruption at the company
being acquired as part of due diligence, ensured that the
corruption was voluntarily disclosed to the government,
cooperated with the investigation, and incorporated the
acquired company into its compliance program and inter-
nal controls. On the other hand, SEC took action against
the acquired company, and DOJ took action against a sub-
sidiary of the acquired company.
328
When pre-acquisition
due diligence is not possible, DOJ has described proce-
dures, contained in Opinion Procedure Release No. 08-02,
pursuant to which companies can nevertheless be rewarded
if they choose to conduct thorough post-acquisition FCPA
due diligence.
329
FCPA due diligence, however, is normally only a
portion of the compliance process for mergers and acquisi-
tions. DOJ and SEC evaluate whether the acquiring com-
pany promptly incorporated the acquired company into all
of its internal controls, including its compliance program.
Companies should consider training new employees, reeval-
uating third parties under company standards, and, where
appropriate, conducting audits on new business units.
For example, as a result of due diligence conducted
by a California-based issuer before acquiring the majority
interest in a joint venture, the issuer learned of corrupt pay-
ments to obtain business. However, the issuer only imple-
mented its internal controls “halfway” so as not to “choke
the sales engine and cause a distraction for the sales guys.”
As a result, the improper payments continued, and the
issuer was held liable for violating the FCPA’s internal con-
trols and books and records provisions.
330
63
Other Guidance on Compliance and
International Best Practices
In addition to this guide, the U.S. Departments of
Commerce and State have both issued publications that contain
guidance regarding compliance programs. The Department
of Commerce’s International Trade Administration has pub-
lished Business Ethics: A Manual for Managing a Responsible
Business Enterprise in Emerging Market Economies,
331
and the
Department of State has published Fighting Global Corruption:
Business Risk Management.
332
There is also an emerging international consensus on
compliance best practices, and a number of inter-govern-
mental and non-governmental organizations have issued
guidance regarding best practices for compliance.
333
Most
notably, the OECD’s 2009 Anti-Bribery Recommendation
and its Annex II, Good Practice Guidance on Internal
Controls, Ethics, and Compliance,
334
published in February
2010, were drafted based on consultations with the private
sector and civil society and set forth specific good practices
for ensuring effective compliance programs and measures
for preventing and detecting foreign bribery. In addition,
businesses may wish to refer to the following resources:
• Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation—Anti-
Corruption Code of Conduct for Business;
335
• International Chamber of Commerce—ICC Rules
on Combating Corruption;
336
• Transparency International—Business Principles for
Countering Bribery;
337
• United Nations Global Compact—The Ten
Principles;
338
• World Bank—Integrity Compliance
Guidelines;
339
and
• World Economic Forum—Partnering Against
Corruption–Principles for Countering Bribery.
340
Hypothetical: Third-Party Vetting
Part 1: Consultants
Company A, a U S issuer headquartered in Delaware, wants to start doing business in a country that poses high risks
of corruption Company A learns about a potential $50 million contract with the country’s Ministry of Immigration This
is a very attractive opportunity to Company A, both for its profitability and to open the door to future projects with the
government At the suggestion of the company’s senior vice president of international sales (Sales Executive), Company A
hires a local businessman who assures them that he has strong ties to political and government leaders in the country and
can help them win the contract Company A enters into a consulting contract with the local businessman (Consultant) The
agreement requires Consultant to use his best efforts to help the company win the business and provides for Consultant to
receive a significant monthly retainer as well as a success fee of 3% of the value of any contract the company wins
What steps should Company A consider taking before hiring Consultant?
There are several factors here that might lead Company A to perform heightened FCPA-related due diligence prior
to retaining Consultant: (1) the market (high-risk country); (2) the size and significance of the deal to the company; (3) the
company’s first time use of this particular consultant; (4) the consultant’s strong ties to political and government leaders;
(5) the success fee structure of the contract; and (6) the vaguely-defined services to be provided In order to minimize the
likelihood of incurring FCPA liability, Company A should carefully vet Consultant and his role in the transaction, including
close scrutiny of the relationship between Consultant and any Ministry of Immigration officials or other government officials
Although there is nothing inherently illegal about contracting with a third party that has close connections to politicians
and government officials to perform legitimate services on a transaction, this type of relationship can be susceptible to
corruption Among other things, Company A may consider conducting due diligence on Consultant, including background
(cont’d)
chapter 5
Guiding Principles
of Enforcement
6364
and reference checks; ensuring that the contract spells out exactly what services and deliverables (such as written status
reports or other documentation) Consultant is providing; training Consultant on the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws;
requiring Consultant to represent that he will abide by the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws; including audit rights in the
contract (and exercising those rights); and ensuring that payments requested by Consultant have the proper supporting
documentation before they are approved for payment
Part 2: Distributors and Local Partners
Assume the following alternative facts:
Instead of hiring Consultant, Company A retains an often-used local distributor (Distributor) to sell Company A’s
products to the Ministry of Immigration In negotiating the pricing struc
to Company A, claims that the standard discount price to Distributor
warehousing, distribution, installation, marketing, and training costs an
the alternative, a contribution to its marketing efforts, either in the for
ture, Distributor, which had introduced the project
creates insufficient mar
gin for Distributor to cover
d requests an additional discount or rebate, or, in
m of a lump sum or as a per
centage of the total
contract The requested discount/allowance is significantly larger than usual, although there is precedent at Company
A for granting this level of discount in unique circumstances Distributor further advises Company A that the Ministry’s
procurement officials responsible for awarding the contract have expressed a strong preference for including a particular
local company (Local Partner) in the transaction as a subcontractor of Company A to perform installation, training, and
other services that would normally have been performed by Distributor or Company A According to Distributor, the
Ministry has a solid working relationship with Local Partner, and it would cause less disruption for Local Partner to perform
most of the on-site work at the Ministry One of the principals (Principal 1) of the Local Partner is an official in another
government ministry
What additional compliance considerations do these alternative facts raise?
As with Consultant in the first scenario above, Company A should carefully vet Distributor and Local Partner and their
roles in the transaction in order to minimize the likelihood of incurring FCPA liability While Company A has an established
relationship with Distributor, the fact that Distributor has requested an additional discount warrants further inquiry into
the economic justification for the change, particularly where, as here, the proposed transaction structure contemplates
paying Local Partner to provide many of the same services that Distributor would otherwise provide In many cases, it may
be appropriate for distributors to receive larger discounts to account for unique circumstances in particular transactions
That said, a common mechanism to create additional margin for bribe payments is through excessive discounts or rebates
to distributors Accordingly, when a company has pre-existing relationships with distributors and other third parties,
transaction-specific due diligence—including an analysis of payment terms to confirm that the payment is commensurate
with the work being performed—can be critical even in circumstances where due diligence of the distributor or other third
party raises no initial red flags
Company A should carefully scrutinize the relationship among Local Partner, Distributor, and Ministry of Immigration
officials While there is nothing inherently illegal about contracting with a third party that is recommended by the end-user,
or even hiring a government official to perform legitimate services on a transaction unrelated to his or her government
job, these facts raise additional red flags that warrant significant scrutiny Among other things, Company A would be
well-advised to require Principal 1 to verify that he will have no role in the Ministry of Immigration’s decision to award
the contract to Company A, notify the Ministry of Immigration and his own ministry of his proposed involvement in the
transaction, and certify that he will abide by the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws and that his involvement in the
transaction is permitted under local law
(cont’d)
65
Assume the following additional facts:
Under its company policy for a government transaction of this size, Company A requires both finance and compliance
approval The finance officer is concerned that the discounts to Distributor are significantly larger than what they have
approved for similar work and will cut too deeply into Company A’s profit margin The finance officer is also skeptical about
including Local Partner to perform some of the same services that Company A is paying Distributor to perform Unsatisfied
with Sales Executive’s explanation, she requests a meeting with Distributor and Principal 1 At the meeting, Distributor
and Principal 1 offer vague and inconsistent justifications for the payments and fail to provide any supporting analysis, and
Principal 1 seems to have no real expertise in the industry During a coffee break, Distributor comments to Sales Executive
that the finance officer is naïve about “how business is done in my country ” Following the meeting, Sales Executive
dismisses the finance officer’s concerns, assuring her that the proposed transaction structure is reasonable and legitimate
Sales Executive also reminds the finance officer that “the deal is key to their growth in the industry ”
The compliance officer focuses his due diligence on vetting Distributor and Local Partner and hires a business investigative
firm to conduct a background check Distributor appears reputable, capable, and financially stable and is willing to take on
real risk in the project, financial and otherwise However, the compliance officer learns that Distributor has established an
off-shore bank account for the transaction The compliance officer further learns that Local Partner’s business was organized
two years ago and appears financially stable but has no expertise in the industry and has established an off-shore shell
company and bank account to conduct this transaction The background check also reveals that Principal 1 is a former college
roommate of a senior official of the Ministry of Immigration The Sales Executive dismisses the compliance officer’s concerns,
commenting that what Local Partner does with its payments “isn’t our problem ” Sales Executive also strongly objects to the
compliance officer’s request to meet with Principal 1 to discuss the off-shore company and account, assuring him that it was
done for legitimate tax purposes and complaining that if Company A continues to “harass” Local Partner and Distributor, they
would partner with Company A’s chief competitor The compliance officer and the finance officer discuss their concerns with
each other but ultimately sign off on the deal even though their questions had not been answered Their decision is motivated
in large part by their conversation with Sales Executive, who told them that this was the region’s most important contract
and that the detailed FCPA questionnaires and robust anti-corruption representations in the contracts placed the burden on
Distributor and Local Partner to act ethically
Company A goes forward with the Distributor and Local Partner agreements and wins the contract after six months The
finance officer approves Company A’s payments to Local Partner via the offshore account, even though Local Partner’s invoices
did not contain supporting detail or documentation of any services provided Company A recorded the payments as legitimate
operational expenses on its books and records Sales Executive received a large year-end bonus due to the award of the contract
In fact, Local Partner and Distributor used part of the payments and discount margin, respectively, to funnel bribe payments
to several Ministry of Immigration officials, including Principal 1’s former college roommate, in exchange for awarding the
contract to Company A Thousands of dollars are also wired to the personal offshore bank account of Sales Executive
How would DOJ and SEC evaluate the potential FCPA liability of Company A and its employees?
This is not the case of a single “rogue employee” circumventing an otherwise robust compliance program Although
Company A’s finance and compliance officers had the correct instincts to scrutinize the structure and economics of the
transaction and the role of the third parties, their due diligence was incomplete When the initial inquiry identified significant
red flags, they approved the transaction despite knowing that their concerns were unanswered or the answers they received
raised additional concerns and red flags Relying on due diligence questionnaires and anti-corruption representations is
insufficient, particularly when the risks are readily apparent Nor can Company A or its employees shield themselves from
liability because it was Distributor and Local Partner—rather than Company A directly—that made the payments
The facts suggest that Sales Executive had actual knowledge of or was willfully blind to the consultant’s payment of
the bribes He also personally profited from the scheme (both from the kickback and from the bonus he received from the
company) and intentionally discouraged the finance and compliance officers from learning the full story Sales Executive is
therefore subject to liability under the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA, and
others may be as well Company A may also be liable for violations of the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal
controls provisions of the FCPA given the number and significance of red flags that established a high probability of bribery
and the role of employees and agents acting on the company’s behalf
chapter 5
Guiding Principles
of Enforcement
6566
chapter 6
FCPA Penalties,
Sanctions, and
Remedies
68
FCPA PENALTIES, SANCTIONS,
AND REMEDIES
What Are the Potential Consequences
for Violations of the FCPA?
The FCPA provides for different criminal and civil
penalties for companies and individuals.
Criminal Penalties
For each violation of the anti-bribery provisions, the
FCPA provides that corporations and other business enti-
ties are subject to a fine of up to $2 million.
341
Individuals,
including officers, directors, stockholders, and agents of
companies, are subject to a fine of up to $250,000 and
imprisonment for up to five years.
342
For each violation of the accounting provisions, the
FCPA provides that corporations and other business enti-
ties are subject to a fine of up to $25 million.
343
Individuals
are subject to a fine of up to $5 million and imprisonment
for up to 20 years.
344
Under the Alternative Fines Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d),
courts may impose significantly higher fines than those pro-
vided by the FCPA—up to twice the benefit that the defen-
dant obtained by making the corrupt payment, as long as
the facts supporting the increased fines are included in the
indictment and either proved to the jury beyond a reason-
able doubt or admitted in a guilty plea proceeding.
345
Fines
imposed on individuals may not be paid by their employer
or principal.
346
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
When calculating penalties for violations of the FCPA,
DOJ focuses its analysis on the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
(Guidelines)
347
in all of its resolutions, including guilty pleas,
DPAs, and NPAs. The Guidelines provide a very detailed and
predictable structure for calculating penalties for all federal
crimes, including violations of the FCPA. To determine the
appropriate penalty, the “offense level” is first calculated by
examining both the severity of the crime and facts specific to
the crime, with appropriate reductions for cooperation and
acceptance of responsibility, and, for business entities, addi-
tional factors such as voluntary disclosure, cooperation, pre-
existing compliance programs, and remediation.
The Guidelines provide for different penalties for the
different provisions of the FCPA. The initial offense level
for violations of the anti-bribery provisions is determined
under § 2C1.1, while violations of the accounting provi-
sions are assessed under § 2B1.1. For individuals, the initial
offense level is modified by factors set forth in Chapters 3,
4, and 5 of the Guidelines
348
to identify a final offense level.
This final offense level, combined with other factors, is used
69
to determine whether the Guidelines would recommend
that incarceration is appropriate, the length of any term of
incarceration, and the appropriate amount of any fine. For
corporations, the offense level is modified by factors par-
ticular to organizations as described in Chapter 8 to deter-
mine the applicable organizational penalty.
For example, violations of the anti-bribery provi-
sions are calculated pursuant to § 2C1.1. The offense level
is determined by first identifying the base offense level;
349
adding additional levels based on specific offense charac-
teristics, including whether the offense involved more than
one bribe, the value of the bribe or the benefit that was con-
ferred, and the level of the public official;
350
adjusting the
offense level based on the defendant’s role in the offense;
351
and using the total offense level as well as the defendant’s
criminal history category to determine the advisory guide-
line range.
352
For violations of the accounting provisions
assessed under § 2B1.1, the procedure is generally the
same, except that the specific offense characteristics differ.
For instance, for violations of the FCPA’s accounting pro-
visions, the offense level may be increased if a substantial
part of the scheme occurred outside the United States or if
the defendant was an officer or director of a publicly traded
company at the time of the offense.
353
For companies, the offense level is calculated pur-
suant to §§ 2C1.1 or 2B1.1 in the same way as for an
individual—by starting with the base offense level and
increasing it as warranted by any applicable specific
offense characteristics. The organizational guidelines
found in Chapter 8, however, provide the structure for
determining the final advisory guideline fine range for
organizations. The base fine consists of the greater of the
amount corresponding to the total offense level, calcu-
lated pursuant to the Guidelines, or the pecuniary gain or
loss from the offense.
354
This base fine is then multiplied
by a culpability score that can either reduce the fine to as
little as five percent of the base fine or increase the recom-
mended fine to up to four times the amount of the base
fine.
355
As described in § 8C2.5, this culpability score is
calculated by taking into account numerous factors such
as the size of the organization committing the criminal
acts; the involvement in or tolerance of criminal activ-
ity by high-level personnel within the organization; and
prior misconduct or obstructive behavior. The culpability
score is reduced if the organization had an effective pre-
existing compliance program to prevent violations and if
the organization voluntarily disclosed the offense, cooper-
ated in the investigation, and accepted responsibility for
the criminal conduct.
356
Civil Penalties
Although only DOJ has the authority to pursue crim-
inal actions, both DOJ and SEC have civil enforcement
authority under the FCPA. DOJ may pursue civil actions
for anti-bribery violations by domestic concerns (and their
officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders) and
foreign nationals and companies for violations while in the
United States, while SEC may pursue civil actions against
issuers and their officers, directors, employees, agents, or
stockholders for violations of the anti-bribery and the
accounting provisions.
357
For violations of the anti-bribery provisions, cor-
porations and other business entities are subject to a civil
penalty of up to $16,000 per violation.
358
Individuals,
including officers, directors, stockholders, and agents of
companies, are similarly subject to a civil penalty of up to
$16,000 per violation,
359
which may not be paid by their
employer or principal.
360
For violations of the accounting provisions, SEC may
obtain a civil penalty not to exceed the greater of (a) the
gross amount of the pecuniary gain to the defendant as a
result of the violations or (b) a specified dollar limitation.
The specified dollar limitations are based on the egregious-
ness of the violation, ranging from $7,500 to $150,000 for
an individual and $75,000 to $725,000 for a company.
361
SEC may obtain civil penalties both in actions filed in fed-
eral court and in administrative proceedings.
362
Collateral Consequences
In addition to the criminal and civil penalties described
above, individuals and companies who violate the FCPA may
face significant collateral consequences, including suspension
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FCPA Penalties,
Sanctions, and
Remedies
6970
or debarment from contracting with the federal government,
cross-debarment by multilateral development banks, and the
suspension or revocation of certain export privileges.
Debarment
Under federal guidelines governing procurement,
an individual or company that violates the FCPA or other
criminal statutes may be barred from doing business with the
federal government. The Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FAR) provide for the potential suspension or debarment
of companies that contract with the government upon
conviction of or civil judgment for bribery, falsification or
destruction of records, the making of false statements, or
“[c]ommission of any other offense indicating a lack of busi-
ness integrity or business honesty that seriously and directly
affects the present responsibility of a Government contrac-
tor or subcontractor.”
363
These measures are not intended
to be punitive and may be imposed only if “in the public’s
interest for the Government’s protection.”
364
Under the FAR, a decision to debar or suspend is dis-
cretionary. The decision is not made by DOJ prosecutors or
SEC staff, but instead by independent debarment authorities
within each agency, such as the Department of Defense or
the General Services Administration, which analyze a num-
ber of factors to determine whether a company should be sus-
pended, debarred, or otherwise determined to be ineligible
for government contracting. Such factors include whether
the contractor has effective internal control systems in place,
self-reported the misconduct in a timely manner, and has
taken remedial measures.
365
If a cause for debarment exists,
the contractor has the burden of demonstrating to the satis-
faction of the debarring official that it is presently responsible
and that debarment is not necessary.
366
Each federal depart-
ment and agency determines the eligibility of contractors
with whom it deals. However, if one department or agency
debars or suspends a contractor, the debarment or suspension
applies to the entire executive branch of the federal govern-
ment, unless a department or agency shows compelling rea-
sons not to debar or suspend the contractor.
367
Although guilty pleas, DPAs, and NPAs do not result
in automatic debarment from U.S. government contracting,
committing a federal crime and the factual admissions
underlying a resolution are factors that the independent
debarment authorities may consider. Moreover, indictment
alone can lead to suspension of the right to do business
with the government.
368
The U.S. Attorney’s Manual also
provides that when a company engages in fraud against the
government, a prosecutor may not negotiate away an agen-
cy’s right to debar or delist the company as part of the plea
bargaining process.
369
In making debarment determina-
tions, contracting agencies, including at the state and local
level, may consult with DOJ in advance of awarding a con-
tract. Depending on the circumstances, DOJ may provide
information to contracting authorities in the context of
the corporate settlement about the facts and circumstances
underlying the criminal conduct and remediation measures
undertaken by the company, if any. This information shar-
ing is not advocacy, and the ultimate debarment decisions
are squarely within the purview of the independent debar-
ment authorities. In some situations, the contracting agency
may impose its own oversight requirements in order for a
company that has admitted to violations of federal law to be
awarded federal contracts, such as the Corporate Integrity
Agreements often required by the Department of Health
and Human Services.
Cross-Debarment by Multilateral Development
Banks
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), like the
World Bank, also have the ability to debar companies and
individuals for corrupt practices.
370
Each MDB has its own
process for evaluating alleged corruption in connection
with MDB-funded projects. When appropriate, DOJ and
SEC work with MDBs to share evidence and refer cases.
On April 9, 2010, the African Development Bank Group,
the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for
71
Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American
Development Bank Group, and the World Bank Group
entered into an agreement under which entities debarred
by one MDB will be sanctioned for the same misconduct
by other signatory MDBs.
371
This cross-debarment agree-
ment means that if a company is debarred by one MDB, it
is debarred by all.
372
Loss of Export Privileges
Companies and individuals who violate the FCPA
may face consequences under other regulatory regimes,
such as the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C.
§ 2751, et seq., and its implementing regulations, the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22
C.F.R. § 120, et seq. AECA and ITAR together provide
for the suspension, revocation, amendment, or denial of an
arms export license if an applicant has been indicted or con-
victed for violating the FCPA.
373
They also set forth certain
factors for the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense
Trade Controls (DDTC)
374
to consider when determining
whether to grant, deny, or return without action license
applications for certain types of defense materials. One of
those factors is whether there is reasonable cause to believe
that an applicant for a license has violated (or conspired
to violate) the FCPA; if so, the Department of State “may
disapprove the application.”
375
In addition, it is the policy
of the Department of State not to consider applications for
licenses involving any persons who have been convicted of
violating the AECA or convicted of conspiracy to violate
the AECA.
376
In an action related to the criminal resolu-
tion of a U.K. military products manufacturer, the DDTC
imposed a “policy of denial” for export licenses on three of
the company’s subsidiaries that were involved in violations
of AECA and ITAR.
377
When Is a Compliance Monitor or
Independent Consultant Appropriate?
One of the primary goals of both criminal prosecu-
tions and civil enforcement actions against companies that
violate the FCPA is ensuring that such conduct does not
occur again. As a consequence, enhanced compliance and
reporting requirements may be part of criminal and civil
resolutions of FCPA matters. The amount of enhanced
compliance and kind of reporting required varies according
to the facts and circumstances of individual cases.
In criminal cases, a company’s sentence, or a DPA or
NPA with a company, may require the appointment of an
independent corporate monitor. Whether a monitor is
appropriate depends on the specific facts and circumstances
of the case. In 2008, DOJ issued internal guidance regard-
ing the selection and use of corporate monitors in DPAs
and NPAs with companies. Additional guidance has since
been issued.
378
A monitor is an independent third party who
assesses and monitors a company’s adherence to the com-
pliance requirements of an agreement that was designed to
reduce the risk of recurrence of the company’s misconduct.
Appointment of a monitor is not appropriate in all circum-
stances, but it may be appropriate, for example, where a com-
pany does not already have an effective internal compliance
program or needs to establish necessary internal controls. In
addition, companies are sometimes allowed to engage in self-
monitoring, typically in cases when the company has made
a voluntary disclosure, has been fully cooperative, and has
demonstrated a genuine commitment to reform.
Factors DOJ and SEC Consider
When Determining Whether a Compliance
Monitor Is Appropriate Include:
Seriousness of the offense
Duration of the misconduct
Pervasiveness of the misconduct, including
whether the conduct cuts across geographic and/
or product lines
Nature and size of the company
Quality of the company’s compliance program at
the time of the misconduct
Subsequent remediation efforts
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Sanctions, and
Remedies
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In civil cases, a company may similarly be required
to retain an independent compliance consultant or moni-
tor to provide an independent, third-party review of the
company’s internal controls. The consultant recommends
improvements, to the extent necessary, which the company
must adopt. When both DOJ and SEC require a com-
pany to retain a monitor, the two agencies have been able
to coordinate their requirements so that the company can
retain one monitor to fulfill both sets of requirements.
The most successful monitoring relationships are
those in which the company embraces the monitor or con-
sultant. If the company takes the recommendations and
suggestions seriously and uses the monitoring period as a
time to find and fix any outstanding compliance issues, the
company can emerge from the monitorship with a stronger,
long-lasting compliance program.
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Resolutions
74
RESOLUTIONS
What Are the Different Types of
Resolutions with DOJ?
Criminal Complaints, Informations, and Indictments
Charges against individuals and companies are
brought in three different ways under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure: criminal complaints, criminal infor-
mations, and indictments.
DOJ may agree to resolve criminal FCPA mat-
ters against companies either through a declination or, in
appropriate cases, a negotiated resolution resulting in a plea
agreement, deferred prosecution agreement, or non-prose-
cution agreement. For individuals, a negotiated resolution
will generally take the form of a plea agreement, which may
include language regarding cooperation, or a non-prosecu-
tion cooperation agreement. When negotiated resolutions
cannot be reached with companies or individuals, the mat-
ter may proceed to trial.
Plea Agreements
Plea agreements—whether with companies or
individuals—are governed by Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendant gener-
ally admits to the facts supporting the charges, admits
guilt, and is convicted of the charged crimes when the
plea agreement is presented to and accepted by a court.
The plea agreement may jointly recommend a sentence
or fine, jointly recommend an analysis under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, or leave such items open for
argument at the time of sentencing.
Deferred Prosecution Agreements
Under a deferred prosecution agreement, or a DPA
as it is commonly known, DOJ files a charging document
with the court,
379
but it simultaneously requests that the
prosecution be deferred, that is, postponed for the pur-
pose of allowing the company to demonstrate its good
conduct. DPAs generally require a defendant to agree to
pay a monetary penalty, waive the statute of limitations,
cooperate with the government, admit the relevant facts,
and enter into certain compliance and remediation com-
mitments, potentially including a corporate compliance
monitor. DPAs describe the company’s conduct, coopera-
tion, and remediation, if any, and provide a calculation of
the penalty pursuant to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
In addition to being publicly filed, DOJ places all of its
DPAs on its website. If the company successfully com-
pletes the term of the agreement (typically two or three
years), DOJ will then move to dismiss the filed charges. A
company’s successful completion of a DPA is not treated
as a criminal conviction.
75
Non-Prosecution Agreements
Under a non-prosecution agreement, or an NPA as
it is commonly known, DOJ maintains the right to file
charges but refrains from doing so to allow the company
to demonstrate its good conduct during the term of the
NPA. Unlike a DPA, an NPA is not filed with a court but is
instead maintained by the parties. In circumstances where
an NPA is with a company for FCPA-related offenses, it is
made available to the public through DOJ’s website. The
requirements of an NPA are similar to those of a DPA,
and generally require a waiver of the statute of limitations,
ongoing cooperation, admission of the material facts, and
compliance and remediation commitments, in addition to
payment of a monetary penalty. If the company complies
with the agreement throughout its term, DOJ does not file
criminal charges. If an individual complies with the terms
of his or her NPA, namely, truthful and complete coopera-
tion and continued law-abiding conduct, DOJ will not pur-
sue criminal charges.
Declinations
As discussed above, DOJ’s decision to bring or decline
to bring an enforcement action under the FCPA is made
pursuant to the Principles of Federal Prosecution, in the case
of individuals, and the Principles of Federal Prosecution
of Business Organizations, in the case of companies. As
described, in the case of individuals, the Principles of Federal
Prosecution advise prosecutors to weigh all relevant consid-
erations, including :
• federal law enforcement priorities;
• the nature and seriousness of the offense;
• the deterrent effect of prosecution;
• the person’s culpability in connection with the
offense;
• the person’s history of criminal activity;
• the person’s willingness to cooperate in the investi-
gation or prosecution of others; and
• the probable sentence or other consequences if the
person is convicted.
380
The Principles of Federal Prosecution provide addi-
tional commentary about each of these factors. For
instance, they explain that prosecutors should take into
account federal law enforcement priorities because federal
law enforcement and judicial resources are not sufficient
to permit prosecution of every alleged offense over which
federal jurisdiction exists. The deterrent effect of prosecu-
tion should also be kept in mind because some offenses,
“although seemingly not of great importance by themselves,
if commonly committed would have a substantial cumula-
tive impact on the community.”
381
As discussed above, the Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations require prosecutors to
consider nine factors when determining whether to prose-
cute a corporate entity for an FCPA violation, including the
nature and seriousness of the offense; the pervasiveness of
wrongdoing within the company; the company’s history of
similar conduct; the existence and effectiveness of the com-
pany’s pre-existing compliance program; and the adequacy
of remedies, such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions.
Pursuant to these guidelines, DOJ has declined to
prosecute both individuals and corporate entities in numer-
ous cases based on the particular facts and circumstances
presented in those matters, taking into account the avail-
able evidence.
382
To protect the privacy rights and other
interests of the uncharged and other potentially interested
parties, DOJ has a long-standing policy not to provide,
without the party’s consent, non-public information on
matters it has declined to prosecute. To put DOJ’s declina-
tions in context, however, in the past two years alone, DOJ
has declined several dozen cases against companies where
potential FCPA violations were alleged.
As mentioned above, there are rare occasions in
which, in conjunction with the public filing of charges
against an individual, it is appropriate to disclose that a
company is not also being prosecuted. That was done in a
recent case where a former employee was charged but the
former corporate employer was not.
383
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What Are the Different Types of
Resolutions with SEC?
Civil Injunctive Actions and Remedies
In a civil injunctive action, SEC seeks a court order
compelling the defendant to obey the law in the future.
Violating such an order can result in civil or criminal con-
tempt proceedings. Civil contempt sanctions, brought by
SEC, are remedial rather than punitive in nature and serve
one of two purposes: to compensate the party injured as a
result of the violation of the injunction or force compliance
with the terms of the injunction.
Where a defendant has profited from a violation of
law, SEC can obtain the equitable relief of disgorgement
of ill-gotten gains and pre-judgment interest and can also
obtain civil money penalties pursuant to Sections 21(d)(3)
and 32(c) of the Exchange Act. SEC may also seek ancillary
relief (such as an accounting from a defendant). Pursuant
to Section 21(d)(5), SEC also may seek, and any federal
court may grant, any other equitable relief that may be
appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors, such
as enhanced remedial measures or the retention of an inde-
pendent compliance consultant or monitor.
Civil Administrative Actions and Remedies
SEC has the ability to institute various types of admin-
istrative proceedings against a person or an entity that it
believes has violated the law. This type of enforcement action
is brought by SEC’s Enforcement Division and is litigated
before an SEC administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ’s
decision is subject to appeal directly to the Securities and
Exchange Commission itself, and the Commission’s decision
is in turn subject to review by a U.S. Court of Appeals.
Administrative proceedings provide for a variety of
relief. For regulated persons and entities, such as broker-
dealers and investment advisers and persons associated with
them, sanctions include censure, limitation on activities,
suspension of up to twelve months, and bar from associa-
tion or revocation of registration. For professionals such as
attorneys and accountants, SEC can order in Rule 102(e)
proceedings that the professional be censured, suspended,
or barred from practicing before SEC.
384
SEC staff can seek
an order from an administrative law judge requiring the
respondent to cease and desist from any current or future
violations of the securities laws. In addition, SEC can obtain
disgorgement, pre-judgment interest, and civil money pen-
alties in administrative proceedings under Section 21B
of the Exchange Act, and also can obtain other equitable
relief, such as enhanced remedial measures or the retention
of an independent compliance consultant or monitor.
Deferred Prosecution Agreements
A deferred prosecution agreement is a written agree-
ment between SEC and a potential cooperating individual
or company in which SEC agrees to forego an enforcement
action against the individual or company if the individual
or company agrees to, among other things: (1) cooper-
ate truthfully and fully in SEC’s investigation and related
enforcement actions; (2) enter into a long-term tolling
agreement; (3) comply with express prohibitions and/
or undertakings during a period of deferred prosecution;
and (4) under certain circumstances, agree either to admit
or not to contest underlying facts that SEC could assert
to establish a violation of the federal securities laws. If the
agreement is violated during the period of deferred prosecu-
tion, SEC staff may recommend an enforcement action to
the Commission against the individual or company for the
original misconduct as well as any additional misconduct.
Furthermore, if the Commission authorizes the enforce-
ment action, SEC staff may use any factual admissions
made by the cooperating individual or company in support
of a motion for summary judgment, while maintaining the
ability to bring an enforcement action for any additional
misconduct at a later date.
77
In May of 2011, SEC entered into its first deferred
prosecution agreement against a company for violating the
F C PA .
385
In that case, a global manufacturer of steel pipe
products violated the FCPA by bribing Uzbekistan govern-
ment officials during a bidding process to supply pipelines
for transporting oil and natural gas. The company made
almost $5 million in profits when it was subsequently
awarded several contracts by the Uzbekistan government.
The company discovered the misconduct during a world-
wide review of its operations and brought it to the govern-
ment’s attention. In addition to self-reporting, the company
conducted a thorough internal investigation; provided
complete, real-time cooperation with SEC and DOJ staff;
and undertook extensive remediation, including enhanced
anti-corruption procedures and training. Under the terms
of the DPA, the company paid $5.4 million in disgorge-
ment and prejudgment interest. The company also paid a
$3.5 million monetary penalty to resolve a criminal investi-
gation by DOJ through an NPA.
386
For further information about deferred prosecution
agreements, see SEC’s Enforcement Manual.
387
Non-Prosecution Agreements
A non-prosecution agreement is a written agreement
between SEC and a potential cooperating individual or com-
pany, entered into in limited and appropriate circumstances,
that provides that SEC will not pursue an enforcement
action against the individual or company if the individual or
company agrees to, among other things: (1) cooperate truth-
fully and fully in SEC’s investigation and related enforce-
ment actions; and (2) comply, under certain circumstances,
with express undertakings. If the agreement is violated, SEC
staff retains its ability to recommend an enforcement action
to the Commission against the individual or company.
For further information about non-prosecution
agreements, see SEC’s Enforcement Manual.
388
Termination Letters and Declinations
As discussed above, SEC’s decision to bring or
decline to bring an enforcement action under the FCPA is
made pursuant to the guiding principles set forth in SEC’s
Enforcement Manual. The same factors that apply to SEC
staff ’s determination of whether to recommend an enforce-
ment action against an individual or entity apply to the
decision to close an investigation without recommending
enforcement action.
389
Generally, SEC staff considers, among other things:
• the seriousness of the conduct and potential viola-
tions;
• the resources available to SEC staff to pursue the
investigation;
• the sufficiency and strength of the evidence;
• the extent of potential investor harm if an action is
not commenced; and
• the age of the conduct underlying the potential
violations.
SEC has declined to take enforcement action against
both individuals and companies based on the facts and cir-
cumstances present in those matters, where, for example,
the conduct was not egregious, the company fully coop-
erated, and the company identified and remediated the
misconduct quickly. SEC Enforcement Division policy is
to notify individuals and entities at the earliest opportu-
nity when the staff has determined not to recommend an
enforcement action against them to the Commission. This
notification takes the form of a termination letter.
In order to protect the privacy rights and other inter-
ests of the uncharged and other potentially interested par-
ties, SEC does not provide non-public information on mat-
ters it has declined to prosecute.
What Are Some Examples of Past
Declinations by DOJ and SEC?
Neither DOJ nor SEC typically publicizes declina-
tions but, to provide some insight into the process, the fol-
lowing are recent, anonymized examples of matters DOJ
and SEC have declined to pursue:
Example 1: Public Company Declination
DOJ and SEC declined to take enforcement action
against a public U.S. company. Factors taken into consider-
ation included:
chapter 7
Resolutions
7778
• The company discovered that its employees had
received competitor bid information from a third
party with connections to the foreign government.
• The company began an internal investigation,
withdrew its contract bid, terminated the employees
involved, severed ties to the third-party agent, and
voluntarily disclosed the conduct to DOJ’s Antitrust
Division, which also declined prosecution.
• During the internal investigation, the company
uncovered various FCPA red flags, including prior
concerns about the third-party agent, all of which
the company voluntarily disclosed to DOJ and SEC.
• The company immediately took substantial steps to
improve its compliance program.
Example 2: Public Company Declination
DOJ and SEC declined to take enforcement action
against a public U.S. company. Factors taken into consider-
ation included:
• With knowledge of employees of the company’s
subsidiary, a retained construction company
paid relatively small bribes, which were wrongly
approved by the company’s local law firm, to for-
eign building code inspectors.
• When the company’s compliance department
learned of the bribes, it immediately ended the
conduct, terminated its relationship with the con-
struction company and law firm, and terminated or
disciplined the employees involved.
• The company completed a thorough internal inves-
tigation and voluntarily disclosed to DOJ and SEC.
• The company reorganized its compliance depart-
ment, appointed a new compliance officer dedi-
cated to anti-corruption, improved the training
and compliance program, and undertook a
review of all of the company’s international third-
party relationships.
Example 3: Public Company Declination
DOJ and SEC declined to take enforcement action
against a U.S. publicly held industrial services company for
bribes paid by a small foreign subsidiary. Factors taken into
consideration included:
• The company self-reported the conduct to DOJ
and SEC.
• The total amount of the improper payments was
relatively small, and the activity appeared to be
an isolated incident by a single employee at the
subsidiary.
• The profits potentially obtained from the improper
payments were very small.
• The payments were detected by the company’s
existing internal controls. The company’s audit
committee conducted a thorough independent
internal investigation. The results of the investiga-
tion were provided to the government.
• The company cooperated fully with investigations
by DOJ and SEC.
• The company implemented significant remedial
actions and enhanced its internal control structure.
Example 4: Public Company Declination
DOJ and SEC declined to take enforcement action
against a U.S. publicly held oil-and-gas services company
for small bribes paid by a foreign subsidiary’s customs agent.
Factors taken into consideration included:
• The company’s internal controls timely detected a
potential bribe before a payment was made.
• When company management learned of the
potential bribe, management immediately reported
the issue to the company’s General Counsel and
Audit Committee and prevented the payment from
occurring.
• Within weeks of learning of the attempted bribe,
the company provided in-person FCPA training
to employees of the subsidiary and undertook
79
an extensive internal investigation to determine
whether any of the company’s subsidiaries in the
same region had engaged in misconduct.
• The company self-reported the misconduct and the
results of its internal investigation to DOJ and SEC.
• The company cooperated fully with investigations
by DOJ and SEC.
• In addition to the immediate training at the relevant
subsidiary, the company provided comprehensive
FCPA training to all of its employees and conducted
an extensive review of its anti-corruption compliance
program.
• The company enhanced its internal controls and
record-keeping policies and procedures, includ-
ing requiring periodic internal audits of customs
payments.
• As part of its remediation, the company directed that
local lawyers rather than customs agents be used to
handle its permits, with instructions that “no matter
what, we don’t pay bribes”—a policy that resulted in
a longer and costlier permit procedure.
Example 5: Public Company Declination
DOJ and SEC declined to take enforcement action
against a U.S. publicly held consumer products company
in connection with its acquisition of a foreign company.
Factors taken into consideration included:
• The company identified the potential improper
payments to local government officials as part of its
pre-acquisition due diligence.
• The company promptly developed a comprehen-
sive plan to investigate, correct, and remediate any
FCPA issues after acquisition.
• The company promptly self-reported the issues prior
to acquisition and provided the results of its investi-
gation to the government on a real-time basis.
• The acquiring company’s existing internal controls
and compliance program were robust.
• After the acquisition closed, the company imple-
mented a comprehensive remedial plan, ensured
that all improper payments stopped, provided
extensive FCPA training to employees of the new
subsidiary, and promptly incorporated the new
subsidiary into the company’s existing internal
controls and compliance environment.
Example 6: Private Company Declination
In 2011, DOJ declined to take prosecutorial action
against a privately held U.S. company and its foreign subsid-
iary. Factors taken into consideration included:
• The company voluntarily disclosed bribes paid to
social security officials in a foreign country.
• The total amount of the bribes was small.
• When discovered, the corrupt practices were imme-
diately terminated.
• The conduct was thoroughly investigated, and the
results of the investigation were promptly provided
to DOJ.
• All individuals involved were either terminated
or disciplined. The company also terminated its
relationship with its foreign law firm.
• The company instituted improved training and
compliance programs commensurate with its size
and risk exposure.
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7980
chapter 8
Whistleblower
Provisions and
Protections
82
WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS
AND PROTECTIONS
Assistance and information from a whistleblower who knows of possible secu-
rities law violations can be among the most powerful weapons in the law en-
forcement arsenal. Through their knowledge of the circumstances and individu-
als involved, whistleblowers can help SEC and DOJ identify potential violations
much earlier than might otherwise have been possible, thus allowing SEC and
DOJ to minimize the harm to investors, better preserve the integrity of the
U.S. capital markets, and more swiftly hold accountable those responsible for
unlawful conduct.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank
Act of 2010 both contain provisions affecting whistleblow-
ers who report FCPA violations. Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits
issuers from retaliating against whistleblowers and provides
that employees who are retaliated against for reporting pos-
sible securities law violations may file a complaint with the
Department of Labor, for which they would be eligible to
receive reinstatement, back pay, and other compensation.
390
Sarbanes-Oxley also prohibits retaliation against employee
whistleblowers under the obstruction of justice statute.
391
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act added Section 21F to
the Exchange Act, addressing whistleblower incentives and
protections. Section 21F authorizes SEC to provide mon-
etary awards to eligible individuals who voluntarily come
forward with high quality, original information that leads
to an SEC enforcement action in which over $1,000,000 in
sanctions is ordered.
392
The awards range is between 10%
and 30% of the monetary sanctions recovered by the gov-
ernment. The Dodd-Frank Act also prohibits employers
from retaliating against whistleblowers and creates a private
right of action for employees who are retaliated against.
393
Furthermore, businesses should be aware that retali-
ation against a whistleblower may also violate state, local,
and foreign laws that provide protection of whistleblowers.
83
SEC Office of the Whistleblower
100 F Street NE, Mail Stop 5971
Washington, DC 20549
Facsimile: (703) 813-9322
Online Report Form: http://www .sec .gov/
whistleblower
On August 12, 2011, the final rules for SEC’s
Whistleblower Program became effective. These rules set
forth the requirements for whistleblowers to be eligible for
awards consideration, the factors that SEC will use to deter-
mine the amount of the award, the categories of individuals
who are excluded from award consideration, and the cate-
gories of individuals who are subject to limitations in award
considerations.
394
The final rules strengthen incentives for
employees to report the suspected violations internally
through internal compliance programs when appropriate,
although it does not require an employee to do so in order
to qualify for an award.
395
Individuals with information about a possible viola-
tion of the federal securities laws, including FCPA viola-
tions, should submit that information to SEC either online
through SEC’s Tips, Complaints, and Referrals (TCR)
Intake and Resolution System (available at https://dene-
bleo.sec.gov/TCRExternal/disclaimer.xhtml) or by mail-
ing or faxing a completed Form TCR to the Commission’s
Office of the Whistleblower.
Whistleblowers can submit information anony-
mously. To be considered under SEC’s whistleblower pro-
gram as eligible for a reward, however, the information
must be submitted on an anonymous whistleblower’s behalf
by an attorney.
396
Whether or not a whistleblower reports
anonymously, SEC is committed to protecting the identity
of a whistleblower to the fullest extent possible under the
statute.
397
SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower administers
SEC’s Whistleblower Program and answers questions from
the public regarding the program. Additional informa-
tion regarding SEC’s Whistleblower Program, including
answers to frequently asked questions, is available online at
http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower.
chapter 8
Whistleblower
Provisions and
Protections
8384
chapter 9
DOJ Opinion
Procedure
86
DOJ OPINION PROCEDURE
DOJ’s opinion procedure is a valuable mechanism for companies and individu-
als to determine whether proposed conduct would be prosecuted by DOJ
under the FCPA.
398
Generally speaking, under the opinion procedure process,
parties submit information to DOJ, after which DOJ issues an opinion about
whether the proposed conduct falls within its enforcement policy. All of DOJ’s
prior opinions are available online.
399
Parties interested in obtaining such an
opinion should follow these steps:
400
First, those seeking an opinion should evaluate whether
their question relates to actual, prospective conduct.
401
The
opinion procedure cannot be used to obtain opinions on
purely historical conduct or on hypothetical questions. DOJ
will not consider a request unless that portion of the transac-
tion for which an opinion is sought involves only prospective
conduct, although the transaction as a whole may have com-
ponents that already have occurred. An executed contract
is not a prerequisite and, in most—if not all—instances, an
opinion request should be made before the requestor com-
mits to proceed with a transaction.
402
Those seeking requests
should be aware that FCPA opinions relate only to the
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.
403
Second, before making the request, the company or
individual should check that they are either an issuer or a
domestic concern, as only those categories of parties can
receive an opinion.
404
If the transaction involves more than
one issuer or domestic concern, consider making a request
for an opinion jointly, as opinions only apply to the parties
that request them.
405
Third, those seeking an opinion must put their request
in writing. The request must be specific and accompanied
by all relevant and material information bearing on the con-
duct and circumstances for which an opinion is requested.
Material information includes background information,
complete copies of all operative documents, and detailed
statements of all collateral or oral understandings, if any.
Those seeking opinions are under an affirmative obligation
to make full and true disclosures.
406
Materials disclosed to
DOJ will not be made public without the consent of the
party submitting them.
407
87
Fourth, the request must be signed. For corporate
requestors, the signatory should be an appropriate senior
officer with operational responsibility for the conduct that is
the subject of the request and who has been designated by the
corporation’s chief executive officer. In appropriate cases, DOJ
also may require the chief executive officer to sign the request.
Those signing the request must certify that it contains a true,
correct, and complete disclosure with respect to the proposed
conduct and the circumstances of the conduct.
408
Fifth, an original and five copies of the request should
be addressed to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Criminal Division, Attention: FCPA Opinion Group.
409
The mailing address is P.O. Box 28188 Central Station,
Washington, D.C. 20038. DOJ also asks that you send an
electronic courtesy copy to [email protected].
DOJ will evaluate the request for an FCPA opinion.
410
A party may withdraw a request for an opinion at any time
prior to the release of an opinion.
411
If the request is complete
and all the relevant information has been submitted, DOJ will
respond to the request by issuing an opinion within 30 days.
412
If the request is incomplete, DOJ will identify for the requestor
what additional information or documents are required for
DOJ to review the request. Such information must be pro-
vided to DOJ promptly. Once the additional information has
been received, DOJ will issue an opinion within 30 days of
receipt of that additional information.
413
DOJ’s FCPA opin-
ions state whether, for purposes of DOJ’s present enforcement
policy, the prospective conduct would violate either the issuer
or domestic concern anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.
414
DOJ also may take other positions in the opinion as it con-
siders appropriate.
415
To the extent that the opinion concludes
that the proposed conduct would not violate the FCPA, a
rebuttable presumption is created that the requestor’s con-
duct that was the basis of the opinion is in compliance with
the FCPA.
416
In order to provide non-binding guidance to the
business community, DOJ makes versions of its opinions pub-
licly available on its website.
417
If, after receiving an opinion, a party is concerned about
prospective conduct that is beyond the scope of conduct speci-
fied in a previous request, the party may submit an additional
request for an opinion using the procedures outlined above.
418
chapter 9
DOJ Opinion
Procedure
8788
chapter 10
Conclusion
90
CONCLUSION
The FCPA was designed to prevent corrupt practices, protect investors,
and provide a fair playing field for those honest companies trying to win busi-
ness based on quality and price rather than bribes. Following Congress’ leader-
ship in enacting the FCPA 35 years ago, and through determined international
diplomatic and law enforcement efforts in the time since, laws like the FCPA
prohibiting foreign bribery have been enacted by most of the United States’
major trading partners.
This guide is designed to provide practical advice about, and useful in-
sights into, our enforcement considerations. For businesses desiring to com-
pete fairly in foreign markets, it is our goal to maximize those businesses’ ability
to comply with the FCPA in the most effective and efficient way suitable to their
business and the markets in which they operate. Through our ongoing efforts
with the U.S. and international business and legal communities and non-
governmental organizations, DOJ and SEC can continue effectively to protect
the integrity of our markets and reduce corruption around the world.
APPENDIX
The Foreign
Corrupt
ices ActtcPra
92
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT:
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78m, 78ff
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 [Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934] Prohibited foreign trade practices by issuers
(a) Prohibition
It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a class of securities regis-
tered pursuant to section 78l of this title or which is required to file
reports under section 78o(d) of this title, or for any officer, director,
employee, or agent of such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting
on behalf of such issuer, to make use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an
offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any
money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of
anything of value to—
(1) any foreign official for purposes of—
(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his
official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do
any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing
any improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or
decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or
with, or directing business to, any person;
(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for
foreign political office for purposes of—
(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candi-
date in its or his official capacity, (ii) inducing such party, official, or
candidate to do or omit to do an act in violation of the lawful duty of
such party, official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advan-
tage; or
(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or his influ-
ence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or
influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or
with, or directing business to, any person; or
(3) any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or
thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly,
to any foreign official, to any foreign political party or official thereof,
or to any candidate for foreign political office, for purposes of—
(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, politi-
cal party, party official, or candidate in his or its official capacity, (ii)
inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or candi-
date to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of
such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate, or (iii)
securing any improper advantage; or
93
(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or can-
didate to use his or its influence with a foreign government or instru-
mentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such
government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or
with, or directing business to, any person.
(b) Exception for routine governmental action
Subsections (a) and (g ) of this section shall not apply to any facilitat-
ing or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or party
official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the perfor-
mance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official, political
party, or party official.
(c) Affirmative defenses
It shall be an affirmative defense to actions under subsection (a) or (g )
of this section that—
(1) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was
made, was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign
official’s, political party’s, party official’s, or candidate’s country; or
(2) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was
made, was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and
lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party,
party official, or candidate and was directly related to—
(A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or ser-
vices; or
(B) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign govern-
ment or agency thereof.
(d) Guidelines by Attorney General
Not later than one year after August 23, 1988, the Attorney General,
after consultation with the Commission, the Secretary of Commerce,
the United States Trade Representative, the Secretary of State, and the
Secretary of the Treasury, and after obtaining the views of all interested
persons through public notice and comment procedures, shall deter-
mine to what extent compliance with this section would be enhanced
and the business community would be assisted by further clarification of
the preceding provisions of this section and may, based on such determi-
nation and to the extent necessary and appropriate, issue—
(1) guidelines describing specific types of conduct, associated with
common types of export sales arrangements and business contracts,
which for purposes of the Department of Justice’s present enforce-
ment policy, the Attorney General determines would be in confor-
mance with the preceding provisions of this section; and
(2) general precautionary procedures which issuers may use on a vol-
untary basis to conform their conduct to the Department of Justice’s
present enforcement policy regarding the preceding provisions of this
section. The Attorney General shall issue the guidelines and procedures
referred to in the preceding sentence in accordance with the provisions
of subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5 and those guidelines and proce-
dures shall be subject to the provisions of chapter 7 of that title.
(e) Opinions of Attorney
General
(1) The Attorney General, after consultation with appropriate depart-
ments and agencies of the United States and after obtaining the views
of all interested persons through public notice and comment pro-
cedures, shall establish a procedure to provide responses to specific
inquiries by issuers concerning conformance of their conduct with the
Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy regarding the pre-
ceding provisions of this section. The Attorney General shall, within
30 days after receiving such a request, issue an opinion in response
to that request. The opinion shall state whether or not certain speci-
fied prospective conduct would, for purposes of the Department of
Justice’s present enforcement policy, violate the preceding provisions
of this section. Additional requests for opinions may be filed with the
Attorney General regarding other specified prospective conduct that
is beyond the scope of conduct specified in previous requests. In any
action brought under the applicable provisions of this section, there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that conduct, which is specified in a
request by an issuer and for which the Attorney General has issued an
opinion that such conduct is in conformity with the Department of
Justice’s present enforcement policy, is in compliance with the preced-
ing provisions of this section. Such a presumption may be rebutted by
a preponderance of the evidence. In considering the presumption for
purposes of this paragraph, a court shall weight all relevant factors,
including but not limited to whether the information submitted to
the Attorney General was accurate and complete and whether it was
within the scope of the conduct specified in any request received by
the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall establish the pro-
cedure required by this paragraph in accordance with the provisions
of subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5 and that procedure shall be
subject to the provisions of chapter 7 of that title.
(2) Any document or other material which is provided to, received by,
or prepared in the Department of Justice or any other department or
agency of the United States in connection with a request by an issuer
under the procedure established under paragraph (1), shall be exempt
from disclosure under section 552 of Title 5 and shall not, except
with the consent of the issuer, be made publicly available, regardless of
whether the Attorney General responds to such a request or the issuer
withdraws such request before receiving a response.
(3) Any issuer who has made a request to the Attorney General
under paragraph (1) may withdraw such request prior to the time the
Attorney General issues an opinion in response to such request. Any
request so withdrawn shall have no force or effect.
APPENDIX
The Foreign
Corrupt
Practices Act
9394
(4) The Attorney General shall, to the maximum extent practicable,
provide timely guidance concerning the Department of Justice’s pres-
ent enforcement policy with respect to the preceding provisions of
this section to potential exporters and small businesses that are unable
to obtain specialized counsel on issues pertaining to such provisions.
Such guidance shall be limited to responses to requests under para-
graph (1) concerning conformity of specified prospective conduct
with the Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy regard-
ing the preceding provisions of this section and general explanations
of compliance responsibilities and of potential liabilities under the
preceding provisions of this section.
(f ) Definitions
For purposes of this section:
(1)(A) The term “foreign official” means any officer or employee of
a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person act-
ing in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or
department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such
public international organization.
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term “public international
organization” means—
(i) an organization that is designated by Executive Order pursuant
to section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22
U.S.C. § 288); or
(ii) any other international organization that is designated by the
President by Executive order for the purposes of this section, effective
as of the date of publication of such order in the Federal Register.
(2) (A) A person’s state of mind is “knowing” with respect to conduct,
a circumstance, or a result if—
(i) such person is aware that such person is engaging in such conduct,
that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially cer-
tain to occur; or
(ii) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that
such result is substantially certain to occur.
(B) When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is
required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is
aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless
the person actually believes that such circumstance does not exist.
(3)(A) The term “routine governmental action” means only an action
which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in—
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a
person to do business in a foreign country;
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or sched-
uling inspections associated with contract performance or inspections
related to transit of goods across country;
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and
unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities
from deterioration; or
(v) actions of a similar nature.
(B) The term “routine governmental action” does not include any
decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award
new business to or to continue business with a particular party, or
any action taken by a foreign official involved in the decision-making
process to encourage a decision to award new business to or continue
business with a particular party.
(g ) Alternative Jurisdiction
(1) It shall also be unlawful for any issuer organized under the laws of
the United States, or a State, territory, possession, or commonwealth
of the United States or a political subdivision thereof and which has
a class of securities registered pursuant to section 78l of this title or
which is required to file reports under section 78o(d)) of this title, or
for any United States person that is an officer, director, employee, or
agent of such issuer or a stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such
issuer, to corruptly do any act outside the United States in furtherance
of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment
of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the
giving of anything of value to any of the persons or entities set forth
in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subsection (a) of this section
for the purposes set forth therein, irrespective of whether such issuer
or such officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder makes use
of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
in furtherance of such offer, gift, payment, promise, or authorization.
(2) As used in this subsection, the term “United States person” means
a national of the United States (as defined in section 101 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101)) or any corpo-
ration, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust,
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship organized under
the laws of the United States or any State, territory, possession, or com-
monwealth of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 Prohibited foreign trade practices by domestic
concerns
(a) Prohibition
It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern, other than an issuer
which is subject to section 78dd-1 of this title, or for any officer, direc-
tor, employee, or agent of such domestic concern or any stockholder
95
thereof acting on behalf of such domestic concern, to make use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce cor-
ruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authori-
zation of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or
authorization of the giving of anything of value to—
(1) any foreign official for purposes of—
(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his
official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do
any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing
any improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act
or decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining busi-
ness for or with, or directing business to, any person; or
(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for
foreign political office for purposes of—
(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candi-
date in its or his official capacity, (ii) inducing such party, official, or can-
didate to do or omit to do an act in violation of the lawful duty of such
party, official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or his influ-
ence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or
influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining busi-
ness for or with, or directing business to, any person;
(3) any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or
thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly,
to any foreign official, to any foreign political party or official thereof,
or to any candidate for foreign political office, for purposes of—
(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, politi-
cal party, party official, or candidate in his or its official capacity, (ii)
inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or candi-
date to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of
such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate, or (iii)
securing any improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or can-
didate to use his or its influence with a foreign government or instru-
mentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such
government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining busi-
ness for or with, or directing business to, any person.
(b) Exception for routine governmental action
Subsections (a) and (i) of this section shall not apply to any facilitat-
ing or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or party
official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the perfor-
mance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official, political
party, or party official.
(c) Affirmative defenses
It shall be an affirmative defense to actions under subsection (a) or (i)
of this section that—
(1) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was
made, was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign
official’s, political party’s, party official’s, or candidate’s country; or
(2) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was
made, was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and
lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party,
party official, or candidate and was directly related to—
(A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or ser-
vices; or
(B) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign govern-
ment or agency thereof.
(d) Injunctive relief
(1) When it appears to the Attorney General that any domestic con-
cern to which this section applies, or officer, director, employee, agent,
or stockholder thereof, is engaged, or about to engage, in any act or
practice constituting a violation of subsection (a) or (i) of this sec-
tion, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, bring a civil action
in an appropriate district court of the United States to enjoin such act
or practice, and upon a proper showing, a permanent injunction or a
temporary restraining order shall be granted without bond.
(2) For the purpose of any civil investigation which, in the opinion of
the Attorney General, is necessary and proper to enforce this section,
the Attorney General or his designee are empowered to administer
oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require
the production of any books, papers, or other documents which the
Attorney General deems relevant or material to such investigation.
The attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evi-
dence may be required from any place in the United States, or any
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States, at any
designated place of hearing.
(3) In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to,
any person, the Attorney General may invoke the aid of any court of
the United States within the jurisdiction of which such investigation
or proceeding is carried on, or where such person resides or carries
APPENDIX
The Foreign
Corrupt
Practices Act
9596
on business, in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and the production of books, papers, or other documents. Any such
court may issue an order requiring such person to appear before the
Attorney General or his designee, there to produce records, if so
ordered, or to give testimony touching the matter under investigation.
Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such
court as a contempt thereof. All process in any such case may be served
in the judicial district in which such person resides or may be found.
The Attorney General may make such rules relating to civil investiga-
tions as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions
of this subsection.
(e) Guidelines by Attorney General
Not later than 6 months after August 23, 1988, the Attorney General,
after consultation with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, the
Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Treasury, and after obtain-
ing the views of all interested persons through public notice and com-
ment procedures, shall determine to what extent compliance with
this section would be enhanced and the business community would
be assisted by further clarification of the preceding provisions of this
section and may, based on such determination and to the extent neces-
sary and appropriate, issue—
(1) guidelines describing specific types of conduct, associated with
common types of export sales arrangements and business contracts,
which for purposes of the Department of Justice’s present enforce-
ment policy, the Attorney General determines would be in confor-
mance with the preceding provisions of this section; and
(2) general precautionary procedures which domestic concerns may
use on a voluntary basis to conform their conduct to the Department
of Justice’s present enforcement policy regarding the preceding provi-
sions of this section.
The Attorney General shall issue the guidelines and procedures
referred to in the preceding sentence in accordance with the provi-
sions of s
ubchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5 and those guidelines and
procedures shall be subject to the provisions of chapter 7 of that title.
(f ) Opinions of Attorney General
(1) The Attorney General, after consultation with appropriate depart-
ments and agencies of the United States and after obtaining the views of
all interested persons through public notice and comment procedures,
shall establish a procedure to provide responses to specific inquiries by
domestic concerns concerning conformance of their conduct with the
Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy regarding the pre-
ceding provisions of this section. The Attorney General shall, within
30 days after receiving such a request, issue an opinion in response to
that request. The opinion shall state whether or not certain specified
prospective conduct would, for purposes of the Department of Justice’s
present enforcement policy, violate the preceding provisions of this sec-
tion. Additional requests for opinions may be filed with the Attorney
General regarding other specified prospective conduct that is beyond
the scope of conduct specified in previous requests. In any action
brought under the applicable provisions of this section, there shall be
a rebuttable presumption that conduct, which is specified in a request
by a domestic concern and for which the Attorney General has issued
an opinion that such conduct is in conformity with the Department of
Justice’s present enforcement policy, is in compliance with the preced-
ing provisions of this section. Such a presumption may be rebutted by a
preponderance of the evidence. In considering the presumption for pur-
poses of this paragraph, a court shall weigh all relevant factors, including
but not limited to whether the information submitted to the Attorney
General was accurate and complete and whether it was within the
scope of the conduct specified in any request received by the Attorney
General. The Attorney General shall establish the procedure required
by this paragraph in accordance with the provisions of subchapter II of
chapter 5 of Title 5 and that procedure shall be subject to the provisions
of chapter 7 of that title.
(2) Any document or other material which is provided to, received by,
or prepared in the Department of Justice or any other department or
agency of the United States in connection with a request by a domes-
tic concern under the procedure established under paragraph (1), shall
be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of Title 5 and shall not,
except with the consent of the domestic concern, by made publicly
available, regardless of whether the Attorney General response to
such a request or the domestic concern withdraws such request before
receiving a response.
(3) Any domestic concern who has made a request to the Attorney
General under paragraph (1) may withdraw such request prior to
the time the Attorney General issues an opinion in response to such
request. Any request so withdrawn shall have no force or effect.
(4) The Attorney General shall, to the maximum extent practicable,
provide timely guidance concerning the Department of Justice’s pres-
ent enforcement policy with respect to the preceding provisions of
this section to potential exporters and small businesses that are unable
to obtain specialized counsel on issues pertaining to such provisions.
Such guidance shall be limited to responses to requests under para-
graph (1) concerning conformity of specified prospective conduct
with the Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy regard-
ing the preceding provisions of this section and general explanations
of compliance responsibilities and of potential liabilities under the
preceding provisions of this section.
97
(g ) Penalties
(1)(A) Any domestic concern that is not a natural person and that
violates subsection (a) or (i) of this section shall be fined not more
than $2,000,000.
(B) Any domestic concern that is not a natural person and that vio-
lates subsection (a) or (i) of this section shall be subject to a civil pen-
alty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an action brought by the
Attorney General.
(2)(A) Any natural person that is an officer, director, employee, or
agent of a domestic concern, or stockholder acting on behalf of such
domestic concern, who willfully violates subsection (a) or (i) of this
section shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both.
(B) Any natural person that is an officer, director, employee, or agent
of a domestic concern, or stockholder acting on behalf of such domes-
tic concern, who violates subsection (a) or (i) of this section shall be
subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an
action brought by the Attorney General.
(3) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) upon any officer,
director, employee, agent, or stockholder of a domestic concern, such
fine may not be paid, directly or indirectly, by such domestic concern.
(h) Definitions
For purposes of this section:
(1) The term “domestic concern” means—
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United
States; and
(B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship
which has its principal place of business in the United States, or which
is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a terri-
tory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.
(2)(A) The term “foreign official” means any officer or employee of
a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person act-
ing in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or
department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such
public international organization.
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term “public international
organization” means—
(i) an organization that has been designated by Executive order pursu-
ant to Section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act
(22 U.S.C. § 288); or
(ii) any other international organization that is designated by the
President by Executive order for the purposes of this section, effective
as of the date of publication of such order in the Federal Register.
(3)(A) A person’s state of mind is “knowing” with respect to conduct,
a circumstance, or a result if—
(i) such person is aware that such person is engaging in such conduct,
that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially cer-
tain to occur; or
(ii) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that
such result is substantially certain to occur.
(B) When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance
is required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person
is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance,
unless the person actually believes that such circumstance does not
exist.
(4)(A) The term “routine governmental action” means only an action
which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in—
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a
person to do business in a foreign country;
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or sched-
uling inspections associated with contract performance or inspections
related to transit of goods across country;
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and
unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities
from deterioration; or
(v) actions of a similar nature.
(B) The term “routine governmental action” does not include any
decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award
new business to or to continue business with a particular party, or
any action taken by a foreign official involved in the decision-making
process to encourage a decision to award new business to or continue
business with a particular party.
(5) The term “interstate commerce” means trade, commerce, transpor-
tation, or communication among the several States, or between any
foreign country and any State or between any State and any place or
ship outside thereof, and such term includes the intrastate use of—
(A) a telephone or other interstate means of communication, or
(B) any other interstate instrumentality.
(i) Alternative Jurisdiction
(1) It shall also be unlawful for any United States person to corruptly
do any act outside the United States in furtherance of an offer, pay-
ment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money,
or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of any-
thing of value to any of the persons or entities set forth in paragraphs
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(1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a), for the purposes set forth therein,
irrespective of whether such United States person makes use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in fur-
therance of such offer, gift, payment, promise, or authorization.
(2) As used in this subsection, a “United States person” means
a national of the United States (as defined in section 101 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101)) or any corpo-
ration, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust,
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship organized under
the laws of the United States or any State, territory, possession, or com-
monwealth of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 Prohibited foreign trade practices by persons
other than issuers or domestic concerns
(a) Prohibition
It shall be unlawful for any person other than an issuer that is subject
to section 78dd-1 [Section 30A of the Exchange Act] of this title or
a domestic concern, or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of
such person or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such per-
son, while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use
of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
to do any other act in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay,
or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise
to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to—
(1) any foreign official for purposes of—
(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his
official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do
any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing
any improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act
or decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such person in obtaining or retaining business for or
with, or directing business to, any person;
(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for
foreign political office for purposes of—
(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candi-
date in its or his official capacity, (ii) inducing such party, official, or can-
didate to do or omit to do an act in violation of the lawful duty of such
party, official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or his influ-
ence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or
influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such person in obtaining or retaining business for or
with, or directing business to, any person; or
(3) any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or
thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly,
to any foreign official, to any foreign political party or official thereof,
or to any candidate for foreign political office, for purposes of—
(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, politi-
cal party, party official, or candidate in his or its official capacity, (ii)
inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or candi-
date to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of
such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate, or (iii)
securing any improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or can-
didate to use his or its influence with a foreign government or instru-
mentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such
government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such person in obtaining or retaining business for or
with, or directing business to, any person.
(b) Exception for routine governmental action
Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any facilitating or
expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or party offi-
cial the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance
of a routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party,
or party official.
(c) Affirmative defenses
It shall be an affirmative defense to actions under subsection (a) of this
section that—
(1) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was
made, was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign
official’s, political party’s, party official’s, or candidate’s country; or
(2) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was
made, was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and
lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party,
party official, or candidate and was directly related to—
99
(A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or ser-
vices; or
(B) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign govern-
ment or agency thereof.
(d) Injunctive relief
(1) When it appears to the Attorney General that any person to which
this section applies, or officer, director, employee, agent, or stock-
holder thereof, is engaged, or about to engage, in any act or practice
constituting a violation of subsection (a) of this section, the Attorney
General may, in his discretion, bring a civil action in an appropri-
ate district court of the United States to enjoin such act or practice,
and upon a proper showing, a permanent injunction or a temporary
restraining order shall be granted without bond.
(2) For the purpose of any civil investigation which, in the opinion of
the Attorney General, is necessary and proper to enforce this section,
the Attorney General or his designee are empowered to administer
oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require
the production of any books, papers, or other documents which the
Attorney General deems relevant or material to such investigation.
The attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evi-
dence may be required from any place in the United States, or any
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States, at any
designated place of hearing.
(3) In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to,
any person, the Attorney General may invoke the aid of any court of
the United States within the jurisdiction of which such investigation
or proceeding is carried on, or where such person resides or carries
on business, in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and the production of books, papers, or other documents. Any such
court may issue an order requiring such person to appear before the
Attorney General or his designee, there to produce records, if so
ordered, or to give testimony touching the matter under investigation.
Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such
court as a contempt thereof.
(4) All process in any such case may be served in the judicial district
in which such person resides or may be found. The Attorney General
may make such rules relating to civil investigations as may be necessary
or appropriate to implement the provisions of this subsection.
(e) Penalties
(1)(A) Any juridical person that violates subsection (a) of this section
shall be fined not more than $2,000,000.
(B) Any juridical person that violates subsection (a) of this section
shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in
an action brought by the Attorney General.
(2)(A) Any natural person who willfully violates subsection (a) of
this section shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both.
(B) Any natural person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall
be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an
action brought by the Attorney General.
(3) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) upon any officer,
director, employee, agent, or stockholder of a person, such fine may
not be paid, directly or indirectly, by such person.
(f ) Definitions
For purposes of this section:
(1) The term “person,” when referring to an offender, means any natu-
ral person other than a national of the United States (as defined in
8 U.S.C. § 1101) or any corporation, partnership, association, joint-
stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole
proprietorship organized under the law of a foreign nation or a politi-
cal subdivision thereof
(2)(A) The term “foreign official” means any officer or employee of
a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person act-
ing in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or
department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such
public international organization.
For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term “public international
organization” means—
(i) an organization that has been designated by Executive Order pur-
suant to Section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act
(22 U.S.C. § 288); or
(ii) any other international organization that is designated by the
President by Executive order for the purposes of this section, effective
as of the date of publication of such order in the Federal Register.
(3)(A) A person’s state of mind is “knowing” with respect to conduct,
a circumstance, or a result if—
(i) such person is aware that such person is engaging in such conduct,
that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially cer-
tain to occur; or
(ii) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that
such result is substantially certain to occur.
(B) When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is
required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is
aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless
the person actually believes that such circumstance does not exist.
(4)(A) The term “routine governmental action” means only an action
which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in—
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(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a
person to do business in a foreign country;
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or sched-
uling inspections associated with contract performance or inspections
related to transit of goods across country;
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and
unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities
from deterioration; or
(v) actions of a similar nature.
(B) The term “routine governmental action” does not include any
decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award
new business to or to continue business with a particular party, or
any action taken by a foreign official involved in the decision-making
process to encourage a decision to award new business to or continue
business with a particular party.
(5) The term “interstate commerce” means trade, commerce, transpor-
tation, or communication among the several States, or between any
foreign country and any State or between any State and any place or
ship outside thereof, and such term includes the intrastate use of—
(A) a telephone or other interstate means of communication, or
(B) any other interstate instrumentality.
* * *
15 U.S.C. § 78m [Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934]
Periodical and other reports
(a) Reports by issuer of security; contents
Every issuer of a security registered pursuant to section 78l of this title
shall file with the Commission, in accordance with such rules and reg-
ulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
for the proper protection of investors and to insure fair dealing in the
security—
(1) such information and documents (and such copies thereof ) as the
Commission shall require to keep reasonably current the information
and documents required to be included in or filed with an applica-
tion or registration statement filed pursuant to section 78l of this title,
except that the Commission may not require the filing of any material
contract wholly executed before July 1, 1962.
(2) such annual reports (and such copies thereof ), certified if required
by the rules and regulations of the Commission by independent pub-
lic accountants, and such quarterly reports (and such copies thereof ),
as the Commission may prescribe.
Every issuer of a security registered on a national securities exchange
shall also file a duplicate original of such information, documents,
and reports with the exchange. In any registration statement, periodic
report, or other reports to be filed with the Commission, an emerging
growth company need not present selected financial data in accor-
dance with section 229.301 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations,
for any period prior to the earliest audited period presented in con-
nection with its first registration statement that became effective
under this chapter or the Securities Act of 1933 [15 U.S.C. §§ 77a,
et seq.] and, with respect to any such statement or reports, an emerg-
ing growth company may not be required to comply with any new
or revised financial accounting standard until such date that a com-
pany that is not an issuer (as defined under section 7201 of this title)
is required to comply with such new or revised accounting standard, if
such standard applies to companies that are not issuers.
(b) Form of report; books, records, and internal accounting ; directives
(1) The Commission may prescribe, in regard to reports made pursu-
ant to this chapter, the form or forms in which the required informa-
tion shall be set forth, the items or details to be shown in the balance
sheet and the earnings statement, and the methods to be followed in
the preparation of reports, in the appraisal or valuation of assets and
liabilities, in the determination of depreciation and depletion, in the
differentiation of recurring and nonrecurring income, in the differen-
tiation of investment and operating income, and in the preparation,
where the Commission deems it necessary or desirable, of separate
and/or consolidated balance sheets or income accounts of any person
directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any
person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer; but
in the case of the reports of any person whose methods of accounting
are prescribed under the provisions of any law of the United States,
or any rule or regulation thereunder, the rules and regulations of the
Commission with respect to reports shall not be inconsistent with
the requirements imposed by such law or rule or regulation in respect
of the same subject matter (except that such rules and regulations of
the Commission may be inconsistent with such requirements to the
extent that the Commission determines that the public interest or the
protection of investors so requires).
(2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to
section 78l of this title and every issuer which is required to file reports
pursuant to section 78o(d) of this title shall—
101
(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of
the assets of the issuer;
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls suf-
ficient to provide reasonable assurances that—
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general
or specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of
financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II)
to maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with manage-
ment’s general or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the exist-
ing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with
respect to any differences; and
(C) notwithstanding any other provision of law, pay the allocable
share of such issuer of a reasonable annual accounting support fee or
fees, determined in accordance with section 7219 of this title.
(3)(A) With respect to matters concerning the national security of the
United States, no duty or liability under paragraph (2) of this subsec-
tion shall be imposed upon any person acting in cooperation with the
head of any Federal department or agency responsible for such matters
if such act in cooperation with such head of a department or agency
was done upon the specific, written directive of the head of such
department or agency pursuant to Presidential authority to issue such
directives. Each directive issued under this paragraph shall set forth
the specific facts and circumstances with respect to which the provi-
sions of this paragraph are to be invoked. Each such directive shall,
unless renewed in writing, expire one year after the date of issuance.
(B) Each head of a Federal department or agency of the United States
who issues such a directive pursuant to this paragraph shall main-
tain a complete file of all such directives and shall, on October 1 of
each year, transmit a summary of matters covered by such directives
in force at any time during the previous year to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(4) No criminal liability shall be imposed for failing to comply with
the requirements of paragraph (2) of this subsection except as pro-
vided in paragraph (5) of this subsection.
(5) No person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to imple-
ment a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any
book, record, or account described in paragraph (2).
(6) Where an issuer which has a class of securities registered pursu-
ant to section 78l of this title or an issuer which is required to file
reports pursuant to section 78o(d) of this title holds 50 per centum
or less of the voting power with respect to a domestic or foreign firm,
the provisions of paragraph (2) require only that the issuer proceed
in good faith to use its influence, to the extent reasonable under the
issuer’s circumstances, to cause such domestic or foreign firm to devise
and maintain a system of internal accounting controls consistent with
paragraph (2). Such circumstances include the relative degree of the
issuer’s ownership of the domestic or foreign firm and the laws and
practices governing the business operations of the country in which
such firm is located. An issuer which demonstrates good faith efforts
to use such influence shall be conclusively presumed to have complied
with the requirements of paragraph (2).
(7) For the purpose of paragraph (2) of this subsection, the terms “rea-
sonable assurances” and “reasonable detail” mean such level of detail
and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the con-
duct of their own affairs.
* * *
15 U.S.C. § 78ff Penalties [Section 32 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934]
(a) Willful violations; false and misleading statements
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter (other
than section 78dd-1 of this title [Section 30A of the Exchange Act]),
or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made
unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of
this chapter, or any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or
causes to be made, any statement in any application, report, or docu-
ment required to be filed under this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement
as provided in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, or by any
self-regulatory organization in connection with an application for
membership or participation therein or to become associated with a
member thereof, which statement was false or misleading with respect
to any material fact, shall upon conviction be fined not more than
$5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, except
that when such person is a person other than a natural person, a fine
not exceeding $25,000,000 may be imposed; but no person shall be
subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any
rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule
or regulation.
(b) Failure to file information, documents, or reports
Any issuer which fails to file information, documents, or reports
required to be filed under subsection (d) of section 78o of this title or
any rule or regulation thereunder shall forfeit to the United States the
sum of $100 for each and every day such failure to file shall continue.
Such forfeiture, which shall be in lieu of any criminal penalty for such
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failure to file which might be deemed to arise under subsection (a) of
this section, shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States
and shall be recoverable in a civil suit in the name of the United States.
(c) Violations by issuers, officers, directors, stockholders, employees,
or agents of issuers
(1)(A) Any issuer that violates subsection (a) or (g ) of section 78dd-1
[Section 30A of the Exchange Act] of this title shall be fined not more
than $2,000,000.
(B) Any issuer that violates subsection (a) or (g ) of section 78dd-1
[Section 30A of the Exchange Act]of this title shall be subject to a
civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an action brought
by the Commission.
(2)(A) Any officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer, or stock-
holder acting on behalf of such issuer, who willfully violates subsec-
tion (a) or (g ) of section 78dd-1 [Section 30A of the Exchange Act]
of this title shall be fined not more than $100,000, or imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both.
(B) Any officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer, or stock-
holder acting on behalf of such issuer, who violates subsection (a) or
(g ) of section 78dd-1 [Section 30A of the Exchange Act] of this title
shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in
an action brought by the Commission.
(3) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) upon any officer,
director, employee, agent, or stockholder of an issuer, such fine may
not be paid, directly or indirectly, by such issuer.
APPENDIX
Endnotes
104
ENDNOTES
1
S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 4 (1977) [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 95-114],
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/
senaterpt-95-114.pdf.
2
Id.; H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977) [hereinafter H. R. Rep. No.
95-640], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
history/1977/houseprt-95-640.pdf. The House Report made clear
Congress’s concerns:
The payment of bribes to influence the acts or
decisions of foreign officials, foreign political parties
or candidates for foreign political office is unethical.
It is counter to the moral expectations and values of
the American public. But not only is it unethical, it
is bad business as well. It erodes public confidence
in the integrity of the free market system. It short-
circuits the marketplace by directing business to
those companies too inefficient to compete in terms
of price, quality or service, or too lazy to engage in
honest salesmanship, or too intent upon unloading
marginal products. In short, it rewards corruption
instead of efficiency and puts pressure on ethical
enterprises to lower their standards or risk losing
business.
Id.
3
See, e.g., U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., USAID Anticorruption
Strategy 5-6 (2005), available at http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/
ads/200/200mbo.pdf. The growing recognition that corruption poses
a severe threat to domestic and international security has galvanized
efforts to combat it in the United States and abroad. See, e.g., Int’l Anti-
Corruption and Good Governance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-309,
§ 202, 114 Stat. 1090 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2152
(2000)) (noting that “[w]idespread corruption endangers the stability
and security of societies, undermines democracy, and jeopardizes the
social, political, and economic development of a society. . . . [and that]
[c]orruption facilitates criminal activities, such as money laundering,
hinders economic development, inflates the costs of doing business, and
undermines the legitimacy of the government and public trust”).
4
See Maryse Tremblay & Camille Karbassi, Corruption and Human
Trafficking 4 (Transparency Int’l, Working Paper No. 3, 2011), available
at http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/ti-working_paper_
human_trafficking_28_jun_2011; U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev.,
Foreign Aid in the National Interest 40 (2002), available at
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABW900.pdf (“No problem does
more to alienate citizens from their political leaders and institutions,
and to undermine political stability and economic development, than
endemic corruption among the government, political party leaders,
judges, and bureaucrats. The more endemic the corruption is, the more
likely it is to be accompanied by other serious deficiencies in the rule of
law: smuggling, drug trafficking, criminal violence, human rights abuses,
and personalization of power.”).
5
President George W. Bush observed in 2006 that “the culture of
corruption has undercut development and good governance and
. . . . impedes our efforts to promote freedom and democracy, end
poverty, and combat international crime and terrorism.” President’s
Statement on Kleptocracy, 2 Pub. Papers 1504 (Aug. 10, 2006),
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2006/08/20060810.html. The administrations of former
President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama both recognized
the threats posed to security and stability by corruption. For instance,
in issuing a proclamation restricting the entry of certain corrupt foreign
public officials, former President George W. Bush recognized “the
serious negative effects that corruption of public institutions has on the
United States’ efforts to promote security and to strengthen democratic
institutions and free market systems. . . .” Proclamation No. 7750, 69
Fed. Reg. 2287 ( Jan. 14, 2004). Similarly, President Barack Obama’s
National Security Strateg y paper, released in May 2010, expressed the
administration’s efforts and commitment to promote the recognition that
“pervasive corruption is a violation of basic human rights and a severe
impediment to development and global security.” The White House,
National Security Strategy 38 (2010), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_
strateg y.pdf.
6
See, e.g., Int’l Chamber of Commerce, et al., Clean Business
Is Good Business: The Business Case Against Corruption
(2008), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_
events/8.1/clean_business_is_good_business.pdf; World Health Org.,
Fact Sheet No. 335, Medicines: Corruption and Pharmaceuticals (Dec.
2009), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs335/
en/; Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption: The Facts, Foreign Pol’y, Summer
1997, at 119-20; Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q. J. Econ.
681, 683, 705 (1995) (finding that “corruption lowers private investment
. . . [and] reduc[es] economic growth . . .”); The World Bank, The
Data Revolution: Measuring Governance and Corruption,
(Apr. 8, 2004), available at http://go.worldbank.org/87JUY8GJH0.
7
See, e.g., The Corruption Eruption, Economist (Apr. 29, 2010),
available at http://www.economist.com/node/16005114 (“The hidden
costs of corruption are almost always much higher than companies
imagine. Corruption inevitably begets ever more corruption: bribe-takers
keep returning to the trough and bribe-givers open themselves up to
blackmail.”); Daniel Kaufmann and Shang-Jin Wei, Does “Grease Money”
Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7093, 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w7093.pdf (“Contrary to the ‘efficient grease’ theory, we find
105
that firms that pay more bribes are also likely to spend more, not less,
management time with bureaucrats negotiating regulations, and face
higher, not lower, cost of capital.”).
8
For example, in a number of recent enforcement actions, the same
employees who were directing or controlling the bribe payments were
also enriching themselves at the expense of the company. See, e.g.,
Complaint, SEC v. Peterson, No. 12-cv-2033 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), ECF
No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/
comp-pr2012-78.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Peterson,
No. 12-cr-224 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), ECF No. 7 [hereinafter United States v.
Peterson], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
petersong/petersong-information.pdf; Plea Agreement, United States v.
Stanley, No. 08-cr-597 (S.D. Tex. 2008), ECF No. 9 [hereinafter United
States v. Stanley], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/cases/stanleya/09-03-08stanley-plea-agree.pdf; Plea Agreement,
United States v. Sapsizian, No. 06-cr-20797 (S.D. Fla. 2007), ECF No. 42
[hereinafter United States v. Sapsizian], available at http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/sapsizianc/06-06-07sapsizian-plea.pdf.
9
See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 06-cv-2942 (S.D.N.Y. 2006),
ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Tyco Int’l], available at http://www.sec.
gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19657.pdf; Complaint, SEC
v. Willbros Group, Inc., No. 08-cv-1494 (S.D. Tex. 2008), ECF No. 1
[hereinafter SEC v. Willbros], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
complaints/2008/comp20571.pdf.
10
See Plea Agreement, United States v. Bridgestone Corp., No. 11-cr-
651 (S.D. Tex. 2011), ECF No. 21, available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bridgestone/10-05-11bridgestone-plea.pdf.
11
See S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 6; H.R. Rep. 95-640, at 4; see also A. Carl
Kotchian, The Payoff: Lockheed’s 70-Day Mission to Tokyo, Saturday
R ev., Jul. 9, 1977, at 7.
12
U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., Report of the Securities
and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal
Corporate Payments and Practices 2-3 (1976).
13
See H.R. R ep. No. 95-640, at 4-5; S. R ep. No. 95-114, at 3-4.
14
H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 4-5; S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 4. The Senate
Report observed, for instance, that “[m]anagements which resort to
corporate bribery and the falsification of records to enhance their
business reveal a lack of confidence about themselves,” while citing the
Secretary of the Treasury’s testimony that “‘[p]aying bribes—apart from
being morally repugnant and illegal in most countries—is simply not
necessary for the successful conduct of business here or overseas.’” Id.
15
See S. Rep. No. 100-85, at 46 (1987) (recounting FCPA’s historical
background and explaining that “a strong antibribery statute could help
U.S. corporations resist corrupt demands . . . .”) [hereinafter S. Rep. No.
100-85].
16
S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 7.
17
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, § 5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25 (1988); see also H.R. Rep. No.
100-576, at 916-24 (1988) (discussing FCPA amendments, including
changes to standard of liability for acts of third parties) [hereinafter H.R.
R ep. No. 100-576].
18
See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 5003(d). The
amended statute included the following directive:
It is the sense of the Congress that the President
should pursue the negotiation of an international
agreement, among the members of the Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development, to
govern persons from those countries concerning
acts prohibited with respect to issuers and domestic
concerns by the amendments made by this section.
Such international agreement should include a
process by which problems and conflicts associated
with such acts could be resolved.
Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 2 (1998) (describing efforts by
Executive Branch to encourage U.S. trading partners to enact legislation
similar to FCPA following 1988 amendments) [hereinafter S. Rep. No.
105-277].
19
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions art. 1.1, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1
[hereinafter Anti-Bribery Convention]. The Anti-Bribery Convention
requires member countries to make it a criminal offense “for any person
intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other
advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign
public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the
official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of
official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper
advantage in the conduct of international business.” The Convention
and its commentaries also call on all parties (a) to ensure that aiding and
abetting and authorization of an act of bribery are criminal offenses, (b)
to assert territorial jurisdiction “broadly so that an extensive physical
connection to the bribery act is not required,” and (c) to assert nationality
jurisdiction consistent with the general principles and conditions of each
party’s legal system. Id. at art. 1.2, cmts. 25, 26.
20
See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub.
L. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998); see also S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 2-3
(describing amendments to “the FCPA to conform it to the requirements
of and to implement the OECD Convention”).
21
There is no private right of action under the FCPA. See, e.g., Lamb v.
Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1028-29 (6th Cir. 1990); McLean v.
Int’l Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1987).
22
U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 9-47.110
(2008) [hereinafter USAM], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/
eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/.
23
Go to http://export.gov/worldwide_us/index.asp for more
information.
24
Additional information about publicly available market research
and due diligence assistance is available online. See In’l Trade Admin.,
Market Research and Due Diligence, available at http://export.gov/
salesandmarketing/eg_main_018204.asp. The International Company
Profile reports include a listing of the potential partner’s key officers
and senior management; banking relationships and other financial
information about the company; and market information, including
sales and profit figures and potential liabilities. They are not, however,
intended to substitute for a company’s own due diligence, and the
Commercial Service does not offer ICP in countries where Dun &
Bradstreet or other private sector vendors are already performing this
service. See In’l Trade Admin., International Company Profile, available at
http://export.gov/salesandmarketing/eg_main_018198.asp.
25
The Commercial Services’ domestic and foreign offices can also be
found at http://export.gov/usoffices/index.asp and http://export.gov/
worldwide_us/index.asp.
26
This form can be located at http://tcc.export.gov/Report_a_Barrier/
index.asp.
27
See In’l Trade Admin., “Doing Business In” Guides, available at
http://export.gov/about/eg_main_016806.asp.
28
The Business Ethics Manual is available at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/goodgovernance/business_ethics/manual.asp.
29
Information about the Advocacy Center can be found at http://export.
gov/advocacy.
30
Reports on U.S. compliance with these treaties can be found at http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/intlagree/.
31
See Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998, 34 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2290, 2291
(Nov. 10, 1998) (“U.S. companies have had to compete on an uneven
playing field . . . . The OECD Convention . . . is designed to change all
that. Under the Convention, our major competitors will be obligated to
criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials in international business
transactions.”).
32
Colombia is also a member of the Working Group and is expected to
accede to the Anti-Bribery Convention.
33
OECD, Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
available at http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3746,
en_2649_34859_35692940_1_1_1_1,00.html.
34
OECD, Phase 3 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/31/0,3746,
en_2649_34859_44684959_1_1_1_1,00.html.
35
OECD, Country Reports on the Implementation of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3
746,en_2649_34859_1933144_1_1_1_1,00.html.
36
The OECD Phase 1, 2, and 3 reports on the United States, as well as
the U.S. responses to questionnaires, are available at http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/intlagree.
37
See OECD Working Group on Bribery, United States: Phase 3, Report
on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
APPENDIX
Endnotes
105106
Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 2009
Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business
Transactions, Oct. 2010, at 61-62 (recommending that the United States
“[c]onsolidate and summarise publicly available information on the
application of the FCPA in relevant sources”), available at http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841.pdf.
38
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 109-6, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, available at http://www.
unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-
50026_E.pdf [hereinafter UNCAC].
39
For more information about the UNCAC review mechanism, see
Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption, United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/
UNCAC/Publications/ReviewMechanism-BasicDocuments/
Mechanism_for_the_Review_of_Implementation_-_Basic_
Documents_-_E.pdf.
40
For information about the status of UNCAC, see United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, UNCAC Signature and Ratification Status as
of 12 July 2012, available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/
CAC/signatories.html.
41
Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724, available at http://www.oas.
org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html. For additional information
about the status of the IACAC, see Organization of American States,
Signatories and Ratifications, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/Sigs/b-58.html.
42
Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27,
1999, 38 I.L.M. 505, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/
Treaties/html/173.htm.
43
For additional information about GRECO, see Council of Europe,
Group of States Against Corruption, available at http://www.coe.int/t/
dghl/monitoring/greco/default_EN.asp. The United States has not yet
ratified the GRECO convention.
44
The text of the FCPA statute is set forth in the appendix. See also Jur y
Instructions at 21-27, United States v. Esquenazi, No. 09-cr-21010 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 5, 2011), ECF No. 520 [hereinafter United States v. Esquenazi]
(FCPA jury instructions); Jury Instructions at 14-25, United States v.
Kay, No. 01-cr-914 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2004), ECF No. 142 (same), aff ’d,
513 F.3d 432, 446-52 (5th Cir. 2007), reh’g denied, 513 F.3d 461 (5th
Cir. 2008) [hereinafter United States v. Kay]; Jury Instructions at 76-87,
United States v. Jefferson, No. 07-cr-209 (E.D. Va. July 30, 2009), ECF
No. 684 [hereinafter United States v. Jefferson] (same); Jury Instructions
at 8-10, United States v. Green, No. 08-cr-59 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11,
2009), ECF No. 288 [hereinafter United States v. Green] (same); Jury
Instructions at 23-29, United States v. Bourke, No. 05-cr-518 (S.D.N.Y.
July 2009) [hereinafter United States v. Bourke] (same, not docketed);
Jury Instructions at 2-8, United States v. Mead, No. 98-cr-240 (D.N.J.
Oct. 1998) [hereinafter United States v. Mead] (same).
45
The provisions of the FCPA applying to issuers are part of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter Exchange Act]. The anti-bribery
provisions can be found at Section 30A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-1.
46
15 U.S.C. § 78l.
47
15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).
48
SEC enforcement actions have involved a number of foreign
issuers. See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Mag yar Telekom Plc., et al., No.
11-cv-9646 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2011), ECF No. 1 (German and
Hungarian companies), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
complaints/2011/comp22213-co.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Alcatel-
Lucent, S.A., No. 10-cv-24620 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2010), ECF No.
1 [hereinafter SEC v. Alcatel-Lucent] (French company), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21795.pdf;
Complaint, SEC v. ABB, Ltd., No. 10-cv-1648 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2010),
ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. ABB] (Swiss company), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-175.
pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Daimler AG, No. 10-cv-473 (D.D.C. Apr. 1,
2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Daimler AG] (German company),
available at http://sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-
pr2010-51.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-
cv-2167 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Siemens
AG] (Germany company), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
complaints/2008/comp20829.pdf. Certain DOJ enforcement actions
have likewise involved foreign issuers. See, e.g., Criminal Information,
United States v. Mag yar Telekom, Plc., No. 11-cr-597 (E.D. Va. Dec. 29,
2011), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/cases/mag yar-telekom/2011-12-29-information-mag yar-telekom.
pdf; Non-Pros. Agreement, In re Deutsche Telekom AG (Dec. 29, 2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/deutsche-
telekom/2011-12-29-deustche-telekom-npa.pdf; Criminal Information,
United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., No. 10-cr-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
27, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.],
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcatel-
etal/12-27-10alcatel-et-al-info.pdf; Criminal Information, United
States v. Daimler AG, No. 10-cr-63 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010), ECF No.
1 [hereinafter United States v. Daimler AG], available at http://www.
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-22-10daimlerag-info.
pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft,
No. 08-cr-367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United
States v. Siemens AG], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens/12-12-08siemensakt-info.pdf.
49
See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml.
50
See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Turner, et al., No. 10-cv-1309 (D.D.C.
Aug. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter, SEC v. Turner] (charging a
Lebansese/Canadian agent of a UK company listed on U.S. exchange
with violating the FCPA for bribes of Iraqi officials), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21615.pdf; Indictment,
United States v. Naaman, No. 08-cr-246 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2008), ECF
No. 3 [hereinafter United States v. Naaman] (same), available at http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/naamano/08-07-08naaman-
indict.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Elkin, et al., No. 10-cv-661 (D.D.C.
Apr. 28, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Elkin] (charging an
employee of U.S. publicly traded company with violating FCPA for
bribery of officials in Kyrg yzstan), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/complaints/2010/comp21509.pdf; Criminal Information,
United States v. Elkin, No. 10-cr-15 (W.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2010), ECF No.
8 [hereinafter United States v. Elkin] (same), available at http://www.
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/elkin/08-03-10elkin-information.
pdf; Indictment, United States v. Tesler, et al., No. 09-cr-98 (S.D. Tex.
Feb. 17, 2009), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Tesler] (charging
a British agent of U.S. publicly traded company with violating the
FCPA for bribery of Nigerian officials), available at http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/tesler/tesler-indict.pdf; Superseding
Indictment, United States v. Sapsizian, et al., supra note 8, ECF 32
(charging a French employee of French company traded on a U.S.
exchange with violating the FCPA).
51
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2.
52
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1).
53
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a). See, e.g., Superseding Indictment, United States
v. Nexus Technologies, et al., No. 08-cr-522 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009),
ECF No. 106 [hereinafter United States v. Nexus Technologies] (private
U.S. company and corporate executives charged with violating FCPA for
bribes paid in Vietnam), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/nguyenn/09-04-08nguyen-indict.pdf; Indictment,
United States v. Esquenazi, supra note 44, (private U.S. company and
corporate executives charged with FCPA violations for bribes paid in
Haiti), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
esquenazij/12-08-09esquenazi-indict.pdf.
54
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). As discussed above, foreign companies that
have securities registered in the United States or that are required to file
periodic reports with the SEC, including certain foreign companies with
American Depository Receipts, are covered by the FCPA’s anti-bribery
provisions governing “issuers” under 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
107
55
See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub.
L. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a); see also U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual § 9-1018 (Nov.
2000) (the Department “interprets [Section 78dd-3(a)] as conferring
jurisdiction whenever a foreign company or national causes an act to be
done within the territory of the United States by any person acting as
that company’s or national’s agent.”). This interpretation is consistent
with U.S. treaty obligations. See S. Rep. No. 105-2177 (1998) (expressing
Congress’ intention that the 1998 amendments to the FCPA “conform
it to the requirements of and to implement the OECD Convention.”);
Anti-Bribery Convention at art. 4.1, supra note 19 (“Each Party shall
take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over
the bribery of a foreign public official when the offence is committed in
whole or in part in its territory.”).
56
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a); see, e.g., Criminal Information, United States v.
Alcatel-Lucent France, S.A., et al., No. 10-cr-20906 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27,
2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France]
(subsidiary of French publicly traded company convicted of conspiracy
to violate FCPA), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/cases/alcatel-lucent-sa-etal/12-27-10alcatel-et-al-info.pdf; Criminal
Information, United States v. DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia
SAO, No. 10-cr-64 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010), ECF No. 1 (subsidiary of
German publicly traded company convicted of violating FCPA), available
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-22-
10daimlerrussia-info.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Siemens
S.A. (Argentina), No. 08-cr-368 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), ECF No. 1
(subsidiary of German publicly traded company convicted of violating
FCPA), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
siemens/12-12-08siemensargen-info.pdf.
57
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(5) (defining “interstate commerce”), 78dd-
3(f )(5) (same); see also 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(17).
58
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(5), 78dd-3(f )(5).
59
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.
60
Criminal Information, United States v. JGC Corp., No. 11-cr-260
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2011), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. JGC
Corp.], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
jgc-corp/04-6-11jgc-corp-info.pdf; Criminal Information, United States
v. Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V., No. 10-cr-460 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 7, 2010),
ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Snamprogetti], available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/snamprogetti/07-07-
10snamprogetti-info.pdf.
61
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g ) (“irrespective of whether such issuer or such
officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder makes use of the mails
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance
of such offer, gift, payment, promise, or authorization”), 78dd-2(i)
(1) (“irrespective of whether such United States person makes use of
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in
furtherance of such offer, gift, payment, promise, or authorization”).
62
S. Rep. No. 105-277 at 2 (“[T]he OECD Convention calls on parties
to assert nationality jurisdiction when consistent with national legal
and constitutional principles. Accordingly, the Act amends the FCPA
to provide for jurisdiction over the acts of U.S. businesses and nationals
in furtherance of unlawful payments that take place wholly outside
the United States. This exercise of jurisdiction over U.S. businesses and
nationals for unlawful conduct abroad is consistent with U.S. legal
and constitutional principles and is essential to protect U.S. interests
abroad.”).
63
Id. at 2-3.
64
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).
65
See H.R. Rep. No. 95-831, at 12 (referring to “business purpose” test).
66
See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Siemens AG, supra note 48; Criminal
Information, United States v. Siemens AG, supra note 48.
67
In amending the FCPA in 1988, Congress made clear that the business
purpose element, and specifically the “retaining business” prong, was
meant to be interpreted broadly:
The Conferees wish to make clear that the reference
to corrupt payments for “retaining business” in
present law is not limited to the renewal of contracts
or other business, but also includes a prohibition
against corrupt payments related to the execution
or performance of contracts or the carrying out of
existing business, such as a payment to a foreign
official for the purpose of obtaining more favorable
tax treatment. The term should not, however, be
construed so broadly as to include lobbying or other
normal representations to government officials.
H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 1951-52 (internal citations omitted).
68
See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Panalpina, Inc., No. 10-cv-4334 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Panalpina, Inc.], available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21727.pdf;
Criminal Information, United States v. Panalpina, Inc., No. 10-cr-
765 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v.
Panalpina, Inc.], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/cases/panalpina-inc/11-04-10panalpina-info.pdf; Criminal
Information, United States v. Panalpina World Transport (Holding )
Ltd., No. 10-cr-769 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1, available
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/panalpina-
world/11-04-10panalpina-world-info.pdf; see also Press Release, U.S.
Sec. and Exchange Comm., SEC Charges Seven Oil Services and
Freight Forwarding Companies for Widespread Bribery of Customs
Officials (Nov. 4, 2010) (“The SEC alleges that the companies bribed
customs officials in more than 10 countries in exchange for such perks
as avoiding applicable customs duties on imported goods, expediting
the importation of goods and equipment, extending drilling contracts,
and lowering tax assessments.”), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2010/2010-214.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Oil Services Companies and a Freight Forwarding Company Agree
to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More Than $156
Million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010) (logistics provider and its
subsidiary engaged in scheme to pay thousands of bribes totaling at least
$27 million to numerous foreign officials on behalf of customers in oil
and gas industry “to circumvent local rules and regulations relating to
the import of goods and materials into numerous foreign jurisdictions”),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-
crm-1251.html.
69
United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 755-56 (5th Cir. 2004).
70
Id. at 749. Indeed, the Kay court found that Congress’ explicit
exclusion of facilitation payments from the scope of the FCPA was
evidence that “Congress intended for the FCPA to prohibit all other
illicit payments that are intended to influence non-trivial official foreign
action in an effort to aid in obtaining or retaining business for some
person.” Id. at 749-50 (emphasis added).
71
Id. at 750.
72
Id. at 749-55.
73
Id. at 756 (“It still must be shown that the bribery was intended to
produce an effect—here, through tax savings—that would ‘assist in
obtaining or retaining business.’”).
74
The FCPA does not explicitly define “corruptly,” but in drafting the
statute Congress adopted the meaning ascribed to the same term in the
domestic bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b). See H.R. Rep. No. 95-640,
at 7.
75
The House Report states in full:
The word “corruptly” is used in order to make
clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must
be intended to induce the recipient to misuse
his official position; for example, wrongfully to
direct business to the payor or his client, to obtain
preferential legislation or regulations, or to induce a
foreign official to fail to perform an official function.
The word “corruptly” connotes an evil motive or
purpose such as that required under 18 U.S.C.
201(b) which prohibits domestic bribery. As in
18 U.S.C. 201(b), the word “corruptly” indicates
an intent or desire wrongfully to influence the
recipient. It does not require that the act [be] fully
consummated or succeed in producing the desired
outcome.
Id. The Senate Report provides a nearly identical explanation of the
meaning of the term:
The word “corruptly” is used in order to make
clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must
be intended to induce the recipient to misuse
his official position in order to wrongfully direct
business to the payor or his client, or to obtain
ENDIX
notes
107108
preferential legislation or a favorable regulation.
The word “corruptly” connotes an evil motive or
purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the
recipient.
S.
Rep. No. 95-114, at 10.
76
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).
77
See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Monsanto Co., No. 05-cv-14 (D.D.C.
Jan. 6, 2005) (among other things, the company paid a $50,000 bribe
to influence an Indonesian official to repeal an unfavorable law, which
was not repealed despite the bribe), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/complaints/comp19023.pdf; Criminal Information, United
States v. Monsanto Co., No. 05-cr-8 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/monsanto-co/01-06-
05monsanto-info.pdf.
78
Jury instructions in FCPA cases have defined “corruptly” consistent
with the definition found in the legislative history. See, e.g., Jury
Instructions at 22-23, United States v. Esquenazi, supra note 44; Jury
Instructions at 10, United States v. Green, supra note 44; Jury Instructions
at 35, United States v. Jefferson, supra note 44; Jury Instructions at 25,
United States v. Bourke, supra note 44; Jury Instructions at 17, United
States v. Kay, supra note 44; Jury Instructions at 5, United States v. Mead,
supra note 44.
79
See Complaint, SEC v. Innospec, Inc., No. 10-cv-448 (D.D.C. Mar.
18, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Innospec], available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21454.pdf; Criminal
Information at 8, United States v. Innospec Inc., No. 10-cr-61 (D.D.C.
Mar. 17, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Innospec],
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/innospec-
inc/03-17-10innospec-info.pdf.
80
See Complaint, SEC v. Innospec, supra note 79; Criminal Information,
United States v. Innospec, supra note 79.
81
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g )(2)(A), 78dd-3(e)(2)(A), 78ff(c)(2)(A).
82
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(1)(A) (corporate criminal liability under
issuer provision) with § 78ff(c)(2)(A) (individual criminal liability under
issuer provision); compare 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g )(1)(A) (corporate
criminal liability under domestic concern provision) with § 78dd-2(g )
(2)(A) (individual criminal liability under issuer provision); compare
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(e)(1)(A) (corporate criminal liability for territorial
provision) with § 78dd-3(e)(2)(A) (individual criminal liability for
territorial provision). However, companies still must act corruptly.
See Section 30A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a),
78dd-3(a).
83
United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 448 (5th Cir. 2007); see also
Jury Instructions at 38, United States v. Esquenazi, supra note 44; Jury
Instructions at 10, United States v. Green, supra note 44; Jury Instructions
at 35, United States v. Jefferson, supra note 44; Jury Instructions at 25,
United States v. Bourke, supra note 44; Jury Instructions at 5, United States
v. Mead, supra note 44.
84
Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1998) (construing
“willfully” in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A)) (quoting Ratzlaf v.
United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994)); see also Kay, 513 F.3d at 446-
51 (discussing Bryan and term “willfully” under the FCPA).
85
Kay, 513 F.3d at 447-48; Stichting Ter Behartiging Van de Belangen
Van Oudaandeelhouders In Het Kapitaal Van Saybolt Int’l B.V. v.
Schreiber, 327 F.3d 173, 181 (2d Cir. 2003).
86
The phrase “anything of value” is not defined in the FCPA, but the
identical phrase under the domestic bribery statute has been broadly
construed to include both tangible and intangible benefits. See, e.g.,
United States v. Moore, 525 F.3d 1033, 1048 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting
defendant’s objection to instruction defining sex as a “thing of value,”
which “unambiguously covers intangible considerations”); United
States v. Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299, 1304-05 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that
loans and promises of future employment are “things of value”); United
States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 622-23 (2d Cir. 1983) (approving jury
instruction that stock could be a “thing of value” if defendant believed it
had value, even though the shares had no commercial value, and noting
that “[t]he phrase ‘anything of value’ in bribery and related statutes has
consistently been given a broad meaning”).
87
Section 30A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a), 78dd-
3(a) (emphasis added).
88
Like the FCPA, the domestic bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, prohibits
giving, offering, or promising “anything of value.” Numerous domestic
AP
E
bribery cases under Section 201 have involved “small” dollar bribes.
See, e.g., United States v. Franco, 632 F.3d 880, 882-84 (5th Cir. 2011)
(affirming bribery convictions of inmate for paying correctional officer
$325 to obtain cell phone, food, and marijuana, and noting that 18
U.S.C. § 201 does not contain minimum monetary threshold); United
States v. Williams, 216 F.3d 1099, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming
bribery conviction for $70 bribe to vehicle inspector); United States v.
Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 396 (3rd Cir. 1989) (affirming bribery conviction
for $100 bribe paid to official of Occupational Health and Safety
Administration); United States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 817,
822 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming bribery convictions including $100 bribe
to immigration official); United States v. Bishton, 463 F.2d 887, 889
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (affirming bribery conviction for $100 bribe to division
chief of District of Columbia Sewer Operations Division).
89
Complaint, SEC v. Daimler AG, supra note 48; Criminal Information,
United States v. Daimler AG, supra note 48.
90
Complaint, SEC v. Halliburton Company and KBR, Inc., No. 09-cv-
399 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009), ECF No 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Halliburton
and KBR], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/
comp20897.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Kellogg
Brown & Root LLC, No. 09-cr-71, ECF No. 1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2009)
[hereinafter United States v. KBR], available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kelloggb/02-06-09kbr-info.pdf.
91
Complaint, SEC v. Halliburton and KBR, supra note 90; Criminal
Information, United States v. KBR, supra note 90.
92
See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. RAE Sys. Inc., No. 10-cv-2093 (D.D.C.
Dec. 10, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. RAE Sys., Inc.] (fur
coat, among other extravagant gifts), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/complaints/2010/comp21770.pdf; Non-Pros. Agreement,
In re RAE Sys. Inc. (Dec. 10, 2010) [hereinafter In re RAE Sys. Inc.]
(same), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
rae-systems/12-10-10rae-systems.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Daimler AG,
supra note 48 (armored Mercedes Benz worth €300,000); Criminal
Information, United States v. Daimler AG, supra note 48 (same).
93
See Complaint, SEC v. ABB Ltd, No. 04-cv-1141 (D.D.C. July
6, 2004), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
complaints/comp18775.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v.
ABB Vetco Gray Inc., et al., No. 04-cr-279 (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2004),
ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. ABB Vetco Gray], available
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/abb/06-22-
04abbvetco-info.pdf.
94
Complaint, SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., No. 09-cv-6094 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
31, 2009), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. UTStarcom], available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp21357.pdf; Non-
Pros. Agreement, In re UTStarcom Inc. (Dec. 31, 2009) [hereinafter In re
UTStarcom], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/utstarcom-inc/12-31-09utstarcom-agree.pdf.
95
Complaint, SEC v. UTStarcom, supra note 94; Non-Pros. Agreement,
In re UTStarcom, supra note 94.
96
Complaint, SEC v. UTStarcom, supra note 94; Non-Pros. Agreement,
In re UTStarcom, supra note 94.
97
Complaint, SEC v. Lucent Technologies Inc., No. 07-cv-2301 (D.D.C.
Dec. 21, 2007), ECF No.1 [hereinafter SEC v. Lucent], available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20414.pdf; Non-
Pros. Agreement, In re Lucent Technologies (Nov. 14, 2007) [hereinafter
In re Lucent], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/lucent-tech/11-14-07lucent-agree.pdf.
98
Complaint, SEC v. Lucent, supra note 97; Non-Pros. Agreement, In re
Lucent, supra note 97.
99
The company consented to the entry of a final judgment permanently
enjoining it from future violations of the books and records and internal
P
nd
109
controls provisions and paid a civil penalty of $1,500,000. Complaint, No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. York Int’l Corp.], available at http://www.sec.
SEC v. Lucent, supra note 97. Additionally, the company entered into a gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20319.pdf; Criminal Information,
non-prosecution agreement with DOJ and paid a $1,000,000 monetary United States v. York Int’l Corp., No. 07-cr-253 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2007),
penalty. Non-Pros. Agreement, In re Lucent, supra note 97. ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. York Int’l Corp.], available at
100
United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1311 (8th Cir. 1991).http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/york/10-01-07york-
101
Judgment, United States v. Liebo, No. 89-cr-76 (D. Minn. Jan. 31, info.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Textron Inc., No. 07-cv-1505 (D.D.C. Aug.
1992), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/23, 2007), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Textron], available at http://
liebor/1992-01-31-liebor-judgment.pdf. www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20251.pdf; Non-Pros.
102
Complaint, SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 04-cv-945 (D.D.C. Agreement, In re Textron Inc. (Aug. 23, 2007), available at http://www.
June 9, 2004), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/textron-inc/08-21-07textron-
complaints/comp18740.pdf; Admin. Proceeding Order, In the Matter agree.pdf. DOJ has issued opinion procedure releases concerning
of Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 49838 ( June 9, payments (that were, in essence, donations) to government agencies or
2004) (finding that company violated FCPA accounting provisions and departments. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 09-01
imposing $500,000 civil monetary penalty), available at http://www.sec.(Aug. 3, 2009) (involving donation of 100 medical devices to foreign
gov/litigation/admin/34-49838.htm.government), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
103
FCPA opinion procedure releases can be found at http://www.fcpa/opinion/2009/0901.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op.
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/. In the case of the company seeking to Release 06-01 (Oct. 16, 2006) (involving contribution of $25,000 to
contribute the $1.42 million grant to a local MFI, DOJ noted that it had regional customs department to pay incentive rewards to improve local
undertaken each of these due diligence steps and controls, in addition to enforcement of anti-counterfeiting laws), available at http://www.justice.
others, that would minimize the likelihood that anything of value would gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2006/0601.pdf.
be given to any officials of the Eurasian country. U.S. Dept. of Justice,
116
The United States has some state-owned entities, like the Tennessee
FCPA Op. Release 10-02 ( July 16, 2010), available at http://www.Valley Authority, that are instrumentalities of the government. McCarthy
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2010/1002.pdf. v. Middle Tenn. Elec. Membership Corp., 466 F.3d 399, 411 n.18
104
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 95-01 ( Jan. 11, (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]here is no question that TVA is an agency and
1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/instrumentality of the United States.”) (internal quotes omitted).
opinion/1995/9501.pdf.
117
During the period surrounding the FCPA’s adoption, state-owned
105
Id.entities held virtual monopolies and operated under state-controlled
106
Id.price-setting in many national industries around the world. See generally
107
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 97-02 (Nov. 5, World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics
1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/and Politics of Government Ownership, World Bank
opinion/1997/9702.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release Policy Research Report at 78 (1995); Sunita Kikeri and
06-01 (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/Aishetu Kolo, State Enterprises, The World Bank Group
fraud/fcpa/opinion/2006/0601.pdf.(Feb. 2006), available at http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/
108
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 06-01 (Oct. 16, 2006).publicpolicyjournal/304Kikeri_Kolo.pdf.
109
Id.
118
Id. at 1 (“[A]fter more than two decades of privatization, government
110
Id.ownership and control remains widespread in many regions—and in
111
See Section 30A(a)(1)-(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)many parts of the world still dominates certain sectors.”).
(1)-(3); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a)(1)-(3), 78dd-3(a)(1)-(3).
119
To date, consistent with the approach taken by DOJ and SEC, all
112
Section 30A(f )(1)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f )(1)district courts that have considered this issue have concluded that this is
(A); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(f )(2)(A).an issue of fact for a jury to decide. See Order, United States v. Carson,
113
Under the FCPA, any person “acting in an official capacity for 2011 WL 5101701, No. 09-cr-77 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011), ECF No.
or on behalf of ” a foreign government, a department, agency, or 373 [hereinafter United States v. Carson]; United States v. Aguilar, 783
instrumentality thereof, or a public international organization, is a F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Order, United States v. Esquenazi,
foreign official. Section 30A(f )(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f )(1)(A); 15 supra note 44, ECF No. 309; see also Order, United States v. O’Shea, No.
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-2(f )(2)(A). See also U.S. Dept. of 09-cr-629 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2012), ECF No. 142; Order, United States
Justice, FCPA Op. Release No. 10-03, at 2 (Sept. 1, 2010), available v. Nguyen, No. 08-cr-522 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2009), ECF No. 144. These
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2010/1003.pdf district court decisions are consistent with the acceptance by district
(listing safeguards to ensure that consultant was not acting on behalf of courts around the country of over 35 guilty pleas by individuals who
foreign government).admitted to violating the FCPA by bribing officials of state-owned or
114
But see Sections 30A(b) and f(3)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § state-controlled entities. See Government’s Opposition to Defendants’
78dd-1(b) & (f )(3); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(b) & (h)(4), 78dd-3(b) & (f )Amended Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Ten of the
(4) (facilitating payments exception).Indictment at 18, United States v. Carson, supra note 119, ECF No. 332;
115
Even though payments to a foreign government may not violate the Exhibit I, United States v. Carson, supra note 119, ECF No. 335 (list of
anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, such payments may violate other examples of enforcement actions based on foreign officials of state-owned
U.S. laws, including wire fraud, money laundering, and the FCPA’s entities).
accounting provisions. This was the case in a series of matters brought by
120
Jury Instructions, United States v. Esquenazi, supra note 44, ECF No.
DOJ and SEC involving kickbacks to the Iraqi government through the 520; Order at 5 and Jury Instructions, United States v. Carson, supra note
United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme. See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. 119, ECF No. 373 and ECF No. 549; Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
Innospec, supra note 79; Criminal Information, United States v. Innospec,
121
Criminal Information, United States v. C.E. Millier Corp., et al.,
supra note 79; Complaint, SEC v. Novo Nordisk A/S, No. 09-cv-862 No. 82-cr-788 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 1982), available at http://www.
(D.D.C. May 11, 2009), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ce-miller/1982-09-17-ce-miller-
litigation/complaints/2009/comp21033.pdf; Criminal Information, information.pdf.
United States v. Novo Nordisk A/S, No. 09-cr-126 (D.D.C. May 11,
122
See Complaint, SEC v. Sam P. Wallace Co., Inc., et al., No. 81-cv-
2009), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/1915 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 1982); Criminal Information, United States v.
fraud/fcpa/cases/nordiskn/05-11-09novo-info.pdf; Complaint, Sam P. Wallace Co., Inc., No. 83-cr-34 (D.P.R. Feb. 23, 1983), available
SEC v. Ingersoll-Rand Company Ltd., No. 07-cv-1955 (D.D.C. Oct. at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/sam-wallace-
31, 2007), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/company/1983-02-23-sam-wallace-company-information.pdf; see also
complaints/2007/comp20353.pdf; Criminal Information, United States Criminal Information, United States v. Goodyear Int’l Corp., No. 89-
v. Ingersoll-Rand Italiana SpA, No. 07-cr-294 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2007), cr-156 (D.D.C. May 11, 1989) (Iraqi Trading Company identified as
ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/“instrumentality of the Government of the Republic of Iraq”), available
cases/ingerand-italiana/10-31-07ingersollrand-info.pdf; Complaint, at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/goodyear/1989-
SEC v. York Int’l Corp., No. 07-cv-1750 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2007), ECF 05-11-goodyear-information.pdf.
ENDIX
notes
109110
123
See Complaint, SEC v. ABB, supra note 48; Criminal Information at
3, United States v. ABB Inc., No. 10-cr-664 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2010),
ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. ABB], available at http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/abb/09-20-10abbinc-info.
pdf; Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as
amended, art. 27, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de
1917 (Mex.); Ley Del Servicio Publico de Energia Electrica, as amended,
art. 1-3, 10, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 22 de Diciembre de
1975 (Mex.).
124
See Indictment at 2, United States v. Esquenazi, supra note 44, ECF No.
3; Affidavit of Mr. Louis Gary Lissade at 1-9, id., ECF No. 417-2.
125
Criminal Information at 30-31, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France,
supra note 56, ECF No. 10.
126
Id.
127
See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998,
Pub. L. 105-366 § 2, 112 Stat. 3302, 3303, 3305, 3308 (1998).
128
Section 30A(F)(1)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f )(1)
(B); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(2)(B), 78dd-3(f )(2)(B).
129
Third parties and intermediaries themselves are also liable for FCPA
violations. Section 30A(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a);
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a), and 78dd-3(a).
130
Section 30A(a)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3); 15
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a)(3), 78dd-3(a)(3).
131
See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 11-cv-686
(D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011) [hereinafter SEC v. Johnson & Johnson] (bribes
paid through Greek and Romanian agents)), available at http://www.sec.
gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21922.pdf; Criminal Information,
United States v. DePuy, Inc., No. 11-cr-99 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011), ECF
No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. DePuy] (bribes paid through Greek
agents), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
depuy-inc/04-08-11depuy-info.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. ABB, supra note
48 (bribes paid through Mexican agents); Criminal Information, United
States v. ABB, supra note 123 (same); Criminal Information, United
States v. Int’l Harvester Co., No. 82-cr-244 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 1982)
(bribes paid through Mexican agent), available at http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/international-harvester/1982-11-17-
international-harvester-information.pdf.
132
See Criminal Information, United States v. Marubeni Corp., No. 12-
cr-22 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2012), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v.
Marubeni], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/marubeni/2012-01-17-marubeni-information.pdf; Criminal
Information, United States v. JGC Corp., supra note 60, ECF No. 1;
Criminal Information, United States v. Snamprogetti, supra note 60, ECF
No. 1; Complaint, SEC v. ENI, S.p.A. and Snamprogetti Netherlands
B.V., No. 10-cv-2414 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2010), ECF No. 1, available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-119.pdf;
Criminal Information, United States v. Technip S.A., No. 10-cr-439 (S.D.
Tex. June 28, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Technip],
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/technip-
sa/06-28-10-technip-%20information.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Technip,
No. 10-cv-2289 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v.
Technip], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/
comp-pr2010-110.pdf; Indictment, United States v. Tesler, supra note
50; Complaint, SEC v. Halliburton and KBR, supra note 90; Criminal
Information, United States v. KBR, supra note 90; Criminal Information,
United States v. Stanley, No. 08-cr-597 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2008), ECF No.
1, available at http://justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/stanleya/08-
29-08stanley-info.pdf.
133
See Criminal Information, United States v. AGA Medical Corp., No.
08-cr-172, ECF No. 1 (D. Minn. June 3, 2008), available at http://www.
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/agamedcorp/06-03-08aga-info.
pdf.
134
Complaint, SEC v. Innospec, supra note 79; Criminal Information,
United States v. Innospec, supra note 79; Superseding Criminal
Information, United States v. Naaman, supra note 50, ECF No. 15,
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
naamano/06-24-10naaman-supsersed-info.pdf; Complaint, SEC v.
Tu r n e r, supra note 50.
135
See sources cited supra note 68.
136
See sources cited supra note 68.
137
Section 30A(a)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3); 15
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a)(3), 78dd-3(a)(3).
138
See Section 30A(f )(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f )
(2)(A); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(3)(A), 78dd-3(f )(3)(A).
139
See Section 30A(f )(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f )
(2)(B); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(3)(B), 78dd-3(f )(3)(B). The “knowing”
standard was intended to cover “both prohibited actions that are taken
with ‘actual knowledge’ of intended results as well as other actions
that, while falling short of what the law terms ‘positive knowledge,’
nevertheless evidence a conscious disregard or deliberate ignorance
of known circumstances that should reasonably alert one to the high
probability of violations of the Act.” H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 920; see
also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, § 5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1423-24 (1988).
140
H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 920 (1988).
141
Section 30A(c)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1); 15
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(1).
142
H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 922. The conferees also noted that “[i]n
interpreting what is ‘lawful under the written laws and regulations’ . . . the
normal rules of legal construction would apply.” Id.
143
See United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537-40 (S.D.N.Y.
2008). Likewise, the court found that a provision under Azeri law that
relieved bribe payors of criminal liability if they were extorted did
not make the bribe payments legal. Azeri extortion law precludes the
prosecution of the payor of the bribes for the illegal payments, but it does
not make the payments legal. Id. at 540-41.
144
Section 30A(c)(2)(A), (B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)
(2); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(c)(2), 78dd-3(c)(2).
145
For example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
providing airline tickets to a government official in order to corruptly
influence that official may form the basis for a violation of the FCPA’s
anti-bribery provisions. See Liebo, 923 F. 2d at 1311-12.
146
See generally U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 11-01
( June 30, 2011) (travel, lodging, and meal expenses of two foreign
officials for two-day trip to United States to learn about services of U.S.
adoption service provider), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/opinion/2011/11-01.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA
Op. Release 08-03 ( July 11, 2008) (stipends to reimburse minimal
travel expenses of local, government-affiliated journalists attending press
conference in foreign country), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0803.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice,
FCPA Op. Release 07-02 (Sept. 11, 2007) (domestic travel, lodging,
and meal expenses of six foreign officials for six-week educational
program), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
opinion/2007/0702.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release
07-01 ( July 24, 2007) (domestic travel, lodging, and meal expenses
of six foreign officials for four-day educational and promotional tour
of U.S. company’s operations sites), available at http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2007/0701.pdf; U.S. Dept. of
Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-04 (Sept. 3, 2004) (travel, lodging,
and modest per diem expenses of five foreign officials to participate
in nine-day study tour of mutual insurance companies), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2004/0404.
pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-03 ( June 14,
2004) (travel, lodging, meal, and insurance expenses for twelve foreign
officials and one translator on ten-day trip to three U.S. cities to meet
with U.S. public sector officials), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2004/0403.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice,
FCPA Op. Release 04-01 ( Jan. 6, 2004) (seminar expenses, including
receptions, meals, transportation and lodging costs, for one-and-a-half
day comparative law seminar on labor and employment law in foreign
country), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
opinion/2004/0401.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release
111
96-01 (Nov. 25, 1996) (travel, lodging, and meal expenses of regional eventual act or decision or which do not involve any discretionary action,”
government representatives to attend training courses in United giving the examples of “a gratuity paid to a customs official to speed the
States), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/processing of a customs document” or “payments made to secure permits,
opinion/1996/9601.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release licenses, or the expeditious performance of similar duties of an essentially
92-01 (Feb. 1992) (training expenses so that foreign officials could ministerial or clerical nature which must of necessity be performed in any
effectively perform duties related to execution and performance of joint-event.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 8.
venture agreement, including seminar fees, airfare, lodging, meals, and
161
Section 30A(f )(3)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f )(3)
ground transportation), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/(B); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(4)(B), 78dd-3(f )(4)(B).
fraud/fcpa/review/1992/r9201.pdf.
162
In a 2004 decision, the Fifth Circuit emphasized this precise point,
147
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 11-01 ( June 30, 2011); commenting on the limited nature of the facilitating payments exception:
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-02 (Sept. 11, 2007); A brief review of the types of routine governmental
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-01 ( July 24, 2007); actions enumerated by Congress shows how limited
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-04 (Sept. 3, 2004); U.S. Congress wanted to make the grease exceptions.
Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-03 ( June 14, 2004); U.S. Routine governmental action, for instance, includes
Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-01 ( Jan. 6, 2004).“obtaining permits, licenses, or other official
148
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 96-01 (Nov. 25, 1996). documents to qualify a person to do business in
149
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 11-01 ( June 30, 2011); a foreign country,” and “scheduling inspections
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-02 (Sept. 11, 2007); associated with contract performance or inspections
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-01 ( July 24, 2007); related to transit of goods across country.”
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-04 (Sept. 3, 2004); U.S. Therefore, routine governmental action does not
Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-01 ( Jan. 6, 2004) . include the issuance of every official document or
150
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-01 ( Jan. 6, 2004). every inspection, but only (1) documentation that
151
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 08-03 ( July 11, 2008). qualifies a party to do business and (2) scheduling an
152
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 11-01 ( June 30, 2011); inspection—very narrow categories of largely non-
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 92-01 (Feb. 1992). discretionary, ministerial activities performed by
153
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 08-03 ( July 11, 2008). mid- or low-level foreign functionaries.
154
Id. Un ite d
States v. Kay; 359 F.3d 738, 750-51 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal
155
Id.; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-03 ( June 14, footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
2004); U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-01 ( Jan. 6,
163
Non-Pros. Agreement, In re Helmerich & Payne, Inc. ( July 29, 2009)
2004); U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-01 ( July 24, [hereinafter In re Helmerich & Payne], available at http://www.justice.
2007). gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/helmerich-payne/06-29-09helmerich-
156
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 11-01 ( June 30, 2011); agree.pdf; Admin. Proceeding Order, In the Matter of Helmerich &
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-02 (Sept. 11, 2007); Payne, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 60400 ( July 30, 2009) [hereinafter
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-01 ( July 24, 2007); In the Matter of Helmerich & Payne], available at http://www.sec.gov/
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-04 (Sept. 3, 2004); U.S. litigation/admin/2009/34-60400.pdf.
Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-03 ( June 14, 2004); U.S.
164
Criminal Information, Vetco Gray Controls Inc., et al., No. 07-
Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-01 ( Jan. 6, 2004). cr-4 No. (S.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2007), ECF Nos. 1-2, available at http://
157
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-01 ( July 24, 2007); www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/vetco-controls/02-06-
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 08-03 ( July 11, 2008). 07vetcogray-info.pdf.
158
For example, DOJ has previously approved expenditures on behalf of
165
Complaint, SEC v. Noble Corp., No. 10-cv-4336 (S.D. Tex. Nov.
family members or for entertainment purposes under certain, limited 4, 2010), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
circumstances. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Rev. P. Release complaints/2010/comp21728.pdf; Non-Pros. Agreement, In re Noble
83-02 ( July 26, 1983) (declining to take enforcement action against Corp. (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
company seeking to provide promotional tour for foreign official and fraud/fcpa/cases/noble-corp/11-04-10noble-corp-npa.pdf; see also
wife, where both had already planned a trip to the United States at their sources cited supra note 68.
own expense and company proposed to pay only for all reasonable and
166
Working Group on Bribery, 2009 Recommendation of the Council for
necessary actual domestic expenses for the extension of their travel to Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
allow the promotional tour, which would not exceed $5,000), available at Business Transactions, at § VI (recommending countries should
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/review/1983/r8302.pdf.periodically review their policies and approach to facilitation payments
159
Unlike the local law and bona fide expenditures defenses, the and should encourage companies to prohibit or discourage facilitation
facilitating payments exception is not an affirmative defense to the payments “in view of the corrosive effect of small facilitation payments,
FCPA. Rather, payments of this kind fall outside the scope of the particularly on sustainable economic development and the rule of law”);
FCPA’s bribery prohibition. Prior to 1988, the “facilitating payments” Working Group on Bribery, United States: Phase 3, at 24 (Oct. 15,
exception was incorporated into the definition of “foreign official,” which 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841.
excluded from the statute’s purview officials whose duties were primarily pdf (commending United States for steps taken in line with 2009
ministerial or clerical. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. recommendation to encourage companies to prohibit or discourage
L. No. 95-213, § 104(d)(2), 91 Stat. 1494, 1498 (1977) (providing that facilitation payments).
the term foreign official “does not include any employee of a foreign
167
Facilitating payments are illegal under the U.K. Bribery Act 2010,
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof whose which came into force on July 1, 2011, and were also illegal under
duties are essentially ministerial or clerical”). The original exception thus prior U.K. legislation. See Bribery Act 2010, c.23 (Eng.), available
focused on the duties of the recipient, rather than the purpose of the at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents; see also
payment. In practice, however, it proved difficult to determine whether U.K. Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance About
a foreign official’s duties were “ministerial or clerical.” S. Rep. No. 100-Procedures Which Relevant Commercial Organisations Can Put into Place
85, at 53. Responding to criticism that the statutory language “does not to Prevent Persons Associated with Them from Bribing (Section 9 of the
clearly reflect Congressional intent and the boundaries of the prohibited Bribery Act 2010), at 18 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/
conduct,” Congress revised the FCPA to define the exception in terms of guidance/docs/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf.
the purpose of the payment. H. Rep. No. 100-40, pt. 2, at 77. In doing so,
168
See, e.g., Non-Pros. Agreement, In re Helmerich & Payne, supra note
Congress reiterated that while its policy to exclude facilitating payments 163; Admin. Proceeding Order, In the Matter of Helmerich & Payne,
reflected practical considerations of enforcement, “such payments should supra note 163.
not be condoned.” Id. The enacted language reflects this narrow purpose.
169
In order to establish duress or coercion, a defendant must demonstrate
160
In exempting facilitating payments, Congress sought to distinguish that the defendant was under unlawful, present, immediate, and
them as “payments which merely move a particular matter toward an impending threat of death or serious bodily injury; that the defendant did
ENDIX
notes
111112
not negligently or recklessly create a situation where he would be forced
to engage in criminal conduct (e.g., had been making payments as part
of an ongoing bribery scheme); that the defendant had no reasonable
legal alternative to violating the law; and that there was a direct causal
relationship between the criminal action and the avoidance of the
threatened harm. See Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr.
No. 16 (2003); see also Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instr. No. 1.36 (2001);
Sixth Circuit Pattern Jury Instr. No. 6.05 (2010); Seventh Circuit Pattern
Jury Instr. No. 6.08 (1998); Ninth Circuit Pattern Jury Instr. No. 6.5
(2010); 1A Kevin F. O’Malley, Jay E. Grenig, Hon. William C. Lee,
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 19.02 (6th ed. 2008 & Supp.
2012).
170
S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 11.
171
Id. at 10.
172
Id. at 11.
173
United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540 n.31 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
174
Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 540 (citing S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 10-11).
175
Id.
176
These payments, however, must be accurately reflected in the
company’s books and records so that the company and its management
are aware of the payments and can assure that the payments were properly
made under the circumstances. For example, in one instance, a Kazakh
immigration prosecutor threatened to fine, jail, or deport employees
of a U.S. company’s subsidiary. Believing the threats to be genuine, the
employees in Kazakhstan sought guidance from senior management
of the U.S. subsidiary and were authorized to make the payments. The
employees then paid the government official a total of $45,000 using
personal funds. The subsidiary reimbursed the employees, but it falsely
recorded the reimbursements as “salary advances” or “visa fines.” The
parent company, which eventually discovered these payments, as well
as other improperly booked cash payments made to a Kazakhstani
consultant to obtain visas, was charged with civil violations of the
accounting provisions. Admin. Proceeding Order, In the Matter of
NATCO Group Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 61325 ( Jan. 11, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2010/34-61325.pdf
(imposing cease-and-desist order and $65,000 civil monetary penalty).
177
See Jury Instructions at 21, United States v. Aguilar, No. 10-cr-1031
(C.D. Cal. May 16, 2011), ECF No. 511.
178
See, e.g., Pacific Can Co. v. Hewes, 95 F.2d 42, 46 (9th Cir. 1938)
(“Where one corporation is controlled by another, the former acts
not for itself but as directed by the latter, the same as an agent, and the
principal is liable for the acts of its agent within the scope of the agent’s
authority.”); United States v. NYNEX Corp., 788 F. Supp. 16, 18 n.3
(D.D.C. 1992) (holding that “[a] corporation can of course be held
criminally liable for the acts of its agents,” including “the conduct of its
subsidiaries.”).
179
Pacific Can Co., 95 F.2d at 46; NYNEX Corp., 788 F. Supp. at 18 n.3.
180
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir.
1962).
181
Admin. Proceeding Order, In the Matter of United Industrial Corp.,
Exchange Act Release No. 60005 (May 29, 2009), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/34-60005.pdf; see also Lit. Release
No. 21063, SEC v. Worzel (May 29, 2009), available at http://www.sec.
gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21063.htm.
182
See, e.g., Philip Urofksy, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Successor
Liability Resulting From Inadequate FCPA Due Diligence in M&A
Transactions, 1763 PLI/Corp. 631, 637 (2009) (“As a legal matter, when
one corporation acquires another, it assumes any existing liabilities of
that corporation, including liability for unlawful payments, regardless of
whether it knows of them.”). Whether or not successor liability applies to
a particular corporate transaction depends on the facts involved and state,
federal, and, potentially, foreign law.
183
See, e.g., Carolyn Lindsey, More Than You Bargained for: Successor
Liability Under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 Ohio N.U.
L. Rev. 959, 966 (2009) (“Allowing a company to escape its debts and
liabilities by merging with another entity is considered to lead to an
unjust result.”).
184
See, e.g., Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271, 274
(1959) (affirming criminal successor liability for antitrust violations);
United States v. Alamo Bank of Texas, 880 F.2d 828, 830 (5th Cir. 1989)
(affirming criminal successor liability for Bank Secrecy Act violations);
United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 907 (9th Cir. 1974) (affirming
criminal successor liability for conspiracy and Travel Act violations);
United States v. Shields Rubber Corp., 732 F. Supp. 569, 571-72 (W.D.
Pa. 1989) (permitting criminal successor liability for customs violations);
see also United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 776 F.2d 1476, 1477 (10th
Cir. 1985) (allowing criminal post-dissolution liability for antitrust, mail
fraud, and false statement violations);.
185
Complaint, SEC v. The Titan Corp., No. 05-cv-411 (D.D.C. Mar. 1,
2005) (discovery of FCPA violations during pre-acquisition due diligence
protected potential acquiring company and led to termination of merger
agreement), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/
comp19107.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Titan Corp.,
No. 05-cr-314 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005) (same) [hereinafter United States
v. Titan Corp.], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/titan-corp/03-01-05titan-info.pdf.
186
For a discussion of declinations, see Chapter 7.
187
See Complaint, SEC v. El Paso Corp., No. 07-cv-899 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7,
2007), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. El Paso Corp.] (charging company
with books and records and internal controls charges for improper
payments to Iraq under U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp19991.pdf.
188
Complaint, SEC v. Alliance One Int’l, Inc., No. 10-cv-1319 (D.D.C.
Aug. 6, 2010), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
complaints/2010/comp21618-alliance-one.pdf; Non-Pros. Agreement,
In re Alliance One Int’l, Inc. (Aug. 6, 2010), available at http://www.
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-06-10alliance-
one-npa.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Alliance One Int’l
AG, No. 10-cr-17 (W.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2010), ECF No. 3, available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-06-
10alliance-one-info.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Alliance
One Tobacco Osh, LLC, No. 10-cr-16 (W.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2010), ECF
No. 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
alliance-one/08-06-10alliance-one-tobaccoinfo.pdf.
189
See Criminal Information, United States v. Syncor Taiwan, Inc., No.
02-cr-1244 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2002), ECF No. 1, available at http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/syncor-taiwan/12-05-
02syncor-taiwan-info.pdf; Plea Agreement, United States v. Syncor
Taiwan, Inc., No. 02-cr-1244 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2002), ECF No. 14,
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/syncor-
taiwan/12-03-02syncor-taiwan-plea-agree.pdf.
190
See Complaint, SEC v. Syncor Int’l Corp., No. 02-cv-2421 (D.D.C.
Dec. 10, 2002), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
complaints/comp17887.htm; SEC v. Syncor International Corp., SEC
Lit. Rel. 17997, (Dec. 10, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/lr17887.htm.
191
See Complaint, SEC v. York Int’l Corp., supra note 115; Criminal
Information, United States v. York Int’l Corp., supra note 115.
192
See Criminal Information, United States v. Latin Node, Inc., No.
09-cr-20239 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2009), ECF No. 1, available at http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/litton-applied/03-23-
09latinnode-info.pdf; eLandia Int’l Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K),
at 20 (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1352819/000119312509070961/d10k.htm.
193
See Criminal Information, United States v. Salvoch, No. 10-cr-20893
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2010), ECF No. 3, available at http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/salvoch/12-17-10salvoch-info.pdf;
Criminal Information, United States v. Vasquez, No. 10-cr-20894 (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 17, 2010), ECF No. 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/vasquezjp/12-17-10vasquez-juan-info.pdf;
Indictment, United States v. Granados, et al., No. 10-cr-20881, (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 14, 2010), ECF No. 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/
113
criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/granados-jorge/12-21-10granados-indict.pdf. within five years next after such offense shall have been committed.”
194
See Deferred Pros. Agreement, United States v. Snamprogetti, supra
208
See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957)
note 60, ECF No. 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/(holding government must prove conspiracy still existed and at least
fcpa/cases/snamprogetti/07-07-10snamprogetti-dpa.pdf. one overt act was committed within the statute of limitations); Fiswick
195
Compare Criminal Information, United States v. Snamprogetti, supra v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946) (“The statute of limitations,
note 60, with Deferred Pros. Agreement, United States v. Snamprogetti, unless suspended, runs from the last overt act during the existence of
supra note 60, ECF No. 3.the conspiracy. The overt acts averred and proved may thus mark the
196
See Press Release, General Electric Co., General Electric Agrees to duration, as well as the scope, of the conspiracy.”) (citation omitted); see
Acquire InVision (Mar. 15, 2004), available at http://www.ge.com/files/generally Julie N. Sarnoff, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 48 Am. Crim. L.
usa/company/investor/downloads/sharpeye_press_release.pdf; Press Rev. 663, 676 (Spring 2011).
Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, InVision Tech. Inc. Enters into Agreement
209
18 U.S.C. § 3292.
with the United States (Dec. 6, 2004), available at http://www.justice.
210
28 U.S.C. § 2462.
gov/opa/pr/2004/December/04_crm_780.htm; Company News; G.E.
211
S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 3 (noting that, in the past, “corporate bribery
Gets InVision, a Maker of Bomb Detectors, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 2004, at has been concealed by the falsification of corporate books and records,”
C4.that the accounting provisions “remove [] this avenue of coverup,” and
197
Non-Pros. Agreement, In re InVision (Dec. 3, 2004), available at that “[t]aken together, the accounting requirements and criminal [anti-
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/invision-tech/12-03-bribery] prohibitions . . . should effectively deter corporate bribery of
04invisiontech-agree.pdf; Non-Pros. Agreement, In re General Elec. Co., foreign government officials”).
(Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
212
S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 7.
cases/invision-tech/12-03-04invisiontech-agree-ge.pdf; Complaint, SEC
213
Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
v. GE InVision, Inc., f/k/a InVision Technologies, Inc., No. 05-cv-660,
214
Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2005), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/
215
The accounting provisions contain a narrow exemption related to
litigation/complaints/comp19078.pdf. national security and the protection of classified information. Under
198
See U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 08-02 ( June 13, this “national security” provision, “no duty or liability [under Section
2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act] shall be imposed upon any person acting
opinion/2008/0802.pdf; see also Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, in cooperation with the head of any federal department or agency
Pfizer H.C.P. Corp. Agrees to Pay $15 Million Penalty to Resolve Foreign responsible for such matters if such act in cooperation with such head of
Bribery Investigation (Aug. 7, 2012) (“In the 18 months following its a department or agency was done upon the specific, written directive of
acquisition of Wyeth, Pfizer Inc., in consultation with the department, the head of such department or agency pursuant to Presidential authority
conducted a due diligence and investigative review of the Wyeth business to issue such directives.” Section 13(b)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
operations and integrated Pfizer Inc.’s internal controls system into § 78m(b)(3). As Congress made clear, however, the exception is narrowly
the former Wyeth business entities. The department considered these tailored and intended to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
extensive efforts and the SEC resolution in its determination not to H.R. Rep. 94-831, at 11, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
pursue a criminal resolution for the pre-acquisition improper conduct of fraud/fcpa/history/1977/corruptrpt-94-831.pdf.
Wyeth subsidiaries.”), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/
216
Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
August/12-crm-980.html.
217
H.R. Rep. No. 94-831, at 10.
199
18 U.S.C. § 2.
218
Id.
200
In enacting the FCPA in 1977, Congress explicitly noted that “[t]he
219
Section 13(b)(7) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7).
concepts of aiding and abetting and joint participation would apply to a
220
H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 917 (1988), available athttp://www.justice.
violation under this bill in the same manner in which those concepts have gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1988/tradeact-100-418.pdf. Congress
always applied in both SEC civil actions and in implied private actions rejected the addition of proposed cost-benefit language to the definition
brought under the securities laws generally.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 8.“in response to concerns that such a statutory provision might be abused
201
Pinkerton held that a conspirator may be found guilty of a substantive and weaken the accounting provisions at a time of increasing concern
offense committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy about audit failures and financial fraud and resultant recommendations
if the co-conspirator’s acts were reasonably foreseeable. See Pinkerton v. by experts for stronger accounting practices and audit standards.” Id.
United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946).
221
See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Biomet, Inc., No. 12-cv-454 (D.D.C. Mar.
202
See United States v. MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 26, 2012), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Biomet], available at http://
1998); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 982 (5th Cir. 1975). www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp22306.pdf; Criminal
203
See Criminal Information, United States v. Marubeni, supra note Information, United States v. Biomet, Inc., No. 12-cr-80 (D.D.C. Mar.
132; Criminal Information, United States v. JGC Corp., supra note 60; 26, 2012) [hereinafter United States v. Biomet], available at http://www.
Criminal Information, United States v. Snamprogetti, supra note 60; see justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/biomet/2012-03-26-biomet-
also Criminal Information, United States v. Technip, supra note 132.information.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Smith & Nephew Inc., No. 12-cv-
204
Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, “Prosecution of Persons Who 187 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2012), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/
Aid and Abet Violations,” explicitly provides that, for purposes of a litigation/complaints/2012/comp22252.pdf; Criminal Information,
civil action seeking injunctive relief or a civil penalty, “any person that United States v. Smith & Nephew plc., No. 12-cr-30 (D.D.C. Feb. 6,
knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person 2012), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation fcpa/cases/smith-nephew/2012-02-06-s-n-information.pdf; Complaint,
issued under this chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such SEC v. Johnson & Johnson, supra note 131; Criminal Information,
provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is United States v. DePuy, supra note 131; Complaint, SEC v. Maxwell
provided.” Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e). Technologies Inc., No. 11-cv-258 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 1
205
Under Section 21C(a) of the Exchange Act, the SEC may impose a [hereinafter SEC v. Maxwell Technologies], available at http://www.sec.
cease-and-desist order through the SEC’s administrative proceedings gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21832.pdf; Criminal Information,
upon any person who is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any United States v. Maxwell Technologies Inc., No. 11-cr-329 (S.D. Cal.
provision of the Exchange Act or any rule or regulation thereunder, and Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
upon any other person that is, was, or would be a cause of the violation, fraud/fcpa/cases/maxwell/01-31-11maxwell-tech-info.pdf; Complaint,
due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known would SEC v. Transocean, Inc., No. 10-cv-1891 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2010), ECF
contribute to such violation. Section 21C(a) of the Exchange Act,15 No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/
U.S.C. § 78u-3(a).comp21725.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Transocean,
206
See Complaint, SEC v. Panalpina, Inc., supra note 68.Inc., No. 10-cr-768 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1, available at
207
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) provides: “Except as otherwise expressly provided http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/transocean-inc/11-
by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, 04-10transocean-info.pdf.
not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted
222
S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 7.
ENDIX
notes
113114
223
Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
224
Section 13(b)(7) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7).
225
See Complaint, SEC v. Siemens AG, supra note 48; Criminal
Information, United States v. Siemens AG, supra note 48.
226
Complaint, SEC v. Siemens AG, supra note 48; Criminal Information,
United States v. Siemens AG, supra note 48; Press Release, U.S. Dept.
of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in
Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html.
227
See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Biomet, supra note 221 (bribes paid to
government healthcare providers in which phony invoices were used
to justify payments and bribes were falsely recorded as “consulting
fees” or “commissions” in company’s books and records); Criminal
Information, United States v. Biomet, supra note 221 (same); SEC v.
Alcatel-Lucent, supra note 48 (bribes paid to foreign officials to secure
telecommunications contracts where company lacked proper internal
controls and permitted books and records to falsified); United States v.
Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., supra note 48 (same).
228
Complaint, SEC v. Daimler AG, supra note 48; Criminal Information,
United States v. Daimler AG, supra note 48.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Tyco Int’l, supra note 9; Complaint, SEC v.
Willbros, No. 08-cv-1494 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2008), ECF No. 1, available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20571.pdf.
235
See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Siemens AG, supra note 48; Complaint,
SEC v. York Int’l Corp., supra note 115; Complaint, SEC v. Textron, supra
note 115; Criminal Information, United States v. Control Components,
Inc., No. 09-cr-162 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2009), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter
United States v. Control Components], available at http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/control-inc/07-22-09cci-info.pdf;
Criminal Information, United States v. SSI Int’l Far East, Ltd., No. 06-cr-
398, ECF No. 1 (D. Or. Oct. 10, 2006) [hereinafter United States v. SSI
Int’l], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
ssi-intl/10-10-06ssi-information.pdf.
236
See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. El Paso Corp., supra note 187; Complaint,
SEC v. Innospec, supra note 79; Complaint, SEC v. Chevron Corp., 07-
cv-10299 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2007), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.
sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20363.pdf.
237
Plea Agreement, United States v. Stanley, supra note 8; Plea Agreement,
United States v. Sapsizian, supra note 8.
238
See Complaint, SEC v. Maxwell Technologies, supra note 221.
239
See Complaint, SEC v. Willbros Group, supra note 9.
240
15 U.S.C. § 7201, et seq.
241
Exchange Act Rule 13a-15, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15; Exchange Act
Rule 15d-15, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-15; Item 308 of Regulation S-K, 17
C.F.R. § 229.308; Item 15, Form 20-F, available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/forms/form20-f.pdf; General Instruction (B), Form 40-F (for
foreign private issuers), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/
form40-f.pdf.
242
See U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., Commission Guidance
Regarding Management’s Report on Internal Control
over Financial Reporting Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 33-8810 ( June
27, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2007/33-8810.
pdf.
243
Id.
244
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102, 91
Stat. 1494 (1977).
245
See supra note 48; SEC v. Technip, supra note 132, (French company);
United States v. Technip, supra note 132, (same); see also Admin.
Proceeding Order, In re Diageo plc, Exchange Act Release No. 64978
(SEC July 27, 2011) (UK company), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/2011/34-64978.pdf; Admin. Proceeding Order, In
re Statoil, ASA, Exchange Act Release No. 54599 (SEC May 29, 2009)
(Norwegian company), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/2006/34-54599.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v.
Statoil, ASA, No. 06-cr-960 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2006) (same), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/statoil-asa-inc/10-13-
09statoil-information.pdf.
246
Although private companies are not covered by the books and records
and internal controls provisions of the FCPA and do not fall within
SEC’s jurisdiction, such companies generally are required by federal and
state tax laws and state corporation laws to maintain accurate books and
records sufficient to properly calculate taxes owed. Further, most large
private companies maintain their books and records to facilitate the
preparation of financial statements in conformity with GAAP to comply
with financial institutions’ lending requirements.
247
See SEC v. RAE Sys. Inc., supra note 92; In re RAE Sys. Inc., supra note
92.
248
See Section 13(b)(6) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (6),
which provides that where an issuer “holds 50 per centum or less of the
voting power with respect to a domestic or foreign firm,” the issuer must
“proceed in good faith to use its influence, to the extent reasonable under
the issuer’s circumstances, to cause such domestic or foreign firm to devise
and maintain a system of internal accounting controls consistent with
[Section 13(b)(2)].”
249
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6). Congress added the language in sub-
section 78m(b)(6) to the FCPA in 1988, recognizing that “it is
unrealistic to expect a minority owner to exert a disproportionate degree
of influence over the accounting practices of a subsidiary.” H.R. Rep.
No. 100-576, at 917. The Conference Report noted that, with respect
to minority owners, “the amount of influence which an issuer may
exercise necessarily varies from case to case. While the relative degree of
ownership is obviously one factor, other factors may also be important in
determining whether an issuer has demonstrated good-faith efforts to use
its influence.” Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 100-85, at 50.
250
Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, titled “Prosecution of Persons
Who Aid and Abet Violations,” explicitly provides that for purposes of
a civil action seeking injunctive relief or a civil penalty, “any person that
knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person
in violation of a provision of this title, or of any rule or regulation issued
under this title, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to
the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.” See
Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e).
251
See Complaint at 11-12, SEC v. Elkin, supra note 50, ECF 1.
252
SEC v. Elkin, supra note 50, ECF 6-9 (final judgments).
253
See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Nature’s Sunshine Products, Inc., et al., No.
09-cv-672 (D. Utah, July 31, 2009), ECF No. 2, available at http://www.
sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21162.htm.
254
See Admin. Proceeding Order, In re Watts Water Technologies,
Inc. and Leesen Chang, Exchange Act Release No. 65555 (SEC
Oct. 13, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/2011/34-65555.pdf.
255
Id. at 2, 4, 6-7.
256
Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1.
257
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5).
258
Section 3(a)(9) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9).
259
Exchange Act Rule 13b2-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2
260
Complaint, SEC v. Jennings, No. 11-cv-1444 (D.D.C. Jan. 24,
2011), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
complaints/2011/comp21822.pdf.
261
Complaint, id., ECF No. 1; Final Judgment, id., ECF No. 3.
262
Serious Fraud Office, Innospec Ltd: Former CEO admits bribery to
falsify product tests ( July 30, 2012), available at http://www.sfo.gov.
uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2012/innospec-ltd--
former-ceo-admits-bribery-to-falsify-product-tests.aspx.
263
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4)-(5). Congress adopted this language in 1988 in
order to make clear that, consistent with enforcement policy at the time,
115
criminal penalties would not be imposed “for inadvertent or insignificant Nos. 182, 816, 824 (judgments against foreign official defendants).
errors in books and records, or inadvertent violations of accounting
282
Criminal Information, United States v. SSI Int’l, supra note 235
controls.” See S. Rep. No. 100-85, at 49; H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at (alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346); Plea Agreement, United
916 (“The Conferees intend to codify current Securities and Exchange States v. SSI Int’l, supra note 235, (Oct. 10, 2006), available at http://
Commission (SEC) enforcement policy that penalties not be imposed for www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/control-inc/07-24-09cci-
insignificant or technical infractions or inadvertent conduct.”). plea-agree.pdf.
264
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
283
See Ex-Im Bank, Form of Exporter’s Certificate, EBD-M-56 ( Jan.
265
See United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., supra note 48; see also United 2007), available at http://www.exim.gov/pub/ins/pdf/ebd-m-56.pdf.
States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, supra note 56.
284
See 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
266
See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent,
285
22 C.F.R. §§ 130.2, 130.9.
S.A., supra note 48, ECF No. 10, available at http://www.justice.gov/
286
For example, in United States v. BAE Systems plc, BAE pleaded guilty
criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcatel-etal/02-22-11alcatel-dpa.pdf. to conspiring to defraud the United States by impairing and impeding its
267
See Plea Agreement, United States v. Siemens AG, supra note 48, ECF lawful functions, to making false statements about its FCPA compliance
No. 14, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/program, and to violating the AECA and ITAR. BAE paid a $400
siemens/12-15-08siemensakt-plea.pdf. million fine and agreed to an independent corporate monitor to ensure
268
See Minute Entry of Guilty Plea, United States v. Peterson, supra note compliance with applicable anti-corruption and export control laws.
8, ECF 13; see also Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Former Morgan Criminal Information and Plea Agreement, United States v. BAE Sys.
Stanley Managing Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal plc, No. 10-cr-35 (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2010), ECF Nos.1, 8, available at
Controls Required by FCPA (Apr. 23, 2012), available at http://www.http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bae-system/02-01-
justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html. 10baesystems-info.pdf and http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
269
See Criminal Information, United States v. Baker Hughes Svcs. cases/bae-system/03-01-10baesystems-plea-agree.pdf. In an action based
Int’l, No. 07-cr-129 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2007), ECF No. 1, available at on the same underlying facts as the criminal guilty plea, BAE entered
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/baker-hughs/04-11-a civil settlement with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls for
07bakerhughesintl-info.pdf.violations of AECA and ITAR, including over 2500 ITAR violations
270
See United States v. Panalpina, Inc., supra note 68.that included a failure to report the payment of fees or commissions
271
Id.associated with defense transactions and failure to maintain records
272
See FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, ¶¶ involving ITAR-controlled transactions. BAE paid $79 million in
63-80.penalties, and the State Department imposed a “policy of denial” for
273
PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 12 and PCAOB AU Section 325.export licenses on three BAE subsidiaries involved in the wrongful
274
See Section 10A of the Exchange Act, 15U.S.C. § 78j-1.conduct. Consent Agreement between BAE Sys. plc and Defense Trade
275
18 U.S.C. § 1952.Controls at 17-20, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State
276
See, e.g., United States v. Nexus Technologies, supra note 53; Criminal (May 16, 2011), available at http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/
Information, United States v. Robert Richard King, et al., No. 01-cr-190 consent_agreements/pdf/BAES_CA.pdf; Proposed Charging Letter, In
(W.D. Mo. June 27, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/re Investigation of BAE Systems plc Regarding Violations of the Arms
fraud/fcpa/cases/kingr-etal/05-03-02king-robert-indict.pdf; Superseding Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations,
Indictment, United States v. Mead, supra note 44; Criminal Information, U.S. Dept. of State (May 2011), available at http://www.pmddtc.state.
United States v. Saybolt North America Inc., et al., No. 98-cr-10266 (D. gov/compliance/consent_agreements/pdf/BAES_PCL.pdf.
Mass. Aug. 18, 1998), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
287
26 U.S.C. § 162(c)(1); see also Plea Agreement, United States v. Smith,
fraud/fcpa/cases/saybolt/08-10-98saybolt-info.pdf. No. 07-cr-69 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009), ECF No. 89, available at http://
277
See Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Kozeny, No. 05-www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/smithl/09-03-09smithl-plea-
cr-518 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009), ECF No. 203, available at http://www.agree.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Titan Corp., supra note
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kozenyv/05-26-09bourke2nd-185.
supersed-indict.pdf; Judgment, United States v. Bourke, No. 05-cr-518
288
See USAM § 9-27.000.
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2009), ECF No. 253, available at http://www.justice.
289
See USAM § 9-27.420 (setting forth considerations to be weighed
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kozenyv/11-12-09bourke-judgment.pdf. when determining whether it would be appropriate to enter into plea
278
Plea Agreement, United States v. Control Components, supra note agreement).
235, ECF No. 7; see also Order, United States v. Carson, supra note 119,
290
See USAM § 9-28.000 et seq.
ECF No. 440 (denying motion to dismiss counts alleging Travel Act
291
See USAM § 9-28.710 (discussing attorney-client and work product
violations), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/protections).
cases/carsons/2011-09-20-carson-minutes-denying-motion-to-dismiss.
292
See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf.
pdf.
293
See USAM§ 9-28.300.A; see also USAM § 9-28.700.B (explaining
279
See, e.g., Criminal Information, United States v. Esquenazi, supra note benefits of cooperation for both government and corporation).
44; Criminal Information, United States v. Green, supra note 44; Criminal
294
See USAM § 9-28.900 (discussing restitution and remediation). The
Information, United States v. General Elec. Co., No. 92-cr-87 (S.D. Ohio commentary further provides that prosecutors should consider and weigh
July 22, 1992), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/whether the corporation appropriately disciplined wrongdoers and a
cases/general-electric/1992-07-22-general-electric-information.pdf. corporation’s efforts to reform, including its quick recognition of the
280
Foreign officials may “not be charged with violating the FCPA itself, flaws in the program and its efforts to improve the program. Id.
since the [FCPA] does not criminalize the receipt of a bribe by a foreign
295
See USAM §§ 9-27.230, 9-27.420.
official.” United States v. Blondek, 741 F.Supp. 116, 117 (N.D. Tex.
296
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(b)(7) (2011).
1990), aff ’d United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (“We
297
Id. § 8C2.5(f )(2) (2011).
hold that foreign officials may not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §
298
U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., Report of Investigation
371 for conspiring to violate the FCPA.”). Foreign officials, however, Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
can be charged with violating the FCPA when the foreign official acts of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship
as an intermediary of a bribe payment. See, e.g., Information, United of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, SEC
States v. Basu, No. 02-cr-475 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 2002) (World Bank Rel. Nos. 34-44969 and AAER-1470 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter
employee charged with wire fraud and FCPA violations for facilitating Seaboard Report] available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
bribe payments to another World Bank official and Kenyan government investreport/34-44969.htm.
official), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
299
U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., Policy Statement
basu/11-26-02basu-info.pdf; Information, United States v. Sengupta, No. Concerning Cooperation by Individuals in its
02-cr-40 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/Investigations and Related Enforcements Actions, 17
criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/sengupta/01-30-02sengupta-info.pdf. C.F.R. § 202.12 ( Jan. 10, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
281
, Judgments, , note 44, ECF policy/2010/34-61340.pdf. See, e.g.United States v. Esquenazisupra
ENDIX
notes
115116
300
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines at § 8B2.1(a)(2).
301
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(b).
302
See generally Debbie Troklus, et al., Compliance 101: How
to build and maintain an effective compliance and ethics
program, Society of Corp. Compliance and Ethics (2008)
3-9 [hereinafter Compliance 101] (listing reasons to implement
compliance program, including protecting company’s reputation,
creating trust between management and employees, preventing false
statements to customers, creating efficiencies and streamlining processes,
detecting employee and contractor fraud and abuse, ensuring high-
quality products and services, and providing “early warning” system of
inappropriate actions); Transparency Int’l, Business Principles
for Countering Bribery: Small and Medium Enterprise
(SME) Edition 5 (2008) (citing benefits of anti-bribery program
like protecting reputation, creating record of integrity enhances
opportunities to acquire government business, protecting company
assets otherwise squandered on bribes); Mark Pieth, Harmonising
Anti-Corruption Compliance: The OECD Good Practice
Guidance 45-46 (2011) [hereinafter Harmonising Anti-
Corruption Compliance] (citing need for compliance program
to prevent and detect in-house risks, such as workplace security or
conflicts of interest, and external risks, like anti-trust violations, embargo
circumvention, environmental hazards, and money laundering ).
303
Debarment authorities, such as the Department of Defense or
the General Services Administration, may also consider a company’s
compliance program when deciding whether to debar or suspend
a contractor. Specifically, the relevant regulations provide that the
debarment authority should consider “[w]hether the contractor had
effective standards of conduct and internal control systems in place at
the time of the activity which constitutes cause for debarment or had
adopted such procedures prior to any Government investigation of the
activity cited as a cause for debarment,” and “[w]hether the contractor
has instituted or agreed to institute new or revised review and control
procedures and ethics training programs.” 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a).
304
Seaboard Report, supra note 298; U.S. Sec. and Exchange
Comm., Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission
Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Decisions, SEC Rel. No. 44969 (Oct. 23, 2001),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm.
305
USAM § 9-28.300. When evaluating the pervasiveness of wrongdoing
within the corporation, prosecutors are advised that while it may be
appropriate to charge a corporation for minor misconduct where the
wrongdoing was pervasive, “it may not be appropriate to impose liability
upon a corporation, particularly one with a robust compliance program in
place, under a strict respondeat superior theory for the single isolated act
of a rogue employee.” Id. § 9-28.500.A (emphasis added). Prosecutors
should also consider a company’s compliance program when examining
any remedial actions taken, including efforts to implement an effective
compliance program or to improve an existing one. As the commentary
explains, “although the inadequacy of a corporate compliance program is
a factor to consider when deciding whether to charge a corporation, that
corporation’s quick recognition of the flaws in the program and its efforts
to improve the program are also factors to consider as to appropriate
disposition of a case.” Id. § 9-28.900.B. Finally, the Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations provides that prosecutors should
consider the existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s pre-existing
compliance program in determining how to treat a corporate target. Id.
§ 9-28.800.
306
See USAM § 9-28.800.B; see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines §
8B2.1(a) (2011) (“The failure to prevent or detect the instant offense
does not necessarily mean that the program is not generally effective in
preventing and detecting criminal conduct.”).
307
See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Former Morgan Stanley
Managing Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls
Required by FCPA (Apr. 25, 2012) (declining to bring criminal case
against corporate employer that “had constructed and maintained a
system of internal controls, which provided reasonable assurances that its
employees were not bribing government officials”), available at http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html; Press Release,
U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., SEC Charges Former Morgan Stanley
Executive with FCPA Violations and Investment Adviser Fraud, No.
2012-78 (Apr. 25, 2012) (indicating corporate employer was not charged
in the matter and had “cooperated with the SEC’s inquiry and conducted
a thorough internal investigation to determine the scope of the improper
payments and other misconduct involved”), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/press/2012/2012-78.htm.
308
See USAM § 9-28.800.B.
309
See, e.g., Int’l Chamber of Commerce, ICC Rules on
Combating Corruption (2011) [hereinafter ICC Rules on
Combating Corruption], available at http://www.iccwbo.
org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/business_in_society/Statements/
ICC_Rules_on_Combating_Corruption_2011edition.pdf;
Transparency Int’l, Business Principles for Countering
Bribery (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter Business Principles for
Countering Bribery], available at http://www.transparency.
org/global_priorities/private_sector/business_principles/; United
Kingdom Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act of 2010,
Guidance about procedures which relevant commercial
organisations can put into place to prevent persons
associated with them from bribing (2010), available at http://
www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.
pdf; World Bank Group, Integrity Compliance Guidelines
(2011) [hereinafter Integrity Compliance Guidelines],
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/
Integrity_Compliance_Guidelines.pdf; Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation, APEC Anti-corruption Code of Conduct
for Business (2007) [hereinafter APEC Anti-corruption Code],
available at http://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-
on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Task-Groups/~/media/
Files/Groups/ACT/07_act_codebrochure.ashx; Int’l Chamber of
Commerce, Transparency Int’l, United Nations Global
Compact, and World Economic Forum, Resisting Extortion
and Solicitation in International Transactions: A
Company Tool for Employee Training (2011), available at
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_RESIST_Report_2011.
pdf; Int’l Chamber of Commerce, et al., Clean Business
Is Good Business, available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/
WEF_PACI_BusinessCaseFightingCorruption_2011.pdf; World
Economic Forum, Partnering Against Corruption –
Principles for Countering Bribery (2009) [hereinafter
Partnering Against Corruption], available at http://www3.
weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_Principles_2009.pdf; Working
Group on Bribery, OECD, Good Practice Guidance on
Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance 2010, [hereinafter
OECD Good Practice Guidance] available at http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/5/51/44884389.pdf; U.N. Global Compact, The Ten
Principles [hereinafter The Ten Principles] available at http://
www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html.
310
This is also reflected in the Sentencing Guidelines, which recognizes
that no single, formulaic set of requirements should be imposed, but
instead focuses on a number of factors like applicable industry practice
or the standards called for by any applicable governmental regulation,
the size of the organization, and whether the organization has engaged
in similar misconduct in the past. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines §
8B2.1 & app. note 2 (2011).
311
This was underscored by then-SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman
in 2003 in a speech on the SEC’s implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act: “[T]he ultimate effectiveness of the new corporate governance rules
will be determined by the ‘tone at the top.’ Adopting a code of ethics
means little if the company’s chief executive officer or its directors make
clear, by conduct or otherwise, that the code’s provisions do not apply
to them. . . . Corporate officers and directors hold the ultimate power
117
and responsibility for restoring public trust by conducting themselves available at http://justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0802.
in a manner that is worthy of the trust that is placed in them.” Cynthia pdf.
Glassman, SEC Implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley: The New Corporate
330
Complaint, SEC v. Rae Sys., Inc., supra note 92; Non-Pros. Agreement,
Governance, Remarks at National Economists Club (April 7, 2003), In re Rae Sys. Inc., supra note 92.
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch040703cag.htm .
331
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Business Ethics: A Manual for
312
Indeed, research has found that “[e]thical culture is the single biggest Managing a Responsible Business Enterprise in Emerging
factor determining the amount of misconduct that will take place in a Market Economies (2004), available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/
business.” Ethics Resource Center, 2009 National Business goodgovernance/adobe/bem_manual.pdf.
Ethics Survey: Ethics in the Recession (2009), at 41. Metrics
332
U.S. Dept. of State, Fighting Global Corruption: Business
of ethical culture include ethical leadership (tone at the top), supervisor Risk Management (2d ed. 2001), available at http://www.ogc.doc.
reinforcement of ethical behavior (middle management reinforcement), gov/pdfs/Fighting_Global_Corruption.pdf.
and peer commitment (supporting one another in doing the right
333
See Harmonising Anti-Corruption Compliance, supra note
thing ). Ethics Resource Center, 2011 National Business 302, at 46 (“Anti-corruption compliance is becoming more and more
Ethics Survey: Workplace Ethics in Transition (2012) at 19. harmonised worldwide.”).
Strong ethical cultures and strong ethics and compliance programs are
334
OECD Good Practice Guidance, supra note 309.
related, as data show that a well-implemented program helps lead to a
335
APEC Anti-corruption Code, supra note 309.
strong ethical culture. Id. at 34. “Understanding the nature of any gap
336
ICC Rules on Combating Corruption, supra note 309.
between the desired culture and the actual culture is a critical first step in
337
Business Principles for Countering Bribery, supra note 309.
determining the nature of any ethics-based risks inside the organization.”
338
The Ten Principles, supra note 309.
David Gebler, The Role of Culture at 1.7, in Society of Corporate
339
Integrity Compliance Guidelines, supra note 309.
Compliance and Ethics, The Complete Compliance and
340
Partnering Against Corruption, supra note 309.
Ethics Manual (2011). To create an ethical culture, attention must be
341
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g )(1)(A), 78dd-3(e)(1)(A), 78ff(c)(1)(A).
paid to norms at all levels of an organization, including the “tone at the
342
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g )(2)(A), 78dd-3(e)(2)(A), 78ff(c)(2)(A); 18
top,” “mood in the middle,” and “buzz at the bottom.” Id. 1.9-1.10.U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3), (e) (fine provision that supersedes FCPA-specific
313
See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(2)(B)-(C) (2011).fine provisions).
314
Id.
343
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
315
Id.
344
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
316
Id.
345
18 U.S.C. § 3571(d); see Southern Union v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
317
See, e.g., Ethics and Compliance Officer Association 2344, 2350-51 & n.4 (2012).
Foundation, The Ethics and Compliance Handbook: A
346
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g )(3), 78dd-3(e)(3), 78ff(c)(3).
Practical Guide From Leading Organizations (2008) at 13-26
347
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are promulgated by the U.S.
[hereinafter The Ethics and Compliance Handbook]. Sentencing Commission:
318
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(b)(4) (2011).The United States Sentencing Commission
319
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(b)(6) (2011) (“The (“Commission”) is an independent agency in the
organization’s compliance and ethics program shall be promoted judicial branch composed of seven voting and two
and enforced consistently throughout the organization through (A) non-voting ex-officio members. Its principal purpose
appropriate incentives to perform in accordance with the compliance and is to establish sentencing policies and practices for
ethics program; and (B) appropriate disciplinary measures for engaging the federal criminal justice system that will assure the
in criminal conduct and for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent or ends of justice by promulgating detailed guidelines
detect criminal conduct.”).prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders
320
See, e.g., Joseph E. Murphy, Society of Corp. Compliance and convicted of federal crimes. The Guidelines and
Ethics, Using Incentives in Your Compliance and Ethics policy statements promulgated by the Commission
Program (2011) at 1; The Ethics and Compliance Handbook, are issued pursuant to Section 994(a) of Title 28,
supra note 317, at 111-23.United States Code.
321
Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC, Tone at U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 1A1.1 (2011).
the Top: Getting It Right, Second Annual General Counsel Roundtable
348
Id. at ch. 3-5.
(Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
349
Id. § 2C1.1.
spch120304smc.htm.
350
Id. § 2C1.1(b).
322
See, e.g., ICC Rules on Combating Corruption, supra note 309,
351
Id. § 3B1.1.
at 8.
352
Id. at ch. 4, § 5A.
323
See, e.g. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C);
353
Id. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B), 2B1.1(b)(18)(A).
Compliance 101, supra note 302, at 30-33.
354
Id. § 8C2.4 (a).
324
Corporate Board Member/FTI Consulting 2009 Legal Study, Buckle
355
Id. § 8C2.5.
Up. Boards and General Counsel May Face a Bumpy Ride in 2009, at 5
356
Id. § 8C2.5(f ), 8C2.5(g ).
(“Interestingly, while 67% of general counsel say their company is subject
357
DOJ has exercised this civil authority in limited circumstances in
to compliance under the FCPA, 64% of those say there is room for the last thirty years. See, e.g., United States & SEC v. KPMG Siddharta
improvement in their FCPA training and compliance programs.”).Siddharta & Harsono, et al., No. 01-cv-3105 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (entry
325
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(b)(5)(B) (“The of injunction barring company from future FCPA violations based on
organization shall take reasonable steps . . . to evaluate periodically the allegations that company paid bribes to Indonesian tax official in order
effectiveness of the organization’s compliance and ethics program.”).to reduce the company’s tax assessment); United States v. Metcalf &
326
See, e.g., Compliance 101, supra note 302, at 60-61; The Ethics Eddy, Inc., No. 99-cv-12566 (D. Mass. 1999) (entry of injunction barring
and Compliance Handbook, supra note 317, at 155-60; Business company from future FCPA violations and requiring maintenance of
Principles for Countering Bribery, supra note 309, at 14.compliance program based on allegations that it paid excessive marketing
327
See, e.g., Michael M. Mannix and David S. Black., Compliance Issues and promotional expenses such as airfare, travel expenses, and per
in M&A: Performing Diligence on the Target’s Ethics and Compliance diem to an Eg yptian official and his family); United States v. American
Program at 5.71-5.81, in Society of Corporate Compliance Totalisator Co. Inc., No. 93-cv-161 (D. Md. 1993) (entry of injunction
and Ethics, The Complete Compliance and Ethics Manual barring company from future FCPA violations based on allegations that
(2011).it paid money to its Greek agent with knowledge that all or some of
328
Complaint, SEC v. Syncor International Corp., supra note 190; the money paid would be offered, given, or promised to Greek foreign
Criminal Information, United States v. Syncor Taiwan, Inc., supra note officials in connection with sale of company’s system and spare parts);
189. United States v. Eagle Bus Manufacturing, Inc., No. 91-cv-171 (S.D. Tex.
329
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 08-02 ( June 13, 2008), 1991) (entry of injunction barring company from future FCPA violations
ENDIX
notes
117118
based on allegations that employees of the company participated in
bribery scheme to pay foreign officials of Saskatchewan’s state-owned
transportation company $50,000 CAD in connection with sale of buses)
United States v. Carver, et al., No. 79-cv-1768 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (entry
of injunction barring company from future FCPA violations based on
allegations that Carver and Holley, officers and shareholders of Holcar
Oil Corp., paid $1.5 million to Qatar foreign official to secure an oil
drilling concession agreement); United States v. Kenny, et al., No. 79-cv-
2038 (D.D.C. 1979) (in conjunction with criminal proceeding, entry of
injunction barring company from future FCPA violations for providing
illegal financial assistance to political party to secure renewal of stamp
distribution agreement).
358
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g )(1)(B), 78dd-3(e)(1)(B), 78ff(c)(1)(B); see also
17 C.F.R. § 201.1004 (providing adjustments for inflation).
359
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g )(2)(B), 78dd-3(e)(2)(B), 78ff(c)(2)(B); see als
17 C.F.R. § 201.1004 (providing adjustments for inflation).
360
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g )(3), 78dd-3(e)(3), 78ff(c)(3); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.1004 (providing adjustments for inflation).
361
Section 21(B)(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3); see also
17 C.F.R. § 201.1004 (providing adjustments for inflation).
362
See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 §§ 202, 301, 401, and 402
(codified in scattered sections of Title 15 of the United States Code).
363
48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-2, 9.407-2.
364
48 C.F.R. § 9.402(b).
365
See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-1, 9.407-1(b)(2). Section 9.406-1 sets forth the
following non-exhaustive list of factors:
(1) Whether the contractor had effective standards
of conduct and internal control systems in place at
the time of the activity which constitutes cause for
debarment or had adopted such procedures prior to
any Government investigation of the activity cited as
a cause for debarment.
(2) Whether the contractor brought the activity
cited as a cause for debarment to the attention of the
appropriate Government agency in a timely manner.
(3) Whether the contractor has fully investigated
the circumstances surrounding the cause for
debarment and, if so, made the result of the
investigation available to the debarring official.
(4) Whether the contractor cooperated fully with
Government agencies during the investigation and
any court or administrative action.
(5) Whether the contractor has paid or has agreed
to pay all criminal, civil, and administrative liability
for the improper activity, including any investigative
or administrative costs incurred by the Government,
and has made or agreed to make full restitution.
(6) Whether the contractor has taken appropriate
disciplinary action against the individuals
responsible for the activity which constitutes cause
for debarment.
(7) Whether the contractor has implemented or
agreed to implement remedial measures, including
any identified by the Government.
(8) Whether the contractor has instituted or agreed
to institute new or revised review and control
procedures and ethics training programs.
(9) Whether the contractor has had adequate
time to eliminate the circumstances within the
contractor’s organization that led to the cause for
debarment.
(10) Whether the contractor’s management
recognizes and understands the seriousness of the
misconduct giving rise to the cause for debarment
and has implemented programs to prevent
recurrence.
366
48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a).
367
Exec. Order No. 12,549, 51 Fed. Reg. 6,370 (Feb. 18, 1986); Exec.
Order No. 12,689, 54 Fed. Reg. 34131 (Aug. 18, 1989).
368
48 C.F.R. § 9.407-2(b).
369
USAM § 9-28.1300 (2008).
;
o
370
See, e.g., African Development Bank Group, Integrity
and Anti-Corruption Progress Report 2009-2010 7, 14
(“As the premier financial development institution in Africa, the
Af DB is determined to root out misconduct, fraud and corruption
within its own ranks as well as in the implementation of the projects
it finances. In order to do so, the Bank created an anti-corruption and
fraud investigation division in November 2005 as its sole investigative
body. The unit became operational in June 2006 and commenced
investigations in January 2007. . . . Investigations conducted by the
IACD [Integrity and Anti-Corruption Department] are not criminal
proceedings; they are administrative in nature. Sanctions range from
personnel disciplinary actions, such as separation, to loan cancellation
and debarment for contractors, which can be temporary or permanent.”),
available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/
Publications/Integrity%20and%20Anti-Corruption.pdf; The World
Bank Group, Procurement: Sanctions Committee (“The World Bank’s
debarment process was first formulated in July, 1996, and the Sanctions
Committee was established in November 1998 to review allegations and
recommend sanctions to the President. Written procedures were issued
in August 2001 and are posted on the Bank’s website, along with the
sanction actions.”), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDK:5000
2288~pagePK:84271~piPK:84287~theSitePK:84266,00.html.
371
See African Development Bank Group, Asian Development Bank,
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter-American
Development Bank Group and World Bank Group, Agreement
for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions (Apr. 9, 2010),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/
AgreementForMutualEnforcementof DebarmentDecisions.pdf.
372
Id.; see also The World Bank Group, Cross-Debarment Accord Steps Up
Fight Against Corruption (Apr. 9, 2010) (“‘With today’s cross-debarment
agreement among development banks, a clear message on anticorruption
is being delivered: Steal and cheat from one, get punished by all,’ said
World Bank Group President Robert B. Zoellick.”), available at http://
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:2
2535805~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html.
373
22 C.F.R. §§ 126.7(a)(3)-(4), 120.27(a)(6).
374
Authority under the AECA is delegated to the DDTC. See 22 C.F.R.
§ 120.1(a).
375
22 U.S.C. § 2778(g )(1)(A)(vi), (g )(3)(B).
376
22 C.F.R. § 127.7(c).
377
See supra note 286.
378
See Gary G. Grindler, Acting Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Mem. to the Heads of Department Components and United
States Attorneys on Additional Guidance on the Use of Monitors in
Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution (May 25,
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo-guidance-
monitors.pdf; Lanny A. Breuer, Assist. Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice,
Mem. to All Criminal Division Personnel on Selection of Monitors in
Criminal Division Matters ( June 24, 2009), available at http://www.
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3-supp-appx-3.pdf; see
also Craig S. Morford, Acting Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Mem. to the Heads of Department Components and United States
Attorneys on Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution
Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations
(Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-
useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf.
379
Historically, DOJ had, on occasion, agreed to DPAs with companies
that were not filed with the court. That is no longer the practice of DOJ.
380
USAM § 9-27.230.
381
USAM § 9-27.230.B.
119
382
DOJ has recently declined matters where some or all of the following
internally and still be treated as if he or she had reported to the SEC
circumstances were present: (1) a corporation voluntarily and fully
at the earlier reporting date , thus preserving their “place in line” for
disclosed the potential misconduct; (2) corporate principles voluntarily
a possible whistleblower award from the SEC; and (3) provide that a
engaged in interviews with DOJ and provided truthful and complete
whistleblower’s voluntary participation in an entity’s internal compliance
information about their conduct; (3) a parent company conducted
and reporting systems is a factor that can increase the amount of an
extensive pre-acquisition due diligence of potentially liable subsidiaries
award, and that a whistleblower’s interference with internal compliance
and engaged in significant remediation efforts post-acquisition; (4) a
and reporting system is a factor that can decrease the amount of an award.
company provided information about its extensive compliance policies,
See Exchange Act Rule 21F, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F.
procedures, and internal controls; (5) a company agreed to a civil
396
See Exchange Act Rule 21F-7(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-7(b).
resolution with the Securities and Exchange Commission while also
397
For example, SEC staff will not disclose a whistleblower’s identity in
demonstrating that criminal declination was appropriate; (6) only a single
response to requests under the Freedom of Information Act. However,
employee was involved in the improper payments; and (7) the improper
there are limits on SEC’s ability to shield a whistleblower’s identity,
payments involved minimal funds compared to overall business revenues.
and in certain circumstances SEC must disclose it to outside entities.
383
See Criminal Information, United States v. Peterson, supra note 8,
For example, in an administrative or court proceeding, SEC may be
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Former Morgan Stanley Managing
required to produce documents or other information that would
Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required
reveal the whistleblower’s identity. In addition, as part of ongoing
by FCPA (Apr. 25, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
SEC investigatory responsibilities, SEC staff may use information
pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html (“After considering all the available
provided by a whistleblower during the course of the investigation. In
facts and circumstances, including that Morgan Stanley constructed and
appropriate circumstances, SEC may also provide information, subject
maintained a system of internal controls, which provided reasonable
to confidentiality requirements, to other governmental or regulatory
assurances that its employees were not bribing government officials, the
entities. Exchange Act Rule 21F-7(a), 17 C.F.R. 240.21F-7(a).
Department of Justice declined to bring any enforcement action against
398
Although SEC does not have an opinion procedure release process,
Morgan Stanley related to Peterson’s conduct. The company voluntarily
it has declared its decision to follow the guidance announced through
disclosed this matter and has cooperated throughout the department’s
DOJ’s FCPA Opinion Release Procedure. U.S. Sec. and Exchange
investigation.”); see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm.,
Comm., SEC Release No. 34-17099 (Aug. 29, 1980), available at http://
SEC Charges Former Morgan Stanley Executive with FCPA Violations
www.sec.gov/news/digest/1980/dig082980.pdf. SEC Release No. 34-
and Investment Adviser Fraud (Apr. 25, 2012), available at http://www.
17099 stated that, to encourage issuers to take advantage of the DOJ’s
sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-78.htm (“Morgan Stanley, which is not
FCPA Review Procedure, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, SEC
charged in the matter, cooperated with the SEC’s inquiry and conducted
would “not take enforcement action alleging violations of Section 30A
a thorough internal investigation to determine the scope of the improper
in any case where an issuer has sought and obtained an FCPA Review
payments and other misconduct involved.”).
letter from the Department, prior to May 31, 1981, stating that the
384
SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e).
Department will not take enforcement action under Section 30A with
385
Deferred Pros. Agreement, In the Matter of Tenaris, S.A. (May 17,
respect to the transaction involved.” Id. The release further noted that it
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112-dpa.
would revisit this policy once the DOJ had evaluated the results of the
pdf; see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., Tenaris to Pay
FCPA Review Procedure after its first year of operation. A second release
$5.4 Million in SEC’s First-Ever Deferred Prosecution Agreement (May
stated that the SEC would continue to adhere to the policy announced
17, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112.
in Release No. 34-17099. U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., SEC Release
htm.
No. 34-18255 (Nov. 13, 1981), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
386
See Non-Pros. Agreement, In re Tenaris, S.A. (May 17, 2011), available
digest/1981/dig111381.p
df.
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/tenaris-sa/2011-
399
Both DOJ’s opinion procedure releases (from 1993 to present) and
03-14-tenaris.pdf.
review procedure releases (from 1980-1992) are available at http://www.
387
See U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., Enforcement Manual
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion.
§ 6.2.3. (March 9, 2012), available at http://www.sec-gov/divisions/
400
The full regulations relating to DOJ’s opinion procedure are available
enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf.
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/frgncrpt.pdf.
388
See id. § 6.2.4.
401
28 C.F.R. § 80.1.
389
See id. § 2.6.
402
28 C.F.R. § 80.3.
390
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c).
403
28 C.F.R. § 80.12 (“Neither the submission of a request for an
391
18 U.S.C. § 1513(e).
FCPA Opinion, its pendency, nor the issuance of an FCPA Opinion,
392
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(3). The new provision defines “original
shall in any way alter the responsibility of an issuer to comply with the
information” to mean information that:
accounting requirements of 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(2) and (3).”).
(A) is derived from the independent knowledge
404
28 C.F.R. § 80.4.
or analysis of a whistleblower; (B) is not known
405
28 C.F.R. § 80.5.
to the Commission from any other source, unless
406
28 C.F.R. § 80.6.
the whistleblower is the original source of the
407
28 C.F.R. § 80.14(a). This non-disclosure policy applies regardless of
information; and (C) is not exclusively derived from
whether DOJ responds to the request or the party withdraws the request
an allegation made in a judicial or administrative
before receiving a response. Id.
hearing, in a governmental report, hearing, audit,
408
28 C.F.R. § 80.6.
or investigation, or from the news media, unless the
409
28 C.F.R. § 80.2.
whistleblower is a source of the information.
410
In connection with any request for an FCPA opinion, DOJ may
393
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
conduct whatever independent investigation it believes appropriate. 28
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376,
C.F.R. § 80.7.
1841-49 (2010).
411
28 C.F.R. § 80.15. Once a request is withdrawn, it has no effect.
394
For detailed information about the program, including eligibility
However, DOJ reserves the right to retain a copy of any FCPA
requirements and certain limitations that apply, see Section 922 of the
opinion request, documents, and information submitted during the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, available
opinion release procedure for any governmental purpose, subject to the
at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/dodd-frank-sec-922.pdf,
restrictions on disclosures in 28 C.F.R. § 80.14.
and the final rules on eligibility, Exchange Act Rule 21F-8, 17 C.F.R. §
412
28 C.F.R. § 80.8.
240.21F-8.
413
28 C.F.R. § 80.7. “Such additional information, if furnished orally,
395
For example, the rules: (1) make a whistleblower eligible for an award
must be confirmed in writing promptly. The same person who signed
if the whistleblower reports original information internally, and the
the initial request must sign the written, supplemental information and
company informs the SEC about the violations; (2) give whistleblowers
must again certify it to be a true, correct and complete disclosure of the
120 days to report information to the SEC after first reporting
requested information.” Id.
ENDIX
notes
119120
414
28 C.F.R. § 80.9 (“No oral clearance, release or other statement
purporting to limit the enforcement discretion of the Department of
Justice may be given. The requesting issuer or domestic concern may rely
only upon a written FCPA opinion letter signed by the Attorney General
or his designee.”).
415
28 C.F.R. § 80.8. FCPA opinions do not bind or obligate any agency
other than DOJ. They also do not affect the requesting party’s obligations
to any other agency or under any statutory or regulatory provision other
than those specifically cited in the particular FCPA opinion. 28 C.F.R. §
80.11. If the conduct for which an FCPA opinion is requested is subject
to approval by any other agency, such FCPA opinion may not be taken
to indicate DOJ’s views on any legal or factual issues before that other
agency. 28 C.F.R. § 80.13.
416
28 C.F.R. § 80.10. DOJ can rebut this presumption by a
preponderance of the evidence. A court determining whether the
presumption has been rebutted weighs all relevant factors, including
whether the submitted information was accurate and complete and the
activity was within the scope of conduct specified in the request. Id. As of
September 2012, DOJ has never pursued an enforcement action against a
party for conduct that formed the basis of an FCPA opinion stating that
the prospective conduct would violate DOJ’s present enforcement policy.
417
As a general matter, DOJ normally anonymizes much of the
information in its publicly released opinions and includes the general
nature and circumstances of the proposed conduct. DOJ does not release
the identity of any foreign sales agents or other types of identifying
information. 28 C.F.R. § 80.14(b). However, DOJ may release the
identity of the requesting party, the foreign country in which the
proposed conduct is to take place, and any actions DOJ took in response
to the FCPA opinion request. Id. If a party believes that an opinion
contains proprietary information, it may request that DOJ remove or
anonymize those portions of the opinion before it is publicly released. 28
C.F.R. § 80.14(c).
418
28 C.F.R. § 80.16.
FCPA Unit
Fraud Section, Criminal Division
U S Department of Justice
1400 New York Avenue, N W
Washington, DC 20005
http://www justice gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
FCPA Unit
Enforcement Division
U S Securities & Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549
http://www sec gov/spotlight/fcpa shtmlOCR text (526,824c · tika · 95% conf)
chapter 1 Introduction FCPA A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act By the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Enforcement Division of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission This guide is intended to provide information for businesses and individuals regarding the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The guide has been prepared by the staff of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Enforcement Division of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. It is non-binding, informal, and summary in nature, and the information contained herein does not constitute rules or regulations. As such, it is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, that are enforceable at law by any party, in any criminal, civil, or administrative matter. It is not intended to substitute for the advice of legal counsel on specific issues related to the FCPA. It does not in any way limit the enforcement intentions or litigating positions of the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, or any other U.S. government agency. Companies or individuals seeking an opinion concerning specific prospective conduct are encouraged to use the U.S. Department of Justice’s opinion procedure discussed in Chapter 9 of this guide. This guide is United States Government property. It is available to the public free of charge online at www.justice.gov/ criminal/fraud/fcpa and www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa.shtml. http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa.shtml A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT By the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Enforcement Division of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission FOREWORD We are pleased to announce the publication of A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is a critically important statute for combating corruption around the globe. Corruption has corrosive effects on democratic institutions, undermining public accountability and diverting public resources from impor- tant priorities such as health, education, and infrastructure. When business is won or lost based on how much a company is willing to pay in bribes rather than on the quality of its products and services, law-abiding companies are placed at a com- petitive disadvantage—and consumers lose. For these and other reasons, enforcing the FCPA is a continuing priority at the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Guide is the product of extensive efforts by experts at DOJ and SEC, and has benefited from valuable input from the Departments of Commerce and State. It endeavors to provide helpful information to enterprises of all shapes and sizes— from small businesses doing their first transactions abroad to multi-national corporations with subsidiaries around the world. The Guide addresses a wide variety of topics, including who and what is covered by the FCPA’s anti-bribery and accounting provisions; the definition of a “foreign official”; what constitute proper and improper gifts, travel and entertainment expenses; the nature of facilitating payments; how successor liability applies in the mergers and acquisitions context; the hallmarks of an effective corporate compliance program; and the different types of civil and criminal resolutions available in the FCPA context. On these and other topics, the Guide takes a multi-faceted approach, setting forth in detail the statutory require- ments while also providing insight into DOJ and SEC enforcement practices through hypotheticals, examples of enforce- ment actions and anonymized declinations, and summaries of applicable case law and DOJ opinion releases. The Guide is an unprecedented undertaking by DOJ and SEC to provide the public with detailed information about our FCPA enforcement approach and priorities. We are proud of the many lawyers and staff who worked on this project, and hope that it will be a useful reference for companies, individuals, and others interested in our enforcement of the Act. November 14, 2012 Lanny A. Breuer Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division Department of Justice Robert S. Khuzami Director of Enforcement Securities and Exchange Commission CONTENTS Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Costs of Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 National Landscape: Interagency Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Securities and Exchange Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Law Enforcement Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Departments of Commerce and State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 International Landscape: Global Anti-Corruption Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 OECD Working Group on Bribery and the Anti-Bribery Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 U.N. Convention Against Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Other Anti-Corruption Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Chapter 2: THE FCPA: ANTI-BRIBERY PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Who Is Covered by the Anti-Bribery Provisions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Issuers—15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Domestic Concerns—15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Territorial Jurisdiction—15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 What Jurisdictional Conduct Triggers the Anti-Bribery Provisions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 What Is Covered?—The Business Purpose Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 What Does “Corruptly” Mean? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 What Does “Willfully” Mean and When Does It Apply? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 What Does “Anything of Value” Mean? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Cash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Gifts, Travel, Entertainment, and Other Things of Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Charitable Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Who Is a Foreign Official? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Department, Agency, or Instrumentality of a Foreign Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Public International Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 How Are Payments to Third Parties Treated? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 What Affirmative Defenses Are Available? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 The Local Law Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Reasonable and Bona Fide Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 What Are Facilitating or Expediting Payments? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Does the FCPA Apply to Cases of Extortion or Duress? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Principles of Corporate Liability for Anti-Bribery Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Parent-Subsidiary Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Successor Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Additional Principles of Criminal Liability for Anti-Bribery Violations: Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy . . . . 34 Additional Principles of Civil Liability for Anti-Bribery Violations: Aiding and Abetting and Causing . . . . . . . . 34 What Is the Applicable Statute of Limitations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Statute of Limitations in Criminal Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Statute of Limitations in Civil Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Chapter 3: THE FCPA: ACCOUNTING PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 What Is Covered by the Accounting Provisions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Books and Records Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Internal Controls Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Potential Reporting and Anti-Fraud Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 What Are Management’s Other Obligations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Who Is Covered by the Accounting Provisions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Civil Liability for Issuers, Subsidiaries, and Affiliates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Civil Liability for Individuals and Other Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Criminal Liability for Accounting Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Auditor Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Chapter 4: OTHER RELATED U.S. LAWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Travel Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Money Laundering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Mail and Wire Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Certification and Reporting Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Tax Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Chapter 5: GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF ENFORCEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 What Does DOJ Consider When Deciding Whether to Open an Investigation or Bring Charges? . . . . . . . . . 52 DOJ Principles of Federal Prosecution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 DOJ Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 What Does SEC Consider When Deciding Whether to Open an Investigation or Bring Charges? . . . . . . . . . 53 Self-Reporting, Cooperation, and Remedial Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Criminal Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Civil Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Corporate Compliance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Hallmarks of Effective Compliance Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Commitment from Senior Management and a Clearly Articulated Policy Against Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Code of Conduct and Compliance Policies and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Oversight, Autonomy, and Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Training and Continuing Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Incentives and Disciplinary Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Third-Party Due Diligence and Payments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Confidential Reporting and Internal Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Continuous Improvement: Periodic Testing and Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Mergers and Acquisitions: Pre-Acquisition Due Diligence and Post-Acquisition Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Other Guidance on Compliance and International Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Chapter 6: FCPA PENALTIES, SANCTIONS, AND REMEDIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 What Are the Potential Consequences for Violations of the FCPA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Criminal Penalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Civil Penalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Collateral Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Debarment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Cross-Debarment by Multilateral Development Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Loss of Export Privileges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 When Is a Compliance Monitor or Independent Consultant Appropriate? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Chapter 7: RESOLUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 What Are the Different Types of Resolutions with DOJ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Criminal Complaints, Informations, and Indictments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Plea Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Deferred Prosecution Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Non-Prosecution Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Declinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 What Are the Different Types of Resolutions with SEC? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Civil Injunctive Actions and Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Civil Administrative Actions and Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Deferred Prosecution Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Non-Prosecution Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Termination Letters and Declinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 What Are Some Examples of Past Declinations by DOJ and SEC? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Chapter 8: WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS AND PROTECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Chapter 9: DOJ OPINION PROCEDURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Chapter 10: CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 APPENDIX: THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 APPENDIX: ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Corporate bribery is bad business. In our free market system it is basic that the sale of products should take place on the basis of price, quality, and service. Corporate bribery is fundamentally destructive of this basic tenet. Corporate bribery of foreign officials takes place primarily to assist corporations in gaining business. Thus foreign corporate bribery affects the very stability of overseas business. Foreign corporate bribes also affect our domestic competitive climate when domestic firms engage in such practices as a substitute for healthy com- petition for foreign business.1 —United States Senate, 1977 chapter 1 Introduction 2 INTRODUCTION Congress enacted the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA or the Act) in 1977 in response to revelations of widespread bribery of foreign officials by U.S. companies. The Act was intended to halt those corrupt practices, create a level playing field for honest businesses, and restore public confidence in the integ- rity of the marketplace.2 The FCPA contains both anti-bribery and accounting provisions. The anti-bribery provisions prohibit U.S. per- sons and businesses (domestic concerns), U.S. and foreign public companies listed on stock exchanges in the United States or which are required to file periodic reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission (issuers), and certain foreign persons and businesses acting while in the territory of the United States (territorial jurisdiction) from making corrupt payments to foreign officials to obtain or retain business. The accounting provisions require issuers to make and keep accurate books and records and to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls. The accounting provisions also prohibit individu- als and businesses from knowingly falsifying books and records or knowingly circumventing or failing to imple- ment a system of internal controls. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) share FCPA enforcement authority and are committed to fighting for- eign bribery through robust enforcement. An important component of this effort is education, and this resource guide, prepared by DOJ and SEC staff, aims to provide businesses and individuals with information to help them abide by the law, detect and prevent FCPA violations, and implement effective compliance programs. The Costs of Corruption Corruption is a global problem. In the three decades since Congress enacted the FCPA, the extent of corporate bribery has become clearer and its ramifications in a trans- national economy starker. Corruption impedes economic growth by diverting public resources from important pri- orities such as health, education, and infrastructure. It undermines democratic values and public accountability and weakens the rule of law.3 And it threatens stability and security by facilitating criminal activity within and across 3 borders, such as the illegal trafficking of people, weapons, and drugs.4 International corruption also undercuts good governance and impedes U.S. efforts to promote freedom and democracy, end poverty, and combat crime and terror- ism across the globe.5 Corruption is also bad for business. Corruption is anti-competitive, leading to distorted prices and disadvan- taging honest businesses that do not pay bribes. It increases the cost of doing business globally and inflates the cost of government contracts in developing countries.6 Corruption also introduces significant uncertainty into business trans- actions: Contracts secured through bribery may be legally unenforceable, and paying bribes on one contract often results in corrupt officials making ever-increasing demands.7 Bribery has destructive effects within a business as well, undermining employee confidence in a company’s manage- ment and fostering a permissive atmosphere for other kinds of corporate misconduct, such as employee self-dealing, embezzlement,8 financial fraud,9 and anti-competitive behavior.10 Bribery thus raises the risks of doing business, putting a company’s bottom line and reputation in jeop- ardy. Companies that pay bribes to win business ultimately undermine their own long-term interests and the best inter- ests of their investors. Historical Background Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977 after revela- tions of widespread global corruption in the wake of the Watergate political scandal. SEC discovered that more than 400 U.S. companies had paid hundreds of millions of dol- lars in bribes to foreign government officials to secure busi- ness overseas.11 SEC reported that companies were using secret “slush funds” to make illegal campaign contributions in the United States and corrupt payments to foreign offi- cials abroad and were falsifying their corporate financial records to conceal the payments.12 Congress viewed passage of the FCPA as critical to stopping corporate bribery, which had tarnished the image of U.S. businesses, impaired public confidence in the financial integrity of U.S. companies, and hampered the efficient functioning of the markets.13 As Congress recognized when it passed the FCPA, corruption imposes enormous costs both at home and abroad, leading to mar- ket inefficiencies and instability, sub-standard products, and an unfair playing field for honest businesses.14 By enacting a strong foreign bribery statute, Congress sought to minimize these destructive effects and help companies resist corrupt demands, while addressing the destruc- tive foreign policy ramifications of transnational brib- ery.15 The Act also prohibited off-the-books accounting through provisions designed to “strengthen the accuracy of the corporate books and records and the reliability of the audit process which constitute the foundations of our system of corporate disclosure.”16 In 1988, Congress amended the FCPA to add two affirmative defenses: (1) the local law defense; and (2) the reasonable and bona fide promotional expense defense.17 Congress also requested that the President negotiate an international treaty with members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to prohibit bribery in international business transactions by many of the United States’ major trading partners.18 Subsequent negotiations at the OECD culminated in the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery Convention), which, among other things, required parties to make it a crime to bribe foreign officials.19 No problem does more to alienate citizens from their political leaders and institutions, and to undermine political stability and economic development, than endemic corruption among the government, political party leaders, judges, and bureaucrats. — USAID Anti-Corruption Strategy chapter 1 Introduction 3 4 In 1998, the FCPA was amended to conform to the requirements of the Anti-Bribery Convention. These amendments expanded the FCPA’s scope to: (1) include payments made to secure “any improper advantage”; (2) reach certain foreign persons who commit an act in fur- therance of a foreign bribe while in the United States; (3) cover public international organizations in the definition of “foreign official”; (4) add an alternative basis for juris- diction based on nationality; and (5) apply criminal pen- alties to foreign nationals employed by or acting as agents of U.S. companies.20 The Anti-Bribery Convention came into force on February 15, 1999, with the United States as a founding party. National Landscape: Interagency Efforts DOJ and SEC share enforcement authority for the FCPA’s anti-bribery and accounting provisions.21 They also work with many other federal agencies and law enforce- ment partners to investigate and prosecute FCPA viola- tions, reduce bribery demands through good governance programs and other measures, and promote a fair playing field for U.S. companies doing business abroad. Department of Justice DOJ has criminal FCPA enforcement authority over “issuers” (i.e., public companies) and their officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders acting on the issuer’s behalf. DOJ also has both criminal and civil enforce- ment responsibility for the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions over “domestic concerns”—which include (a) U.S. citizens, nationals, and residents and (b) U.S. businesses and their officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders act- ing on the domestic concern’s behalf—and certain foreign persons and businesses that act in furtherance of an FCPA violation while in the territory of the United States. Within DOJ, the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division has pri- mary responsibility for all FCPA matters.22 FCPA matters are handled primarily by the FCPA Unit within the Fraud Section, regularly working jointly with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices around the country. DOJ maintains a website dedicated to the FCPA and its enforcement at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ fcpa/. The website provides translations of the FCPA in numerous languages, relevant legislative history, and selected documents from FCPA-related prosecutions and resolutions since 1977, including charging documents, plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, non-prosecution agree- ments, press releases, and other relevant pleadings and court decisions. The website also provides copies of opinions issued in response to requests by companies and individuals under DOJ’s FCPA opinion procedure. The procedures for submit- ting a request for an opinion can be found at http://www. justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/frgncrpt.pdf and are discussed further in Chapter 9. Individuals and companies wishing to disclose information about potential FCPA viola- tions are encouraged to contact the FCPA Unit at the tele- phone number or email address above. Securities and Exchange Commission SEC is responsible for civil enforcement of the FCPA over issuers and their officers, directors, employees, agents, DOJ Contact Information Deputy Chief (FCPA Unit) Fraud Section, Criminal Division Bond Building 1400 New York Ave, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 Telephone: (202) 514-7023 Facsimile: (202) 514-7021 Email: [email protected] http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/frgncrpt.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/frgncrpt.pdf mailto:[email protected] 5 or stockholders acting on the issuer’s behalf. SEC’s Division of Enforcement has responsibility for investigating and prosecuting FCPA violations. In 2010, SEC’s Enforcement Division created a specialized FCPA Unit, with attorneys in Washington, D.C. and in regional offices around the country, to focus specifically on FCPA enforcement. The Unit investigates potential FCPA violations; facilitates coordination with DOJ’s FCPA program and with other federal and international law enforcement partners; uses its expert knowledge of the law to promote consistent enforce- ment of the FCPA; analyzes tips, complaints, and referrals regarding allegations of foreign bribery; and conducts pub- lic outreach to raise awareness of anti-corruption efforts and good corporate governance programs. The FCPA Unit maintains a “Spotlight on FCPA” section on SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/ fcpa.shtml. The website, which is updated regularly, pro- vides general information about the Act, links to all SEC enforcement actions involving the FCPA, including both federal court actions and administrative proceedings, and contains other useful information. Individuals and companies with information about possible FCPA violations by issuers may report them to the Enforcement Division via SEC’s online Tips, Complaints and Referral system, http://www.sec.gov/complaint/tip- scomplaint.shtml. They may also submit information to SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower through the same online system or by contacting the Office of the Whistleblower at (202) 551-4790. Additionally, investors with questions about the FCPA can call the Office of Investor Education and Advocacy at (800) SEC-0330. For more information about SEC’s Whistleblower Program, under which certain eligible whistleblowers may be entitled to a monetary award if their information leads to certain SEC actions, see Chapter 8. Law Enforcement Partners DOJ’s FCPA Unit regularly works with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to investigate potential FCPA violations. The FBI’s International Corruption Unit has pri- mary responsibility for international corruption and fraud investigations and coordinates the FBI’s national FCPA enforcement program. The FBI also has a dedicated FCPA squad of FBI special agents (located in the Washington Field Office) that is responsible for investigating many, and providing support for all, of the FBI’s FCPA investigations. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security and the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation regularly investigate potential FCPA violations. A number of other agencies are also involved in the fight against international corruption, including the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, which has helped lead a number of FCPA investigations. Departments of Commerce and State Besides enforcement efforts by DOJ and SEC, the U.S. government is also working to address corrup- tion abroad and level the playing field for U.S. businesses through the efforts of the Departments of Commerce and State. Both Commerce and State advance anti-corruption and good governance initiatives globally and regularly assist U.S. companies doing business overseas in several SEC Contact Information FCPA Unit Chief Division of Enforcement U .S . Securities and Exchange Commission 100 F Street, N .E . Washington, DC 20549 Online: Tips, Complaints, and Referrals website http://www .sec .gov/complaint/tipscomplaint .shtml Office of Investor Education and Advocacy: (800) SEC-0330 http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa.shtml http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa.shtml http://www.sec.gov/complaint/tipscomplaint.shtml http://www.sec.gov/complaint/tipscomplaint.shtml http://www.sec.gov/complaint/info_tipscomplaint.shtml http://www.sec.gov/complaint/info_tipscomplaint.shtml http://www.sec.gov/complaint/select.shtml chapter 1 Introduction 5 6 important ways. Both agencies encourage U.S. businesses to seek the assistance of U.S embassies when they are con- fronted with bribe solicitations or other corruption-related issues overseas.23 The Department of Commerce offers a num- ber of important resources for businesses, including the International Trade Administration’s United States and Foreign Commercial Service (Commercial Service). The Commercial Service has export and industry specialists located in over 100 U.S. cities and 70 countries who are available to provide counseling and other assistance to U.S. businesses, particularly small and medium-sized companies, regarding exporting their products and services. Among other things, these specialists can help a U.S. company con- duct due diligence when choosing business partners or agents overseas. The International Company Profile Program, for instance, can be part of a U.S. business’ evaluation of poten- tial overseas business partners.24 Businesses may contact the Commercial Service through its website, http://export.gov/ eac/, or directly at its domestic and foreign offices.25 Additionally, the Department of Commerce’s Office of the General Counsel maintains a website, http://www. commerce.gov/os/ogc/transparency-and-anti-bribery- initiatives, that contains recent articles and speeches, links to translations of the FCPA, a catalogue of anti-corruption resources, and a list of international conventions and ini- tiatives. The Trade Compliance Center in the Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration hosts a website with anti-bribery resources, http://tcc.export. gov/Bribery. This website contains an online form through which U.S. companies can report allegations of foreign bribery by foreign competitors in international business transactions.26 The Department of Commerce also pro- vides information to companies through a number of U.S. and international publications designed to assist firms in complying with anti-corruption laws. For example, the Department of Commerce has included a new anti-corrup- tion section in its Country Commercial Guides, prepared by market experts at U.S. embassies worldwide, that contains information on market conditions for more than 100 coun- tries, including information on the FCPA for exporters.27 The Department of Commerce has also published a guide, Business Ethics: A Manual for Managing a Responsible Business Enterprise in Emerging Market Economies, which contains information about corporate compliance pro- grams for businesses involved in international trade.28 The Departments of Commerce and State also pro- vide advocacy support, when determined to be in the national interest, for U.S. companies bidding for foreign government contracts. The Department of Commerce’s Advocacy Center, for example, supports U.S. businesses competing against foreign companies for international con- tracts, such as by arranging for the delivery of an advocacy message by U.S. government officials or assisting with unan- ticipated problems such as suspected bribery by a competi- tor.29 The Department of State’s Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (specifically, its Office of Commercial and Business Affairs) similarly assists U.S. firms doing business overseas by providing advocacy on behalf of U.S. businesses and identifying risk areas for U.S. businesses; more infor- mation is available on its website, http://www.state.gov/e/ eb/cba/. Also, the Department of State’s economic officers serving overseas provide commercial advocacy and support for U.S. companies at the many overseas diplomatic posts where the Commercial Service is not represented. The Department of State promotes U.S. government interests in addressing corruption internationally through country-to-country diplomatic engagement; development of and follow-through on international commitments relat- ing to corruption; promotion of high-level political engage- ment (e.g., the G20 Anticorruption Action Plan); public outreach in foreign countries; and support for building the capacity of foreign partners to combat corruption. In fiscal year 2009, the U.S. government provided more than $1 billion for anti-corruption and related good governance assistance abroad. http://export.gov/eac/ http://export.gov/eac/ http://www.commerce.gov/os/ogc/transparency-and-anti-bribery-initiatives http://www.commerce.gov/os/ogc/transparency-and-anti-bribery-initiatives http://www.commerce.gov/os/ogc/transparency-and-anti-bribery-initiatives http://tcc.export.gov/Bribery http://tcc.export.gov/Bribery http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cba/ http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cba/ 7 The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) manages U.S. participation in many multilateral anti-corruption political and legal initiatives at the global and regional level. INL also funds and coordinates significant efforts to assist countries with combating corruption through legal reform, training, and other capacity-building efforts. Inquiries about the U.S. government’s general anti-corruption efforts and implementation of global and regional anti-corruption ini- tiatives may be directed to INL on its website, http://www. state.gov/j/inl/c/crime/corr/index.htm, or by email to: [email protected]. In addition, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has developed several anti-corruption programs and publications, information about which can be found at http://www.usaid.gov/what- we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/promot- ing-accountability-transparency. Finally, the Department of State’s brochure “Fighting Global Corruption: Business Risk Management,” available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/pdfs/ Fighting_Global_Corruption.pdf, provides guidance about corporate compliance programs as well as international anti- corruption initiatives. International Landscape: Global Anti- Corruption Efforts In recent years, there has been a growing interna- tional consensus that corruption must be combated, and the United States and other countries are parties to a number of international anti-corruption conventions. Under these conventions, countries that are parties undertake commit- ments to adopt a range of preventive and criminal law mea- sures to combat corruption. The conventions incorporate review processes that allow the United States to monitor other countries to ensure that they are meeting their inter- national obligations. Likewise, these processes in turn permit other parties to monitor the United States’ anti-corruption laws and enforcement to ensure that such enforcement and legal frameworks are consistent with the United States’ treaty obligations.30 U.S. officials regularly address the subject of corruption with our foreign counterparts to raise awareness of the importance of fighting corruption and urge stronger enforcement of anti-corruption laws and policies. OECD Working Group on Bribery and the Anti- Bribery Convention The OECD was founded in 1961 to stimulate eco- nomic progress and world trade. As noted, the Anti-Bribery Convention requires its parties to criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials in international business transac- tions.31 As of November 1, 2012, there were 39 parties to the Anti-Bribery Convention: 34 OECD member coun- tries (including the United States) and five non-OECD member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, the Russian Federation, and South Africa). All of these parties are also members of the OECD Working Group on Bribery (Working Group).32 The Working Group is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention, the 2009 Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, and related instruments. Its mem- bers meet quarterly to review and monitor implementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention by member states around the world. Each party undergoes periodic peer review.33 This peer-review monitoring system is conducted in three phases. The Phase 1 review includes an in-depth assess- ment of each country’s domestic laws implementing the Convention. The Phase 2 review examines the effectiveness of each country’s laws and anti-bribery efforts. The final phase is a permanent cycle of peer review (the first cycle of which is referred to as the Phase 3 review) that evaluates a country’s enforcement actions and results, as well as the country’s efforts to address weaknesses identified during the Phase 2 review.34 All of the monitoring reports for the par- ties to the Convention can be found on the OECD website and can be a useful resource about the foreign bribery laws of the OECD Working Group member countries.35 The United States was one of the first countries to undergo all three phases of review. The reports and appen- dices can be found on DOJ’s and SEC’s websites.36 In its http://www.state.gov/j/inl/c/crime/corr/index.htm http://www.state.gov/j/inl/c/crime/corr/index.htm mailto:[email protected] http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/promoting-accountability-transparency http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/promoting-accountability-transparency http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/promoting-accountability-transparency http://www.ogc.doc.gov/pdfs/Fighting_Global_Corruption.pdf http://www.ogc.doc.gov/pdfs/Fighting_Global_Corruption.pdf chapter 1 Introduction 7 8 Phase 3 review of the United States, which was completed in October 2010, the Working Group commended U.S. efforts to fight transnational bribery and highlighted a number of best practices developed by the United States. The report also noted areas where the United States’ anti- bribery efforts could be improved, including consolidat- ing publicly available information on the application of the FCPA and enhancing awareness among small- and medium-sized companies about the prevention and detec- tion of foreign bribery. This guide is, in part, a response to these Phase 3 recommendations and is intended to help businesses and individuals better understand the FCPA.37 U.N. Convention Against Corruption The United States is a state party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on October 31, 2003, and entered into force on December 14, 2005.38 The United States ratified the UNCAC on October 30, 2006. The UNCAC requires parties to crimi- nalize a wide range of corrupt acts, including domestic and foreign bribery and related offenses such as money launder- ing and obstruction of justice. The UNCAC also estab- lishes guidelines for the creation of anti-corruption bodies, codes of conduct for public officials, transparent and objec- tive systems of procurement, and enhanced accounting and auditing standards for the private sector. A peer review mechanism assesses the implementation of the UNCAC by parties to the Convention, with a focus in the first round on criminalization and law enforcement as well as inter- national legal cooperation.39 The United States has been reviewed under the Pilot Review Programme, the report of which is available on DOJ’s website. As of November 1, 2012, 163 countries were parties to the UNCAC.40 Other Anti-Corruption Conventions The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC) was the first international anti-corruption con- vention, adopted in March 1996 in Caracas, Venezuela, by members of the Organization of American States.41 The IACAC requires parties (of which the United States is one) to criminalize both foreign and domestic brib- ery. A body known as the Mechanism for Follow-Up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (MESICIC) monitors parties’ compli- ance with the IACAC. As of November 1, 2012, 31 coun- tries were parties to MESICIC. The Council of Europe established the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) in 1999 to monitor countries’ compliance with the Council of Europe’s anti- corruption standards, including the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption.42 These stan- dards include prohibitions on the solicitation and receipt of bribes, as well as foreign bribery. As of November 1, 2012, GRECO member states, which need not be members of the Council of Europe, include more than 45 European countries and the United States.43 The United States has been reviewed under both MESICIC and GRECO, and the reports generated by those reviews are available on DOJ’s website. chapter 2 The FCPA: Anti-Bribery Provisions 10 THE FCPA: ANTI-BRIBERY PROVISIONS The FCPA addresses the problem of international corruption in two ways: (1) the anti-bribery provisions, which are discussed below, prohibit individuals and businesses from bribing foreign government officials in order to obtain or retain business and (2) the accounting provisions, which are discussed in Chapter 3, impose certain record keeping and internal control requirements on issuers, and prohibit individuals and companies from knowingly falsifying an issuer’s books and records or circumventing or failing to implement an is- suer’s system of internal controls. Violations of the FCPA can lead to civil and criminal penalties, sanctions, and remedies, including fines, disgorgement, and/or imprisonment. In general, the FCPA prohibits offering to pay, pay- ing, promising to pay, or authorizing the payment of money or anything of value to a foreign official in order to influ- ence any act or decision of the foreign official in his or her official capacity or to secure any other improper advantage in order to obtain or retain business.44 Who Is Covered by the Anti-Bribery Provisions? The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply broadly to three categories of persons and entities: (1) “issuers” and their officers, directors, employees, agents, and sharehold- ers; (2) “domestic concerns” and their officers, directors, employees, agents, and shareholders; and (3) certain per- sons and entities, other than issuers and domestic concerns, acting while in the territory of the United States. Issuers—15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act), which can be found at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, contains the anti-bribery provision governing 11 How Can I Tell If My Company Is an “Issuer”? It is listed on a national securities exchange in the United States (either stock or American Depository Receipts); or The company’s stock trades in the over-the- counter market in the United States and the company is required to file SEC reports. To see if your company files SEC reports, go to SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/ searchedgar/webusers.htm. issuers.45 A company is an “issuer” under the FCPA if it has a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act46 or is required to file periodic and other reports with SEC under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act.47 In practice, this means that any company with a class of securities listed on a national securities exchange in the United States, or any company with a class of securi- ties quoted in the over-the-counter market in the United States and required to file periodic reports with SEC, is an issuer. A company thus need not be a U.S. company to be an issuer. Foreign companies with American Depository Receipts that are listed on a U.S. exchange are also issuers.48 As of December 31, 2011, 965 foreign companies were reg- istered with SEC.49 Officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders acting on behalf of an issuer (whether U.S. or foreign nationals), and any co-conspirators, also can be prosecuted under the FCPA.50 Domestic Concerns—15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 The FCPA also applies to “domestic concerns.” 51 A domestic concern is any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States, or any corporation, part- nership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship that is organized under the laws of the United States or its states, territories, possessions, or commonwealths or that has its principal place of business in the United States.52 Officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders acting on behalf of a domestic concern, including foreign nationals or companies, are also covered.53 Territorial Jurisdiction—15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 The FCPA also applies to certain foreign nationals or entities that are not issuers or domestic concerns.54 Since 1998, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions have applied to foreign persons and foreign non-issuer entities that, either directly or through an agent, engage in any act in further- ance of a corrupt payment (or an offer, promise, or authori- zation to pay) while in the territory of the United States.55 Also, officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders acting on behalf of such persons or entities may be subject to the FCPA’s anti-bribery prohibitions.56 What Jurisdictional Conduct Triggers the Anti- Bribery Provisions? The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions can apply to conduct both inside and outside the United States. Issuers and domestic concerns—as well as their officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders—may be prosecuted for using the U.S. mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of a corrupt payment to a foreign official. The Act defines “interstate commerce” as “trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between any foreign country and any State or between any State and any place or ship outside thereof ….”57 The term also includes the intrastate use of any interstate means of communication, or any other interstate instrumentality.58 Thus, placing a telephone call or sending an e-mail, text message, or fax from, to, or through the United States involves interstate commerce—as does sending a wire transfer from or to a U.S. bank or otherwise using the U.S. banking system, or traveling across state bor- ders or internationally to or from the United States. Those who are not issuers or domestic concerns may be prosecuted under the FCPA if they directly, or through an agent, engage in any act in furtherance of a corrupt pay- ment while in the territory of the United States, regardless of http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm chapter 2 The FCPA: Anti-Bribery Provisions 11 12 whether they utilize the U.S. mails or a means or instrumen- tality of interstate commerce.59 Thus, for example, a foreign national who attends a meeting in the United States that fur- thers a foreign bribery scheme may be subject to prosecution, as may any co-conspirators, even if they did not themselves attend the meeting. A foreign national or company may also be liable under the FCPA if it aids and abets, conspires with, or acts as an agent of an issuer or domestic concern, regardless of whether the foreign national or company itself takes any action in the United States.60 In addition, under the “alternative jurisdiction” pro- vision of the FCPA enacted in 1998, U.S. companies or persons may be subject to the anti-bribery provisions even if they act outside the United States.61 The 1998 amend- ments to the FCPA expanded the jurisdictional coverage of the Act by establishing an alternative basis for jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction based on the nationality principle.62 In particular, the 1998 amendments removed the requirement that there be a use of interstate commerce (e.g., wire, email, telephone call) for acts in furtherance of a corrupt payment to a foreign official by U.S. companies and persons occur- ring wholly outside of the United States.63 What Is Covered?—The Business Purpose Test The FCPA applies only to payments intended to induce or influence a foreign official to use his or her posi- tion “in order to assist … in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.”64 This requirement is known as the “business purpose test” and is broadly interpreted.65 Not surprisingly, many enforcement actions involve bribes to obtain or retain government contracts.66 The FCPA also prohibits bribes in the conduct of business or Hypothetical: FCPA Jurisdiction Company A, a Delaware company with its principal place of business in New York, is a large energy company that operates globally, including in a number of countries that have a high risk of corruption, such as Foreign Country. Company A’s shares are listed on a national U.S. stock exchange. Company A enters into an agreement with a European company (EuroCo) to submit a joint bid to the Oil Ministry to build a refinery in Foreign Country. EuroCo is not an issuer. Executives of Company A and EuroCo meet in New York to discuss how to win the bid and decide to hire a purported third-party consultant (Intermediary) and have him use part of his “commission” to bribe high-ranking officials within the Oil Ministry. Intermediary meets with executives at Company A and EuroCo in New York to finalize the scheme. Eventually, millions of dollars in bribes are funneled from the United States and Europe through Intermediary to high-ranking officials at the Oil Ministry, and Company A and EuroCo win the contract. A few years later, a front page article alleging that the contract was procured through bribery appears in Foreign Country, and DOJ and SEC begin investigating whether the FCPA was violated. Based on these facts, which entities fall within the FCPA’s jurisdiction? All of the entities easily fall within the FCPA’s jurisdiction. Company A is both an “issuer” and a “domestic concern” under the FCPA, and Intermediary is an “agent” of Company A. EuroCo and Intermediary are also subject to the FCPA’s territorial jurisdiction provision based on their conduct while in the United States. Moreover, even if EuroCo and Intermediary had never taken any actions in the territory of the United States, they can still be subject to jurisdiction under a traditional application of conspiracy law and may be subject to substantive FCPA charges under Pinkerton liability, namely, being liable for the reasonably foreseeable substantive FCPA crimes committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. 13 to gain a business advantage.67 For example, bribe payments made to secure favorable tax treatment, to reduce or elimi- nate customs duties, to obtain government action to pre- vent competitors from entering a market, or to circumvent a licensing or permit requirement, all satisfy the business purpose test.68 In 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the business purpose test in United States v. Kay and held that bribes paid to obtain favorable tax treatment— which reduced a company’s customs duties and sales taxes on imports—could constitute payments made to “obtain or retain” business within the meaning of the FCPA.69 The court explained that in enacting the FCPA, “Congress meant to prohibit a range of payments wider than only those that directly influence the acquisition or retention of govern- ment contracts or similar commercial or industrial arrange- ments.”70 The Kay court found that “[t]he congressional target was bribery paid to engender assistance in improving the business opportunities of the payor or his beneficiary, irrespective of whether that assistance be direct or indirect, and irrespective of whether it be related to administering the law, awarding, extending, or renewing a contract, or executing or preserving an agreement.”71 Accordingly, Kay held that payments to obtain favorable tax treatment can, under appropriate circumstances, violate the FCPA: Avoiding or lowering taxes reduces operating costs and thus increases profit margins, thereby freeing up funds that the business is otherwise legally obligated to expend. And this, in turn, enables it to take any number of actions to the disadvantage of competi- tors. Bribing foreign officials to lower taxes and cus- toms duties certainly can provide an unfair advantage over competitors and thereby be of assistance to the payor in obtaining or retaining business. * * * [W]e hold that Congress intended for the FCPA to apply broadly to payments intended to assist the payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining or retaining business for some person, and that bribes paid to foreign tax officials to secure illegally reduced customs and tax liability constitute a type of payment that can fall within this broad coverage.72 Paying Bribes to Customs Officials In 2010, a global freight forwarding company and six of its corporate customers in the oil and gas industry resolved charges that they paid bribes to customs officials. The companies bribed customs officials in more than ten countries in exchange for such benefits as: evading customs duties on imported goods improperly expediting the importation of goods and equipment extending drilling contracts and lowering tax assessments obtaining false documentation related to temporary import permits for drilling rigs enabling the release of drilling rigs and other equipment from customs officials In many instances, the improper payments at issue allowed the company to carry out its existing business, which fell within the FCPA’s prohibition on corrupt payments made for the purpose of “retaining” business. The seven companies paid a total of more than $235 million in civil and criminal sanctions and disgorgement. Examples of Actions Taken to Obtain or Retain Business Winning a contract Influencing the procurement process Circumventing the rules for importation of products Gaining access to non-public bid tender information Evading taxes or penalties Influencing the adjudication of lawsuits or enforcement actions Obtaining exceptions to regulations Avoiding contract termination chapter 2 The FCPA: Anti-Bribery Provisions 13 14 In short, while the FCPA does not cover every type of bribe paid around the world for every purpose, it does apply broadly to bribes paid to help obtain or retain busi- ness, which can include payments made to secure a wide variety of unfair business advantages.73 What Does “Corruptly” Mean? To violate the FCPA, an offer, promise, or authori- zation of a payment, or a payment, to a government offi- cial must be made “corruptly.”74 As Congress noted when adopting the FCPA, the word “corruptly” means an intent or desire to wrongfully influence the recipient: The word “corruptly” is used in order to make clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be in- tended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position; for example, wrongfully to direct business to the payor or his client, to obtain preferential legis- lation or regulations, or to induce a foreign official to fail to perform an official function.75 Where corrupt intent is present, the FCPA prohibits paying, offering, or promising to pay money or anything of value (or authorizing the payment or offer).76 By focus- ing on intent, the FCPA does not require that a corrupt act succeed in its purpose.77 Nor must the foreign official actually solicit, accept, or receive the corrupt payment for the bribe payor to be liable.78 For example, in one case, a specialty chemical company promised Iraqi government officials approximately $850,000 in bribes for an upcoming contract. Although the company did not, in the end, make the payment (the scheme was thwarted by the U.S. govern- ment’s investigation), the company still violated the FCPA and was held accountable.79 Also, as long as the offer, promise, authorization, or payment is made corruptly, the actor need not know the identity of the recipient; the attempt is sufficient.80 Thus, an executive who authorizes others to pay “whoever you need to” in a foreign government to obtain a contract has violated the FCPA—even if no bribe is ultimately offered or paid. What Does “Willfully” Mean and When Does It Apply? In order for an individual defendant to be criminally liable under the FCPA, he or she must act “willfully.”81 Proof of willfulness is not required to establish corporate criminal or civil liability,82 though proof of corrupt intent is. The term “willfully” is not defined in the FCPA, but it has generally been construed by courts to connote an act committed voluntarily and purposefully, and with a bad purpose, i.e., with “knowledge that [a defendant] was doing a ‘bad’ act under the general rules of law.”83 As the Supreme Court explained in Bryan v. United States, “[a]s a general matter, when used in the criminal context, a ‘will- ful’ act is one undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’ In other words, in order to establish a ‘willful’ violation of a statute, ‘the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.’”84 Notably, as both the Second Circuit and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals have found, the FCPA does not require the government to prove that a defendant was specifically aware of the FCPA or knew that his conduct violated the FCPA.85 To be guilty, a defendant must act with a bad pur- pose, i.e., know generally that his conduct is unlawful. What Does “Anything of Value” Mean? In enacting the FCPA, Congress recognized that bribes can come in many shapes and sizes—a broad range of unfair benefits86—and so the statute prohibits the corrupt “offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to” a foreign official.87 An improper benefit can take many forms. While cases often involve payments of cash (sometimes in the guise of “consulting fees” or “commissions” given through intermediaries), others have involved travel expenses and 15 expensive gifts. Like the domestic bribery statute, the FCPA does not contain a minimum threshold amount for corrupt gifts or payments.88 Indeed, what might be considered a modest payment in the United States could be a larger and much more significant amount in a foreign country. Regardless of size, for a gift or other payment to vio- late the statute, the payor must have corrupt intent—that is, the intent to improperly influence the government official. The corrupt intent requirement protects companies that engage in the ordinary and legitimate promotion of their businesses while targeting conduct that seeks to improp- erly induce officials into misusing their positions. Thus, it is difficult to envision any scenario in which the provision of cups of coffee, taxi fare, or company promotional items of nominal value would ever evidence corrupt intent, and neither DOJ nor SEC has ever pursued an investigation on the basis of such conduct. Moreover, as in all areas of federal law enforcement, DOJ and SEC exercise discre- tion in deciding which cases promote law enforcement pri- orities and justify investigation. Certain patterns, however, have emerged: DOJ’s and SEC’s anti-bribery enforcement actions have focused on small payments and gifts only when they comprise part of a systemic or long-standing course of conduct that evidences a scheme to corruptly pay foreign officials to obtain or retain business. These assessments are necessarily fact specific. Cash The most obvious form of corrupt payment is large amounts of cash. In some instances, companies have main- tained cash funds specifically earmarked for use as bribes. One U.S. issuer headquartered in Germany disbursed cor- rupt payments from a corporate “cash desk” and used off- shore bank accounts to bribe government officials to win contracts.89 In another instance, a four-company joint ven- ture used its agent to pay $5 million in bribes to a Nigerian political party.90 The payments were made to the agent in suitcases of cash (typically in $1 million installments), and, in one instance, the trunk of a car when the cash did not fit into a suitcase.91 Gifts, Travel, Entertainment, and Other Things of Value A small gift or token of esteem or gratitude is often an appropriate way for business people to display respect for each other. Some hallmarks of appropriate gift-giving are when the gift is given openly and transparently, properly recorded in the giver’s books and records, provided only to reflect esteem or gratitude, and permitted under local law. Items of nominal value, such as cab fare, reasonable meals and entertainment expenses, or company promo- tional items, are unlikely to improperly influence an offi- cial, and, as a result, are not, without more, items that have resulted in enforcement action by DOJ or SEC. The larger or more extravagant the gift, however, the more likely it was given with an improper purpose. DOJ and SEC enforce- ment cases thus have involved single instances of large, extravagant gift-giving (such as sports cars, fur coats, and other luxury items) as well as widespread gifts of smaller items as part of a pattern of bribes.92 For example, in one case brought by DOJ and SEC, a defendant gave a govern- ment official a country club membership fee and a genera- tor, as well as household maintenance expenses, payment of cell phone bills, an automobile worth $20,000, and lim- ousine services. The same official also received $250,000 through a third-party agent.93 In addition, a number of FCPA enforcement actions have involved the corrupt payment of travel and entertain- ment expenses. Both DOJ and SEC have brought cases where these types of expenditures occurred in conjunction with other conduct reflecting systemic bribery or other clear indicia of corrupt intent. A case involving a California-based telecommuni- cations company illustrates the types of improper travel and entertainment expenses that may violate the FCPA.94 Between 2002 and 2007, the company spent nearly $7 mil- lion on approximately 225 trips for its customers in order to obtain systems contracts in China, including for employees of Chinese state-owned companies to travel to popular tour- ist destinations in the United States.95 Although the trips were purportedly for the individuals to conduct training at chapter 2 The FCPA: Anti-Bribery Provisions 15 16 the company’s facilities, in reality, no training occurred on many of these trips and the company had no facilities at those locations. Approximately $670,000 of the $7 million was falsely recorded as “training” expenses.96 Likewise, a New Jersey-based telecommunications company spent millions of dollars on approximately 315 trips for Chinese government officials, ostensibly to inspect factories and train the officials in using the company’s equipment.97 In reality, during many of these trips, the offi- cials spent little or no time visiting the company’s facilities, but instead visited tourist destinations such as Hawaii, Las Vegas, the Grand Canyon, Niagara Falls, Disney World, Universal Studios, and New York City.98 Some of the trips were characterized as “factory inspections” or “training” with government customers but consisted primarily or entirely of sightseeing to locations chosen by the officials, typically lasting two weeks and costing between $25,000 and $55,000 per trip. In some instances, the company gave the government officials $500 to $1,000 per day in spend- ing money and paid all lodging, transportation, food, and entertainment expenses. The company either failed to record these expenses or improperly recorded them as “consulting fees” in its corporate books and records. The Examples of Improper Travel and Entertainment a $12,000 birthday trip for a government decision- maker from Mexico that included visits to wineries and dinners $10,000 spent on dinners, drinks, and entertainment for a government official a trip to Italy for eight Iraqi government officials that consisted primarily of sightseeing and included $1,000 in “pocket money” for each official a trip to Paris for a government official and his wife that consisted primarily of touring activities via a chauffeur-driven vehicle company also failed to implement appropriate internal con- trols to monitor the provision of travel and other things of value to Chinese government officials.99 Companies also may violate the FCPA if they give payments or gifts to third parties, like an official’s family members, as an indirect way of corruptly influencing a for- eign official. For example, one defendant paid personal bills and provided airline tickets to a cousin and close friend of the foreign official whose influence the defendant sought in obtaining contracts.100 The defendant was convicted at trial and received a prison sentence.101 As part of an effective compliance program, a com- pany should have clear and easily accessible guidelines and processes in place for gift-giving by the company’s directors, officers, employees, and agents. Though not necessarily appropriate for every business, many larger companies have automated gift-giving clearance pro- cesses and have set clear monetary thresholds for gifts along with annual limitations, with limited exceptions for gifts approved by appropriate management. Clear guidelines and processes can be an effective and efficient means for controlling gift-giving, deterring improper gifts, and protecting corporate assets. The FCPA does not prohibit gift-giving. Rather, just like its domestic bribery counterparts, the FCPA prohibits the payments of bribes, including those disguised as gifts. Charitable Contributions Companies often engage in charitable giving as part of legitimate local outreach. The FCPA does not prohibit charitable contributions or prevent corporations from act- ing as good corporate citizens. Companies, however, can- not use the pretense of charitable contributions as a way to funnel bribes to government officials. 17 For example, a pharmaceutical company used chari- table donations to a small local castle restoration charity headed by a foreign government official to induce the offi- cial to direct business to the company. Although the charity was a bona fide charitable organization, internal documents at the pharmaceutical company’s subsidiary established that the payments were not viewed as charitable contributions but rather as “dues” the subsidiary was required to pay for assistance from the government official. The payments con- stituted a significant portion of the subsidiary’s total pro- motional donations budget and were structured to allow the subsidiary to exceed its authorized limits. The payments Hypothetical: Gifts, Travel, and Entertainment Company A is a large U.S. engineering company with global operations in more than 50 countries, including a number that have a high risk of corruption, such as Foreign Country. Company A’s stock is listed on a national U.S. stock exchange. In conducting its business internationally, Company A’s officers and employees come into regular contact with foreign officials, including officials in various ministries and state-owned entities. At a trade show, Company A has a booth at which it offers free pens, hats, t-shirts, and other similar promotional items with Company A’s logo. Company A also serves free coffee, other beverages, and snacks at the booth. Some of the visitors to the booth are foreign officials. Is Company A in violation of the FCPA? No. These are legitimate, bona fide expenditures made in connection with the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of Company A’s products or services There is nothing to suggest corrupt intent here The FCPA does not prevent companies from promoting their businesses in this way or providing legitimate hospitality, including to foreign officials Providing promotional items with company logos or free snacks as set forth above is an appropriate means of providing hospitality and promoting business Such conduct has never formed the basis for an FCPA enforcement action At the trade show, Company A invites a dozen current and prospective customers out for drinks, and pays the moderate bar tab. Some of the current and prospective customers are foreign officials under the FCPA. Is Company A in violation of the FCPA? No. Again, the FCPA was not designed to prohibit all forms of hospitality to foreign officials. While the cost here may be more substantial than the beverages, snacks, and promotional items provided at the booth, and the invitees specifically selected, there is still nothing to suggest corrupt intent. Two years ago, Company A won a long-term contract to supply goods and services to the state-owned Electricity Commission in Foreign Country. The Electricity Commission is 100% owned, controlled, and operated by the government of Foreign Country, and employees of the Electricity Commission are subject to Foreign Country’s domestic bribery laws. Some Company A executives are in Foreign Country for meetings with officials of the Electricity Commission. The General Manager of the Electricity Commission was recently married, and during the trip Company A executives present a moderately priced crystal vase to the General Manager as a wedding gift and token of esteem. Is Company A in violation of the FCPA? No. It is appropriate to provide reasonable gifts to foreign officials as tokens of esteem or gratitude. It is important that such gifts be made openly and transparently, properly recorded in a company’s books and records, and given only where appropriate under local law, customary where given, and reasonable for the occasion. During the course of the contract described above, Company A periodically provides training to Electricity Commission employees at its facilities in Michigan. The training is paid for by the Electricity Commission as part of the contract. Senior officials of the Electricity Commission inform Company A that they want to inspect the faciliti and ensure that the training is working well. Company A pays for the airfare, hotel, and transportation for the es (cont’d) chapter 2 The FCPA: Anti-Bribery Provisions 17 18 Electricity Commission senior officials to travel to Michigan to inspect Company A’s facilities. Because it is a lengthy international flight, Company A agrees to pay for business class airfare, to which its own employees are entitled for lengthy flights. The foreign officials visit Michigan for several days, during which the senior officials perform an appropriate inspection. Company A executives take the officials to a moderately priced dinner, a baseball game, and a play. Do any of these actions violate the FCPA? No Neither the costs associated with training the employees nor the trip for the senior officials to the Company’s facilities in order to inspect them violates the FCPA Reasonable and bona fide promotional expenditures do not violate the FCPA Here, Company A is providing training to the Electricity Commission’s employees and is hosting the Electricity Commission senior officials Their review of the execution and performance of the contract is a legitimate business purpose Even the provision of business class airfare is reasonable under the circumstances, as are the meals and entertainment, which are only a small component of the business trip Would this analysis be different if Company A instead paid for the senior officials to travel first-class with their spouses for an all-expenses-paid, week-long trip to Las Vegas, where Company A has no facilities? Yes. This conduct almost certainly violates the FCPA because it evinces a corrupt intent. Here, the trip does not appear to be designed for any legitimate business purpose, is extravagant, includes expenses for the officials’ spouses, and therefore appears to be designed to corruptly curry favor with the foreign government officials. Moreover, if the trip were booked as a legitimate business expense—such as the provision of training at its facilities—Company A would also be in violation of the FCPA’s accounting provisions. Furthermore, this conduct suggests deficiencies in Company A’s internal controls. Company A’s contract with the Electricity Commission is going to expire, and the Electricity Commission is offering the next contract through its tender process. An employee of the Electricity Commission contacts Company A and offers to provide Company A with confidential, non-public bid information from Company A’s competitors if Company A will pay for a vacation to Paris for him and his girlfriend. Employees of Company A accede to the official’s request, pay for the vacation, receive the confidential bid information, and yet still do not win the contract. Has Company A violated the FCPA? Yes Company A has provided things of value to a foreign official for the purpose of inducing the official to misuse his office and to gain an improper advantage It does not matter that it was the foreign official who first suggested the illegal conduct or that Company A ultimately was not successful in winning the contract This conduct would also violate the FCPA’s accounting provisions if the trip were booked as a legitimate business expense and suggests deficiencies in Company A’s internal controls 19 also were not in compliance with the company’s internal policies, which provided that charitable donations gener- ally should be made to healthcare institutions and relate to the practice of medicine.102 Proper due diligence and controls are critical for charitable giving. In general, the adequacy of measures taken to prevent misuse of charitable donations will depend on a risk-based analysis and the specific facts at hand. In Opinion Procedure Release No. 10-02, DOJ described the due diligence and controls that can minimize the likelihood of an FCPA violation. In that matter, a Eurasian-based sub- sidiary of a U.S. non-governmental organization was asked by an agency of a foreign government to make a grant to a local microfinance institution (MFI) as a prerequisite to the subsidiary’s transformation to bank status. The subsid- iary proposed contributing $1.42 million to a local MFI to satisfy the request. The subsidiary undertook an extensive, three-stage due diligence process to select the proposed grantee and imposed significant controls on the proposed grant, including ongoing monitoring and auditing, ear- marking funds for capacity building, prohibiting compen- sation of board members, and implementing anti-corrup- tion compliance provisions. DOJ explained that it would not take any enforcement action because the company’s due diligence and the controls it planned to put in place sufficed to prevent an FCPA violation. Other opinion releases also address charitable-type grants or donations. Under the facts presented in those releases, DOJ approved the proposed grant or donation,103 based on due diligence measures and controls such as: • certifications by the recipient regarding compliance with the FCPA;104 • due diligence to confirm that none of the recipient’s officers were affiliated with the foreign government at issue;105 • a requirement that the recipient provide audited financial statements;106 • a written agreement with the recipient restricting the use of funds;107 • steps to ensure that the funds were transferred to a valid bank account;108 Five Questions to Consider When Making Charitable Payments in a Foreign Country: 1 What is the purpose of the payment? 2 Is the payment consistent with the company’s internal guidelines on charitable giving? 3 Is the payment at the request of a foreign official? 4 Is a foreign official associated with the charity and, if so, can the foreign official make decisions regarding your business in that country? 5 Is the payment conditioned upon receiving business or other benefits? • confirmation that the charity’s commitments were met before funds were disbursed;109 and • on-going monitoring of the efficacy of the program.110 Legitimate charitable giving does not violate the FCPA. Compliance with the FCPA merely requires that charitable giving not be used as a vehicle to conceal pay- ments made to corruptly influence foreign officials. Who Is a Foreign Official? The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply to corrupt payments made to (1) “any foreign official”; (2) “any foreign political party or official thereof ”; (3) “any candidate for foreign political office”; or (4) any person, while knowing that all or a portion of the payment will be offered, given, or promised to an individual falling within one of these three categories.111 Although the statute distinguishes between a “foreign official,” “foreign political party or official thereof,” and “candidate for foreign political office,” the term “for- eign official” in this guide generally refers to an individual falling within any of these three categories. The FCPA defines “foreign official” to include: any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, chapter 2 The FCPA: Anti-Bribery Provisions 19 20 or of a public international organization, or any per- son acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or in- strumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organization.112 As this language makes clear, the FCPA broadly applies to corrupt payments to “any” officer or employee of a foreign government and to those acting on the for- eign government’s behalf.113 The FCPA thus covers cor- rupt payments to low-ranking employees and high-level officials alike.114 The FCPA prohibits payments to foreign officials, not to foreign governments.115 That said, companies contem- plating contributions or donations to foreign governments should take steps to ensure that no monies are used for cor- rupt purposes, such as the personal benefit of individual foreign officials. Department, Agency, or Instrumentality of a Foreign Government Foreign officials under the FCPA include officers or employees of a department, agency, or instrumental- ity of a foreign government. When a foreign government is organized in a fashion similar to the U.S. system, what constitutes a government department or agency is typically clear (e.g., a ministry of energy, national security agency, or transportation authority).116 However, governments can be organized in very different ways.117 Many operate through state-owned and state-controlled entities, particularly in such areas as aerospace and defense manufacturing, bank- ing and finance, healthcare and life sciences, energy and extractive industries, telecommunications, and transporta- tion.118 By including officers or employees of agencies and instrumentalities within the definition of “foreign official,” the FCPA accounts for this variability. The term “instrumentality” is broad and can include state-owned or state-controlled entities. Whether a particu- lar entity constitutes an “instrumentality” under the FCPA requires a fact-specific analysis of an entity’s ownership, control, status, and function.119 A number of courts have approved final jury instructions providing a non-exclusive list of factors to be considered: • the foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity; • the foreign state’s degree of control over the entity (including whether key officers and directors of the entity are, or are appointed by, government officials); • the foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its employees; • the circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; • the purpose of the entity’s activities; • the entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign state’s law; • the exclusive or controlling power vested in the entity to administer its designated functions; • the level of financial support by the foreign state (including subsidies, special tax treatment, government-mandated fees, and loans); • the entity’s provision of services to the jurisdiction’s residents; • whether the governmental end or purpose sought to be achieved is expressed in the policies of the foreign government; and • the general perception that the entity is performing official or governmental functions.120 Companies should consider these factors when eval- uating the risk of FCPA violations and designing compli- ance programs. DOJ and SEC have pursued cases involving instru- mentalities since the time of the FCPA’s enactment and have long used an analysis of ownership, control, status, and function to determine whether a particular entity is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign government. For example, the second-ever FCPA case charged by DOJ involved a California company that paid bribes through a Mexican corporation to two executives of a state-owned 21 Mexican national oil company. 121 And in the early 1980s, DOJ and SEC brought cases involving a $1 million bribe to the chairman of Trinidad and Tobago’s racing authority.122 DOJ and SEC continue to regularly bring FCPA cases involving bribes paid to employees of agencies and instrumentalities of foreign governments. In one such case, the subsidiary of a Swiss engineering company paid bribes to officials of a state-owned and controlled electric- ity commission. The commission was created by, owned by, and controlled by the Mexican government, and it had a monopoly on the transmission and distribution of elec- tricity in Mexico. Many of the commission’s board mem- bers were cabinet-level government officials, and the direc- tor was appointed by Mexico’s president.123 Similarly, in another recent case, Miami telecommunications executives were charged with paying bribes to employees of Haiti’s state-owned and controlled telecommunications company. The telecommunications company was 97% owned and 100% controlled by the Haitian government, and its direc- tor was appointed by Haiti’s president.124 While no one factor is dispositive or necessarily more important than another, as a practical matter, an entity is unlikely to qualify as an instrumentality if a government does not own or control a majority of its shares. However, there are circumstances in which an entity would qualify as an instrumentality absent 50% or greater foreign gov- ernment ownership, which is reflected in the limited num- ber of DOJ or SEC enforcement actions brought in such situations. For example, in addition to being convicted of funneling millions of dollars in bribes to two sitting presi- dents in two different countries, a French issuer’s three subsidiaries were convicted of paying bribes to employees of a Malaysian telecommunications company that was 43% owned by Malaysia’s Ministry of Finance. There, notwith- standing its minority ownership stake in the company, the Ministry held the status of a “special shareholder,” had veto power over all major expenditures, and controlled impor- tant operational decisions.125 In addition, most senior company officers were political appointees, including the Chairman and Director, the Chairman of the Board of the Tender Committee, and the Executive Director.126 Thus, despite the Malaysian government having a minority share- holder position, the company was an instrumentality of the Malaysian government as the government nevertheless had substantial control over the company. Companies and individuals should also remember that, whether an entity is an instrumentality of a foreign government or a private entity, commercial (i.e., private- to-private) bribery may still violate the FCPA’s accounting provisions, the Travel Act, anti-money laundering laws, and other federal or foreign laws. Any type of corrupt payment thus carries a risk of prosecution. Public International Organizations In 1998, the FCPA was amended to expand the defini- tion of “foreign official” to include employees and representa- tives of public international organizations.127 A “public inter- national organization” is any organization designated as such by Executive Order under the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288, or any other organization that the President so designates.128 Currently, public interna- tional organizations include entities such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the World Trade Organization, the OECD, the Organization of American States, and numer- ous others. A comprehensive list of organizations designated as “public international organizations” is contained in 22 U.S.C. § 288 and can also be found on the U.S. Government Printing Office website at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/. How Are Payments to Third Parties Treated? The FCPA expressly prohibits corrupt payments made through third parties or intermediaries.129 Specifically, it covers payments made to “any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly,”130 to a foreign official. Many companies doing business in a foreign country retain a local individual or company to help them conduct business. Although these foreign agents may pro- vide entirely legitimate advice regarding local customs and procedures and may help facilitate business transactions, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ chapter 2 The FCPA: Anti-Bribery Provisions 21 22 companies should be aware of the risks involved in engag- ing third-party agents or intermediaries. The fact that a bribe is paid by a third party does not eliminate the poten- tial for criminal or civil FCPA liability.131 For instance, a four-company joint venture used two agents—a British lawyer and a Japanese trading company—to bribe Nigerian government officials in order to win a series of liquefied natural gas construc- tion projects.132 Together, the four multi-national cor- porations and the Japanese trading company paid a combined $1.7 billion in civil and criminal sanctions for their decade-long bribery scheme. In addition, the subsidiary of one of the companies pleaded guilty and a number of individuals, including the British lawyer and the former CEO of one of the companies’ subsidiaries, received significant prison terms. Similarly, a medical device manufacturer entered into a deferred prosecution agreement as the result of corrupt payments it authorized its local Chinese distributor to pay to Chinese officials.133 Another company, a manufacturer of specialty chemicals, committed multiple FCPA viola- tions through its agents in Iraq: a Canadian national and the Canadian’s companies. Among other acts, the Canadian national paid and promised to pay more than $1.5 million in bribes to officials of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil to secure sales of a fuel additive. Both the company and the Canadian national pleaded guilty to criminal charges and resolved civil enforcement actions by SEC. 134 In another case, the U.S. subsidiary of a Swiss freight forwarding company was charged with paying bribes on behalf of its customers in several countries.135 Although the U.S. subsidiary was not an issuer under the FCPA, it was an “agent” of several U.S. issuers and was thus charged directly with violating the FCPA. Charges against the freight for- warding company and seven of its customers resulted in over $236.5 million in sanctions.136 Because Congress anticipated the use of third-party agents in bribery schemes—for example, to avoid actual knowledge of a bribe—it defined the term “knowing” in a way that prevents individuals and businesses from avoiding liability by putting “any person” between themselves and the foreign officials.137 Under the FCPA, a person’s state of mind is “knowing” with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result if the person: • is aware that [he] is engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially certain to occur; or • has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is substantially certain to occur.138 Thus, a person has the requisite knowledge when he is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circum- stance, unless the person actually believes that such circum- stance does not exist.139 As Congress made clear, it meant to impose liability not only on those with actual knowledge of wrongdoing, but also on those who purposefully avoid actual knowledge: [T]he so-called “head-in-the-sand” problem—vari- ously described in the pertinent authorities as “con- scious disregard,” “willful blindness” or “deliberate ignorance”—should be covered so that management officials could not take refuge from the Act’s prohi- bitions by their unwarranted obliviousness to any action (or inaction), language or other “signaling de- vice” that should reasonably alert them of the “high probability” of an FCPA violation.140 Common red flags associated with third parties include: • excessive commissions to third-party agents or consultants; • unreasonably large discounts to third-party distributors; • third-party “consulting agreements” that include only vaguely described services; • the third-party consultant is in a different line of business than that for which it has been engaged; • the third party is related to or closely associated with the foreign official; 23 • the third party became part of the transaction at the express request or insistence of the foreign official; • the third party is merely a shell company incorpo- rated in an offshore jurisdiction; and • the third party requests payment to offshore bank accounts. Businesses may reduce the FCPA risks associated with third-party agents by implementing an effective com- pliance program, which includes due diligence of any pro- spective foreign agents. What Affirmative Defenses Are Available? The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions contain two affir- mative defenses: (1) that the payment was lawful under the written laws of the foreign country (the “local law” defense), and (2) that the money was spent as part of demonstrating a product or performing a contractual obligation (the “reason- able and bona fide business expenditure” defense). Because these are affirmative defenses, the defendant bears the burden of proving them. The Local Law Defense For the local law defense to apply, a defendant must establish that “the payment, gift, offer, or promise of any- thing of value that was made, was lawful under the writ- ten laws and regulations of the foreign official’s, political party’s, party official’s, or candidate’s country.”141 The defen- dant must establish that the payment was lawful under the foreign country’s written laws and regulations at the time of the offense. In creating the local law defense in 1988, Congress sought “to make clear that the absence of written laws in a foreign official’s country would not by itself be suf- ficient to satisfy this defense.”142 Thus, the fact that bribes may not be prosecuted under local law is insufficient to establish the defense. In practice, the local law defense arises infrequently, as the written laws and regulations of coun- tries rarely, if ever, permit corrupt payments. Nevertheless, if a defendant can establish that conduct that otherwise falls within the scope of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions was lawful under written, local law, he or she would have a defense to prosecution. In United States v. Kozeny, the defendant unsuccess- fully sought to assert the local law defense regarding the law of Azerbaijan. The parties disputed the contents and appli- cability of Azeri law, and each presented expert reports and testimony on behalf of their conflicting interpretations. The court ruled that the defendant could not invoke the FCPA’s affirmative defense because Azeri law did not actually legal- ize the bribe payment. The court concluded that an excep- tion under Azeri law relieving bribe payors who voluntarily United States v. Kozeny, et al. In December 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a conscious avoidance instruction given during the 2009 trial of a businessman who was convicted of conspiring to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions by agreeing to make payments to Azeri officials in a scheme to encourage the privatization of the Azerbaijan Republic’s state oil company. The court of appeals found that the instruction did not lack a factual predicate, citing evidence and testimony at trial demonstrating that the defendant knew corruption was pervasive in Azerbaijan; that he was aware of his business partner’s reputation for misconduct; that he had created two U.S. companies in order to shield himself and other investors from potential liability for payments made in violation of the FCPA; and that the defendant expressed concerns during a conference call about whether his business partner and company were bribing officials. The court of appeals also rejected the defendant’s contention that the conscious avoidance charge had improperly permitted the jury to convict him based on negligence, explaining that ample evidence in the record showed that the defendant had “serious concerns” about the legality of his partner’s business practices “and worked to avoid learning exactly what [he] was doing,” and noting that the district court had specifically instructed the jury not to convict based on negligence. chapter 2 The FCPA: Anti-Bribery Provisions 23 24 whether a particular expenditure is appropriate or may risk violating the FCPA: • Do not select the particular officials who will par- ticipate in the party’s proposed trip or program147 or else select them based on pre-determined, merit- based criteria.148 • Pay all costs directly to travel and lodging vendors and/or reimburse costs only upon presentation of a receipt.149 • Do not advance funds or pay for reimbursements in cash.150 • Ensure that any stipends are reasonable approxima- tions of costs likely to be incurred151 and/or that expenses are limited to those that are necessary and reasonable.152 • Ensure the expenditures are transparent, both within the company and to the foreign government.153 • Do not condition payment of expenses on any action by the foreign official.154 • Obtain written confirmation that payment of the expenses is not contrary to local law.155 • Provide no additional compensation, stipends, or spending money beyond what is necessary to pay for actual expenses incurred.156 • Ensure that costs and expenses on behalf of the foreign officials will be accurately recorded in the company’s books and records.157 In sum, while certain expenditures are more likely to raise red flags, they will not give rise to prosecution if they are (1) reasonable, (2) bona fide, and (3) directly related to (4) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services or the execution or performance of a contract.158 disclose bribe payments to the authorities of criminal liabil- ity did not make the bribes legal.143 Reasonable and Bona Fide Expenditures The FCPA allows companies to provide reasonable and bona fide travel and lodging expenses to a foreign official, and it is an affirmative defense where expenses are directly related to the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of a company’s products or services, or are related to a company’s execution or performance of a con- tract with a foreign government or agency.144 Trips that are primarily for personal entertainment purposes, how- ever, are not bona fide business expenses and may violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.145 Moreover, when expenditures, bona fide or not, are mischaracterized in a company’s books and records, or where unauthorized or improper expenditures occur due to a failure to imple- ment adequate internal controls, they may also violate the FCPA’s accounting provisions. Purposeful mischarac- terization of expenditures may also, of course, indicate a corrupt intent. DOJ and SEC have consistently recognized that busi- nesses, both foreign and domestic, are permitted to pay for reasonable expenses associated with the promotion of their products and services or the execution of existing contracts. In addition, DOJ has frequently provided guidance about legitimate promotional and contract-related expenses— addressing travel and lodging expenses in particular— through several opinion procedure releases. Under the cir- cumstances presented in those releases,146 DOJ opined that the following types of expenditures on behalf of foreign officials did not warrant FCPA enforcement action: • travel and expenses to visit company facilities or operations; • travel and expenses for training; and • product demonstration or promotional activities, including travel and expenses for meetings. Whether any particular payment is a bona fide expen- diture necessarily requires a fact-specific analysis. But the following non-exhaustive list of safeguards, compiled from several releases, may be helpful to businesses in evaluating 25 What Are Facilitating or Expediting Payments? The FCPA’s bribery prohibition contains a narrow exception for “facilitating or expediting payments” made in furtherance of routine governmental action.159 The facili- tating payments exception applies only when a payment is made to further “routine governmental action” that involves non-discretionary acts.160 Examples of “routine governmen- tal action” include processing visas, providing police pro- tection or mail service, and supplying utilities like phone service, power, and water. Routine government action does not include a decision to award new business or to continue business with a particular party.161 Nor does it include acts that are within an official’s discretion or that would consti- tute misuse of an official’s office.162 Thus, paying an official a small amount to have the power turned on at a factory might be a facilitating payment; paying an inspector to ignore the fact that the company does not have a valid permit to operate the factory would not be a facilitating payment. Whether a payment falls within the exception is not dependent on the size of the payment, though size can be telling, as a large payment is more suggestive of corrupt intent to influence a non-routine governmental action. But, like the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions more generally, the facilitating payments exception focuses on the purpose of the payment rather than its value. For instance, an Oklahoma- based corporation violated the FCPA when its subsidiary paid Argentine customs officials approximately $166,000 to secure customs clearance for equipment and materials that lacked required certifications or could not be imported under local law and to pay a lower-than-applicable duty rate. The company’s Venezuelan subsidiary had also paid Venezuelan customs officials approximately $7,000 to permit the importation and exportation of equipment and materials not in compliance with local regulations and to avoid a full inspection of the imported goods.163 In another case, three subsidiaries of a global supplier of oil drilling products and services were criminally charged with authorizing an agent to make at least 378 corrupt payments (totaling approximately $2.1 million) to Nigerian Customs Service officials for pref- erential treatment during the customs process, including the reduction or elimination of customs duties.164 Labeling a bribe as a “facilitating payment” in a com- pany’s books and records does not make it one. A Swiss offshore drilling company, for example, recorded pay- ments to its customs agent in the subsidiary’s “facilitat- ing payment” account, even though company personnel believed the payments were, in fact, bribes. The company was charged with violating both the FCPA’s anti-bribery and accounting provisions.165 Although true facilitating payments are not ille- gal under the FCPA, they may still violate local law in the countries where the company is operating, and the OECD’s Working Group on Bribery recommends that all countries encourage companies to prohibit or discourage facilitating payments, which the United States has done regularly.166 In addition, other countries’ foreign bribery laws, such as the United Kingdom’s, may not contain an exception for facilitating payments.167 Individuals and companies should therefore be aware that although true facilitating payments Examples of “Routine Governmental Action” An action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in— obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; providing police protection, mail pickup and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across country; providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or actions of a similar nature. chapter 2 The FCPA: Anti-Bribery Provisions 25 26 are permissible under the FCPA, they may still subject a company or individual to sanctions. As with any expenditure, facilitating payments may still violate the FCPA if they are not properly recorded in an issuer’s books and records.168 Hypothetical: Facilitating Payments Company A is a large multi-national mining company with operations in Foreign Country, where it recently identified a significant new ore deposit It has ready buyers for the new ore but has limited capacity to get it to market In order to increase the size and speed of its ore export, Company A will need to build a new road from its facility to the port that can accommodate larger trucks Company A retains an agent in Foreign Country to assist it in obtaining the required permits, including an environmental permit, to build the road The agent informs Company A’s vice president for international operations that he plans to make a one-time small cash payment to a clerk in the relevant government office to ensure that the clerk files and stamps the permit applications expeditiously, as the agent has experienced delays of three months when he has not made this “grease” payment The clerk has no discretion about whether to file and stamp the permit applications once the requisite filing fee has been paid The vice president authorizes the payment A few months later, the agent tells the vice president that he has run into a problem obtaining a necessary environmental permit. It turns out that the planned road construction would adversely impact an environmentally sensitive and protected local wetland. While the problem could be overcome by rerouting the road, such rerouting would cost Company A $1 million more and would slow down construction by six months. It would also increase the transit time for the ore and reduce the number of monthly shipments. The agent tells the vice president that he is good friends with the director of Foreign Country’s Department of Natural Resources and that it would only take a modest cash payment to the director and the “problem would go away.” The vice president authorizes the payment, and the agent makes it. After receiving the payment, the director issues the permit, and Company A constructs its new road through the wetlands. Was the payment to the clerk a violation of the FCPA? No. Under these circumstances, the payment to the clerk would qualify as a facilitating payment, since it is a one-time, small payment to obtain a routine, non-discretionary governmental service that Company A is entitled to receive (i.e., the stamping and filing of the permit application). However, while the payment may qualify as an exception to the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, it may violate other laws, both in Foreign Country and elsewhere. In addition, if the payment is not accurately recorded, it could violate the FCPA’s books and records provision. Was the payment to the director a violation of the FCPA? Yes. The payment to the director of the Department of Natural Resources was in clear violation of the FCPA, since it was designed to corruptly influence a foreign official into improperly approving a permit. The issuance of the environmental permit was a discretionary act, and indeed, Company A should not have received it. Company A, its vice president, and the local agent may all be prosecuted for authorizing and paying the bribe. 27 Does the FCPA Apply to Cases of Extortion or Duress? Situations involving extortion or duress will not give rise to FCPA liability because a payment made in response to true extortionate demands under imminent threat of physical harm cannot be said to have been made with corrupt intent or for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business.169 In enacting the FCPA, Congress recognized that real-world situations might arise in which a business is compelled to pay an official in order to avoid threats to health and safety. As Congress explained, “a payment to an official to keep an oil rig from being dynamited should not be held to be made with the requisite corrupt purpose.”170 Mere economic coercion, however, does not amount to extortion. As Congress noted when it enacted the FCPA: “The defense that the payment was demanded on the part of a government official as a price for gaining entry into a mar- ket or to obtain a contract would not suffice since at some point the U.S. company would make a conscious decision whether or not to pay a bribe.”171 The fact that the payment was “first proposed by the recipient … does not alter the cor- rupt purpose on the part of the person paying the bribe.”172 This distinction between extortion and economic coer- cion was recognized by the court in United States v. Kozeny. There, the court concluded that although an individual who makes a payment under duress (i.e., upon threat of physi- cal harm) will not be criminally liable under the FCPA,173 a bribe payor who claims payment was demanded as a price for gaining market entry or obtaining a contract “cannot argue that he lacked the intent to bribe the official because he made the ‘conscious decision’ to pay the official.”174 While the bribe payor in this situation “could have turned his back and walked away,” in the oil rig example, “he could not.”175 Businesses operating in high-risk countries may face real threats of violence or harm to their employees, and payments made in response to imminent threats to health or safety do not violate the FCPA.176 If such a situation arises, and to ensure the safety of its employees, companies should immediately contact the appropriate U.S. embassy for assistance. Principles of Corporate Liability for Anti-Bribery Violations General principles of corporate liability apply to the FCPA. Thus, a company is liable when its directors, officers, employees, or agents, acting within the scope of their employ- ment, commit FCPA violations intended, at least in part, to benefit the company.177 Similarly, just as with any other stat- ute, DOJ and SEC look to principles of parent-subsidiary and successor liability in evaluating corporate liability. Parent-Subsidiary Liability There are two ways in which a parent company may be liable for bribes paid by its subsidiary. First, a parent may have participated sufficiently in the activity to be directly liable for the conduct—as, for example, when it directed its subsidiary’s misconduct or otherwise directly participated in the bribe scheme. Second, a parent may be liable for its subsidiary’s con- duct under traditional agency principles. The fundamental characteristic of agency is control.178 Accordingly, DOJ and SEC evaluate the parent’s control—including the parent’s knowledge and direction of the subsidiary’s actions, both generally and in the context of the specific transaction— when evaluating whether a subsidiary is an agent of the par- ent. Although the formal relationship between the parent and subsidiary is important in this analysis, so are the practi- cal realities of how the parent and subsidiary actually interact. If an agency relationship exists, a subsidiary’s actions and knowledge are imputed to its parent.179 Moreover, under traditional principles of respondeat superior, a com- pany is liable for the acts of its agents, including its employ- ees, undertaken within the scope of their employment and intended, at least in part, to benefit the company.180 Thus, if an agency relationship exists between a parent and a subsidiary, the parent is liable for bribery committed by the subsidiary’s employees. For example, SEC brought an administrative action against a parent for bribes paid by the president of its indirect, wholly owned subsidiary. In that matter, the subsidiary’s president reported directly to the CEO of the parent issuer, and the issuer routinely identified chapter 2 The FCPA: Anti-Bribery Provisions 27 28 the president as a member of its senior management in its annual filing with SEC and in annual reports. Additionally, the parent’s legal department approved the retention of the third-party agent through whom the bribes were arranged despite a lack of documented due diligence and an agency agreement that violated corporate policy; also, an official of the parent approved one of the payments to the third-party agent.181 Under these circumstances, the parent company had sufficient knowledge and control of its subsidiary’s actions to be liable under the FCPA. Successor Liability Companies acquire a host of liabilities when they merge with or acquire another company, including those aris- ing out of contracts, torts, regulations, and statutes. As a gen- eral legal matter, when a company merges with or acquires another company, the successor company assumes the prede- cessor company’s liabilities.182 Successor liability is an integral component of corporate law and, among other things, pre- vents companies from avoiding liability by reorganizing.183 Successor liability applies to all kinds of civil and criminal liabilities,184 and FCPA violations are no exception. Whether successor liability applies to a particular corporate transac- tion depends on the facts and the applicable state, federal, and foreign law. Successor liability does not, however, create liability where none existed before. For example, if an issuer were to acquire a foreign company that was not previously subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction, the mere acquisition of that foreign company would not retroactively create FCPA liability for the acquiring issuer. DOJ and SEC encourage companies to conduct pre- acquisition due diligence and improve compliance pro- grams and internal controls after acquisition for a variety of reasons. First, due diligence helps an acquiring company to accurately value the target company. Contracts obtained through bribes may be legally unenforceable, business obtained illegally may be lost when bribe payments are stopped, there may be liability for prior illegal conduct, and the prior corrupt acts may harm the acquiring company’s reputation and future business prospects. Identifying these issues before an acquisition allows companies to better evaluate any potential post-acquisition liability and thus properly assess the target’s value.185 Second, due diligence reduces the risk that the acquired company will continue to pay bribes. Proper pre-acquisition due diligence can iden- tify business and regional risks and can also lay the founda- tion for a swift and successful post-acquisition integration into the acquiring company’s corporate control and com- pliance environment. Third, the consequences of potential violations uncovered through due diligence can be handled by the parties in an orderly and efficient manner through negotiation of the costs and responsibilities for the inves- tigation and remediation. Finally, comprehensive due dili- gence demonstrates a genuine commitment to uncovering and preventing FCPA violations. In a significant number of instances, DOJ and SEC have declined to take action against companies that voluntarily disclosed and remediated conduct and cooperated with DOJ and SEC in the merger and acquisition context.186 And DOJ and SEC have only taken action against successor companies in limited cir- cumstances, generally in cases involving egregious and sustained violations or where the successor company directly participated in the violations or failed to stop the misconduct from continuing after the acquisition. In one case, a U.S.-based issuer was charged with books and records and internal controls violations for continuing a kickback scheme originated by its predecessor.187 Another recent case involved a merger between two tobacco leaf merchants, where prior to the merger each company committed FCPA violations through its foreign subsidiaries, involving multiple countries over the course of many years. At each company, the bribes were directed by the parent company’s senior management. The two issuers then merged to form a new public company. Under these circumstances—the merger of two public companies that had each engaged in 29 bribery—both the new entity and the foreign subsidiaries were liable under the FCPA. The new parent entered into a non-prosecution agreement with DOJ and settled a civil action with SEC, while the company’s subsidiaries, which also merged, pleaded guilty.188 More often, DOJ and SEC have pursued enforce- ment actions against the predecessor company (rather than the acquiring company), particularly when the acquiring company uncovered and timely remedied the violations or when the government’s investigation of the predecessor company preceded the acquisition. In one such case, an Ohio-based health care company’s due diligence of an acquisition target uncovered FCPA vio- lations by the target’s subsidiary, and, before the merger was completed, the subsidiary’s violations were disclosed to DOJ and SEC. The subsidiary pleaded guilty and paid a $2 million criminal fine,189 the acquisition target settled with SEC and paid a $500,000 civil penalty,190 Practical Tips to Reduce FCPA Risk in Mergers and Acquisitions Companies pursuing mergers or acquisitions can take certain steps to identify and potentially reduce FCPA risks: M&A Opinion Procedure Release Requests: One option is to seek an opinion from DOJ in anticipation of a potential acquisition, such as occurred with Opinion Release 08-02 That case involved special circumstances, namely, severely limited pre-acquisition due diligence available to the potential acquiring company, and, because it was an opinion release (i e , providing certain assurances by DOJ concerning prospective conduct), it necessarily imposed demanding standards and prescriptive timeframes in return for specific assurances from DOJ, which SEC, as a matter of discretion, also honors Thus, obtaining an opinion from DOJ can be a good way to address specific due diligence challenges, but, because of the nature of such an opinion, it will likely contain more stringent requirements than may be necessary in all circumstances M&A Risk-Based FCPA Due Diligence and Disclosure: As a practical matter, most acquisitions will typically not require the type of prospective assurances contained in an opinion from DOJ DOJ and SEC encourage companies engaging in mergers and acquisitions to: (1) conduct thorough risk-based FCPA and anti-corruption due diligence on potential new business acquisitions; (2) ensure that the acquiring company’s code of conduct and compliance policies and procedures regarding the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws apply as quickly as is practicable to newly acquired businesses or merged entities; (3) train the directors, officers, and employees of newly acquired businesses or merged entities, and when appropriate, train agents and business partners, on the FCPA and other relevant anti-corruption laws and the company’s code of conduct and compliance policies and procedures; (4) conduct an FCPA-specific audit of all newly acquired or merged businesses as quickly as practicable; and (5) disclose any corrupt payments discovered as part of its due diligence of newly acquired entities or merged entities DOJ and SEC will give meaningful credit to companies who undertake these actions, and, in appropriate circumstances, DOJ and SEC may consequently decline to bring enforcement actions and no successor liability was sought against the acquir- ing entity. In another case, a Pennsylvania-based issuer that supplied heating and air conditioning products and services was subject to an ongoing investigation by DOJ and SEC at the time that it was acquired; DOJ and SEC resolved enforcement actions only against the predecessor company, which had by that time become a wholly owned subsidiary of the successor company.191 DOJ and SEC have also brought actions only against a predecessor company where its FCPA violations are discov- ered after acquisition. For example, when a Florida-based U.S. company discovered in post-acquisition due diligence that the telecommunications company (a domestic con- cern) it had acquired had engaged in foreign bribery, the successor company disclosed the FCPA violations to DOJ. It then conducted an internal investigation, cooperated fully with DOJ, and took appropriate remedial action— including terminating senior management at the acquired chapter 2 The FCPA: Anti-Bribery Provisions 29 30 company. No enforcement action was taken against the suc- cessor, but the predecessor company pleaded guilty to one count of violating the FCPA and agreed to pay a $2 million fine.192 Later, four executives from the predecessor company were convicted of FCPA violations, three of whom received terms of imprisonment.193 On occasion, when an enforcement action has been taken against a predecessor company, the succes- sor seeks assurances that it will not be subject to a future enforcement action. In one such case, a Dutch predeces- sor resolved FCPA charges with DOJ through a deferred prosecution agreement.194 While both the predecessor and successor signed the agreement, which included a commitment to ongoing cooperation and an improved compliance program, only the predecessor company was charged; in signing the agreement, the successor company gained the certainty of conditional release from criminal liability, even though it was not being pursued for FCPA violations.195 In another case, after a Connecticut-based company uncovered FCPA violations by a California company it sought to acquire, both companies voluntarily disclosed the conduct to DOJ and SEC.196 The prede- cessor company resolved its criminal liability through a non-prosecution agreement with DOJ that included an $800,000 monetary penalty and also settled with SEC, paying a total of $1.1 million in disgorgement, pre-judg- ment interest, and civil penalties. The successor company proceeded with the acquisition and separately entered into a non-prosecution agreement with DOJ in which it agreed, among other things, to ensure full performance of the predecessor company’s non-prosecution agreement. This agreement provided certainty to the successor con- cerning its FCPA liability. 197 Importantly, a successor company’s voluntary disclo- sure, appropriate due diligence, and implementation of an effective compliance program may also decrease the likeli- hood of an enforcement action regarding an acquired com- pany’s post-acquisition conduct when pre-acquisition due diligence is not possible.198 31 Hypothetical: Successor Liability Where Acquired Company Was Not Previously Subject to the FCPA Company A is a Delaware corporation with its principal offices in the United States and whose shares are listed on a national U.S. exchange. Company A is considering acquiring Foreign Company, which is not an issuer or a domestic concern. Foreign Company takes no actions within the United States that would make it subject to territorial jurisdiction. Company A’s proposed acquisition would make Foreign Company a subsidiary of Company A. Scenario 1: Prior to acquiring Foreign Company, Company A engages in extensive due diligence of Foreign Company, including: (1) having its legal, accounting, and compliance departments review Foreign Company’s sales and financial data, its customer contracts, and its third-party and distributor agreements; (2) performing a risk-based analysis of Foreign Company’s customer base; (3) performing an audit of selected transactions engaged in by Foreign Company; and (4) engaging in discussions with Foreign Company’s general counsel, vice president of sales, and head of internal audit regarding all corruption risks, compliance efforts, and any other corruption-related issues that have surfaced at Foreign Company over the past ten years. This due diligence aims to determine whether Foreign Company has appropriate anti-corruption and compliance policies in place, whether Foreign Company’s employees have been adequately trained regarding those policies, how Foreign Company ensures that those policies are followed, and what remedial actions are taken if the policies are violated. During the course of its due diligence, Company A learns that Foreign Company has made several potentially improper payments in the form of an inflated commission to a third-party agent in connection with a government contract with Foreign Country. Immediately after the acquisition, Company A discloses the conduct to DOJ and SEC, suspends and terminates those employees and the third-party agent responsible for the payments, and makes certain that the illegal payments have stopped. It also quickly integrates Foreign Company into Company A’s own robust internal controls, including its anti-corruption and compliance policies, which it communicates to its new employees through required online and in-person training in the local language. Company A also requires Foreign Company’s third-party distributors and other agents to sign anti-corruption certifications, complete training, and sign new contracts that incorporate FCPA and anti- corruption representations and warranties and audit rights. Based on these facts, could DOJ or SEC prosecute Company A? No. Although DOJ and SEC have jurisdiction over Company A because it is an issuer, neither could pursue Company A for conduct that occurred prior to its acquisition of Foreign Company. As Foreign Company was neither an issuer nor a domestic concern and was not subject to U.S. territorial jurisdiction, DOJ and SEC have no jurisdiction over its pre-acquisition misconduct. The acquisition of a company does not create jurisdiction where none existed before. Importantly, Company A’s extensive pre-acquisition due diligence allowed it to identify and halt the corruption. As there was no continuing misconduct post-acquisition, the FCPA was not violated. Scenario 2: Company A performs only minimal and pro forma pre-acquisition due diligence. It does not conduct a risk-based analysis, and its review of Foreign Company’s data, contracts, and third-party and distributor agreements is cursory. Company A acquires Foreign Company and makes it a wholly owned subsidiary. Although Company A circulates its compliance policies to all new personnel after the acquisition, it does not translate the compliance policies into the local language or train its new personnel or third-party agents on anti-corruption issues. A few months after the acquisition, an employee in Company A’s international sales office (Sales Employee) learns from a legacy Foreign Company employee that for years the government contract that generated most of Foreign Company’s revenues depended on inflated commissions to a third-party agent “to make the right person happy at Foreign Government Agency.” Sales Employee is told that unless the payments continue the business will likely be lost, which would mean that Company A’s new acquisition would quickly become a financial failure. The payments continue for two (cont’d) chapter 2 The FCPA: Anti-Bribery Provisions 31 32 years after the acquisition. After another employee of Company A reports the long-running bribe scheme to a director at Foreign Government Agency, Company A stops the payments and DOJ and SEC investigate. Based on these facts, would DOJ or SEC charge Company A? Yes. DOJ and SEC have prosecuted companies like Company A in similar circumstances. Any charges would not, however, be premised upon successor liability, but rather on Company A’s post-acquisition bribe payments, which themselves created criminal and civil liability for Company A. Scenario 3: Under local law, Company A’s ability to conduct pre-acquisition due diligence on Foreign Company is limited. In the due diligence it does conduct, Company A determines that Foreign Company is doing business in high-risk countries and in high-risk industries but finds no red flags specific to Foreign Company’s operations. Post-acquisition, Company A conducts extensive due diligence and determines that Foreign Company had paid bribes to officials with Foreign Government Agency. Company A takes prompt action to remediate the problem, including following the measures set forth in Opinion Procedure Release No. 08-02. Among other actions, it voluntarily discloses the misconduct to DOJ and SEC, ensures all bribes are immediately stopped, takes remedial action against all parties involved in the corruption, and quickly incorporates Foreign Company into a robust compliance program and Company A’s other internal controls. Based on these facts, would DOJ or SEC prosecute Company A? DOJ and SEC have declined to prosecute companies like Company A in similar circumstances Companies can follow the measures set forth in Opinion Procedure Release No 08-02, or seek their own opinions, where adequate pre-acquisition due diligence is not possible Hypothetical: Successor Liability Where Acquired Company Was Already Subject to the FCPA Both Company A and Company B are Delaware corporations with their principal offices in the United States Both companies’ shares are listed on a national U S exchange Scenario 1: Company A is considering acquiring several of Company B’s business lines. Prior to the acquisition, Company A engages in extensive due diligence, including: (1) having its legal, accounting, and compliance departments review Company B’s sales and financial data, its customer contracts, and its third-party and distributor agreements; (2) performing a risk-based analysis of Company B’s customer base; (3) performing an audit of selected transactions engaged in by Company B; and (4) engaging in discussions with Company B’s general counsel, vice president of sales, and head of internal audit regarding all corruption risks, compliance efforts, and any other major corruption-related issues that have surfaced at Company B over the past ten years. This due diligence aims to determine whether Company B has appropriate anti-corruption and compliance policies in place, whether Company B’s employees have been adequately trained regarding those policies, how Company B ensures that those policies are followed, and what remedial actions are taken if the policies are violated. During the course of its due diligence, Company A learns that Company B has made several potentially improper payments in connection with a government contract with Foreign Country. As a condition of the acquisition, Company A requires Company B to disclose the misconduct to the government. Company A makes certain that the illegal payments (cont’d) 33 have stopped and quickly integrates Company B’s business lines into Company A’s own robust internal controls, including its anti-corruption and compliance policies, which it communicates to its new employees through required online and in- person training in the local language. Company A also requires Company B’s third-party distributors and other agents to sign anti-corruption certifications, complete training, and sign new contracts that incorporate FCPA and anti-corruption representations and warranties and audit rights. Based on these facts, would DOJ or SEC prosecute? DOJ and SEC have declined to prosecute companies like Company A in similar circumstances. DOJ and SEC encourage companies like Company A to conduct extensive FCPA due diligence. By uncovering the corruption, Company A put itself in a favorable position, and, because the corrupt payments have stopped, Company A has no continuing liability. Whether DOJ and SEC might charge Company B depends on facts and circumstances beyond the scope of this hypothetical. DOJ would consider its Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations and SEC would consider the factors contained in the Seaboard Report, both of which are discussed in Chapter 5. In general, the more egregious and long-standing the corruption, the more likely it is that DOJ and SEC would prosecute Company B. In certain limited circumstances, DOJ and SEC have in the past declined to bring charges against acquired companies, recognizing that acquiring companies may bear much of the reputational damage and costs associated with such charges. Scenario 2: Company A plans to acquire Company B Although, as in Scenario 1, Company A conducts extensive due diligence, it does not uncover the bribery until after the acquisition Company A then makes certain that the illegal payments stop and voluntarily discloses the misconduct to DOJ and SEC It quickly integrates Company B into Company A’s own robust internal controls, including its anti-corruption and compliance policies, which it communicates to its new employees through required online and in-person training in the local language Company A also requires Company B’s third-party distributors and other agents to sign anti-corruption certifications, complete training, and sign new contracts that incorporate FCPA and anti- corruption representations and warranties and audit rights Based on these facts, would DOJ or SEC prosecute? Absent unusual circumstances not contemplated by this hypothetical, DOJ and SEC are unlikely to prosecute Company A for the pre-acquisition misconduct of Company B, provided that Company B still exists in a form that would allow it to be prosecuted separately (e.g., Company B is a subsidiary of Company A). DOJ and SEC understand that no due diligence is perfect and that society benefits when companies with strong compliance programs acquire and improve companies with weak ones. At the same time, however, neither the liability for corruption—nor the harms caused by it— are eliminated when one company acquires another. Whether DOJ and SEC will pursue a case against Company B (or, in unusual circumstances, Company A) will depend on consideration of all the factors in the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations and the Seaboard Report, respectively. Scenario 3: Company A merges with Company B, which is in the same line of business and interacts with the same Foreign Government customers, and forms Company C Due diligence before the merger reveals that both Company A and Company B have been engaging in similar bribery In both cases, the bribery was extensive and known by high-level management within the companies Based on these facts, would DOJ or SEC prosecute? Yes. DOJ and SEC have prosecuted companies like Company C on the basis of successor liability. Company C is a combination of two companies that both violated the FCPA, and their merger does not eliminate their liability. In addition, since Company C is an ongoing concern, DOJ and SEC may impose a monitorship to ensure that the bribery has ceased and a compliance program is developed to prevent future misconduct. chapter 2 The FCPA: Anti-Bribery Provisions 33 34 Additional Principles of Criminal Liability for Anti-Bribery Violations: Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy Under federal law, individuals or companies that aid or abet a crime, including an FCPA violation, are as guilty as if they had directly committed the offense themselves. The aiding and abetting statute provides that whoever “commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission,” or “will- fully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States,” is punishable as a principal.199 Aiding and abetting is not an independent crime, and the government must prove that an underlying FCPA violation was committed.200 Individuals and companies, including foreign nation- als and companies, may also be liable for conspiring to violate the FCPA—i.e., for agreeing to commit an FCPA violation—even if they are not, or could not be, indepen- dently charged with a substantive FCPA violation. For instance, a foreign, non-issuer company could be convicted of conspiring with a domestic concern to violate the FCPA. Under certain circumstances, it could also be held liable for the domestic concern’s substantive FCPA violations under Pinkerton v. United States, which imposes liability on a defendant for reasonably foreseeable crimes committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy that the defendant joined.201 A foreign company or individual may be held liable for aiding and abetting an FCPA violation or for conspiring to violate the FCPA, even if the foreign company or indi- vidual did not take any act in furtherance of the corrupt payment while in the territory of the United States. In con- spiracy cases, the United States generally has jurisdiction over all the conspirators where at least one conspirator is an issuer, domestic concern, or commits a reasonably fore- seeable overt act within the United States.202 For example, if a foreign company or individual conspires to violate the FCPA with someone who commits an overt act within the United States, the United States can prosecute the foreign company or individual for the conspiracy. The same prin- ciple applies to aiding and abetting violations. For instance, even though they took no action in the United States, Japanese and European companies were charged with con- spiring with and aiding and abetting a domestic concern’s FCPA violations.203 Additional Principles of Civil Liability for Anti-Bribery Violations: Aiding and Abetting and Causing Both companies and individuals can be held civilly liable for aiding and abetting FCPA anti-bribery violations if they knowingly or recklessly provide substantial assis- tance to a violator.204 Similarly, in the administrative pro- ceeding context, companies and individuals may be held liable for causing FCPA violations.205 This liability extends to the subsidiaries and agents of U.S. issuers. In one case, the U.S. subsidiary of a Swiss freight for- warding company was held civilly liable for paying bribes on behalf of its customers in several countries.206 Although the U.S. subsidiary was not an issuer for purposes of the FCPA, it was an “agent” of several U.S. issuers. By paying bribes on behalf of its issuers’ customers, the subsidiary both directly violated and aided and abetted the issuers’ FCPA violations. What Is the Applicable Statute of Limitations? Statute of Limitations in Criminal Cases The FCPA’s anti-bribery and accounting provisions do not specify a statute of limitations for criminal actions. Accordingly, the general five-year limitations period set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3282 applies to substantive criminal violations of the Act.207 In cases involving FCPA conspiracies, the govern- ment may be able to reach conduct occurring before the five-year limitations period applicable to conspiracies 35 under 18 U.S.C. § 371. For conspiracy offenses, the govern- ment generally need prove only that one act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred during the limitations period, thus enabling the government to prosecute bribes paid or accounting violations occurring more than five years prior to the filing of formal charges.208 There are at least two ways in which the applicable limitations period is commonly extended. First, compa- nies or individuals cooperating with DOJ may enter into a tolling agreement that voluntarily extends the limitations period. Second, under 18 U.S.C. § 3292, the government may seek a court order suspending the statute of limitations posed in a criminal case for up to three years in order to obtain evidence from foreign countries. Generally, the sus- pension period begins when the official request is made by the U.S. government to the foreign authority and ends on the date on which the foreign authority takes final action on the request.209 Statute of Limitations in Civil Actions In civil cases brought by SEC, the statute of limita- tions is set by 28 U.S.C. § 2462, which provides for a five- year limitation on any “suit or proceeding for the enforce- ment of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture.” The five-year period begins to run “when the claim first accrued.” The five-year limitations period applies to SEC actions seek- ing civil penalties, but it does not prevent SEC from seeking equitable remedies, such as an injunction or the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, for conduct pre-dating the five-year period. In cases against individuals who are not residents of the United States, the statute is tolled for any period when the defendants are not “found within the United States in order that proper service may be made thereon.”210 Furthermore, companies or individuals coop- erating with SEC may enter into tolling agreements that voluntarily extend the limitations period. chapter 2 The FCPA: Anti-Bribery Provisions 35 36 chapter 3 The FCPA: Accounting Provisions 38 THE FCPA: ACCOUNTING PROVISIONS In addition to the anti-bribery provisions, the FCPA contains accounting provi- sions applicable to public companies. The FCPA’s accounting provisions op- erate in tandem with the anti-bribery provisions211 and prohibit off-the-books accounting. Company management and investors rely on a company’s financial statements and internal accounting controls to ensure transparency in the finan- cial health of the business, the risks undertaken, and the transactions between the company and its customers and business partners. The accounting provi- sions are designed to “strengthen the accuracy of the corporate books and records and the reliability of the audit process which constitute the foundations of our system of corporate disclosure.”212 The accounting provisions consist of two primary components. First, under the “books and records” pro- vision, issuers must make and keep books, records, and accounts that, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect an issuer’s transactions and dispositions of an issu- er’s assets.213 Second, under the “internal controls” provi- sion, issuers must devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to assure management’s con- trol, authority, and responsibility over the firm’s assets.214 These components, and other aspects of the accounting provisions, are discussed in greater detail below. Although the accounting provisions were originally enacted as part of the FCPA, they do not apply only to brib- ery-related violations. Rather, the accounting provisions ensure that all public companies account for all of their assets and liabilities accurately and in reasonable detail, and they form the backbone for most accounting fraud and issuer disclosure cases brought by DOJ and SEC.215 39 What Is Covered by the Accounting Provisions? Books and Records Provision Bribes, both foreign and domestic, are often mischarac- terized in companies’ books and records. Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)), commonly called the “books and records” provision, requires issuers to “make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transac- tions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”216 The “in reasonable detail” qualification was adopted by Congress “in light of the concern that such a standard, if unqualified, might connote a degree of exactitude and precision which is unrealistic.”217 The addition of this phrase was intended to make clear “that the issuer’s records should reflect trans- actions in conformity with accepted methods of recording economic events and effectively prevent off-the-books slush funds and payments of bribes.”218 The term “reasonable detail” is defined in the statute as the level of detail that would “satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.”219 Thus, as Congress noted when it adopted this definition, “[t]he concept of reasonable- ness of necessity contemplates the weighing of a number of relevant factors, including the costs of compliance.”220 Although the standard is one of reasonable detail, it is never appropriate to mischaracterize transactions in a company’s books and records.221 Bribes are often concealed In the past, “corporate bribery has been concealed by the falsification of corporate books and records” and the accounting provisions “remove[] this avenue of coverup.” Senate Report No. 95-114, at 3 (1977) under the guise of legitimate payments, such as commis- sions or consulting fees. In instances where all the elements of a violation of the anti-bribery provisions are not met—where, for exam- ple, there was no use of interstate commerce—companies nonetheless may be liable if the improper payments are inac- curately recorded. Consistent with the FCPA’s approach to prohibiting payments of any value that are made with a corrupt purpose, there is no materiality threshold under the books and records provision. In combination with the inter- nal controls provision, the requirement that issuers main- tain books and records that accurately and fairly reflect the corporation’s transactions “assure[s], among other things, that the assets of the issuer are used for proper corporate purpose[s].”222 As with the anti-bribery provisions, DOJ’s and SEC’s enforcement of the books and records provision has typically involved misreporting of either large bribe pay- ments or widespread inaccurate recording of smaller pay- ments made as part of a systemic pattern of bribery. Bribes Have Been Mischaracterized As: Commissions or Royalties Consulting Fees Sales and Marketing Expenses Scientific Incentives or Studies Travel and Entertainment Expenses Rebates or Discounts After Sales Service Fees Miscellaneous Expenses Petty Cash Withdrawals Free Goods Intercompany Accounts Supplier / Vendor Payments Write-offs “Customs Intervention” Payments chapter 3 The FCPA: Accounting Provisions 39 40 Internal Controls Provision The payment of bribes often occurs in companies that have weak internal control environments. Internal controls over financial reporting are the processes used by compa- nies to provide reasonable assurances regarding the reliabil- ity of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements. They include various components, such as: a control environment that covers the tone set by the organi- zation regarding integrity and ethics; risk assessments; con- trol activities that cover policies and procedures designed to ensure that management directives are carried out (e.g., approvals, authorizations, reconciliations, and segregation of duties); information and communication; and monitor- ing. Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)), commonly called the “internal controls” provision, requires issuers to: devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that— (i) transactions are executed in accordance with man- agement’s general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to per- mit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is com- pared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences ….223 Like the “reasonable detail” requirement in the books and records provision, the Act defines “reasonable assurances” as “such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.”224 The Act does not specify a particular set of controls that companies are required to implement. Rather, the internal controls provision gives companies the flexibility to develop and maintain a system of controls that is appro- priate to their particular needs and circumstances. An effective compliance program is a critical com- ponent of an issuer’s internal controls. Fundamentally, the design of a company’s internal controls must take into account the operational realities and risks attendant to the company’s business, such as: the nature of its products or services; how the products or services get to market; the nature of its work force; the degree of regulation; the extent of its government interaction; and the degree to which it has operations in countries with a high risk of corruption. A company’s compliance program should be tailored to these differences. Businesses whose operations expose them to a high risk of corruption will necessarily devise and employ different internal controls than businesses that have a lesser exposure to corruption, just as a financial services company would be expected to devise and employ different internal controls than a manufacturer. A 2008 case against a German manufacturer of indus- trial and consumer products illustrates a systemic internal controls problem involving bribery that was unprecedented in scale and geographic reach. From 2001 to 2007, the com- pany created elaborate payment schemes—including slush Companies with ineffective internal controls often face risks of embezzlement and self-dealing by employees, commercial bribery, export control problems, and violations of other U.S. and local laws. 41 funds, off-the-books accounts, and systematic payments to business consultants and other intermediaries—to facilitate bribery. Payments were made in ways that obscured their purpose and the ultimate recipients of the money. In some cases, employees obtained large amounts of cash from cash desks and then transported the cash in suitcases across inter- national borders. Authorizations for some payments were placed on sticky notes and later removed to avoid any perma- nent record. The company made payments totaling approxi- mately $1.36 billion through various mechanisms, including $805.5 million as bribes and $554.5 million for unknown purposes.225 The company was charged with internal controls and books and records violations, along with anti-bribery violations, and paid over $1.6 billion to resolve the case with authorities in the United States and Germany.226 The types of internal control failures identified in the above example exist in many other cases where companies were charged with internal controls violations.227 A 2010 case against a multi-national automobile manufacturer involved bribery that occurred over a long period of time in multiple countries.228 In that case, the company used doz- ens of ledger accounts, known internally as “internal third party accounts,” to maintain credit balances for the ben- efit of government officials.229 The accounts were funded through several bogus pricing mechanisms, such as “price surcharges,” “price inclusions,” or excessive commissions.230 The company also used artificial discounts or rebates on sales contracts to generate the money to pay the bribes.231 The bribes also were made through phony sales intermedi- aries and corrupt business partners, as well as through the use of cash desks.232 Sales executives would obtain cash from the company in amounts as high as hundreds of thousands of dollars, enabling the company to obscure the purpose and recipients of the money paid to government officials.233 In addition to bribery charges, the company was charged with internal controls and books and records violations. Good internal controls can prevent not only FCPA violations, but also other illegal or unethical conduct by the company, its subsidiaries, and its employees. DOJ and SEC have repeatedly brought FCPA cases that also involved other types of misconduct, such as financial fraud,234 commercial bribery,235 export controls violations,236 and embezzlement or self-dealing by company employees.237 Potential Reporting and Anti-Fraud Violations Issuers have reporting obligations under Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, which requires issuers to file an annual report that contains comprehensive information about the issuer. Failure to properly disclose material infor- mation about the issuer’s business, including material rev- enue, expenses, profits, assets, or liabilities related to bribery of foreign government officials, may give rise to anti-fraud and reporting violations under Sections 10(b) and 13(a) of the Exchange Act. For example, a California-based technology company was charged with reporting violations, in addition to viola- tions of the FCPA’s anti-bribery and accounting provisions, when its bribery scheme led to material misstatements in its SEC filings.238 The company was awarded contracts procured through bribery of Chinese officials that generated material revenue and profits. The revenue and profits helped the com- pany offset losses incurred to develop new products expected to become the company’s future source of revenue growth. The company improperly recorded the bribe payments as sales commission expenses in its books and records. Companies engaged in bribery may also be engaged in activity that violates the anti-fraud and reporting provi- sions. For example, an oil and gas pipeline company and its employees engaged in a long-running scheme to use the company’s petty cash accounts in Nigeria to make a vari- ety of corrupt payments to Nigerian tax and court officials using false invoices.239 The company and its employees also engaged in a fraudulent scheme to minimize the company’s tax obligations in Bolivia by using false invoices to claim false offsets to its value-added tax obligations. The scheme resulted in material overstatements of the company’s net income in the company’s financial statements, which vio- lated the Exchange Act’s anti-fraud and reporting provi- sions. Both schemes also violated the books and records and internal controls provisions. chapter 3 The FCPA: Accounting Provisions 41 42 What Are Management’s Other Obligations? Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 In 2002, in response to a series of accounting scandals involving U.S. companies, Congress enacted the Sarbanes- Oxley Act (Sarbanes-Oxley or SOX),240 which strength- ened the accounting requirements for issuers. All issuers must comply with Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirements, several of which have FCPA implications. SOX Section 302 (15 U.S.C. § 7241)—Responsibility of Corporate Officers for the Accuracy and Validity of Corporate Financial Reports Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires that a com- pany’s “principal officers” (typically the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO)) take responsibility for and certify the integrity of their compa- ny’s financial reports on a quarterly basis. Under Exchange Act Rule 13a-14, which is commonly called the “SOX cer- tification” rule, each periodic report filed by an issuer must include a certification signed by the issuer’s principal execu- tive officer and principal financial officer that, among other things, states that: (i) based on the officer’s knowledge, the report contains no material misstatements or omissions; (ii) based on the officer’s knowledge, the relevant financial statements are accurate in all material respects; (iii) inter- nal controls are properly designed; and (iv) the certifying officers have disclosed to the issuer’s audit committee and auditors all significant internal control deficiencies. SOX Section 404 (15 U.S.C. § 7262)—Reporting on the State of a Company’s Internal Controls over Financial Reporting Sarbanes-Oxley also strengthened a company’s required disclosures concerning the state of its internal con- trol over financial reporting. Under Section 404, issuers are required to present in their annual reports management’s conclusion regarding the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls over financial reporting. This statement must also assess the effectiveness of such internal controls and procedures. In addition, the company’s independent auditor must attest to and report on its assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls over finan- cial reporting. As directed by Section 404, SEC has adopted rules requiring issuers and their independent auditors to report to the public on the effectiveness of the compa- ny’s internal controls over financial reporting.241 These internal controls include those related to illegal acts and fraud—including acts of bribery—that could result in a material misstatement of the company’s financial state- ments.242 In 2007, SEC issued guidance on controls over financial reporting.243 SOX Section 802 (18 U.S.C. §§ 1519 and 1520)— Criminal Penalties for Altering Documents Section 802 of Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits altering, destroying, mutilating, concealing, or falsifying records, documents, or tangible objects with the intent to obstruct, impede, or influence a potential or actual federal investiga- tion. This section also prohibits any accountant from know- ingly and willfully violating the requirement that all audit or review papers be maintained for a period of five years. Who Is Covered by the Accounting Provisions? Civil Liability for Issuers, Subsidiaries, and Affiliates The FCPA’s accounting provisions apply to every issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act or that is required to file annual or other periodic reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act.244 These provisions apply to any issuer whose securities trade on a national securities exchange in the United States, including foreign issuers with exchange- traded American Depository Receipts.245 They also apply 43 to companies whose stock trades in the over-the-counter market in the United States and which file periodic reports with the Commission, such as annual and quarterly reports. Unlike the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, the accounting provisions do not apply to private companies.246 Although the FCPA’s accounting requirements are directed at “issuers,” an issuer’s books and records include those of its consolidated subsidiaries and affiliates. An issu- er’s responsibility thus extends to ensuring that subsidiaries or affiliates under its control, including foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures, comply with the accounting provisions. For instance, DOJ and SEC brought enforcement actions against a California company for violating the FCPA’s accounting provisions when two Chinese joint ventures in which it was a partner paid more than $400,000 in bribes over a four-year period to obtain business in China.247 Sales personnel in China made the illicit payments by obtaining cash advances from accounting personnel, who recorded the payments on the books as “business fees” or “travel and entertainment” expenses. Although the payments were made exclusively in China by Chinese employees of the joint ven- ture, the California company failed to have adequate internal controls and failed to act on red flags indicating that its affili- ates were engaged in bribery. The California company paid $1.15 million in civil disgorgement and a criminal monetary penalty of $1.7 million. Companies may not be able to exercise the same level of control over a minority-owned subsidiary or affiliate as they do over a majority or wholly owned entity. Therefore, if a parent company owns 50% or less of a subsidiary or affiliate, the parent is only required to use good faith efforts to cause the minority-owned subsid- iary or affiliate to devise and maintain a system of inter- nal accounting controls consistent with the issuer’s own obligations under the FCPA.248 In evaluating an issuer’s good faith efforts, all the circumstances—including “the relative degree of the issuer’s ownership of the domestic or foreign firm and the laws and practices governing the business operations of the country in which such firm is located”—are taken into account.249 Civil Liability for Individuals and Other Entities Companies (including subsidiaries of issuers) and individuals may also face civil liability for aiding and abet- ting or causing an issuer’s violation of the accounting pro- visions.250 For example, in April 2010, SEC charged four individuals—a Country Manager, a Senior Vice President of Sales, a Regional Financial Director, and an International Controller of a U.S. issuer—for their roles in schemes to bribe Kyrgyz and Thai government officials to purchase tobacco from their employer. The complaint alleged that, among other things, the individuals aided and abetted the issuer company’s violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions by “knowingly provid[ing] substantial assistance to” the parent company.251 All four executives settled the charges against them, consenting to the entry of final judgments permanently enjoining them from violating the accounting and anti-bribery provisions, with two executives paying civil penalties.252 As in other areas of federal securities law, corporate officers also can be held liable as control persons.253 Similarly, in October 2011, SEC brought an admin- istrative action against a U.S. water valve manufacturer and a former employee of the company’s Chinese subsidiary for violations of the FCPA’s accounting provisions.254 The Chinese subsidiary had made improper payments to employ- ees of certain design institutes to create design specifications that favored the company’s valve products. The payments were disguised as sales commissions in the subsidiary’s books and records, thereby causing the U.S. issuer’s books and records to be inaccurate. The general manager of the subsid- iary, who approved the payments and knew or should have known that they were improperly recorded, was ordered to cease-and-desist from committing or causing violations of the accounting provisions, among other charges.255 Additionally, individuals and entities can be held directly civilly liable for falsifying an issuer’s books and records or for circumventing internal controls. Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1 provides: “No person shall, directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record or account subject to [the books and records provision] of the Securities Exchange Act.”256 And Section 13(b)(5) of chapter 3 The FCPA: Accounting Provisions 43 44 the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5)) provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or account ….”257 The Exchange Act defines “person” to include a “natural person, company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government.”258 An issuer’s officers and directors may also be held civ- illy liable for making false statements to a company’s audi- tor. Exchange Act Rule 13b2-2 prohibits officers and direc- tors from making (or causing to be made) materially false or misleading statements, including an omission of material facts, to an accountant. This liability arises in connection with any audit, review, or examination of a company’s finan- cial statements or in connection with the filing of any docu- ment with SEC.259 Finally, the principal executive and principal finan- cial officer, or persons performing similar functions, can be held liable for violating Exchange Act Rule 13a-14 by signing false personal certifications required by SOX. Thus, for example, in January 2011, SEC charged the for- mer CEO of a U.S. issuer for his role in schemes to bribe Iraqi government officials in connection with the United Nations Oil-For-Food Programme and to bribe Iraqi and Indonesian officials to purchase the company’s fuel addi- tives. There, the company used false invoices and sham con- sulting contracts to support large bribes that were passed on to foreign officials through an agent, and the bribes were mischaracterized as legitimate commissions and travel fees in the company’s books and records. The officer directed and authorized the bribe payments and their false recording in the books and records. He also signed annual and quar- terly SOX certifications in which he falsely represented that the company’s financial statements were fairly presented and the company’s internal controls sufficiently designed, as well as annual representations to the company’s external auditors where he falsely stated that he complied with the company’s code of ethics and was unaware of any violations of the code of ethics by anyone else. The officer was charged with aiding and abetting violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions, circumventing internal controls, falsifying books and records, making false state- ments to accountants, and signing false certifications.260 He consented to the entry of an injunction and paid disgorge- ment and a civil penalty.261 He also later pleaded guilty in the United Kingdom to conspiring to corrupt Iraqi and Indonesian officials.262 Criminal Liability for Accounting Violations Criminal liability can be imposed on companies and individuals for knowingly failing to comply with the FCPA’s books and records or internal controls provisions.263 As with the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, individuals are only subject to the FCPA’s criminal penalties for violations of the accounting provisions if they acted “willfully.”264 For example, a French company was criminally charged with failure to implement internal controls and failure to keep accurate books and records, among other violations.265 As part of its deferred prosecution agreement, the company admitted to numerous internal control fail- ures, including failure to implement sufficient anti-bribery compliance policies, maintain a sufficient system for the selection and approval of consultants, and conduct appro- priate audits of payments to purported “business consul- tants.”266 Likewise, a German company pleaded guilty to internal controls and books and records violations where, from 2001 through 2007, it made payments totaling approximately $1.36 billion through various mechanisms, including $805.5 million as bribes and $554.5 million for unknown purposes.267 Individuals can be held criminally liable for accounting violations. For example, a former managing director of a U.S. bank’s real estate business in China pleaded guilty to conspir- ing to evade internal accounting controls in order to trans- fer a multi-million dollar ownership interest in a Shanghai building to himself and a Chinese public official with whom 45 he had a personal friendship. The former managing director repeatedly made false representations to his employer about the transaction and the ownership interests involved. 268 Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting Liability As with the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, compa- nies (including subsidiaries of issuers) and individuals may face criminal liability for conspiring to commit or for aid- ing and abetting violations of the accounting provisions. For example, the subsidiary of a Houston-based company pleaded guilty both to conspiring to commit and to aiding and abetting the company’s books and records and anti-bribery violations.269 The subsidiary paid bribes of over $4 million and falsely characterized the payments as “commissions,” “fees,” or “legal services,” consequently causing the company’s books and records to be inaccurate. Although the subsidiary was not an issuer and therefore could not be charged directly with an accounting violation, it was criminally liable for its involvement in the parent company’s accounting violation. Similarly, a U.S. subsidiary of a Swiss freight for- warding company that was not an issuer was charged with conspiring to commit and with aiding and abetting the books and records violations of its customers, who were issuers and therefore subject to the FCPA’s accounting provisions.270 The U.S. subsidiary substantially assisted the issuer-customers in violating the FCPA’s books and records provision by masking the true nature of the bribe payments in the invoices it submitted to the issuer-customers.271 The subsidiary thus faced criminal liability for its involvement in the issuer-customers’ FCPA violations even though it was not itself subject to the FCPA’s accounting provisions. Auditor Obligations All public companies in the United States must file annual financial statements that have been prepared in conformity with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP). These accounting principles are among the most comprehensive in the world. U.S. GAAP requires an accounting of all assets, liabilities, revenue, and expenses as well as extensive disclosures concerning the company’s operations and financial condition. A company’s financial statements should be complete and fairly repre- sent the company’s financial condition.272 Thus, under U.S. GAAP, any payments to foreign government officials must be properly accounted for in a company’s books, records, and financial statements. U.S. laws, including SEC Rules, require issuers to undergo an annual external audit of their financial statements and to make those audited financial statements available to the public by filing them with SEC. SEC Rules and the rules and standards issued by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) under SEC oversight, require external auditors to be independent of the companies that they audit. Independent auditors must comply with the rules and standards set forth by the PCAOB when they perform an audit of a public company. These audit standards govern, for example, the auditor’s responsibility concerning material errors, irregularities, or illegal acts by a client and its officers, directors, and employees. Additionally, the auditor has a responsibility to obtain an understanding of an entity’s inter- nal controls over financial reporting as part of its audit and must communicate all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses identified during the audit to management and the audit committee.273 Under Section 10A of the Exchange Act, indepen- dent auditors who discover an illegal act, such as the pay- ment of bribes to domestic or foreign government officials, have certain obligations in connection with their audits of public companies. 274 Generally, Section 10A requires audi- tors who become aware of illegal acts to report such acts to appropriate levels within the company and, if the company fails to take appropriate action, to notify SEC. chapter 3 The FCPA: Accounting Provisions 45 46 chapter 4 Other Related U.S. Laws 48 OTHER RELATED U.S. LAWS Businesses and individuals should be aware that conduct that violates the FCPA’s anti-bribery or accounting provisions may also violate other statutes or regulations. Moreover, payments to foreign government officials and intermedi- aries may violate these laws even if all of the elements of an FCPA violation are not present. Travel Act The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, prohibits travel in interstate or foreign commerce or using the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with the intent to distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity or to promote, manage, establish, or carry on any unlawful activ- ity.275 “Unlawful activity” includes violations of not only the FCPA, but also state commercial bribery laws. Thus, bribery between private commercial enterprises may, in some circumstances, be covered by the Travel Act. Said dif- ferently, if a company pays kickbacks to an employee of a private company who is not a foreign official, such private- to-private bribery could possibly be charged under the Travel Act. DOJ has previously charged both individual and corporate defendants in FCPA cases with violations of the Travel Act.276 For instance, an individual investor was convicted of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act in 2009 where the relevant “unlawful activity” under the Travel Act was an FCPA violation involving a bribery scheme in Azerbaijan.277 Also in 2009, a California com- pany that engaged in both bribery of foreign officials in vio- lation of the FCPA and commercial bribery in violation of California state law pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act, among other charges.278 Money Laundering Many FCPA cases also involve violations of anti- money laundering statutes.279 For example, two Florida executives of a Miami-based telecommunications company were convicted of FCPA and money laundering conduct where they conducted financial transactions involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activities—violations of the FCPA, the criminal bribery laws of Haiti, and wire fraud— in order to conceal and disguise these proceeds. Notably, although foreign officials cannot be prosecuted for FCPA 49 violations,280 three former Haitian officials involved in the same scheme were convicted of money laundering.281 Mail and Wire Fraud The mail and wire fraud statutes may also apply. In 2006, for example, a wholly owned foreign subsidiary of a U.S. issuer pleaded guilty to both FCPA and wire fraud counts where the scheme included overbilling the sub- sidiary’s customers—both government and private—and using part of the overcharged money to pay kickbacks to the customers’ employees. The wire fraud charges alleged that the subsidiary had funds wired from its parent’s Oregon bank account to off-the-books bank accounts in South Korea that were controlled by the subsidiary. The funds, amounting to almost $2 million, were then paid to manag- ers of state-owned and private steel production companies in China and South Korea as illegal commission payments and kickbacks that were disguised as refunds, commissions, and other seemingly legitimate expenses.282 Certification and Reporting Violations Certain other licensing, certification, and reporting requirements imposed by the U.S. government can also be implicated in the foreign bribery context. For example, as a condition of its facilitation of direct loans and loan guar- antees to a foreign purchaser of U.S. goods and services, the Export-Import Bank of the United States requires the U.S. supplier to make certifications concerning commis- sions, fees, or other payments paid in connection with the financial assistance and that it has not and will not violate the FCPA.283 A false certification may give rise to criminal liability for false statements.284 Similarly, manufacturers, exporters, and brokers of certain defense articles and services are subject to regis- tration, licensing, and reporting requirements under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2751, et seq., and its implementing regulations, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. § 120, et seq. For example, under AECA and ITAR, all manufactur- ers and exporters of defense articles and services must reg- ister with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. The sale of defense articles and services valued at $500,000 or more triggers disclosure requirements concerning fees and commissions, including bribes, in an aggregate amount of $100,000 or more.285 Violations of AECA and ITAR can result in civil and criminal penalties.286 Tax Violations Individuals and companies who violate the FCPA may also violate U.S. tax law, which explicitly prohibits tax deduc- tions for bribes, such as false sales “commissions” deductions intended to conceal corrupt payments.287 Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation has been involved in a num- ber of FCPA investigations involving tax violations, as well as other financial crimes like money laundering. chapter 4 Other Related U.S. Laws 49 50 chapter 5 Guiding Principles of Enforcement 52 GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF ENFORCEMENT What Does DOJ Consider When Deciding Whether to Open an Investigation or Bring Charges? Whether and how DOJ will commence, decline, or otherwise resolve an FCPA matter is guided by the Principles of Federal Prosecution in the case of individu- als, and the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations in the case of companies. DOJ Principles of Federal Prosecution The Principles of Federal Prosecution, set forth in Chapter 9-27.000 of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual,288 pro- vide guidance for DOJ prosecutors regarding initiating or declining prosecution, selecting charges, and plea-bar- gaining. The Principles of Federal Prosecution provide that prosecutors should recommend or commence federal pros- ecution if the putative defendant’s conduct constitutes a federal offense and the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction unless (1) no substantial federal interest would be served by prosecution; (2) the person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3) an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution exists. In assessing the existence of a substantial federal interest, the prosecutor is advised to “weigh all rel- evant considerations,” including the nature and seriousness of the offense; the deterrent effect of prosecution; the per- son’s culpability in connection with the offense; the per- son’s history with respect to criminal activity; the person’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecu- tion of others; and the probable sentence or other conse- quences if the person is convicted. The Principles of Federal Prosecution also set out the considerations to be weighed when deciding whether to enter into a plea agreement with an individual defendant, including the nature and serious- ness of the offense and the person’s willingness to cooperate, as well as the desirability of prompt and certain disposition of the case and the expense of trial and appeal.289 DOJ Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, set forth in Chapter 9-28.000 of the U.S. torney’s Manual,290 provide guidance regarding the resolu- n of cases involving corporate wrongdoing. The Principles Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations recognize At tio of that resolution of corporate criminal cases by means other 53 than indictment, including non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements, may be appropriate in certain cir- cumstances. Nine factors are considered in conducting an investigation, determining whether to charge a corporation, and negotiating plea or other agreements: • the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the public; • the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corpo- ration, including the complicity in, or the condon- ing of, the wrongdoing by corporate management; • the corporation’s history of similar misconduct, including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it; • the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents; • the existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s pre-existing compliance program; • the corporation’s remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an effective corporate compli- ance program or improve an existing one, replace responsible management, discipline or terminate wrongdoers, pay restitution, and cooperate with the relevant government agencies; • collateral consequences, including whether there is disproportionate harm to shareholders, pension holders, employees, and others not proven person- ally culpable, as well as impact on the public arising from the prosecution; • the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation’s malfeasance; and • the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions. As these factors illustrate, in many investigations it will be appropriate for a prosecutor to consider a corpora- tion’s pre-indictment conduct, including voluntary disclo- sure, cooperation, and remediation, in determining whether to seek an indictment. In assessing a corporation’s coopera- tion, prosecutors are prohibited from requesting attorney- client privileged materials with two exceptions—when a corporation or its employee asserts an advice-of-counsel defense and when the attorney-client communications were in furtherance of a crime or fraud. Otherwise, an organi- zation’s cooperation may only be assessed on the basis of whether it disclosed the relevant facts underlying an inves- tigation—and not on the basis of whether it has waived its attorney-client privilege or work product protection.291 What Does SEC Consider When Deciding Whether to Open an Investigation or Bring Charges? SEC’s Enforcement Manual, published by SEC’s Enforcement Division and available on SEC’s website,292 sets forth information about how SEC conducts inves- tigations, as well as the guiding principles that SEC staff considers when determining whether to open or close an investigation and whether civil charges are merited. There are various ways that potential FCPA violations come to the attention of SEC staff, including: tips from informants or whistleblowers; information developed in other inves- tigations; self-reports or public disclosures by companies; referrals from other offices or agencies; public sources, such as media reports and trade publications; and proactive investigative techniques, including risk-based initiatives. Investigations can be formal, such as where SEC has issued a formal order of investigation that authorizes its staff to issue investigative subpoenas for testimony and documents, or informal, such as where the staff proceeds with the inves- tigation without the use of investigative subpoenas. In determining whether to open an investigation and, if so, whether an enforcement action is warranted, SEC staff considers a number of factors, including: the statutes or rules potentially violated; the egregiousness of the poten- tial violation; the potential magnitude of the violation; whether the potentially harmed group is particularly vul- nerable or at risk; whether the conduct is ongoing; whether the conduct can be investigated efficiently and within the statute of limitations period; and whether other authorities, including federal or state agencies or regulators, might be better suited to investigate the conduct. SEC staff also may chapter 5 Guiding Principles of Enforcement 53 54 consider whether the case involves a possibly widespread industry practice that should be addressed, whether the case involves a recidivist, and whether the matter gives SEC an opportunity to be visible in a community that might not otherwise be familiar with SEC or the protections afforded by the securities laws. For more information about the Enforcement Division’s procedures concerning investigations, enforce- ment actions, and cooperation with other regulators, see the Enforcement Manual at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/ enforce.shtml. Self-Reporting, Cooperation, and Remedial Efforts While the conduct underlying any FCPA investiga- tion is obviously a fundamental and threshold consider- ation in deciding what, if any, action to take, both DOJ and SEC place a high premium on self-reporting, along with cooperation and remedial efforts, in determining the appropriate resolution of FCPA matters. Criminal Cases Under DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, federal prosecutors company’s cooperation in determining how corporate criminal case. Specifically, prosecut whether the company made a voluntary an closure as well as the company’s willingness to consider a to resolve a ors consider d timely dis- provide rel- evant information and evidence and identify relevant actors inside and outside the company, including senior execu- tives. In addition, prosecutors may consider a company’s remedial actions, including efforts to improve an existing compliance program or appropriate disciplining of wrong- doers.293 A company’s remedial measures should be mean- ingful and illustrate its recognition of the seriousness of the misconduct, for example, by taking steps to implement the personnel, operational, and organizational changes neces- sary to establish an awareness among employees that crimi- nal conduct will not be tolerated.294 The Principles of Federal Prosecution similarly provide that prosecutors may consider an individual’s willingness to cooperate in deciding whether a prosecution should be undertaken and how it should be resolved. Although a willingness to cooperate will not, by itself, generally relieve a person of criminal liability, it may be given “serious con- sideration” in evaluating whether to enter into a plea agree- ment with a defendant, depending on the nature and value of the cooperation offered.295 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines similarly take into account an individual defendant’s cooperation and volun- tary disclosure. Under § 5K1.1, a defendant’s cooperation, if sufficiently substantial, may justify the government filing a motion for a reduced sentence. And under § 5K2.16, a defendant’s voluntary disclosure of an offense prior to its discovery—if the offense was unlikely to have been discov- ered otherwise—may warrant a downward departure in certain circumstances. Chapter 8 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which gov- erns the sentencing of organizations, takes into account an organization’s remediation as part of an “effective compli- ance and ethics program.” One of the seven elements of such a program provides that after the detection of crimi- nal conduct, “the organization shall take reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the criminal conduct and to prevent further similar criminal conduct, including mak- ing any necessary modifications to the organization’s compliance and ethics program.”296 Having an effective compliance and ethics program may lead to a three-point reduction in an organization’s culpability score under § 8C2.5, which affects the fine calculation under the Guidelines. Similarly, an organization’s self-reporting, cooperation, and acceptance of responsibility may lead to fine reductions under § 8C2.5(g) by decreasing the culpa- bility score. Conversely, an organization will not qualify for the compliance program reduction when it unreason- ably delayed reporting the offense.297 Similar to § 5K1.1 http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce.shtml http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce.shtml 55 for individuals, organizations can qualify for departures pursuant to § 8C4.1 of the Guidelines for cooperating in the prosecution of others. Civil Cases SEC’s Framework for Evaluating Cooperation by Companies SEC’s framework for evaluating cooperation by com- panies is set forth in its 2001 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, which is commonly known as the Seaboard Report.298 The report, which explained the Commission’s decision not to take enforcement action against a public company for certain accounting violations caused by its subsidiary, details the many factors SEC consid- ers in determining whether, and to what extent, it grants leni- ency to companies for cooperating in its investigations and for related good corporate citizenship. Specifically, the report identifies four broad measures of a company’s cooperation: • self-policing prior to the discovery of the miscon- duct, including establishing effective compliance procedures and an appropriate tone at the top; • self-reporting of misconduct when it is discovered, including conducting a thorough review of the nature, extent, origins, and consequences of the mis- conduct, and promptly, completely, and effectively disclosing the misconduct to the public, to regula- tory agencies, and to self-regulatory organizations; • remediation, including dismissing or appropriately disciplining wrongdoers, modifying and improv- ing internal controls and procedures to prevent recurrence of the misconduct, and appropriately compensating those adversely affected; and • cooperation with law enforcement authorities, including providing SEC staff with all informa- tion relevant to the underlying violations and the company’s remedial efforts. Since every enforcement matter is different, this ana- lytical framework sets forth general principles but does not limit SEC’s broad discretion to evaluate every case indi- vidually on its own unique facts and circumstances. Similar to SEC’s treatment of cooperating individuals, credit for cooperation by companies may range from taking no enforcement action to pursuing reduced sanctions in con- nection with enforcement actions. SEC’s Framework for Evaluating Cooperation by Individuals In 2010, SEC announced a new cooperation program for individuals.299 SEC staff has a wide range of tools to facilitate and reward cooperation by individuals, from tak- ing no enforcement action to pursuing reduced sanctions in connection with enforcement actions. Although the evalu- ation of cooperation depends on the specific circumstances, SEC generally evaluates four factors to determine whether, to what extent, and in what manner to credit cooperation by individuals: • the assistance provided by the cooperating indi- vidual in SEC’s investigation or related enforce- ment actions, including, among other things: the value and timeliness of the cooperation, including whether the individual was the first to report the misconduct to SEC or to offer his or her coopera- tion; whether the investigation was initiated based upon the information or other cooperation by the individual; the quality of the cooperation, includ- ing whether the individual was truthful and the cooperation was complete; the time and resources conserved as a result of the individual’s coopera- tion; and the nature of the cooperation, such as the type of assistance provided; • the importance of the matter in which the indi- vidual provided cooperation; • the societal interest in ensuring that the cooperat- ing individual is held accountable for his or her misconduct, including the severity of the individ- ual’s misconduct, the culpability of the individual, and the efforts undertaken by the individual to remediate the harm; and http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm chapter 5 Guiding Principles of Enforcement 55 56 • the appropriateness of a cooperation credit in light of the profile of the cooperating individual. Corporate Compliance Program In a global marketplace, an effective compliance pro- gram is a critical component of a company’s internal con- trols and is essential to detecting and preventing FCPA vio- lations.300 Effective compliance programs are tailored to the company’s specific business and to the risks associated with that business. They are dynamic and evolve as the business and the markets change. An effective compliance program promotes “an orga- nizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law.”301 Such a program protects a company’s reputation, ensures investor value and confidence, reduces uncertainty in business transactions, and secures a company’s assets.302 A well-constructed, thought- fully implemented, and consistently enforced compliance and ethics program helps prevent, detect, remediate, and report misconduct, including FCPA violations. In addition to considering whether a company has self-reported, cooperated, and taken appropriate remedial actions, DOJ and SEC also consider the adequacy of a company’s compliance program when deciding what, if any, action to take. The program may influence whether or not charges should be resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) or non-prosecution agreement (NPA), as well as the appropriate length of any DPA or NPA, or the term of corporate probation. It will often affect the penalty amount and the need for a monitor or self-report- ing.303 As discussed above, SEC’s Seaboard Report focuses, among other things, on a company’s self-policing prior to the discovery of the misconduct, including whether it had established effective compliance procedures.304 Likewise, three of the nine factors set forth in DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations relate, either directly or indirectly, to a compliance program’s design and implementation, including the pervasiveness of wrongdo- ing within the company, the existence and effectiveness of the company’s pre-existing compliance program, and the company’s remedial actions.305 DOJ also considers the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ elements of an effective compliance program, as set forth in § 8B2.1 of the Guidelines. These considerations reflect the recognition that a company’s failure to prevent every single violation does not necessarily mean that a particular company’s compli- ance program was not generally effective. DOJ and SEC understand that “no compliance program can ever prevent all criminal activity by a corporation’s employees,”306 and they do not hold companies to a standard of perfection. An assessment of a company’s compliance program, including its design and good faith implementation and enforcement, is an important part of the government’s assessment of whether a violation occurred, and if so, what action should be taken. In appropriate circumstances, DOJ and SEC may decline to pursue charges against a company based on the company’s effective compliance program, or may otherwise seek to reward a company for its program, even when that program did not prevent the particular underlying FCPA violation that gave rise to the investigation.307 DOJ and SEC have no formulaic requirements regarding compliance programs. Rather, they employ a common-sense and pragmatic approach to evaluating com- pliance programs, making inquiries related to three basic questions: • Is the company’s compliance program well designed? • Is it being applied in good faith? • Does it work?308 This guide contains information regarding some of the basic elements DOJ and SEC consider when evaluating compliance programs. Although the focus is on compliance with the FCPA, given the existence of anti-corruption laws in many other countries, businesses should consider designing programs focused on anti-corruption compli- ance more broadly.309 57 Hallmarks of Effective Compliance Programs Individual companies may have different compliance needs depending on their size and the particular risks asso- ciated with their businesses, among other factors. When it comes to compliance, there is no one-size-fits-all program. Thus, the discussion below is meant to provide insight into the aspects of compliance programs that DOJ and SEC assess, recognizing that companies may consider a variety of factors when making their own determination of what is appropriate for their specific business needs.310 Indeed, small- and medium-size enterprises likely will have different compliance programs from large multi-national corpora- tions, a fact DOJ and SEC take into account when evaluat- ing companies’ compliance programs. Compliance programs that employ a “check-the-box” approach may be inefficient and, more importantly, ineffec- tive. Because each compliance program should be tailored to an organization’s specific needs, risks, and challenges, the information provided below should not be considered a substitute for a company’s own assessment of the corpo- rate compliance program most appropriate for that particu- lar business organization. In the end, if designed carefully, implemented earnestly, and enforced fairly, a company’s compliance program—no matter how large or small the organization—will allow the company generally to prevent violations, detect those that do occur, and remediate them promptly and appropriately. Commitment from Senior Management and a Clearly Articulated Policy Against Corruption Within a business organization, compliance begins with the board of directors and senior executives setting the proper tone for the rest of the company. Managers and employees take their cues from these corporate leaders. Thus, DOJ and SEC consider the commitment of corpo- rate leaders to a “culture of compliance”311 and look to see if this high-level commitment is also reinforced and imple- mented by middle managers and employees at all levels of a business. A well-designed compliance program that is not enforced in good faith, such as when corporate man- agement explicitly or implicitly encourages employees to engage in misconduct to achieve business objectives, will be ineffective. DOJ and SEC have often encountered compa- nies with compliance programs that are strong on paper but that nevertheless have significant FCPA violations because management has failed to effectively implement the pro- gram even in the face of obvious signs of corruption. This may be the result of aggressive sales staff preventing com- pliance personnel from doing their jobs effectively and of senior management, more concerned with securing a valu- able business opportunity than enforcing a culture of com- pliance, siding with the sales team. The higher the financial stakes of the transaction, the greater the temptation for management to choose profit over compliance. A strong ethical culture directly supports a strong compliance program. By adhering to ethical standards, senior managers will inspire middle managers to reinforce those standards. Compliant middle managers, in turn, will encourage employees to strive to attain those standards throughout the organizational structure.312 In short, compliance with the FCPA and ethical rules must start at the top. DOJ and SEC thus evaluate whether senior management has clearly articulated company stan- dards, communicated them in unambiguous terms, adhered to them scrupulously, and disseminated them throughout the organization. Code of Conduct and Compliance Policies and Procedures A company’s code of conduct is often the foundation upon which an effective compliance program is built. As DOJ has repeatedly noted in its charging documents, the most effective codes are clear, concise, and accessible to all employees and to those conducting business on the com- pany’s behalf. Indeed, it would be difficult to effectively implement a compliance program if it was not available in the local language so that employees in foreign subsidiaries can access and understand it. When assessing a compliance program, DOJ and SEC will review whether the company chapter 5 Guiding Principles of Enforcement 57 58 has taken steps to make certain that the code of conduct remains current and effective and whether a company has periodically reviewed and updated its code. Whether a company has policies and procedures that outline responsibilities for compliance within the company, detail proper internal controls, auditing practices, and doc- umentation policies, and set forth disciplinary procedures will also be considered by DOJ and SEC. These types of policies and procedures will depend on the size and nature of the business and the risks associated with the business. Effective policies and procedures require an in-depth understanding of the company’s business model, includ- ing its products and services, third-party agents, custom- ers, government interactions, and industry and geographic risks. Among the risks that a company may need to address include the nature and extent of transactions with foreign governments, including payments to foreign officials; use of third parties; gifts, travel, and entertainment expenses; charitable and political donations; and facilitating and expediting payments. For example, some companies with global operations have created web-based approval pro- cesses to review and approve routine gifts, travel, and enter- tainment involving foreign officials and private customers with clear monetary limits and annual limitations. Many of these systems have built-in flexibility so that senior manage- ment, or in-house legal counsel, can be apprised of and, in appropriate circumstances, approve unique requests. These types of systems can be a good way to conserve corporate resources while, if properly implemented, preventing and detecting potential FCPA violations. Regardless of the specific policies and procedures implemented, these standards should apply to personnel at all levels of the company. Oversight, Autonomy, and Resources In appraising a compliance program, DOJ and SEC also consider whether a company has assigned respon- sibility for the oversight and implementation of a com- pany’s compliance program to one or more specific senior executives within an organization.313 Those individuals must have appropriate authority within the organization, adequate autonomy from management, and sufficient resources to ensure that the company’s compliance program is implemented effectively.314 Adequate autonomy gener- ally includes direct access to an organization’s governing authority, such as the board of directors and committees of the board of directors (e.g., the audit committee).315 Depending on the size and structure of an organization, it may be appropriate for day-to-day operational responsi- bility to be delegated to other specific individuals within a company.316 DOJ and SEC recognize that the reporting structure will depend on the size and complexity of an organization. Moreover, the amount of resources devoted to compliance will depend on the company’s size, complex- ity, industry, geographical reach, and risks associated with the business. In assessing whether a company has reasonable internal controls, DOJ and SEC typically consider whether the company devoted adequate staffing and resources to the compliance program given the size, structure, and risk pro- file of the business. Risk Assessment Assessment of risk is fundamental to developing a strong compliance program, and is another factor DOJ and SEC evaluate when assessing a company’s compliance program.317 One-size-fits-all compliance programs are generally ill-conceived and ineffective because resources inevitably are spread too thin, with too much focus on low- risk markets and transactions to the detriment of high-risk areas. Devoting a disproportionate amount of time polic- ing modest entertainment and gift-giving instead of focus- ing on large government bids, questionable payments to third-party consultants, or excessive discounts to resellers and distributors may indicate that a company’s compli- ance program is ineffective. A $50 million contract with a government agency in a high-risk country warrants greater 59 scrutiny than modest and routine gifts and entertainment. Similarly, performing identical due diligence on all third- party agents, irrespective of risk factors, is often counter- productive, diverting attention and resources away from those third parties that pose the most significant risks. DOJ and SEC will give meaningful credit to a company that implements in good faith a comprehensive, risk-based compliance program, even if that program does not pre- vent an infraction in a low risk area because greater atten- tion and resources had been devoted to a higher risk area. Conversely, a company that fails to prevent an FCPA viola- tion on an economically significant, high-risk transaction because it failed to perform a level of due diligence com- mensurate with the size and risk of the transaction is likely to receive reduced credit based on the quality and effective- ness of its compliance program. As a company’s risk for FCPA violations increases, that business should consider increasing its compliance procedures, including due diligence and periodic internal audits. The degree of appropriate due diligence is fact-spe- cific and should vary based on industry, country, size, and nature of the transaction, and the method and amount of third-party compensation. Factors to consider, for instance, include risks presented by: the country and industry sector, the business opportunity, potential business partners, level of involvement with governments, amount of government regulation and oversight, and exposure to customs and immigration in conducting business affairs. When assessing a company’s compliance program, DOJ and SEC take into account whether and to what degree a company analyzes and addresses the particular risks it faces. Training and Continuing Advice Compliance policies cannot work unless effectively communicated throughout a company. Accordingly, DOJ and SEC will evaluate whether a company has taken steps to ensure that relevant policies and procedures have been com- municated throughout the organization, including through periodic training and certification for all directors, officers, relevant employees, and, where appropriate, agents and business partners.318 For example, many larger companies have implemented a mix of web-based and in-person train- ing conducted at varying intervals. Such training typically covers company policies and procedures, instruction on applicable laws, practical advice to address real-life scenar- ios, and case studies. Regardless of how a company chooses to conduct its training, however, the information should be presented in a manner appropriate for the targeted audi- ence, including providing training and training materials in the local language. For example, companies may want to consider providing different types of training to their sales personnel and accounting personnel with hypotheticals or sample situations that are similar to the situations they might encounter. In addition to the existence and scope of a company’s training program, a company should develop appropriate measures, depending on the size and sophisti- cation of the particular company, to provide guidance and advice on complying with the company’s ethics and com- pliance program, including when such advice is needed urgently. Such measures will help ensure that the compli- ance program is understood and followed appropriately at all levels of the company. Incentives and Disciplinary Measures In addition to evaluating the design and implementa- tion of a compliance program throughout an organization, enforcement of that program is fundamental to its effec- tiveness.319 A compliance program should apply from the board room to the supply room—no one should be beyond its reach. DOJ and SEC will thus consider whether, when enforcing a compliance program, a company has appropri- ate and clear disciplinary procedures, whether those proce- dures are applied reliably and promptly, and whether they are commensurate with the violation. Many companies have found that publicizing disciplinary actions internally, where appropriate under local law, can have an important deterrent effect, demonstrating that unethical and unlawful actions have swift and sure consequences. DOJ and SEC recognize that positive incentives can also drive compliant behavior. These incentives can take many chapter 5 Guiding Principles of Enforcement 59 60 forms such as personnel evaluations and promotions, rewards for improving and developing a company’s compliance pro- gram, and rewards for ethics and compliance leadership.320 Some organizations, for example, have made adherence to compliance a significant metric for management’s bonuses so that compliance becomes an integral part of management’s everyday concern. Beyond financial incentives, some compa- nies have highlighted compliance within their organizations by recognizing compliance professionals and internal audit staff. Others have made working in the company’s compli- ance organization a way to advance an employee’s career. SEC, for instance, has encouraged companies to embrace methods to incentivize ethical and lawful behavior: [M]ake integrity, ethics and compliance part of the promotion, compensation and evaluation processes as well. For at the end of the day, the most effective way to communicate that “doing the right thing” is a priority, is to reward it. Conversely, if employees are led to believe that, when it comes to compensation and career advancement, all that counts is short-term profitability, and that cutting ethical corners is an ac- ceptable way of getting there, they’ll perform to that measure. To cite an example from a different walk of life: a college football coach can be told that the graduation rates of his players are what matters, but he’ll know differently if the sole focus of his contract extension talks or the decision to fire him is his win- loss record. 321 No matter what the disciplinary scheme or potential incentives a company decides to adopt, DOJ and SEC will consider whether they are fairly and consistently applied across the organization. No executive should be above com- pliance, no employee below compliance, and no person within an organization deemed too valuable to be disci- plined, if warranted. Rewarding good behavior and sanc- tioning bad behavior reinforces a culture of compliance and ethics throughout an organization. Third-Party Due Diligence and Payments DOJ’s and SEC’s FCPA enforcement actions dem- onstrate that third parties, including agents, consultants, and distributors, are commonly used to conceal the pay- ment of bribes to foreign officials in international business transactions. Risk-based due diligence is particularly impor- tant with third parties and will also be considered by DOJ and SEC in assessing the effectiveness of a company’s com- pliance program. Although the degree of appropriate due diligence may vary based on industry, country, size and nature of the transaction, and historical relationship with the third-party, some guiding principles always apply. First, as part of risk-based due diligence, companies should understand the qualifications and associations of its third-party partners, including its business reputation, and relationship, if any, with foreign officials. The degree of scrutiny should increase as red flags surface. Second, companies should have an understanding of the business rationale for including the third party in the transaction. Among other things, the company should understand the role of and need for the third party and ensure that the contract terms specifically describe the ser- vices to be performed. Additional considerations include payment terms and how those payment terms compare to typical terms in that industry and country, as well as the timing of the third party’s introduction to the business. Moreover, companies may want to confirm and document that the third party is actually performing the work for which it is being paid and that its compensation is com- mensurate with the work being provided. Third, companies should undertake some form of ongoing monitoring of third-party relationships.322 Where appropriate, this may include updating due diligence peri- odically, exercising audit rights, providing periodic train- ing, and requesting annual compliance certifications by the third party. In addition to considering a company’s due dili- gence on third parties, DOJ and SEC also assess whether the company has informed third parties of the company’s 61 compliance program and commitment to ethical and law- ful business practices and, where appropriate, whether it has sought assurances from third parties, through certifica- tions and otherwise, of reciprocal commitments. These can be meaningful ways to mitigate third-party risk. Confidential Reporting and Internal Investigation An effective compliance program should include a mechanism for an organization’s employees and others to report suspected or actual misconduct or violations of the company’s policies on a confidential basis and without fear of retaliation.323 Companies may employ, for example, anony- mous hotlines or ombudsmen. Moreover, once an allegation is made, companies should have in place an efficient, reliable, Compliance Program Case Study Recent DOJ and SEC actions relating to a financial institution’s real estate transactions with a government agency in China illustrate the benefits of implementing and enforcing a comprehensive risk-based compliance program. The case involved a joint venture real estate investment in the Luwan District of Shanghai, China, between a U.S.-based financial institution and a state-owned entity that functioned as the District’s real estate arm. The government entity conducted the transactions through two special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”), with the second SPV purchasing a 12% stake in a real estate project. The financial institution, through a robust compliance program, frequently trained its employees, imposed a comprehensive payment-approval process designed to prevent bribery, and staffed a compliance department with a direct reporting line to the board of directors. As appropriate given the industry, market, and size and structure of the transactions, the financial institution (1) provided extensive FCPA training to the senior executive responsible for the transactions and (2) conducted extensive due diligence on the transactions, the local government entity, and the SPVs. Due diligence on the entity included reviewing Chinese government records; speaking with sources familiar with the Shanghai real estate market; checking the government entity’s payment records and credit references; conducting an on-site visit and placing a pretextual telephone call to the entity’s offices; searching media sources; and conducting background checks on the entity’s principals. The financial institution vetted the SPVs by obtaining a letter with designated bank account information from a Chinese official associated with the government entity (the “Chinese Official”); using an international law firm to request and review 50 documents from the SPVs’ Canadian attorney; interviewing the attorney; and interviewing the SPVs’ management. Notwithstanding the financial institution’s robust compliance program and good faith enforcement of it, the company failed to learn that the Chinese Official personally owned nearly 50% of the second SPV (and therefore a nearly 6% stake in the joint venture) and that the SPV was used as a vehicle for corrupt payments. This failure was due, in large part, to misrepresentations by the Chinese Official, the financial institution’s executive in charge of the project, and the SPV’s attorney that the SPV was 100% owned and controlled by the government entity. DOJ and SEC declined to take enforcement action against the financial institution, and its executive pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s internal control provisions and also settled with SEC. and properly funded process for investigating the allegation and documenting the company’s response, including any disciplinary or remediation measures taken. Companies will want to consider taking “lessons learned” from any reported violations and the outcome of any resulting investigation to update their internal controls and compliance program and focus future training on such issues, as appropriate. Continuous Improvement: Periodic Testing and Review Finally, a good compliance program should constantly evolve. A company’s business changes over time, as do the environments in which it operates, the nature of its custom- ers, the laws that govern its actions, and the standards of its chapter 5 Guiding Principles of Enforcement 61 62 industry. In addition, compliance programs that do not just exist on paper but are followed in practice will inevitably uncover compliance weaknesses and require enhancements. Consequently, DOJ and SEC evaluate whether companies regularly review and improve their compliance programs and not allow them to become stale. According to one survey, 64% of general counsel whose companies are subject to the FCPA say there is room for improvement in their FCPA training and compliance pro- grams.324 An organization should take the time to review and test its controls, and it should think critically about its poten- tial weaknesses and risk areas. For example, some companies have undertaken employee surveys to measure their compli- ance culture and strength of internal controls, identify best practices, and detect new risk areas. Other companies period- ically test their internal controls with targeted audits to make certain that controls on paper are working in practice. DOJ and SEC will give meaningful credit to thoughtful efforts to create a sustainable compliance program if a problem is later discovered. Similarly, undertaking proactive evaluations before a problem strikes can lower the applicable penalty range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.325 Although the nature and the frequency of proactive evaluations may vary depending on the size and complexity of an organization, the idea behind such efforts is the same: continuous improve- ment and sustainability.326 Mergers and Acquisitions: Pre-Acquisition Due Diligence and Post-Acquisition Integration In the context of the FCPA, mergers and acquisi- tions present both risks and opportunities. A company that does not perform adequate FCPA due diligence prior to a merger or acquisition may face both legal and business risks.327 Perhaps most commonly, inadequate due diligence can allow a course of bribery to continue—with all the attendant harms to a business’s profitability and reputation, as well as potential civil and criminal liability. In contrast, companies that conduct effective FCPA due diligence on their acquisition targets are able to evalu- ate more accurately each target’s value and negotiate for the costs of the bribery to be borne by the target. In addition, such actions demonstrate to DOJ and SEC a company’s commitment to compliance and are taken into account when evaluating any potential enforcement action. For example, DOJ and SEC declined to take enforcement action against an acquiring issuer when the issuer, among other things, uncovered the corruption at the company being acquired as part of due diligence, ensured that the corruption was voluntarily disclosed to the government, cooperated with the investigation, and incorporated the acquired company into its compliance program and inter- nal controls. On the other hand, SEC took action against the acquired company, and DOJ took action against a sub- sidiary of the acquired company.328 When pre-acquisition due diligence is not possible, DOJ has described proce- dures, contained in Opinion Procedure Release No. 08-02, pursuant to which companies can nevertheless be rewarded if they choose to conduct thorough post-acquisition FCPA due diligence.329 FCPA due diligence, however, is normally only a portion of the compliance process for mergers and acquisi- tions. DOJ and SEC evaluate whether the acquiring com- pany promptly incorporated the acquired company into all of its internal controls, including its compliance program. Companies should consider training new employees, reeval- uating third parties under company standards, and, where appropriate, conducting audits on new business units. For example, as a result of due diligence conducted by a California-based issuer before acquiring the majority interest in a joint venture, the issuer learned of corrupt pay- ments to obtain business. However, the issuer only imple- mented its internal controls “halfway” so as not to “choke the sales engine and cause a distraction for the sales guys.” As a result, the improper payments continued, and the issuer was held liable for violating the FCPA’s internal con- trols and books and records provisions.330 63 Other Guidance on Compliance and International Best Practices In addition to this guide, the U.S. Departments of Commerce and State have both issued publications that contain guidance regarding compliance programs. The Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration has pub- lished Business Ethics: A Manual for Managing a Responsible Business Enterprise in Emerging Market Economies,331 and the Department of State has published Fighting Global Corruption: Business Risk Management.332 There is also an emerging international consensus on compliance best practices, and a number of inter-govern- mental and non-governmental organizations have issued guidance regarding best practices for compliance.333 Most notably, the OECD’s 2009 Anti-Bribery Recommendation and its Annex II, Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance,334 published in February 2010, were drafted based on consultations with the private sector and civil society and set forth specific good practices for ensuring effective compliance programs and measures for preventing and detecting foreign bribery. In addition, businesses may wish to refer to the following resources: • Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation—Anti- Corruption Code of Conduct for Business;335 • International Chamber of Commerce—ICC Rules on Combating Corruption;336 • Transparency International—Business Principles for Countering Bribery;337 • United Nations Global Compact—The Ten Principles;338 • World Bank—Integrity Compliance Guidelines;339and • World Economic Forum—Partnering Against Corruption–Principles for Countering Bribery.340 Hypothetical: Third-Party Vetting Part 1: Consultants Company A, a U.S. issuer headquartered in Delaware, wants to start doing business in a country that poses high risks of corruption. Company A learns about a potential $50 million contract with the country’s Ministry of Immigration. This is a very attractive opportunity to Company A, both for its profitability and to open the door to future projects with the government. At the suggestion of the company’s senior vice president of international sales (Sales Executive), Company A hires a local businessman who assures them that he has strong ties to political and government leaders in the country and can help them win the contract. Company A enters into a consulting contract with the local businessman (Consultant). The agreement requires Consultant to use his best efforts to help the company win the business and provides for Consultant to receive a significant monthly retainer as well as a success fee of 3% of the value of any contract the company wins. What steps should Company A consider taking before hiring Consultant? There are several factors here that might lead Company A to perform heightened FCPA-related due diligence prior to retaining Consultant: (1) the market (high-risk country); (2) the size and significance of the deal to the company; (3) the company’s first time use of this particular consultant; (4) the consultant’s strong ties to political and government leaders; (5) the success fee structure of the contract; and (6) the vaguely-defined services to be provided. In order to minimize the likelihood of incurring FCPA liability, Company A should carefully vet Consultant and his role in the transaction, including close scrutiny of the relationship between Consultant and any Ministry of Immigration officials or other government officials. Although there is nothing inherently illegal about contracting with a third party that has close connections to politicians and government officials to perform legitimate services on a transaction, this type of relationship can be susceptible to corruption. Among other things, Company A may consider conducting due diligence on Consultant, including background (cont’d) chapter 5 Guiding Principles of Enforcement 63 64 and reference checks; ensuring that the contract spells out exactly what services and deliverables (such as written status reports or other documentation) Consultant is providing; training Consultant on the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws; requiring Consultant to represent that he will abide by the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws; including audit rights in the contract (and exercising those rights); and ensuring that payments requested by Consultant have the proper supporting documentation before they are approved for payment. Part 2: Distributors and Local Partners Assume the following alternative facts: Instead of hiring Consultant, Company A retains an often-used local distributor (Distributor) to sell Company A’s products to the Ministry of Immigration In negotiating the pricing struc to Company A, claims that the standard discount price to Distributor warehousing, distribution, installation, marketing, and training costs an the alternative, a contribution to its marketing efforts, either in the for ture, Distributor, which had introduced the project creates insufficient margin for Distributor to cover d requests an additional discount or rebate, or, in m of a lump sum or as a percentage of the total contract. The requested discount/allowance is significantly larger than usual, although there is precedent at Company A for granting this level of discount in unique circumstances. Distributor further advises Company A that the Ministry’s procurement officials responsible for awarding the contract have expressed a strong preference for including a particular local company (Local Partner) in the transaction as a subcontractor of Company A to perform installation, training, and other services that would normally have been performed by Distributor or Company A. According to Distributor, the Ministry has a solid working relationship with Local Partner, and it would cause less disruption for Local Partner to perform most of the on-site work at the Ministry. One of the principals (Principal 1) of the Local Partner is an official in another government ministry. What additional compliance considerations do these alternative facts raise? As with Consultant in the first scenario above, Company A should carefully vet Distributor and Local Partner and their roles in the transaction in order to minimize the likelihood of incurring FCPA liability. While Company A has an established relationship with Distributor, the fact that Distributor has requested an additional discount warrants further inquiry into the economic justification for the change, particularly where, as here, the proposed transaction structure contemplates paying Local Partner to provide many of the same services that Distributor would otherwise provide. In many cases, it may be appropriate for distributors to receive larger discounts to account for unique circumstances in particular transactions. That said, a common mechanism to create additional margin for bribe payments is through excessive discounts or rebates to distributors. Accordingly, when a company has pre-existing relationships with distributors and other third parties, transaction-specific due diligence—including an analysis of payment terms to confirm that the payment is commensurate with the work being performed—can be critical even in circumstances where due diligence of the distributor or other third party raises no initial red flags. Company A should carefully scrutinize the relationship among Local Partner, Distributor, and Ministry of Immigration officials. While there is nothing inherently illegal about contracting with a third party that is recommended by the end-user, or even hiring a government official to perform legitimate services on a transaction unrelated to his or her government job, these facts raise additional red flags that warrant significant scrutiny. Among other things, Company A would be well-advised to require Principal 1 to verify that he will have no role in the Ministry of Immigration’s decision to award the contract to Company A, notify the Ministry of Immigration and his own ministry of his proposed involvement in the transaction, and certify that he will abide by the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws and that his involvement in the transaction is permitted under local law. (cont’d) 65 Assume the following additional facts: Under its company policy for a government transaction of this size, Company A requires both finance and compliance approval. The finance officer is concerned that the discounts to Distributor are significantly larger than what they have approved for similar work and will cut too deeply into Company A’s profit margin. The finance officer is also skeptical about including Local Partner to perform some of the same services that Company A is paying Distributor to perform. Unsatisfied with Sales Executive’s explanation, she requests a meeting with Distributor and Principal 1. At the meeting, Distributor and Principal 1 offer vague and inconsistent justifications for the payments and fail to provide any supporting analysis, and Principal 1 seems to have no real expertise in the industry. During a coffee break, Distributor comments to Sales Executive that the finance officer is naïve about “how business is done in my country.” Following the meeting, Sales Executive dismisses the finance officer’s concerns, assuring her that the proposed transaction structure is reasonable and legitimate. Sales Executive also reminds the finance officer that “the deal is key to their growth in the industry.” The compliance officer focuses his due diligence on vetting Distributor and Local Partner and hires a business investigative firm to conduct a background check. Distributor appears reputable, capable, and financially stable and is willing to take on real risk in the project, financial and otherwise. However, the compliance officer learns that Distributor has established an off-shore bank account for the transaction. The compliance officer further learns that Local Partner’s business was organized two years ago and appears financially stable but has no expertise in the industry and has established an off-shore shell company and bank account to conduct this transaction. The background check also reveals that Principal 1 is a former college roommate of a senior official of the Ministry of Immigration. The Sales Executive dismisses the compliance officer’s concerns, commenting that what Local Partner does with its payments “isn’t our problem.” Sales Executive also strongly objects to the compliance officer’s request to meet with Principal 1 to discuss the off-shore company and account, assuring him that it was done for legitimate tax purposes and complaining that if Company A continues to “harass” Local Partner and Distributor, they would partner with Company A’s chief competitor. The compliance officer and the finance officer discuss their concerns with each other but ultimately sign off on the deal even though their questions had not been answered. Their decision is motivated in large part by their conversation with Sales Executive, who told them that this was the region’s most important contract and that the detailed FCPA questionnaires and robust anti-corruption representations in the contracts placed the burden on Distributor and Local Partner to act ethically. Company A goes forward with the Distributor and Local Partner agreements and wins the contract after six months. The finance officer approves Company A’s payments to Local Partner via the offshore account, even though Local Partner’s invoices did not contain supporting detail or documentation of any services provided. Company A recorded the payments as legitimate operational expenses on its books and records. Sales Executive received a large year-end bonus due to the award of the contract. In fact, Local Partner and Distributor used part of the payments and discount margin, respectively, to funnel bribe payments to several Ministry of Immigration officials, including Principal 1’s former college roommate, in exchange for awarding the contract to Company A. Thousands of dollars are also wired to the personal offshore bank account of Sales Executive. How would DOJ and SEC evaluate the potential FCPA liability of Company A and its employees? This is not the case of a single “rogue employee” circumventing an otherwise robust compliance program. Although Company A’s finance and compliance officers had the correct instincts to scrutinize the structure and economics of the transaction and the role of the third parties, their due diligence was incomplete. When the initial inquiry identified significant red flags, they approved the transaction despite knowing that their concerns were unanswered or the answers they received raised additional concerns and red flags. Relying on due diligence questionnaires and anti-corruption representations is insufficient, particularly when the risks are readily apparent. Nor can Company A or its employees shield themselves from liability because it was Distributor and Local Partner—rather than Company A directly—that made the payments. The facts suggest that Sales Executive had actual knowledge of or was willfully blind to the consultant’s payment of the bribes. He also personally profited from the scheme (both from the kickback and from the bonus he received from the company) and intentionally discouraged the finance and compliance officers from learning the full story. Sales Executive is therefore subject to liability under the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA, and others may be as well. Company A may also be liable for violations of the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA given the number and significance of red flags that established a high probability of bribery and the role of employees and agents acting on the company’s behalf. chapter 5 Guiding Principles of Enforcement 65 66 chapter 6 FCPA Penalties, Sanctions, and Remedies 68 FCPA PENALTIES, SANCTIONS, AND REMEDIES What Are the Potential Consequences for Violations of the FCPA? The FCPA provides for different criminal and civil penalties for companies and individuals. Criminal Penalties For each violation of the anti-bribery provisions, the FCPA provides that corporations and other business enti- ties are subject to a fine of up to $2 million.341 Individuals, including officers, directors, stockholders, and agents of companies, are subject to a fine of up to $250,000 and imprisonment for up to five years.342 For each violation of the accounting provisions, the FCPA provides that corporations and other business enti- ties are subject to a fine of up to $25 million.343 Individuals are subject to a fine of up to $5 million and imprisonment for up to 20 years.344 Under the Alternative Fines Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d), courts may impose significantly higher fines than those pro- vided by the FCPA—up to twice the benefit that the defen- dant obtained by making the corrupt payment, as long as the facts supporting the increased fines are included in the indictment and either proved to the jury beyond a reason- able doubt or admitted in a guilty plea proceeding.345 Fines imposed on individuals may not be paid by their employer or principal.346 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines When calculating penalties for violations of the FCPA, DOJ focuses its analysis on the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines)347 in all of its resolutions, including guilty pleas, DPAs, and NPAs. The Guidelines provide a very detailed and predictable structure for calculating penalties for all federal crimes, including violations of the FCPA. To determine the appropriate penalty, the “offense level” is first calculated by examining both the severity of the crime and facts specific to the crime, with appropriate reductions for cooperation and acceptance of responsibility, and, for business entities, addi- tional factors such as voluntary disclosure, cooperation, pre- existing compliance programs, and remediation. The Guidelines provide for different penalties for the different provisions of the FCPA. The initial offense level for violations of the anti-bribery provisions is determined under § 2C1.1, while violations of the accounting provi- sions are assessed under § 2B1.1. For individuals, the initial offense level is modified by factors set forth in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of the Guidelines348 to identify a final offense level. This final offense level, combined with other factors, is used 69 to determine whether the Guidelines would recommend that incarceration is appropriate, the length of any term of incarceration, and the appropriate amount of any fine. For corporations, the offense level is modified by factors par- ticular to organizations as described in Chapter 8 to deter- mine the applicable organizational penalty. For example, violations of the anti-bribery provi- sions are calculated pursuant to § 2C1.1. The offense level is determined by first identifying the base offense level;349 adding additional levels based on specific offense charac- teristics, including whether the offense involved more than one bribe, the value of the bribe or the benefit that was con- ferred, and the level of the public official;350 adjusting the offense level based on the defendant’s role in the offense;351 and using the total offense level as well as the defendant’s criminal history category to determine the advisory guide- line range.352 For violations of the accounting provisions assessed under § 2B1.1, the procedure is generally the same, except that the specific offense characteristics differ. For instance, for violations of the FCPA’s accounting pro- visions, the offense level may be increased if a substantial part of the scheme occurred outside the United States or if the defendant was an officer or director of a publicly traded company at the time of the offense.353 For companies, the offense level is calculated pur- suant to §§ 2C1.1 or 2B1.1 in the same way as for an individual—by starting with the base offense level and increasing it as warranted by any applicable specific offense characteristics. The organizational guidelines found in Chapter 8, however, provide the structure for determining the final advisory guideline fine range for organizations. The base fine consists of the greater of the amount corresponding to the total offense level, calcu- lated pursuant to the Guidelines, or the pecuniary gain or loss from the offense.354 This base fine is then multiplied by a culpability score that can either reduce the fine to as little as five percent of the base fine or increase the recom- mended fine to up to four times the amount of the base fine.355 As described in § 8C2.5, this culpability score is calculated by taking into account numerous factors such as the size of the organization committing the criminal acts; the involvement in or tolerance of criminal activ- ity by high-level personnel within the organization; and prior misconduct or obstructive behavior. The culpability score is reduced if the organization had an effective pre- existing compliance program to prevent violations and if the organization voluntarily disclosed the offense, cooper- ated in the investigation, and accepted responsibility for the criminal conduct.356 Civil Penalties Although only DOJ has the authority to pursue crim- inal actions, both DOJ and SEC have civil enforcement authority under the FCPA. DOJ may pursue civil actions for anti-bribery violations by domestic concerns (and their officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders) and foreign nationals and companies for violations while in the United States, while SEC may pursue civil actions against issuers and their officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders for violations of the anti-bribery and the accounting provisions.357 For violations of the anti-bribery provisions, cor- porations and other business entities are subject to a civil penalty of up to $16,000 per violation.358 Individuals, including officers, directors, stockholders, and agents of companies, are similarly subject to a civil penalty of up to $16,000 per violation,359 which may not be paid by their employer or principal.360 For violations of the accounting provisions, SEC may obtain a civil penalty not to exceed the greater of (a) the gross amount of the pecuniary gain to the defendant as a result of the violations or (b) a specified dollar limitation. The specified dollar limitations are based on the egregious- ness of the violation, ranging from $7,500 to $150,000 for an individual and $75,000 to $725,000 for a company.361 SEC may obtain civil penalties both in actions filed in fed- eral court and in administrative proceedings.362 Collateral Consequences In addition to the criminal and civil penalties described above, individuals and companies who violate the FCPA may face significant collateral consequences, including suspension chapter 6 FCPA Penalties, Sanctions, and Remedies 69 70 or debarment from contracting with the federal government, cross-debarment by multilateral development banks, and the suspension or revocation of certain export privileges. Debarment Under federal guidelines governing procurement, an individual or company that violates the FCPA or other criminal statutes may be barred from doing business with the federal government. The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) provide for the potential suspension or debarment of companies that contract with the government upon conviction of or civil judgment for bribery, falsification or destruction of records, the making of false statements, or “[c]ommission of any other offense indicating a lack of busi- ness integrity or business honesty that seriously and directly affects the present responsibility of a Government contrac- tor or subcontractor.”363 These measures are not intended to be punitive and may be imposed only if “in the public’s interest for the Government’s protection.”364 Under the FAR, a decision to debar or suspend is dis- cretionary. The decision is not made by DOJ prosecutors or SEC staff, but instead by independent debarment authorities within each agency, such as the Department of Defense or the General Services Administration, which analyze a num- ber of factors to determine whether a company should be sus- pended, debarred, or otherwise determined to be ineligible for government contracting. Such factors include whether the contractor has effective internal control systems in place, self-reported the misconduct in a timely manner, and has taken remedial measures.365 If a cause for debarment exists, the contractor has the burden of demonstrating to the satis- faction of the debarring official that it is presently responsible and that debarment is not necessary.366 Each federal depart- ment and agency determines the eligibility of contractors with whom it deals. However, if one department or agency debars or suspends a contractor, the debarment or suspension applies to the entire executive branch of the federal govern- ment, unless a department or agency shows compelling rea- sons not to debar or suspend the contractor.367 Although guilty pleas, DPAs, and NPAs do not result in automatic debarment from U.S. government contracting, committing a federal crime and the factual admissions underlying a resolution are factors that the independent debarment authorities may consider. Moreover, indictment alone can lead to suspension of the right to do business with the government.368 The U.S. Attorney’s Manual also provides that when a company engages in fraud against the government, a prosecutor may not negotiate away an agen- cy’s right to debar or delist the company as part of the plea bargaining process.369 In making debarment determina- tions, contracting agencies, including at the state and local level, may consult with DOJ in advance of awarding a con- tract. Depending on the circumstances, DOJ may provide information to contracting authorities in the context of the corporate settlement about the facts and circumstances underlying the criminal conduct and remediation measures undertaken by the company, if any. This information shar- ing is not advocacy, and the ultimate debarment decisions are squarely within the purview of the independent debar- ment authorities. In some situations, the contracting agency may impose its own oversight requirements in order for a company that has admitted to violations of federal law to be awarded federal contracts, such as the Corporate Integrity Agreements often required by the Department of Health and Human Services. Cross-Debarment by Multilateral Development Banks Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), like the World Bank, also have the ability to debar companies and individuals for corrupt practices.370 Each MDB has its own process for evaluating alleged corruption in connection with MDB-funded projects. When appropriate, DOJ and SEC work with MDBs to share evidence and refer cases. On April 9, 2010, the African Development Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for 71 Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank Group, and the World Bank Group entered into an agreement under which entities debarred by one MDB will be sanctioned for the same misconduct by other signatory MDBs.371 This cross-debarment agree- ment means that if a company is debarred by one MDB, it is debarred by all.372 Loss of Export Privileges Companies and individuals who violate the FCPA may face consequences under other regulatory regimes, such as the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2751, et seq., and its implementing regulations, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. § 120, et seq. AECA and ITAR together provide for the suspension, revocation, amendment, or denial of an arms export license if an applicant has been indicted or con- victed for violating the FCPA.373 They also set forth certain factors for the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)374 to consider when determining whether to grant, deny, or return without action license applications for certain types of defense materials. One of those factors is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that an applicant for a license has violated (or conspired to violate) the FCPA; if so, the Department of State “may disapprove the application.”375 In addition, it is the policy of the Department of State not to consider applications for licenses involving any persons who have been convicted of violating the AECA or convicted of conspiracy to violate the AECA.376 In an action related to the criminal resolu- tion of a U.K. military products manufacturer, the DDTC imposed a “policy of denial” for export licenses on three of the company’s subsidiaries that were involved in violations of AECA and ITAR.377 When Is a Compliance Monitor or Independent Consultant Appropriate? One of the primary goals of both criminal prosecu- tions and civil enforcement actions against companies that violate the FCPA is ensuring that such conduct does not occur again. As a consequence, enhanced compliance and reporting requirements may be part of criminal and civil resolutions of FCPA matters. The amount of enhanced compliance and kind of reporting required varies according to the facts and circumstances of individual cases. In criminal cases, a company’s sentence, or a DPA or NPA with a company, may require the appointment of an independent corporate monitor. Whether a monitor is appropriate depends on the specific facts and circumstances of the case. In 2008, DOJ issued internal guidance regard- ing the selection and use of corporate monitors in DPAs and NPAs with companies. Additional guidance has since been issued.378 A monitor is an independent third party who assesses and monitors a company’s adherence to the com- pliance requirements of an agreement that was designed to reduce the risk of recurrence of the company’s misconduct. Appointment of a monitor is not appropriate in all circum- stances, but it may be appropriate, for example, where a com- pany does not already have an effective internal compliance program or needs to establish necessary internal controls. In addition, companies are sometimes allowed to engage in self- monitoring, typically in cases when the company has made a voluntary disclosure, has been fully cooperative, and has demonstrated a genuine commitment to reform. Factors DOJ and SEC Consider When Determining Whether a Compliance Monitor Is Appropriate Include: Seriousness of the offense Duration of the misconduct Pervasiveness of the misconduct, including whether the conduct cuts across geographic and/ or product lines Nature and size of the company Quality of the company’s compliance program at the time of the misconduct Subsequent remediation efforts chapter 6 FCPA Penalties, Sanctions, and Remedies 71 72 In civil cases, a company may similarly be required to retain an independent compliance consultant or moni- tor to provide an independent, third-party review of the company’s internal controls. The consultant recommends improvements, to the extent necessary, which the company must adopt. When both DOJ and SEC require a com- pany to retain a monitor, the two agencies have been able to coordinate their requirements so that the company can retain one monitor to fulfill both sets of requirements. The most successful monitoring relationships are those in which the company embraces the monitor or con- sultant. If the company takes the recommendations and suggestions seriously and uses the monitoring period as a time to find and fix any outstanding compliance issues, the company can emerge from the monitorship with a stronger, long-lasting compliance program. chapter 7 Resolutions 74 RESOLUTIONS What Are the Different Types of Resolutions with DOJ? Criminal Complaints, Informations, and Indictments Charges against individuals and companies are brought in three different ways under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: criminal complaints, criminal infor- mations, and indictments. DOJ may agree to resolve criminal FCPA mat- ters against companies either through a declination or, in appropriate cases, a negotiated resolution resulting in a plea agreement, deferred prosecution agreement, or non-prose- cution agreement. For individuals, a negotiated resolution will generally take the form of a plea agreement, which may include language regarding cooperation, or a non-prosecu- tion cooperation agreement. When negotiated resolutions cannot be reached with companies or individuals, the mat- ter may proceed to trial. Plea Agreements Plea agreements—whether with companies or individuals—are governed by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendant gener- ally admits to the facts supporting the charges, admits guilt, and is convicted of the charged crimes when the plea agreement is presented to and accepted by a court. The plea agreement may jointly recommend a sentence or fine, jointly recommend an analysis under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, or leave such items open for argument at the time of sentencing. Deferred Prosecution Agreements Under a deferred prosecution agreement, or a DPA as it is commonly known, DOJ files a charging document with the court,379 but it simultaneously requests that the prosecution be deferred, that is, postponed for the pur- pose of allowing the company to demonstrate its good conduct. DPAs generally require a defendant to agree to pay a monetary penalty, waive the statute of limitations, cooperate with the government, admit the relevant facts, and enter into certain compliance and remediation com- mitments, potentially including a corporate compliance monitor. DPAs describe the company’s conduct, coopera- tion, and remediation, if any, and provide a calculation of the penalty pursuant to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. In addition to being publicly filed, DOJ places all of its DPAs on its website. If the company successfully com- pletes the term of the agreement (typically two or three years), DOJ will then move to dismiss the filed charges. A company’s successful completion of a DPA is not treated as a criminal conviction. 75 Non-Prosecution Agreements Under a non-prosecution agreement, or an NPA as it is commonly known, DOJ maintains the right to file charges but refrains from doing so to allow the company to demonstrate its good conduct during the term of the NPA. Unlike a DPA, an NPA is not filed with a court but is instead maintained by the parties. In circumstances where an NPA is with a company for FCPA-related offenses, it is made available to the public through DOJ’s website. The requirements of an NPA are similar to those of a DPA, and generally require a waiver of the statute of limitations, ongoing cooperation, admission of the material facts, and compliance and remediation commitments, in addition to payment of a monetary penalty. If the company complies with the agreement throughout its term, DOJ does not file criminal charges. If an individual complies with the terms of his or her NPA, namely, truthful and complete coopera- tion and continued law-abiding conduct, DOJ will not pur- sue criminal charges. Declinations As discussed above, DOJ’s decision to bring or decline to bring an enforcement action under the FCPA is made pursuant to the Principles of Federal Prosecution, in the case of individuals, and the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, in the case of companies. As described, in the case of individuals, the Principles of Federal Prosecution advise prosecutors to weigh all relevant consid- erations, including: • federal law enforcement priorities; • the nature and seriousness of the offense; • the deterrent effect of prosecution; • the person’s culpability in connection with the offense; • the person’s history of criminal activity; • the person’s willingness to cooperate in the investi- gation or prosecution of others; and • the probable sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted.380 The Principles of Federal Prosecution provide addi- tional commentary about each of these factors. For instance, they explain that prosecutors should take into account federal law enforcement priorities because federal law enforcement and judicial resources are not sufficient to permit prosecution of every alleged offense over which federal jurisdiction exists. The deterrent effect of prosecu- tion should also be kept in mind because some offenses, “although seemingly not of great importance by themselves, if commonly committed would have a substantial cumula- tive impact on the community.”381 As discussed above, the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations require prosecutors to consider nine factors when determining whether to prose- cute a corporate entity for an FCPA violation, including the nature and seriousness of the offense; the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the company; the company’s history of similar conduct; the existence and effectiveness of the com- pany’s pre-existing compliance program; and the adequacy of remedies, such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions. Pursuant to these guidelines, DOJ has declined to prosecute both individuals and corporate entities in numer- ous cases based on the particular facts and circumstances presented in those matters, taking into account the avail- able evidence.382 To protect the privacy rights and other interests of the uncharged and other potentially interested parties, DOJ has a long-standing policy not to provide, without the party’s consent, non-public information on matters it has declined to prosecute. To put DOJ’s declina- tions in context, however, in the past two years alone, DOJ has declined several dozen cases against companies where potential FCPA violations were alleged. As mentioned above, there are rare occasions in which, in conjunction with the public filing of charges against an individual, it is appropriate to disclose that a company is not also being prosecuted. That was done in a recent case where a former employee was charged but the former corporate employer was not.383 chapter 7 Resolutions 75 76 What Are the Different Types of Resolutions with SEC? Civil Injunctive Actions and Remedies In a civil injunctive action, SEC seeks a court order compelling the defendant to obey the law in the future. Violating such an order can result in civil or criminal con- tempt proceedings. Civil contempt sanctions, brought by SEC, are remedial rather than punitive in nature and serve one of two purposes: to compensate the party injured as a result of the violation of the injunction or force compliance with the terms of the injunction. Where a defendant has profited from a violation of law, SEC can obtain the equitable relief of disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and pre-judgment interest and can also obtain civil money penalties pursuant to Sections 21(d)(3) and 32(c) of the Exchange Act. SEC may also seek ancillary relief (such as an accounting from a defendant). Pursuant to Section 21(d)(5), SEC also may seek, and any federal court may grant, any other equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors, such as enhanced remedial measures or the retention of an inde- pendent compliance consultant or monitor. Civil Administrative Actions and Remedies SEC has the ability to institute various types of admin- istrative proceedings against a person or an entity that it believes has violated the law. This type of enforcement action is brought by SEC’s Enforcement Division and is litigated before an SEC administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ’s decision is subject to appeal directly to the Securities and Exchange Commission itself, and the Commission’s decision is in turn subject to review by a U.S. Court of Appeals. Administrative proceedings provide for a variety of relief. For regulated persons and entities, such as broker- dealers and investment advisers and persons associated with them, sanctions include censure, limitation on activities, suspension of up to twelve months, and bar from associa- tion or revocation of registration. For professionals such as attorneys and accountants, SEC can order in Rule 102(e) proceedings that the professional be censured, suspended, or barred from practicing before SEC.384 SEC staff can seek an order from an administrative law judge requiring the respondent to cease and desist from any current or future violations of the securities laws. In addition, SEC can obtain disgorgement, pre-judgment interest, and civil money pen- alties in administrative proceedings under Section 21B of the Exchange Act, and also can obtain other equitable relief, such as enhanced remedial measures or the retention of an independent compliance consultant or monitor. Deferred Prosecution Agreements A deferred prosecution agreement is a written agree- ment between SEC and a potential cooperating individual or company in which SEC agrees to forego an enforcement action against the individual or company if the individual or company agrees to, among other things: (1) cooper- ate truthfully and fully in SEC’s investigation and related enforcement actions; (2) enter into a long-term tolling agreement; (3) comply with express prohibitions and/ or undertakings during a period of deferred prosecution; and (4) under certain circumstances, agree either to admit or not to contest underlying facts that SEC could assert to establish a violation of the federal securities laws. If the agreement is violated during the period of deferred prosecu- tion, SEC staff may recommend an enforcement action to the Commission against the individual or company for the original misconduct as well as any additional misconduct. Furthermore, if the Commission authorizes the enforce- ment action, SEC staff may use any factual admissions made by the cooperating individual or company in support of a motion for summary judgment, while maintaining the ability to bring an enforcement action for any additional misconduct at a later date. 77 In May of 2011, SEC entered into its first deferred prosecution agreement against a company for violating the FCPA.385 In that case, a global manufacturer of steel pipe products violated the FCPA by bribing Uzbekistan govern- ment officials during a bidding process to supply pipelines for transporting oil and natural gas. The company made almost $5 million in profits when it was subsequently awarded several contracts by the Uzbekistan government. The company discovered the misconduct during a world- wide review of its operations and brought it to the govern- ment’s attention. In addition to self-reporting, the company conducted a thorough internal investigation; provided complete, real-time cooperation with SEC and DOJ staff; and undertook extensive remediation, including enhanced anti-corruption procedures and training. Under the terms of the DPA, the company paid $5.4 million in disgorge- ment and prejudgment interest. The company also paid a $3.5 million monetary penalty to resolve a criminal investi- gation by DOJ through an NPA.386 For further information about deferred prosecution agreements, see SEC’s Enforcement Manual.387 Non-Prosecution Agreements A non-prosecution agreement is a written agreement between SEC and a potential cooperating individual or com- pany, entered into in limited and appropriate circumstances, that provides that SEC will not pursue an enforcement action against the individual or company if the individual or company agrees to, among other things: (1) cooperate truth- fully and fully in SEC’s investigation and related enforce- ment actions; and (2) comply, under certain circumstances, with express undertakings. If the agreement is violated, SEC staff retains its ability to recommend an enforcement action to the Commission against the individual or company. For further information about non-prosecution agreements, see SEC’s Enforcement Manual.388 Termination Letters and Declinations As discussed above, SEC’s decision to bring or decline to bring an enforcement action under the FCPA is made pursuant to the guiding principles set forth in SEC’s Enforcement Manual. The same factors that apply to SEC staff ’s determination of whether to recommend an enforce- ment action against an individual or entity apply to the decision to close an investigation without recommending enforcement action.389 Generally, SEC staff considers, among other things: • the seriousness of the conduct and potential viola- tions; • the resources available to SEC staff to pursue the investigation; • the sufficiency and strength of the evidence; • the extent of potential investor harm if an action is not commenced; and • the age of the conduct underlying the potential violations. SEC has declined to take enforcement action against both individuals and companies based on the facts and cir- cumstances present in those matters, where, for example, the conduct was not egregious, the company fully coop- erated, and the company identified and remediated the misconduct quickly. SEC Enforcement Division policy is to notify individuals and entities at the earliest opportu- nity when the staff has determined not to recommend an enforcement action against them to the Commission. This notification takes the form of a termination letter. In order to protect the privacy rights and other inter- ests of the uncharged and other potentially interested par- ties, SEC does not provide non-public information on mat- ters it has declined to prosecute. What Are Some Examples of Past Declinations by DOJ and SEC? Neither DOJ nor SEC typically publicizes declina- tions but, to provide some insight into the process, the fol- lowing are recent, anonymized examples of matters DOJ and SEC have declined to pursue: Example 1: Public Company Declination DOJ and SEC declined to take enforcement action against a public U.S. company. Factors taken into consider- ation included: chapter 7 Resolutions 77 78 • The company discovered that its employees had received competitor bid information from a third party with connections to the foreign government. • The company began an internal investigation, withdrew its contract bid, terminated the employees involved, severed ties to the third-party agent, and voluntarily disclosed the conduct to DOJ’s Antitrust Division, which also declined prosecution. • During the internal investigation, the company uncovered various FCPA red flags, including prior concerns about the third-party agent, all of which the company voluntarily disclosed to DOJ and SEC. • The company immediately took substantial steps to improve its compliance program. Example 2: Public Company Declination DOJ and SEC declined to take enforcement action against a public U.S. company. Factors taken into consider- ation included: • With knowledge of employees of the company’s subsidiary, a retained construction company paid relatively small bribes, which were wrongly approved by the company’s local law firm, to for- eign building code inspectors. • When the company’s compliance department learned of the bribes, it immediately ended the conduct, terminated its relationship with the con- struction company and law firm, and terminated or disciplined the employees involved. • The company completed a thorough internal inves- tigation and voluntarily disclosed to DOJ and SEC. • The company reorganized its compliance depart- ment, appointed a new compliance officer dedi- cated to anti-corruption, improved the training and compliance program, and undertook a review of all of the company’s international third- party relationships. Example 3: Public Company Declination DOJ and SEC declined to take enforcement action against a U.S. publicly held industrial services company for bribes paid by a small foreign subsidiary. Factors taken into consideration included: • The company self-reported the conduct to DOJ and SEC. • The total amount of the improper payments was relatively small, and the activity appeared to be an isolated incident by a single employee at the subsidiary. • The profits potentially obtained from the improper payments were very small. • The payments were detected by the company’s existing internal controls. The company’s audit committee conducted a thorough independent internal investigation. The results of the investiga- tion were provided to the government. • The company cooperated fully with investigations by DOJ and SEC. • The company implemented significant remedial actions and enhanced its internal control structure. Example 4: Public Company Declination DOJ and SEC declined to take enforcement action against a U.S. publicly held oil-and-gas services company for small bribes paid by a foreign subsidiary’s customs agent. Factors taken into consideration included: • The company’s internal controls timely detected a potential bribe before a payment was made. • When company management learned of the potential bribe, management immediately reported the issue to the company’s General Counsel and Audit Committee and prevented the payment from occurring. • Within weeks of learning of the attempted bribe, the company provided in-person FCPA training to employees of the subsidiary and undertook 79 an extensive internal investigation to determine whether any of the company’s subsidiaries in the same region had engaged in misconduct. • The company self-reported the misconduct and the results of its internal investigation to DOJ and SEC. • The company cooperated fully with investigations by DOJ and SEC. • In addition to the immediate training at the relevant subsidiary, the company provided comprehensive FCPA training to all of its employees and conducted an extensive review of its anti-corruption compliance program. • The company enhanced its internal controls and record-keeping policies and procedures, includ- ing requiring periodic internal audits of customs payments. • As part of its remediation, the company directed that local lawyers rather than customs agents be used to handle its permits, with instructions that “no matter what, we don’t pay bribes”—a policy that resulted in a longer and costlier permit procedure. Example 5: Public Company Declination DOJ and SEC declined to take enforcement action against a U.S. publicly held consumer products company in connection with its acquisition of a foreign company. Factors taken into consideration included: • The company identified the potential improper payments to local government officials as part of its pre-acquisition due diligence. • The company promptly developed a comprehen- sive plan to investigate, correct, and remediate any FCPA issues after acquisition. • The company promptly self-reported the issues prior to acquisition and provided the results of its investi- gation to the government on a real-time basis. • The acquiring company’s existing internal controls and compliance program were robust. • After the acquisition closed, the company imple- mented a comprehensive remedial plan, ensured that all improper payments stopped, provided extensive FCPA training to employees of the new subsidiary, and promptly incorporated the new subsidiary into the company’s existing internal controls and compliance environment. Example 6: Private Company Declination In 2011, DOJ declined to take prosecutorial action against a privately held U.S. company and its foreign subsid- iary. Factors taken into consideration included: • The company voluntarily disclosed bribes paid to social security officials in a foreign country. • The total amount of the bribes was small. • When discovered, the corrupt practices were imme- diately terminated. • The conduct was thoroughly investigated, and the results of the investigation were promptly provided to DOJ. • All individuals involved were either terminated or disciplined. The company also terminated its relationship with its foreign law firm. • The company instituted improved training and compliance programs commensurate with its size and risk exposure. chapter 7 Resolutions 79 80 chapter 8 Whistleblower Provisions and Protections 82 WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS AND PROTECTIONS Assistance and information from a whistleblower who knows of possible secu- rities law violations can be among the most powerful weapons in the law en- forcement arsenal. Through their knowledge of the circumstances and individu- als involved, whistleblowers can help SEC and DOJ identify potential violations much earlier than might otherwise have been possible, thus allowing SEC and DOJ to minimize the harm to investors, better preserve the integrity of the U.S. capital markets, and more swiftly hold accountable those responsible for unlawful conduct. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 both contain provisions affecting whistleblow- ers who report FCPA violations. Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits issuers from retaliating against whistleblowers and provides that employees who are retaliated against for reporting pos- sible securities law violations may file a complaint with the Department of Labor, for which they would be eligible to receive reinstatement, back pay, and other compensation.390 Sarbanes-Oxley also prohibits retaliation against employee whistleblowers under the obstruction of justice statute.391 In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act added Section 21F to the Exchange Act, addressing whistleblower incentives and protections. Section 21F authorizes SEC to provide mon- etary awards to eligible individuals who voluntarily come forward with high quality, original information that leads to an SEC enforcement action in which over $1,000,000 in sanctions is ordered. 392 The awards range is between 10% and 30% of the monetary sanctions recovered by the gov- ernment. The Dodd-Frank Act also prohibits employers from retaliating against whistleblowers and creates a private right of action for employees who are retaliated against.393 Furthermore, businesses should be aware that retali- ation against a whistleblower may also violate state, local, and foreign laws that provide protection of whistleblowers. 83 SEC Office of the Whistleblower 100 F Street NE, Mail Stop 5971 Washington, DC 20549 Facsimile: (703) 813-9322 Online Report Form: http://www.sec.gov/ whistleblower On August 12, 2011, the final rules for SEC’s Whistleblower Program became effective. These rules set forth the requirements for whistleblowers to be eligible for awards consideration, the factors that SEC will use to deter- mine the amount of the award, the categories of individuals who are excluded from award consideration, and the cate- gories of individuals who are subject to limitations in award considerations.394 The final rules strengthen incentives for employees to report the suspected violations internally through internal compliance programs when appropriate, although it does not require an employee to do so in order to qualify for an award.395 Individuals with information about a possible viola- tion of the federal securities laws, including FCPA viola- tions, should submit that information to SEC either online through SEC’s Tips, Complaints, and Referrals (TCR) Intake and Resolution System (available at https://dene- bleo.sec.gov/TCRExternal/disclaimer.xhtml) or by mail- ing or faxing a completed Form TCR to the Commission’s Office of the Whistleblower. Whistleblowers can submit information anony- mously. To be considered under SEC’s whistleblower pro- gram as eligible for a reward, however, the information must be submitted on an anonymous whistleblower’s behalf by an attorney.396 Whether or not a whistleblower reports anonymously, SEC is committed to protecting the identity of a whistleblower to the fullest extent possible under the statute.397 SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower administers SEC’s Whistleblower Program and answers questions from the public regarding the program. Additional informa- tion regarding SEC’s Whistleblower Program, including answers to frequently asked questions, is available online at http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower. http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower https://denebleo.sec.gov/TCRExternal/disclaimer.xhtml https://denebleo.sec.gov/TCRExternal/disclaimer.xhtml http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower chapter 8 Whistleblower Provisions and Protections 83 84 chapter 9 DOJ Opinion Procedure 86 DOJ OPINION PROCEDURE DOJ’s opinion procedure is a valuable mechanism for companies and individu- als to determine whether proposed conduct would be prosecuted by DOJ under the FCPA.398 Generally speaking, under the opinion procedure process, parties submit information to DOJ, after which DOJ issues an opinion about whether the proposed conduct falls within its enforcement policy. All of DOJ’s prior opinions are available online.399 Parties interested in obtaining such an opinion should follow these steps:400 First, those seeking an opinion should evaluate whether their question relates to actual, prospective conduct.401 The opinion procedure cannot be used to obtain opinions on purely historical conduct or on hypothetical questions. DOJ will not consider a request unless that portion of the transac- tion for which an opinion is sought involves only prospective conduct, although the transaction as a whole may have com- ponents that already have occurred. An executed contract is not a prerequisite and, in most—if not all—instances, an opinion request should be made before the requestor com- mits to proceed with a transaction.402 Those seeking requests should be aware that FCPA opinions relate only to the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.403 Second, before making the request, the company or individual should check that they are either an issuer or a domestic concern, as only those categories of parties can receive an opinion.404 If the transaction involves more than one issuer or domestic concern, consider making a request for an opinion jointly, as opinions only apply to the parties that request them.405 Third, those seeking an opinion must put their request in writing. The request must be specific and accompanied by all relevant and material information bearing on the con- duct and circumstances for which an opinion is requested. Material information includes background information, complete copies of all operative documents, and detailed statements of all collateral or oral understandings, if any. Those seeking opinions are under an affirmative obligation to make full and true disclosures.406 Materials disclosed to DOJ will not be made public without the consent of the party submitting them.407 87 Fourth, the request must be signed. For corporate requestors, the signatory should be an appropriate senior officer with operational responsibility for the conduct that is the subject of the request and who has been designated by the corporation’s chief executive officer. In appropriate cases, DOJ also may require the chief executive officer to sign the request. Those signing the request must certify that it contains a true, correct, and complete disclosure with respect to the proposed conduct and the circumstances of the conduct. 408 Fifth, an original and five copies of the request should be addressed to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, Attention: FCPA Opinion Group.409 The mailing address is P.O. Box 28188 Central Station, Washington, D.C. 20038. DOJ also asks that you send an electronic courtesy copy to [email protected]. DOJ will evaluate the request for an FCPA opinion.410 A party may withdraw a request for an opinion at any time prior to the release of an opinion.411 If the request is complete and all the relevant information has been submitted, DOJ will respond to the request by issuing an opinion within 30 days.412 If the request is incomplete, DOJ will identify for the requestor what additional information or documents are required for DOJ to review the request. Such information must be pro- vided to DOJ promptly. Once the additional information has been received, DOJ will issue an opinion within 30 days of receipt of that additional information.413 DOJ’s FCPA opin- ions state whether, for purposes of DOJ’s present enforcement policy, the prospective conduct would violate either the issuer or domestic concern anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.414 DOJ also may take other positions in the opinion as it con- siders appropriate.415 To the extent that the opinion concludes that the proposed conduct would not violate the FCPA, a rebuttable presumption is created that the requestor’s con- duct that was the basis of the opinion is in compliance with the FCPA.416 In order to provide non-binding guidance to the business community, DOJ makes versions of its opinions pub- licly available on its website.417 If, after receiving an opinion, a party is concerned about prospective conduct that is beyond the scope of conduct speci- fied in a previous request, the party may submit an additional request for an opinion using the procedures outlined above.418 mailto:[email protected] chapter 9 DOJ Opinion Procedure 87 88 chapter 10 Conclusion 90 CONCLUSION The FCPA was designed to prevent corrupt practices, protect investors, and provide a fair playing field for those honest companies trying to win busi- ness based on quality and price rather than bribes. Following Congress’ leader- ship in enacting the FCPA 35 years ago, and through determined international diplomatic and law enforcement efforts in the time since, laws like the FCPA prohibiting foreign bribery have been enacted by most of the United States’ major trading partners. This guide is designed to provide practical advice about, and useful in- sights into, our enforcement considerations. For businesses desiring to com- pete fairly in foreign markets, it is our goal to maximize those businesses’ ability to comply with the FCPA in the most effective and efficient way suitable to their business and the markets in which they operate. Through our ongoing efforts with the U.S. and international business and legal communities and non- governmental organizations, DOJ and SEC can continue effectively to protect the integrity of our markets and reduce corruption around the world. APPENDIX The Foreign Corrupt ices ActtcPra 92 THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78m, 78ff 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 [Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] Prohibited foreign trade practices by issuers (a) Prohibition It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a class of securities regis- tered pursuant to section 78l of this title or which is required to file reports under section 78o(d) of this title, or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to— (1) any foreign official for purposes of— (A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or (B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person; (2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign political office for purposes of— (A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candi- date in its or his official capacity, (ii) inducing such party, official, or candidate to do or omit to do an act in violation of the lawful duty of such party, official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advan- tage; or (B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or his influ- ence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person; or (3) any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political office, for purposes of— (A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, politi- cal party, party official, or candidate in his or its official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or candi- date to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or 93 (B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or can- didate to use his or its influence with a foreign government or instru- mentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person. (b) Exception for routine governmental action Subsections (a) and (g) of this section shall not apply to any facilitat- ing or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the perfor- mance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or party official. (c) Affirmative defenses It shall be an affirmative defense to actions under subsection (a) or (g) of this section that— (1) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made, was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign official’s, political party’s, party official’s, or candidate’s country; or (2) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made, was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party, party official, or candidate and was directly related to— (A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or ser- vices; or (B) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign govern- ment or agency thereof. (d) Guidelines by Attorney General Not later than one year after August 23, 1988, the Attorney General, after consultation with the Commission, the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Treasury, and after obtaining the views of all interested persons through public notice and comment procedures, shall deter- mine to what extent compliance with this section would be enhanced and the business community would be assisted by further clarification of the preceding provisions of this section and may, based on such determi- nation and to the extent necessary and appropriate, issue— (1) guidelines describing specific types of conduct, associated with common types of export sales arrangements and business contracts, which for purposes of the Department of Justice’s present enforce- ment policy, the Attorney General determines would be in confor- mance with the preceding provisions of this section; and (2) general precautionary procedures which issuers may use on a vol- untary basis to conform their conduct to the Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy regarding the preceding provisions of this section. The Attorney General shall issue the guidelines and procedures referred to in the preceding sentence in accordance with the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5 and those guidelines and proce- dures shall be subject to the provisions of chapter 7 of that title. (e) Opinions of Attorney General (1) The Attorney General, after consultation with appropriate depart- ments and agencies of the United States and after obtaining the views of all interested persons through public notice and comment pro- cedures, shall establish a procedure to provide responses to specific inquiries by issuers concerning conformance of their conduct with the Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy regarding the pre- ceding provisions of this section. The Attorney General shall, within 30 days after receiving such a request, issue an opinion in response to that request. The opinion shall state whether or not certain speci- fied prospective conduct would, for purposes of the Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy, violate the preceding provisions of this section. Additional requests for opinions may be filed with the Attorney General regarding other specified prospective conduct that is beyond the scope of conduct specified in previous requests. In any action brought under the applicable provisions of this section, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that conduct, which is specified in a request by an issuer and for which the Attorney General has issued an opinion that such conduct is in conformity with the Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy, is in compliance with the preced- ing provisions of this section. Such a presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. In considering the presumption for purposes of this paragraph, a court shall weight all relevant factors, including but not limited to whether the information submitted to the Attorney General was accurate and complete and whether it was within the scope of the conduct specified in any request received by the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall establish the pro- cedure required by this paragraph in accordance with the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5 and that procedure shall be subject to the provisions of chapter 7 of that title. (2) Any document or other material which is provided to, received by, or prepared in the Department of Justice or any other department or agency of the United States in connection with a request by an issuer under the procedure established under paragraph (1), shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of Title 5 and shall not, except with the consent of the issuer, be made publicly available, regardless of whether the Attorney General responds to such a request or the issuer withdraws such request before receiving a response. (3) Any issuer who has made a request to the Attorney General under paragraph (1) may withdraw such request prior to the time the Attorney General issues an opinion in response to such request. Any request so withdrawn shall have no force or effect. APPENDIX The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 93 94 (4) The Attorney General shall, to the maximum extent practicable, provide timely guidance concerning the Department of Justice’s pres- ent enforcement policy with respect to the preceding provisions of this section to potential exporters and small businesses that are unable to obtain specialized counsel on issues pertaining to such provisions. Such guidance shall be limited to responses to requests under para- graph (1) concerning conformity of specified prospective conduct with the Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy regard- ing the preceding provisions of this section and general explanations of compliance responsibilities and of potential liabilities under the preceding provisions of this section. (f ) Definitions For purposes of this section: (1)(A) The term “foreign official” means any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person act- ing in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organization. (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term “public international organization” means— (i) an organization that is designated by Executive Order pursuant to section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. § 288); or (ii) any other international organization that is designated by the President by Executive order for the purposes of this section, effective as of the date of publication of such order in the Federal Register. (2) (A) A person’s state of mind is “knowing” with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result if— (i) such person is aware that such person is engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially cer- tain to occur; or (ii) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is substantially certain to occur. (B) When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance does not exist. (3)(A) The term “routine governmental action” means only an action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in— (i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; (ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or sched- uling inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across country; (iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature. (B) The term “routine governmental action” does not include any decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award new business to or to continue business with a particular party, or any action taken by a foreign official involved in the decision-making process to encourage a decision to award new business to or continue business with a particular party. (g) Alternative Jurisdiction (1) It shall also be unlawful for any issuer organized under the laws of the United States, or a State, territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States or a political subdivision thereof and which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 78l of this title or which is required to file reports under section 78o(d)) of this title, or for any United States person that is an officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or a stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, to corruptly do any act outside the United States in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to any of the persons or entities set forth in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subsection (a) of this section for the purposes set forth therein, irrespective of whether such issuer or such officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of such offer, gift, payment, promise, or authorization. (2) As used in this subsection, the term “United States person” means a national of the United States (as defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101)) or any corpo- ration, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship organized under the laws of the United States or any State, territory, possession, or com- monwealth of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 Prohibited foreign trade practices by domestic concerns (a) Prohibition It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern, other than an issuer which is subject to section 78dd-1 of this title, or for any officer, direc- tor, employee, or agent of such domestic concern or any stockholder 95 thereof acting on behalf of such domestic concern, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce cor- ruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authori- zation of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to— (1) any foreign official for purposes of— (A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or (B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining busi- ness for or with, or directing business to, any person; or (2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign political office for purposes of— (A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candi- date in its or his official capacity, (ii) inducing such party, official, or can- didate to do or omit to do an act in violation of the lawful duty of such party, official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or (B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or his influ- ence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining busi- ness for or with, or directing business to, any person; (3) any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political office, for purposes of— (A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, politi- cal party, party official, or candidate in his or its official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or candi- date to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or (B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or can- didate to use his or its influence with a foreign government or instru- mentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining busi- ness for or with, or directing business to, any person. (b) Exception for routine governmental action Subsections (a) and (i) of this section shall not apply to any facilitat- ing or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the perfor- mance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or party official. (c) Affirmative defenses It shall be an affirmative defense to actions under subsection (a) or (i) of this section that— (1) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made, was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign official’s, political party’s, party official’s, or candidate’s country; or (2) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made, was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party, party official, or candidate and was directly related to— (A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or ser- vices; or (B) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign govern- ment or agency thereof. (d) Injunctive relief (1) When it appears to the Attorney General that any domestic con- cern to which this section applies, or officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder thereof, is engaged, or about to engage, in any act or practice constituting a violation of subsection (a) or (i) of this sec- tion, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, bring a civil action in an appropriate district court of the United States to enjoin such act or practice, and upon a proper showing, a permanent injunction or a temporary restraining order shall be granted without bond. (2) For the purpose of any civil investigation which, in the opinion of the Attorney General, is necessary and proper to enforce this section, the Attorney General or his designee are empowered to administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, or other documents which the Attorney General deems relevant or material to such investigation. The attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evi- dence may be required from any place in the United States, or any territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States, at any designated place of hearing. (3) In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to, any person, the Attorney General may invoke the aid of any court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which such investigation or proceeding is carried on, or where such person resides or carries APPENDIX The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 95 96 on business, in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers, or other documents. Any such court may issue an order requiring such person to appear before the Attorney General or his designee, there to produce records, if so ordered, or to give testimony touching the matter under investigation. Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof. All process in any such case may be served in the judicial district in which such person resides or may be found. The Attorney General may make such rules relating to civil investiga- tions as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this subsection. (e) Guidelines by Attorney General Not later than 6 months after August 23, 1988, the Attorney General, after consultation with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Treasury, and after obtain- ing the views of all interested persons through public notice and com- ment procedures, shall determine to what extent compliance with this section would be enhanced and the business community would be assisted by further clarification of the preceding provisions of this section and may, based on such determination and to the extent neces- sary and appropriate, issue— (1) guidelines describing specific types of conduct, associated with common types of export sales arrangements and business contracts, which for purposes of the Department of Justice’s present enforce- ment policy, the Attorney General determines would be in confor- mance with the preceding provisions of this section; and (2) general precautionary procedures which domestic concerns may use on a voluntary basis to conform their conduct to the Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy regarding the preceding provi- sions of this section. The Attorney General shall issue the guidelines and procedures referred to in the preceding sentence in accordance with the provi- sions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5 and those guidelines and procedures shall be subject to the provisions of chapter 7 of that title. (f ) Opinions of Attorney General (1) The Attorney General, after consultation with appropriate depart- ments and agencies of the United States and after obtaining the views of all interested persons through public notice and comment procedures, shall establish a procedure to provide responses to specific inquiries by domestic concerns concerning conformance of their conduct with the Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy regarding the pre- ceding provisions of this section. The Attorney General shall, within 30 days after receiving such a request, issue an opinion in response to that request. The opinion shall state whether or not certain specified prospective conduct would, for purposes of the Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy, violate the preceding provisions of this sec- tion. Additional requests for opinions may be filed with the Attorney General regarding other specified prospective conduct that is beyond the scope of conduct specified in previous requests. In any action brought under the applicable provisions of this section, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that conduct, which is specified in a request by a domestic concern and for which the Attorney General has issued an opinion that such conduct is in conformity with the Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy, is in compliance with the preced- ing provisions of this section. Such a presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. In considering the presumption for pur- poses of this paragraph, a court shall weigh all relevant factors, including but not limited to whether the information submitted to the Attorney General was accurate and complete and whether it was within the scope of the conduct specified in any request received by the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall establish the procedure required by this paragraph in accordance with the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5 and that procedure shall be subject to the provisions of chapter 7 of that title. (2) Any document or other material which is provided to, received by, or prepared in the Department of Justice or any other department or agency of the United States in connection with a request by a domes- tic concern under the procedure established under paragraph (1), shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of Title 5 and shall not, except with the consent of the domestic concern, by made publicly available, regardless of whether the Attorney General response to such a request or the domestic concern withdraws such request before receiving a response. (3) Any domestic concern who has made a request to the Attorney General under paragraph (1) may withdraw such request prior to the time the Attorney General issues an opinion in response to such request. Any request so withdrawn shall have no force or effect. (4) The Attorney General shall, to the maximum extent practicable, provide timely guidance concerning the Department of Justice’s pres- ent enforcement policy with respect to the preceding provisions of this section to potential exporters and small businesses that are unable to obtain specialized counsel on issues pertaining to such provisions. Such guidance shall be limited to responses to requests under para- graph (1) concerning conformity of specified prospective conduct with the Department of Justice’s present enforcement policy regard- ing the preceding provisions of this section and general explanations of compliance responsibilities and of potential liabilities under the preceding provisions of this section. 97 (g) Penalties (1)(A) Any domestic concern that is not a natural person and that violates subsection (a) or (i) of this section shall be fined not more than $2,000,000. (B) Any domestic concern that is not a natural person and that vio- lates subsection (a) or (i) of this section shall be subject to a civil pen- alty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an action brought by the Attorney General. (2)(A) Any natural person that is an officer, director, employee, or agent of a domestic concern, or stockholder acting on behalf of such domestic concern, who willfully violates subsection (a) or (i) of this section shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. (B) Any natural person that is an officer, director, employee, or agent of a domestic concern, or stockholder acting on behalf of such domes- tic concern, who violates subsection (a) or (i) of this section shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an action brought by the Attorney General. (3) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) upon any officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder of a domestic concern, such fine may not be paid, directly or indirectly, by such domestic concern. (h) Definitions For purposes of this section: (1) The term “domestic concern” means— (A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; and (B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a terri- tory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States. (2)(A) The term “foreign official” means any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person act- ing in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organization. (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term “public international organization” means— (i) an organization that has been designated by Executive order pursu- ant to Section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. § 288); or (ii) any other international organization that is designated by the President by Executive order for the purposes of this section, effective as of the date of publication of such order in the Federal Register. (3)(A) A person’s state of mind is “knowing” with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result if— (i) such person is aware that such person is engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially cer- tain to occur; or (ii) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is substantially certain to occur. (B) When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance does not exist. (4)(A) The term “routine governmental action” means only an action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in— (i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; (ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or sched- uling inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across country; (iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature. (B) The term “routine governmental action” does not include any decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award new business to or to continue business with a particular party, or any action taken by a foreign official involved in the decision-making process to encourage a decision to award new business to or continue business with a particular party. (5) The term “interstate commerce” means trade, commerce, transpor- tation, or communication among the several States, or between any foreign country and any State or between any State and any place or ship outside thereof, and such term includes the intrastate use of— (A) a telephone or other interstate means of communication, or (B) any other interstate instrumentality. (i) Alternative Jurisdiction (1) It shall also be unlawful for any United States person to corruptly do any act outside the United States in furtherance of an offer, pay- ment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of any- thing of value to any of the persons or entities set forth in paragraphs APPENDIX The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 97 98 (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a), for the purposes set forth therein, irrespective of whether such United States person makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in fur- therance of such offer, gift, payment, promise, or authorization. (2) As used in this subsection, a “United States person” means a national of the United States (as defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101)) or any corpo- ration, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship organized under the laws of the United States or any State, territory, possession, or com- monwealth of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 Prohibited foreign trade practices by persons other than issuers or domestic concerns (a) Prohibition It shall be unlawful for any person other than an issuer that is subject to section 78dd-1 [Section 30A of the Exchange Act] of this title or a domestic concern, or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such person or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such per- son, while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any other act in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to— (1) any foreign official for purposes of— (A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or (B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such person in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person; (2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign political office for purposes of— (A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candi- date in its or his official capacity, (ii) inducing such party, official, or can- didate to do or omit to do an act in violation of the lawful duty of such party, official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or (B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or his influ- ence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such person in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person; or (3) any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political office, for purposes of— (A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, politi- cal party, party official, or candidate in his or its official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or candi- date to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or (B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or can- didate to use his or its influence with a foreign government or instru- mentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such person in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person. (b) Exception for routine governmental action Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or party offi- cial the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or party official. (c) Affirmative defenses It shall be an affirmative defense to actions under subsection (a) of this section that— (1) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made, was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign official’s, political party’s, party official’s, or candidate’s country; or (2) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made, was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party, party official, or candidate and was directly related to— 99 (A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or ser- vices; or (B) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign govern- ment or agency thereof. (d) Injunctive relief (1) When it appears to the Attorney General that any person to which this section applies, or officer, director, employee, agent, or stock- holder thereof, is engaged, or about to engage, in any act or practice constituting a violation of subsection (a) of this section, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, bring a civil action in an appropri- ate district court of the United States to enjoin such act or practice, and upon a proper showing, a permanent injunction or a temporary restraining order shall be granted without bond. (2) For the purpose of any civil investigation which, in the opinion of the Attorney General, is necessary and proper to enforce this section, the Attorney General or his designee are empowered to administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, or other documents which the Attorney General deems relevant or material to such investigation. The attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evi- dence may be required from any place in the United States, or any territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States, at any designated place of hearing. (3) In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to, any person, the Attorney General may invoke the aid of any court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which such investigation or proceeding is carried on, or where such person resides or carries on business, in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers, or other documents. Any such court may issue an order requiring such person to appear before the Attorney General or his designee, there to produce records, if so ordered, or to give testimony touching the matter under investigation. Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof. (4) All process in any such case may be served in the judicial district in which such person resides or may be found. The Attorney General may make such rules relating to civil investigations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this subsection. (e) Penalties (1)(A) Any juridical person that violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not more than $2,000,000. (B) Any juridical person that violates subsection (a) of this section shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an action brought by the Attorney General. (2)(A) Any natural person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. (B) Any natural person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an action brought by the Attorney General. (3) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) upon any officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder of a person, such fine may not be paid, directly or indirectly, by such person. (f ) Definitions For purposes of this section: (1) The term “person,” when referring to an offender, means any natu- ral person other than a national of the United States (as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101) or any corporation, partnership, association, joint- stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship organized under the law of a foreign nation or a politi- cal subdivision thereof (2)(A) The term “foreign official” means any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person act- ing in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organization. For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term “public international organization” means— (i) an organization that has been designated by Executive Order pur- suant to Section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. § 288); or (ii) any other international organization that is designated by the President by Executive order for the purposes of this section, effective as of the date of publication of such order in the Federal Register. (3)(A) A person’s state of mind is “knowing” with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result if— (i) such person is aware that such person is engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially cer- tain to occur; or (ii) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is substantially certain to occur. (B) When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance does not exist. (4)(A) The term “routine governmental action” means only an action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in— APPENDIX The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 99 100 (i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; (ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or sched- uling inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across country; (iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature. (B) The term “routine governmental action” does not include any decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award new business to or to continue business with a particular party, or any action taken by a foreign official involved in the decision-making process to encourage a decision to award new business to or continue business with a particular party. (5) The term “interstate commerce” means trade, commerce, transpor- tation, or communication among the several States, or between any foreign country and any State or between any State and any place or ship outside thereof, and such term includes the intrastate use of— (A) a telephone or other interstate means of communication, or (B) any other interstate instrumentality. * * * 15 U.S.C. § 78m [Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] Periodical and other reports (a) Reports by issuer of security; contents Every issuer of a security registered pursuant to section 78l of this title shall file with the Commission, in accordance with such rules and reg- ulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate for the proper protection of investors and to insure fair dealing in the security— (1) such information and documents (and such copies thereof ) as the Commission shall require to keep reasonably current the information and documents required to be included in or filed with an applica- tion or registration statement filed pursuant to section 78l of this title, except that the Commission may not require the filing of any material contract wholly executed before July 1, 1962. (2) such annual reports (and such copies thereof ), certified if required by the rules and regulations of the Commission by independent pub- lic accountants, and such quarterly reports (and such copies thereof ), as the Commission may prescribe. Every issuer of a security registered on a national securities exchange shall also file a duplicate original of such information, documents, and reports with the exchange. In any registration statement, periodic report, or other reports to be filed with the Commission, an emerging growth company need not present selected financial data in accor- dance with section 229.301 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, for any period prior to the earliest audited period presented in con- nection with its first registration statement that became effective under this chapter or the Securities Act of 1933 [15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, et seq.] and, with respect to any such statement or reports, an emerg- ing growth company may not be required to comply with any new or revised financial accounting standard until such date that a com- pany that is not an issuer (as defined under section 7201 of this title) is required to comply with such new or revised accounting standard, if such standard applies to companies that are not issuers. (b) Form of report; books, records, and internal accounting; directives (1) The Commission may prescribe, in regard to reports made pursu- ant to this chapter, the form or forms in which the required informa- tion shall be set forth, the items or details to be shown in the balance sheet and the earnings statement, and the methods to be followed in the preparation of reports, in the appraisal or valuation of assets and liabilities, in the determination of depreciation and depletion, in the differentiation of recurring and nonrecurring income, in the differen- tiation of investment and operating income, and in the preparation, where the Commission deems it necessary or desirable, of separate and/or consolidated balance sheets or income accounts of any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer; but in the case of the reports of any person whose methods of accounting are prescribed under the provisions of any law of the United States, or any rule or regulation thereunder, the rules and regulations of the Commission with respect to reports shall not be inconsistent with the requirements imposed by such law or rule or regulation in respect of the same subject matter (except that such rules and regulations of the Commission may be inconsistent with such requirements to the extent that the Commission determines that the public interest or the protection of investors so requires). (2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 78l of this title and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section 78o(d) of this title shall— 101 (A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; (B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls suf- ficient to provide reasonable assurances that— (i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with manage- ment’s general or specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the exist- ing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences; and (C) notwithstanding any other provision of law, pay the allocable share of such issuer of a reasonable annual accounting support fee or fees, determined in accordance with section 7219 of this title. (3)(A) With respect to matters concerning the national security of the United States, no duty or liability under paragraph (2) of this subsec- tion shall be imposed upon any person acting in cooperation with the head of any Federal department or agency responsible for such matters if such act in cooperation with such head of a department or agency was done upon the specific, written directive of the head of such department or agency pursuant to Presidential authority to issue such directives. Each directive issued under this paragraph shall set forth the specific facts and circumstances with respect to which the provi- sions of this paragraph are to be invoked. Each such directive shall, unless renewed in writing, expire one year after the date of issuance. (B) Each head of a Federal department or agency of the United States who issues such a directive pursuant to this paragraph shall main- tain a complete file of all such directives and shall, on October 1 of each year, transmit a summary of matters covered by such directives in force at any time during the previous year to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (4) No criminal liability shall be imposed for failing to comply with the requirements of paragraph (2) of this subsection except as pro- vided in paragraph (5) of this subsection. (5) No person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to imple- ment a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or account described in paragraph (2). (6) Where an issuer which has a class of securities registered pursu- ant to section 78l of this title or an issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section 78o(d) of this title holds 50 per centum or less of the voting power with respect to a domestic or foreign firm, the provisions of paragraph (2) require only that the issuer proceed in good faith to use its influence, to the extent reasonable under the issuer’s circumstances, to cause such domestic or foreign firm to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls consistent with paragraph (2). Such circumstances include the relative degree of the issuer’s ownership of the domestic or foreign firm and the laws and practices governing the business operations of the country in which such firm is located. An issuer which demonstrates good faith efforts to use such influence shall be conclusively presumed to have complied with the requirements of paragraph (2). (7) For the purpose of paragraph (2) of this subsection, the terms “rea- sonable assurances” and “reasonable detail” mean such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the con- duct of their own affairs. * * * 15 U.S.C. § 78ff Penalties [Section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] (a) Willful violations; false and misleading statements Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter (other than section 78dd-1 of this title [Section 30A of the Exchange Act]), or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this chapter, or any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to be made, any statement in any application, report, or docu- ment required to be filed under this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, or by any self-regulatory organization in connection with an application for membership or participation therein or to become associated with a member thereof, which statement was false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, except that when such person is a person other than a natural person, a fine not exceeding $25,000,000 may be imposed; but no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation. (b) Failure to file information, documents, or reports Any issuer which fails to file information, documents, or reports required to be filed under subsection (d) of section 78o of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder shall forfeit to the United States the sum of $100 for each and every day such failure to file shall continue. Such forfeiture, which shall be in lieu of any criminal penalty for such APPENDIX The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 101 102 failure to file which might be deemed to arise under subsection (a) of this section, shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States and shall be recoverable in a civil suit in the name of the United States. (c) Violations by issuers, officers, directors, stockholders, employees, or agents of issuers (1)(A) Any issuer that violates subsection (a) or (g) of section 78dd-1 [Section 30A of the Exchange Act] of this title shall be fined not more than $2,000,000. (B) Any issuer that violates subsection (a) or (g) of section 78dd-1 [Section 30A of the Exchange Act]of this title shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an action brought by the Commission. (2)(A) Any officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer, or stock- holder acting on behalf of such issuer, who willfully violates subsec- tion (a) or (g) of section 78dd-1 [Section 30A of the Exchange Act] of this title shall be fined not more than $100,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. (B) Any officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer, or stock- holder acting on behalf of such issuer, who violates subsection (a) or (g) of section 78dd-1 [Section 30A of the Exchange Act] of this title shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an action brought by the Commission. (3) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) upon any officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder of an issuer, such fine may not be paid, directly or indirectly, by such issuer. APPENDIX Endnotes 104 ENDNOTES 1 S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 4 (1977) [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 95-114], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/ senaterpt-95-114.pdf. 2 Id.; H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977) [hereinafter H. R. Rep. No. 95-640], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ history/1977/houseprt-95-640.pdf. The House Report made clear Congress’s concerns: The payment of bribes to influence the acts or decisions of foreign officials, foreign political parties or candidates for foreign political office is unethical. It is counter to the moral expectations and values of the American public. But not only is it unethical, it is bad business as well. It erodes public confidence in the integrity of the free market system. It short- circuits the marketplace by directing business to those companies too inefficient to compete in terms of price, quality or service, or too lazy to engage in honest salesmanship, or too intent upon unloading marginal products. In short, it rewards corruption instead of efficiency and puts pressure on ethical enterprises to lower their standards or risk losing business. Id. 3 See, e.g., U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., USAID Anticorruption Strategy 5-6 (2005), available at http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/ ads/200/200mbo.pdf. The growing recognition that corruption poses a severe threat to domestic and international security has galvanized efforts to combat it in the United States and abroad. See, e.g., Int’l Anti- Corruption and Good Governance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-309, § 202, 114 Stat. 1090 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2152 (2000)) (noting that “[w]idespread corruption endangers the stability and security of societies, undermines democracy, and jeopardizes the social, political, and economic development of a society. . . . [and that] [c]orruption facilitates criminal activities, such as money laundering, hinders economic development, inflates the costs of doing business, and undermines the legitimacy of the government and public trust”). 4 See Maryse Tremblay & Camille Karbassi, Corruption and Human Trafficking 4 (Transparency Int’l, Working Paper No. 3, 2011), available at http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/ti-working_paper_ human_trafficking_28_jun_2011; U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., Foreign Aid in the National Interest 40 (2002), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABW900.pdf (“No problem does more to alienate citizens from their political leaders and institutions, and to undermine political stability and economic development, than endemic corruption among the government, political party leaders, judges, and bureaucrats. The more endemic the corruption is, the more likely it is to be accompanied by other serious deficiencies in the rule of law: smuggling, drug trafficking, criminal violence, human rights abuses, and personalization of power.”). 5 President George W. Bush observed in 2006 that “the culture of corruption has undercut development and good governance and . . . . impedes our efforts to promote freedom and democracy, end poverty, and combat international crime and terrorism.” President’s Statement on Kleptocracy, 2 Pub. Papers 1504 (Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2006/08/20060810.html. The administrations of former President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama both recognized the threats posed to security and stability by corruption. For instance, in issuing a proclamation restricting the entry of certain corrupt foreign public officials, former President George W. Bush recognized “the serious negative effects that corruption of public institutions has on the United States’ efforts to promote security and to strengthen democratic institutions and free market systems. . . .” Proclamation No. 7750, 69 Fed. Reg. 2287 ( Jan. 14, 2004). Similarly, President Barack Obama’s National Security Strategy paper, released in May 2010, expressed the administration’s efforts and commitment to promote the recognition that “pervasive corruption is a violation of basic human rights and a severe impediment to development and global security.” The White House, National Security Strategy 38 (2010), available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_ strategy.pdf. 6 See, e.g., Int’l Chamber of Commerce, et al., Clean Business Is Good Business: The Business Case Against Corruption (2008), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_ events/8.1/clean_business_is_good_business.pdf; World Health Org., Fact Sheet No. 335, Medicines: Corruption and Pharmaceuticals (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs335/ en/; Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption: The Facts, Foreign Pol’y, Summer 1997, at 119-20; Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q. J. Econ. 681, 683, 705 (1995) (finding that “corruption lowers private investment . . . [and] reduc[es] economic growth . . .”); The World Bank, The Data Revolution: Measuring Governance and Corruption, (Apr. 8, 2004), available at http://go.worldbank.org/87JUY8GJH0. 7 See, e.g., The Corruption Eruption, Economist (Apr. 29, 2010), available at http://www.economist.com/node/16005114 (“The hidden costs of corruption are almost always much higher than companies imagine. Corruption inevitably begets ever more corruption: bribe-takers keep returning to the trough and bribe-givers open themselves up to blackmail.”); Daniel Kaufmann and Shang-Jin Wei, Does “Grease Money” Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7093, 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/ papers/w7093.pdf (“Contrary to the ‘efficient grease’ theory, we find http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/senaterpt-95-114.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/senaterpt-95-114.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/houseprt-95-640.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/houseprt-95-640.pdf http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/200mbo.pdf http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/200mbo.pdf http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/ti-working_paper_human_trafficking_28_jun_2011?mode=window&backgroundColor=%23222222 http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/ti-working_paper_human_trafficking_28_jun_2011?mode=window&backgroundColor=%23222222 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABW900.pdf http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060810.html http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060810.html http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/clean_business_is_good_business.pdf http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/clean_business_is_good_business.pdf http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs335/en/ http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs335/en/ http://go.worldbank.org/87JUY8GJH0 http://www.economist.com/node/16005114 http://www.nber.org/papers/w7093.pdf http://www.nber.org/papers/w7093.pdf 105 that firms that pay more bribes are also likely to spend more, not less, management time with bureaucrats negotiating regulations, and face higher, not lower, cost of capital.”). 8 For example, in a number of recent enforcement actions, the same employees who were directing or controlling the bribe payments were also enriching themselves at the expense of the company. See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Peterson, No. 12-cv-2033 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/ comp-pr2012-78.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Peterson, No. 12-cr-224 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), ECF No. 7 [hereinafter United States v. Peterson], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ petersong/petersong-information.pdf; Plea Agreement, United States v. Stanley, No. 08-cr-597 (S.D. Tex. 2008), ECF No. 9 [hereinafter United States v. Stanley], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ fcpa/cases/stanleya/09-03-08stanley-plea-agree.pdf; Plea Agreement, United States v. Sapsizian, No. 06-cr-20797 (S.D. Fla. 2007), ECF No. 42 [hereinafter United States v. Sapsizian], available at http://www.justice. gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/sapsizianc/06-06-07sapsizian-plea.pdf. 9 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 06-cv-2942 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Tyco Int’l], available at http://www.sec. gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19657.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Willbros Group, Inc., No. 08-cv-1494 (S.D. Tex. 2008), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Willbros], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ complaints/2008/comp20571.pdf. 10 See Plea Agreement, United States v. Bridgestone Corp., No. 11-cr- 651 (S.D. Tex. 2011), ECF No. 21, available at http://www.justice.gov/ criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bridgestone/10-05-11bridgestone-plea.pdf. 11 See S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 6; H.R. Rep. 95-640, at 4; see also A. Carl Kotchian, The Payoff: Lockheed’s 70-Day Mission to Tokyo, Saturday Rev., Jul. 9, 1977, at 7. 12 U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices 2-3 (1976). 13 See H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 4-5; S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 3-4. 14 H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 4-5; S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 4. The Senate Report observed, for instance, that “[m]anagements which resort to corporate bribery and the falsification of records to enhance their business reveal a lack of confidence about themselves,” while citing the Secretary of the Treasury’s testimony that “‘[p]aying bribes—apart from being morally repugnant and illegal in most countries—is simply not necessary for the successful conduct of business here or overseas.’” Id. 15 See S. Rep. No. 100-85, at 46 (1987) (recounting FCPA’s historical background and explaining that “a strong antibribery statute could help U.S. corporations resist corrupt demands . . . .”) [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 100-85]. 16 S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 7. 17 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100- 418, § 5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25 (1988); see also H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 916-24 (1988) (discussing FCPA amendments, including changes to standard of liability for acts of third parties) [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 100-576]. 18 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 5003(d). The amended statute included the following directive: It is the sense of the Congress that the President should pursue the negotiation of an international agreement, among the members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, to govern persons from those countries concerning acts prohibited with respect to issuers and domestic concerns by the amendments made by this section. Such international agreement should include a process by which problems and conflicts associated with such acts could be resolved. Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 2 (1998) (describing efforts by Executive Branch to encourage U.S. trading partners to enact legislation similar to FCPA following 1988 amendments) [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 105-277]. 19 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 1.1, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter Anti-Bribery Convention]. The Anti-Bribery Convention requires member countries to make it a criminal offense “for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business.” The Convention and its commentaries also call on all parties (a) to ensure that aiding and abetting and authorization of an act of bribery are criminal offenses, (b) to assert territorial jurisdiction “broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the bribery act is not required,” and (c) to assert nationality jurisdiction consistent with the general principles and conditions of each party’s legal system. Id. at art. 1.2, cmts. 25, 26. 20 See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998); see also S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 2-3 (describing amendments to “the FCPA to conform it to the requirements of and to implement the OECD Convention”). 21 There is no private right of action under the FCPA. See, e.g., Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1028-29 (6th Cir. 1990); McLean v. Int’l Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1987). 22 U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 9-47.110 (2008) [hereinafter USAM], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/. 23 Go to http://export.gov/worldwide_us/index.asp for more information. 24 Additional information about publicly available market research and due diligence assistance is available online. See In’l Trade Admin., Market Research and Due Diligence, available at http://export.gov/ salesandmarketing/eg_main_018204.asp. The International Company Profile reports include a listing of the potential partner’s key officers and senior management; banking relationships and other financial information about the company; and market information, including sales and profit figures and potential liabilities. They are not, however, intended to substitute for a company’s own due diligence, and the Commercial Service does not offer ICP in countries where Dun & Bradstreet or other private sector vendors are already performing this service. See In’l Trade Admin., International Company Profile, available at http://export.gov/salesandmarketing/eg_main_018198.asp. 25 The Commercial Services’ domestic and foreign offices can also be found at http://export.gov/usoffices/index.asp and http://export.gov/ worldwide_us/index.asp. 26 This form can be located at http://tcc.export.gov/Report_a_Barrier/ index.asp. 27 See In’l Trade Admin., “Doing Business In” Guides, available at http://export.gov/about/eg_main_016806.asp. 28 The Business Ethics Manual is available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/goodgovernance/business_ethics/manual.asp. 29 Information about the Advocacy Center can be found at http://export. gov/advocacy. 30 Reports on U.S. compliance with these treaties can be found at http:// www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/intlagree/. 31 See Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 34 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2290, 2291 (Nov. 10, 1998) (“U.S. companies have had to compete on an uneven playing field . . . . The OECD Convention . . . is designed to change all that. Under the Convention, our major competitors will be obligated to criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions.”). 32 Colombia is also a member of the Working Group and is expected to accede to the Anti-Bribery Convention. 33 OECD, Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3746, en_2649_34859_35692940_1_1_1_1,00.html. 34 OECD, Phase 3 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/31/0,3746, en_2649_34859_44684959_1_1_1_1,00.html. 35 OECD, Country Reports on the Implementation of the OECD Anti- Bribery Convention, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3 746,en_2649_34859_1933144_1_1_1_1,00.html. 36 The OECD Phase 1, 2, and 3 reports on the United States, as well as the U.S. responses to questionnaires, are available at http://www.justice. gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/intlagree. 37 See OECD Working Group on Bribery, United States: Phase 3, Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-78.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-78.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/petersong/petersong-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/petersong/petersong-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/stanleya/09-03-08stanley-plea-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/stanleya/09-03-08stanley-plea-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/sapsizianc/06-06-07sapsizian-plea.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/sapsizianc/06-06-07sapsizian-plea.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19657.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19657.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20571.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20571.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bridgestone/10-05-11bridgestone-plea.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bridgestone/10-05-11bridgestone-plea.pdf http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/ http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/ http://export.gov/worldwide_us/index.asp http://export.gov/salesandmarketing/eg_main_018204.asp http://export.gov/salesandmarketing/eg_main_018204.asp http://www.export.gov/salesandmarketing/eg_main_018198.asp http://export.gov/usoffices/index.asp http://export.gov/worldwide_us/index.asp http://export.gov/worldwide_us/index.asp http://tcc.export.gov/Report_a_Barrier/index.asp http://tcc.export.gov/Report_a_Barrier/index.asp http://export.gov/about/eg_main_016806.asp http://www.ita.doc.gov/goodgovernance/business_ethics/manual.asp http://export.gov/advocacy/ http://export.gov/advocacy/ http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/intlagree/ http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/intlagree/ http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3746,en_2649_34859_35692940_1_1_1_1,00.html http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3746,en_2649_34859_35692940_1_1_1_1,00.html http://www.oecd.org/document/31/0,3746,en_2649_34859_44684959_1_1_1_1,00.html http://www.oecd.org/document/31/0,3746,en_2649_34859_44684959_1_1_1_1,00.html http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3746,en_2649_34859_1933144_1_1_1_1,00.html http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3746,en_2649_34859_1933144_1_1_1_1,00.html http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/intlagree http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/intlagree APPENDIX Endnotes 105 106 Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 2009 Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, Oct. 2010, at 61-62 (recommending that the United States “[c]onsolidate and summarise publicly available information on the application of the FCPA in relevant sources”), available at http://www. oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841.pdf. 38 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, S. Treaty Doc. No. 109-6, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, available at http://www. unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08- 50026_E.pdf [hereinafter UNCAC]. 39 For more information about the UNCAC review mechanism, see Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/ UNCAC/Publications/ReviewMechanism-BasicDocuments/ Mechanism_for_the_Review_of_Implementation_-_Basic_ Documents_-_E.pdf. 40 For information about the status of UNCAC, see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNCAC Signature and Ratification Status as of 12 July 2012, available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/ CAC/signatories.html. 41 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724, available at http://www.oas. org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html. For additional information about the status of the IACAC, see Organization of American States, Signatories and Ratifications, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/ english/Sigs/b-58.html. 42 Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 505, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/ Treaties/html/173.htm. 43 For additional information about GRECO, see Council of Europe, Group of States Against Corruption, available at http://www.coe.int/t/ dghl/monitoring/greco/default_EN.asp. The United States has not yet ratified the GRECO convention. 44 The text of the FCPA statute is set forth in the appendix. See also Jury Instructions at 21-27, United States v. Esquenazi, No. 09-cr-21010 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2011), ECF No. 520 [hereinafter United States v. Esquenazi] (FCPA jury instructions); Jury Instructions at 14-25, United States v. Kay, No. 01-cr-914 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2004), ECF No. 142 (same), aff ’d, 513 F.3d 432, 446-52 (5th Cir. 2007), reh’g denied, 513 F.3d 461 (5th Cir. 2008) [hereinafter United States v. Kay]; Jury Instructions at 76-87, United States v. Jefferson, No. 07-cr-209 (E.D. Va. July 30, 2009), ECF No. 684 [hereinafter United States v. Jefferson] (same); Jury Instructions at 8-10, United States v. Green, No. 08-cr-59 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2009), ECF No. 288 [hereinafter United States v. Green] (same); Jury Instructions at 23-29, United States v. Bourke, No. 05-cr-518 (S.D.N.Y. July 2009) [hereinafter United States v. Bourke] (same, not docketed); Jury Instructions at 2-8, United States v. Mead, No. 98-cr-240 (D.N.J. Oct. 1998) [hereinafter United States v. Mead] (same). 45 The provisions of the FCPA applying to issuers are part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter Exchange Act]. The anti-bribery provisions can be found at Section 30A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1. 46 15 U.S.C. § 78l. 47 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d). 48 SEC enforcement actions have involved a number of foreign issuers. See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Magyar Telekom Plc., et al., No. 11-cv-9646 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2011), ECF No. 1 (German and Hungarian companies), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ complaints/2011/comp22213-co.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Alcatel- Lucent, S.A., No. 10-cv-24620 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Alcatel-Lucent] (French company), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21795.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. ABB, Ltd., No. 10-cv-1648 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. ABB] (Swiss company), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-175. pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Daimler AG, No. 10-cv-473 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Daimler AG] (German company), available at http://sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp- pr2010-51.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08- cv-2167 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Siemens AG] (Germany company), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ complaints/2008/comp20829.pdf. Certain DOJ enforcement actions have likewise involved foreign issuers. See, e.g., Criminal Information, United States v. Magyar Telekom, Plc., No. 11-cr-597 (E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2011), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ fcpa/cases/magyar-telekom/2011-12-29-information-magyar-telekom. pdf; Non-Pros. Agreement, In re Deutsche Telekom AG (Dec. 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/deutsche- telekom/2011-12-29-deustche-telekom-npa.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., No. 10-cr-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcatel- etal/12-27-10alcatel-et-al-info.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Daimler AG, No. 10-cr-63 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Daimler AG], available at http://www. justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-22-10daimlerag-info. pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-cr-367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Siemens AG], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens/12-12-08siemensakt-info.pdf. 49 See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml. 50 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Turner, et al., No. 10-cv-1309 (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter, SEC v. Turner] (charging a Lebansese/Canadian agent of a UK company listed on U.S. exchange with violating the FCPA for bribes of Iraqi officials), available at http:// www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21615.pdf; Indictment, United States v. Naaman, No. 08-cr-246 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2008), ECF No. 3 [hereinafter United States v. Naaman] (same), available at http:// www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/naamano/08-07-08naaman- indict.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Elkin, et al., No. 10-cv-661 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Elkin] (charging an employee of U.S. publicly traded company with violating FCPA for bribery of officials in Kyrgyzstan), available at http://www.sec.gov/ litigation/complaints/2010/comp21509.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Elkin, No. 10-cr-15 (W.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2010), ECF No. 8 [hereinafter United States v. Elkin] (same), available at http://www. justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/elkin/08-03-10elkin-information. pdf; Indictment, United States v. Tesler, et al., No. 09-cr-98 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2009), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Tesler] (charging a British agent of U.S. publicly traded company with violating the FCPA for bribery of Nigerian officials), available at http://www.justice. gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/tesler/tesler-indict.pdf; Superseding Indictment, United States v. Sapsizian, et al., supra note 8, ECF 32 (charging a French employee of French company traded on a U.S. exchange with violating the FCPA). 51 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. 52 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1). 53 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a). See, e.g., Superseding Indictment, United States v. Nexus Technologies, et al., No. 08-cr-522 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009), ECF No. 106 [hereinafter United States v. Nexus Technologies] (private U.S. company and corporate executives charged with violating FCPA for bribes paid in Vietnam), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ fraud/fcpa/cases/nguyenn/09-04-08nguyen-indict.pdf; Indictment, United States v. Esquenazi, supra note 44, (private U.S. company and corporate executives charged with FCPA violations for bribes paid in Haiti), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ esquenazij/12-08-09esquenazi-indict.pdf. 54 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). As discussed above, foreign companies that have securities registered in the United States or that are required to file periodic reports with the SEC, including certain foreign companies with American Depository Receipts, are covered by the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions governing “issuers” under 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841.pdf http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841.pdf http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/ReviewMechanism-BasicDocuments/Mechanism_for_the_Review_of_Implementation_-_Basic_Documents_-_E.pdf http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/ReviewMechanism-BasicDocuments/Mechanism_for_the_Review_of_Implementation_-_Basic_Documents_-_E.pdf http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/ReviewMechanism-BasicDocuments/Mechanism_for_the_Review_of_Implementation_-_Basic_Documents_-_E.pdf http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/ReviewMechanism-BasicDocuments/Mechanism_for_the_Review_of_Implementation_-_Basic_Documents_-_E.pdf http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/173.htm http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/173.htm http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/default_EN.asp http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/default_EN.asp http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp22213-co.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp22213-co.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21795.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-175.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-175.pdf http://sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-51.pdf http://sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-51.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20829.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20829.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/magyar-telekom/2011-12-29-information-magyar-telekom.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/magyar-telekom/2011-12-29-information-magyar-telekom.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/magyar-telekom/2011-12-29-information-magyar-telekom.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/deutsche-telekom/2011-12-29-deustche-telekom-npa.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/deutsche-telekom/2011-12-29-deustche-telekom-npa.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcatel-etal/12-27-10alcatel-et-al-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcatel-etal/12-27-10alcatel-et-al-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-22-10daimlerag-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-22-10daimlerag-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-22-10daimlerag-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens/12-12-08siemensakt-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens/12-12-08siemensakt-info.pdf http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21615.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21615.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/naamano/08-07-08naaman-indict.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/naamano/08-07-08naaman-indict.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/naamano/08-07-08naaman-indict.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21509.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21509.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/elkin/08-03-10elkin-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/elkin/08-03-10elkin-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/elkin/08-03-10elkin-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/tesler/tesler-indict.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/tesler/tesler-indict.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/nguyenn/09-04-08nguyen-indict.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/nguyenn/09-04-08nguyen-indict.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/esquenazij/12-08-09esquenazi-indict.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/esquenazij/12-08-09esquenazi-indict.pdf 107 55 See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a); see also U.S. Dept. of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual § 9-1018 (Nov. 2000) (the Department “interprets [Section 78dd-3(a)] as conferring jurisdiction whenever a foreign company or national causes an act to be done within the territory of the United States by any person acting as that company’s or national’s agent.”). This interpretation is consistent with U.S. treaty obligations. See S. Rep. No. 105-2177 (1998) (expressing Congress’ intention that the 1998 amendments to the FCPA “conform it to the requirements of and to implement the OECD Convention.”); Anti-Bribery Convention at art. 4.1, supra note 19 (“Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official when the offence is committed in whole or in part in its territory.”). 56 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a); see, e.g., Criminal Information, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, S.A., et al., No. 10-cr-20906 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France] (subsidiary of French publicly traded company convicted of conspiracy to violate FCPA), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ fcpa/cases/alcatel-lucent-sa-etal/12-27-10alcatel-et-al-info.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO, No. 10-cr-64 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010), ECF No. 1 (subsidiary of German publicly traded company convicted of violating FCPA), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-22- 10daimlerrussia-info.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Siemens S.A. (Argentina), No. 08-cr-368 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), ECF No. 1 (subsidiary of German publicly traded company convicted of violating FCPA), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ siemens/12-12-08siemensargen-info.pdf. 57 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(5) (defining “interstate commerce”), 78dd- 3(f )(5) (same); see also 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(17). 58 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(5), 78dd-3(f )(5). 59 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. 60 Criminal Information, United States v. JGC Corp., No. 11-cr-260 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2011), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. JGC Corp.], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ jgc-corp/04-6-11jgc-corp-info.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V., No. 10-cr-460 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 7, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Snamprogetti], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/snamprogetti/07-07- 10snamprogetti-info.pdf. 61 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g) (“irrespective of whether such issuer or such officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of such offer, gift, payment, promise, or authorization”), 78dd-2(i) (1) (“irrespective of whether such United States person makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of such offer, gift, payment, promise, or authorization”). 62 S. Rep. No. 105-277 at 2 (“[T]he OECD Convention calls on parties to assert nationality jurisdiction when consistent with national legal and constitutional principles. Accordingly, the Act amends the FCPA to provide for jurisdiction over the acts of U.S. businesses and nationals in furtherance of unlawful payments that take place wholly outside the United States. This exercise of jurisdiction over U.S. businesses and nationals for unlawful conduct abroad is consistent with U.S. legal and constitutional principles and is essential to protect U.S. interests abroad.”). 63 Id. at 2-3. 64 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a). 65 See H.R. Rep. No. 95-831, at 12 (referring to “business purpose” test). 66 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Siemens AG, supra note 48; Criminal Information, United States v. Siemens AG, supra note 48. 67 In amending the FCPA in 1988, Congress made clear that the business purpose element, and specifically the “retaining business” prong, was meant to be interpreted broadly: The Conferees wish to make clear that the reference to corrupt payments for “retaining business” in present law is not limited to the renewal of contracts or other business, but also includes a prohibition against corrupt payments related to the execution or performance of contracts or the carrying out of existing business, such as a payment to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining more favorable tax treatment. The term should not, however, be construed so broadly as to include lobbying or other normal representations to government officials. H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 1951-52 (internal citations omitted). 68 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Panalpina, Inc., No. 10-cv-4334 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Panalpina, Inc.], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21727.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Panalpina, Inc., No. 10-cr- 765 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Panalpina, Inc.], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ fcpa/cases/panalpina-inc/11-04-10panalpina-info.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd., No. 10-cr-769 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/panalpina- world/11-04-10panalpina-world-info.pdf; see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., SEC Charges Seven Oil Services and Freight Forwarding Companies for Widespread Bribery of Customs Officials (Nov. 4, 2010) (“The SEC alleges that the companies bribed customs officials in more than 10 countries in exchange for such perks as avoiding applicable customs duties on imported goods, expediting the importation of goods and equipment, extending drilling contracts, and lowering tax assessments.”), available at http://www.sec.gov/ news/press/2010/2010-214.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Oil Services Companies and a Freight Forwarding Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More Than $156 Million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010) (logistics provider and its subsidiary engaged in scheme to pay thousands of bribes totaling at least $27 million to numerous foreign officials on behalf of customers in oil and gas industry “to circumvent local rules and regulations relating to the import of goods and materials into numerous foreign jurisdictions”), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10- crm-1251.html. 69 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 755-56 (5th Cir. 2004). 70 Id. at 749. Indeed, the Kay court found that Congress’ explicit exclusion of facilitation payments from the scope of the FCPA was evidence that “Congress intended for the FCPA to prohibit all other illicit payments that are intended to influence non-trivial official foreign action in an effort to aid in obtaining or retaining business for some person.” Id. at 749-50 (emphasis added). 71 Id. at 750. 72 Id. at 749-55. 73 Id. at 756 (“It still must be shown that the bribery was intended to produce an effect—here, through tax savings—that would ‘assist in obtaining or retaining business.’”). 74 The FCPA does not explicitly define “corruptly,” but in drafting the statute Congress adopted the meaning ascribed to the same term in the domestic bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b). See H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 7. 75 The House Report states in full: The word “corruptly” is used in order to make clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position; for example, wrongfully to direct business to the payor or his client, to obtain preferential legislation or regulations, or to induce a foreign official to fail to perform an official function. The word “corruptly” connotes an evil motive or purpose such as that required under 18 U.S.C. 201(b) which prohibits domestic bribery. As in 18 U.S.C. 201(b), the word “corruptly” indicates an intent or desire wrongfully to influence the recipient. It does not require that the act [be] fully consummated or succeed in producing the desired outcome. Id. The Senate Report provides a nearly identical explanation of the meaning of the term: The word “corruptly” is used in order to make clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order to wrongfully direct business to the payor or his client, or to obtain http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcatel-lucent-sa-etal/12-27-10alcatel-et-al-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcatel-lucent-sa-etal/12-27-10alcatel-et-al-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-22-10daimlerrussia-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-22-10daimlerrussia-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens/12-12-08siemensargen-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens/12-12-08siemensargen-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/jgc-corp/04-6-11jgc-corp-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/jgc-corp/04-6-11jgc-corp-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/snamprogetti/07-07-10snamprogetti-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/snamprogetti/07-07-10snamprogetti-info.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21727.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/panalpina-inc/11-04-10panalpina-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/panalpina-inc/11-04-10panalpina-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/panalpina-world/11-04-10panalpina-world-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/panalpina-world/11-04-10panalpina-world-info.pdf http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-214.htm http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-214.htm http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-crm-1251.html http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-crm-1251.html ENDIX notes 107 108 preferential legislation or a favorable regulation. The word “corruptly” connotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient. S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 10. 76 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a). 77 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Monsanto Co., No. 05-cv-14 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2005) (among other things, the company paid a $50,000 bribe to influence an Indonesian official to repeal an unfavorable law, which was not repealed despite the bribe), available at http://www.sec.gov/ litigation/complaints/comp19023.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Monsanto Co., No. 05-cr-8 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/monsanto-co/01-06- 05monsanto-info.pdf. 78 Jury instructions in FCPA cases have defined “corruptly” consistent with the definition found in the legislative history. See, e.g., Jury Instructions at 22-23, United States v. Esquenazi, supra note 44; Jury Instructions at 10, United States v. Green, supra note 44; Jury Instructions at 35, United States v. Jefferson, supra note 44; Jury Instructions at 25, United States v. Bourke, supra note 44; Jury Instructions at 17, United States v. Kay, supra note 44; Jury Instructions at 5, United States v. Mead, supra note 44. 79 See Complaint, SEC v. Innospec, Inc., No. 10-cv-448 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Innospec], available at http:// www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21454.pdf; Criminal Information at 8, United States v. Innospec Inc., No. 10-cr-61 (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Innospec], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/innospec- inc/03-17-10innospec-info.pdf. 80 See Complaint, SEC v. Innospec, supra note 79; Criminal Information, United States v. Innospec, supra note 79. 81 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), 78dd-3(e)(2)(A), 78ff(c)(2)(A). 82 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(1)(A) (corporate criminal liability under issuer provision) with § 78ff(c)(2)(A) (individual criminal liability under issuer provision); compare 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(1)(A) (corporate criminal liability under domestic concern provision) with § 78dd-2(g) (2)(A) (individual criminal liability under issuer provision); compare 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(e)(1)(A) (corporate criminal liability for territorial provision) with § 78dd-3(e)(2)(A) (individual criminal liability for territorial provision). However, companies still must act corruptly. See Section 30A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a). 83 United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 448 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Jury Instructions at 38, United States v. Esquenazi, supra note 44; Jury Instructions at 10, United States v. Green, supra note 44; Jury Instructions at 35, United States v. Jefferson, supra note 44; Jury Instructions at 25, United States v. Bourke, supra note 44; Jury Instructions at 5, United States v. Mead, supra note 44. 84 Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1998) (construing “willfully” in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A)) (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994)); see also Kay, 513 F.3d at 446- 51 (discussing Bryan and term “willfully” under the FCPA). 85 Kay, 513 F.3d at 447-48; Stichting Ter Behartiging Van de Belangen Van Oudaandeelhouders In Het Kapitaal Van Saybolt Int’l B.V. v. Schreiber, 327 F.3d 173, 181 (2d Cir. 2003). 86 The phrase “anything of value” is not defined in the FCPA, but the identical phrase under the domestic bribery statute has been broadly construed to include both tangible and intangible benefits. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 525 F.3d 1033, 1048 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting defendant’s objection to instruction defining sex as a “thing of value,” which “unambiguously covers intangible considerations”); United States v. Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299, 1304-05 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that loans and promises of future employment are “things of value”); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 622-23 (2d Cir. 1983) (approving jury instruction that stock could be a “thing of value” if defendant believed it had value, even though the shares had no commercial value, and noting that “[t]he phrase ‘anything of value’ in bribery and related statutes has consistently been given a broad meaning”). 87 Section 30A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a), 78dd- 3(a) (emphasis added). 88 Like the FCPA, the domestic bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, prohibits giving, offering, or promising “anything of value.” Numerous domestic AP E bribery cases under Section 201 have involved “small” dollar bribes. See, e.g., United States v. Franco, 632 F.3d 880, 882-84 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming bribery convictions of inmate for paying correctional officer $325 to obtain cell phone, food, and marijuana, and noting that 18 U.S.C. § 201 does not contain minimum monetary threshold); United States v. Williams, 216 F.3d 1099, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming bribery conviction for $70 bribe to vehicle inspector); United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 396 (3rd Cir. 1989) (affirming bribery conviction for $100 bribe paid to official of Occupational Health and Safety Administration); United States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming bribery convictions including $100 bribe to immigration official); United States v. Bishton, 463 F.2d 887, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (affirming bribery conviction for $100 bribe to division chief of District of Columbia Sewer Operations Division). 89 Complaint, SEC v. Daimler AG, supra note 48; Criminal Information, United States v. Daimler AG, supra note 48. 90 Complaint, SEC v. Halliburton Company and KBR, Inc., No. 09-cv- 399 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009), ECF No 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Halliburton and KBR], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/ comp20897.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. 09-cr-71, ECF No. 1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2009) [hereinafter United States v. KBR], available at http://www.justice.gov/ criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kelloggb/02-06-09kbr-info.pdf. 91 Complaint, SEC v. Halliburton and KBR, supra note 90; Criminal Information, United States v. KBR, supra note 90. 92 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. RAE Sys. Inc., No. 10-cv-2093 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. RAE Sys., Inc.] (fur coat, among other extravagant gifts), available at http://www.sec.gov/ litigation/complaints/2010/comp21770.pdf; Non-Pros. Agreement, In re RAE Sys. Inc. (Dec. 10, 2010) [hereinafter In re RAE Sys. Inc.] (same), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ rae-systems/12-10-10rae-systems.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Daimler AG, supra note 48 (armored Mercedes Benz worth €300,000); Criminal Information, United States v. Daimler AG, supra note 48 (same). 93 See Complaint, SEC v. ABB Ltd, No. 04-cv-1141 (D.D.C. July 6, 2004), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ complaints/comp18775.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. ABB Vetco Gray Inc., et al., No. 04-cr-279 (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2004), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. ABB Vetco Gray], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/abb/06-22- 04abbvetco-info.pdf. 94 Complaint, SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., No. 09-cv-6094 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2009), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. UTStarcom], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp21357.pdf; Non- Pros. Agreement, In re UTStarcom Inc. (Dec. 31, 2009) [hereinafter In re UTStarcom], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ cases/utstarcom-inc/12-31-09utstarcom-agree.pdf. 95 Complaint, SEC v. UTStarcom, supra note 94; Non-Pros. Agreement, In re UTStarcom, supra note 94. 96 Complaint, SEC v. UTStarcom, supra note 94; Non-Pros. Agreement, In re UTStarcom, supra note 94. 97 Complaint, SEC v. Lucent Technologies Inc., No. 07-cv-2301 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2007), ECF No.1 [hereinafter SEC v. Lucent], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20414.pdf; Non- Pros. Agreement, In re Lucent Technologies (Nov. 14, 2007) [hereinafter In re Lucent], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ cases/lucent-tech/11-14-07lucent-agree.pdf. 98 Complaint, SEC v. Lucent, supra note 97; Non-Pros. Agreement, In re Lucent, supra note 97. 99 The company consented to the entry of a final judgment permanently enjoining it from future violations of the books and records and internal P nd http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19023.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19023.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/monsanto-co/01-06-05monsanto-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/monsanto-co/01-06-05monsanto-info.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21454.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21454.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/innospec-inc/03-17-10innospec-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/innospec-inc/03-17-10innospec-info.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp20897.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp20897.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kelloggb/02-06-09kbr-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kelloggb/02-06-09kbr-info.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21770.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21770.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/rae-systems/12-10-10rae-systems.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/rae-systems/12-10-10rae-systems.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18775.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18775.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/abb/06-22-04abbvetco-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/abb/06-22-04abbvetco-info.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp21357.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/utstarcom-inc/12-31-09utstarcom-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/utstarcom-inc/12-31-09utstarcom-agree.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20414.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/lucent-tech/11-14-07lucent-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/lucent-tech/11-14-07lucent-agree.pdf 109 controls provisions and paid a civil penalty of $1,500,000. Complaint, No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. York Int’l Corp.], available at http://www.sec. SEC v. Lucent, supra note 97. Additionally, the company entered into a gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20319.pdf; Criminal Information, non-prosecution agreement with DOJ and paid a $1,000,000 monetary United States v. York Int’l Corp., No. 07-cr-253 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2007), penalty. Non-Pros. Agreement, In re Lucent, supra note 97. ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. York Int’l Corp.], available at 100 United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1311 (8th Cir. 1991). http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/york/10-01-07york- 101 Judgment, United States v. Liebo, No. 89-cr-76 (D. Minn. Jan. 31, info.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Textron Inc., No. 07-cv-1505 (D.D.C. Aug. 1992), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ 23, 2007), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Textron], available at http:// liebor/1992-01-31-liebor-judgment.pdf. www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20251.pdf; Non-Pros. 102 Complaint, SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 04-cv-945 (D.D.C. Agreement, In re Textron Inc. (Aug. 23, 2007), available at http://www. June 9, 2004), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/textron-inc/08-21-07textron- complaints/comp18740.pdf; Admin. Proceeding Order, In the Matter agree.pdf. DOJ has issued opinion procedure releases concerning of Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 49838 ( June 9, payments (that were, in essence, donations) to government agencies or 2004) (finding that company violated FCPA accounting provisions and departments. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 09-01 imposing $500,000 civil monetary penalty), available at http://www.sec. (Aug. 3, 2009) (involving donation of 100 medical devices to foreign gov/litigation/admin/34-49838.htm. government), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ 103 FCPA opinion procedure releases can be found at http://www. fcpa/opinion/2009/0901.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/. In the case of the company seeking to Release 06-01 (Oct. 16, 2006) (involving contribution of $25,000 to contribute the $1.42 million grant to a local MFI, DOJ noted that it had regional customs department to pay incentive rewards to improve local undertaken each of these due diligence steps and controls, in addition to enforcement of anti-counterfeiting laws), available at http://www.justice. others, that would minimize the likelihood that anything of value would gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2006/0601.pdf. be given to any officials of the Eurasian country. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 116 The United States has some state-owned entities, like the Tennessee FCPA Op. Release 10-02 ( July 16, 2010), available at http://www. Valley Authority, that are instrumentalities of the government. McCarthy justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2010/1002.pdf. v. Middle Tenn. Elec. Membership Corp., 466 F.3d 399, 411 n.18 104 U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 95-01 ( Jan. 11, (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]here is no question that TVA is an agency and 1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ instrumentality of the United States.”) (internal quotes omitted). opinion/1995/9501.pdf. 117 During the period surrounding the FCPA’s adoption, state-owned 105 Id. entities held virtual monopolies and operated under state-controlled 106 Id. price-setting in many national industries around the world. See generally 107 U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 97-02 (Nov. 5, World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ and Politics of Government Ownership, World Bank opinion/1997/9702.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release Policy Research Report at 78 (1995); Sunita Kikeri and 06-01 (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ Aishetu Kolo, State Enterprises, The World Bank Group fraud/fcpa/opinion/2006/0601.pdf. (Feb. 2006), available at http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/ 108 U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 06-01 (Oct. 16, 2006). publicpolicyjournal/304Kikeri_Kolo.pdf. 109 Id. 118 Id. at 1 (“[A]fter more than two decades of privatization, government 110 Id. ownership and control remains widespread in many regions—and in 111 See Section 30A(a)(1)-(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) many parts of the world still dominates certain sectors.”). (1)-(3); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a)(1)-(3), 78dd-3(a)(1)-(3). 119 To date, consistent with the approach taken by DOJ and SEC, all 112 Section 30A(f )(1)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f )(1) district courts that have considered this issue have concluded that this is (A); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(f )(2)(A). an issue of fact for a jury to decide. See Order, United States v. Carson, 113 Under the FCPA, any person “acting in an official capacity for 2011 WL 5101701, No. 09-cr-77 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011), ECF No. or on behalf of ” a foreign government, a department, agency, or 373 [hereinafter United States v. Carson]; United States v. Aguilar, 783 instrumentality thereof, or a public international organization, is a F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Order, United States v. Esquenazi, foreign official. Section 30A(f )(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f )(1)(A); 15 supra note 44, ECF No. 309; see also Order, United States v. O’Shea, No. U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-2(f )(2)(A). See also U.S. Dept. of 09-cr-629 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2012), ECF No. 142; Order, United States Justice, FCPA Op. Release No. 10-03, at 2 (Sept. 1, 2010), available v. Nguyen, No. 08-cr-522 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2009), ECF No. 144. These at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2010/1003.pdf district court decisions are consistent with the acceptance by district (listing safeguards to ensure that consultant was not acting on behalf of courts around the country of over 35 guilty pleas by individuals who foreign government). admitted to violating the FCPA by bribing officials of state-owned or 114 But see Sections 30A(b) and f(3)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § state-controlled entities. See Government’s Opposition to Defendants’ 78dd-1(b) & (f )(3); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(b) & (h)(4), 78dd-3(b) & (f ) Amended Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Ten of the (4) (facilitating payments exception). Indictment at 18, United States v. Carson, supra note 119, ECF No. 332; 115 Even though payments to a foreign government may not violate the Exhibit I, United States v. Carson, supra note 119, ECF No. 335 (list of anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, such payments may violate other examples of enforcement actions based on foreign officials of state-owned U.S. laws, including wire fraud, money laundering, and the FCPA’s entities). accounting provisions. This was the case in a series of matters brought by 120 Jury Instructions, United States v. Esquenazi, supra note 44, ECF No. DOJ and SEC involving kickbacks to the Iraqi government through the 520; Order at 5 and Jury Instructions, United States v. Carson, supra note United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme. See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. 119, ECF No. 373 and ECF No. 549; Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. Innospec, supra note 79; Criminal Information, United States v. Innospec, 121 Criminal Information, United States v. C.E. Millier Corp., et al., supra note 79; Complaint, SEC v. Novo Nordisk A/S, No. 09-cv-862 No. 82-cr-788 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 1982), available at http://www. (D.D.C. May 11, 2009), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/ justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ce-miller/1982-09-17-ce-miller- litigation/complaints/2009/comp21033.pdf; Criminal Information, information.pdf. United States v. Novo Nordisk A/S, No. 09-cr-126 (D.D.C. May 11, 122 See Complaint, SEC v. Sam P. Wallace Co., Inc., et al., No. 81-cv- 2009), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ 1915 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 1982); Criminal Information, United States v. fraud/fcpa/cases/nordiskn/05-11-09novo-info.pdf; Complaint, Sam P. Wallace Co., Inc., No. 83-cr-34 (D.P.R. Feb. 23, 1983), available SEC v. Ingersoll-Rand Company Ltd., No. 07-cv-1955 (D.D.C. Oct. at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/sam-wallace- 31, 2007), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ company/1983-02-23-sam-wallace-company-information.pdf; see also complaints/2007/comp20353.pdf; Criminal Information, United States Criminal Information, United States v. Goodyear Int’l Corp., No. 89- v. Ingersoll-Rand Italiana SpA, No. 07-cr-294 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2007), cr-156 (D.D.C. May 11, 1989) (Iraqi Trading Company identified as ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ “instrumentality of the Government of the Republic of Iraq”), available cases/ingerand-italiana/10-31-07ingersollrand-info.pdf; Complaint, at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/goodyear/1989- SEC v. York Int’l Corp., No. 07-cv-1750 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2007), ECF 05-11-goodyear-information.pdf. http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/liebor/1992-01-31-liebor-judgment.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/liebor/1992-01-31-liebor-judgment.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18740.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18740.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49838.htm http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49838.htm http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2010/1002.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2010/1002.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/1995/9501.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/1995/9501.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/1997/9702.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/1997/9702.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2006/0601.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2006/0601.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2010/1003.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp21033.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp21033.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/nordiskn/05-11-09novo-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/nordiskn/05-11-09novo-info.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20353.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20353.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ingerand-italiana/10-31-07ingersollrand-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ingerand-italiana/10-31-07ingersollrand-info.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20319.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20319.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/york/10-01-07york-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/york/10-01-07york-info.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20251.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20251.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/textron-inc/08-21-07textron-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/textron-inc/08-21-07textron-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/textron-inc/08-21-07textron-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2009/0901.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2009/0901.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2006/0601.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2006/0601.pdf http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/304Kikeri_Kolo.pdf http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/304Kikeri_Kolo.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ce-miller/1982-09-17-ce-miller-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ce-miller/1982-09-17-ce-miller-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ce-miller/1982-09-17-ce-miller-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/sam-wallace-company/1983-02-23-sam-wallace-company-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/sam-wallace-company/1983-02-23-sam-wallace-company-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/goodyear/1989-05-11-goodyear-information.pdf ENDIX notes 109 110 123 See Complaint, SEC v. ABB, supra note 48; Criminal Information at 3, United States v. ABB Inc., No. 10-cr-664 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. ABB], available at http:// www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/abb/09-20-10abbinc-info. pdf; Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 27, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.); Ley Del Servicio Publico de Energia Electrica, as amended, art. 1-3, 10, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 22 de Diciembre de 1975 (Mex.). 124 See Indictment at 2, United States v. Esquenazi, supra note 44, ECF No. 3; Affidavit of Mr. Louis Gary Lissade at 1-9, id., ECF No. 417-2. 125 Criminal Information at 30-31, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, supra note 56, ECF No. 10. 126 Id. 127 See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-366 § 2, 112 Stat. 3302, 3303, 3305, 3308 (1998). 128 Section 30A(F)(1)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f )(1) (B); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(2)(B), 78dd-3(f )(2)(B). 129 Third parties and intermediaries themselves are also liable for FCPA violations. Section 30A(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a), and 78dd-3(a). 130 Section 30A(a)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a)(3), 78dd-3(a)(3). 131 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 11-cv-686 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011) [hereinafter SEC v. Johnson & Johnson] (bribes paid through Greek and Romanian agents)), available at http://www.sec. gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21922.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. DePuy, Inc., No. 11-cr-99 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. DePuy] (bribes paid through Greek agents), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ depuy-inc/04-08-11depuy-info.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. ABB, supra note 48 (bribes paid through Mexican agents); Criminal Information, United States v. ABB, supra note 123 (same); Criminal Information, United States v. Int’l Harvester Co., No. 82-cr-244 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 1982) (bribes paid through Mexican agent), available at http://www.justice. gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/international-harvester/1982-11-17- international-harvester-information.pdf. 132 See Criminal Information, United States v. Marubeni Corp., No. 12- cr-22 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2012), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Marubeni], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ cases/marubeni/2012-01-17-marubeni-information.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. JGC Corp., supra note 60, ECF No. 1; Criminal Information, United States v. Snamprogetti, supra note 60, ECF No. 1; Complaint, SEC v. ENI, S.p.A. and Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V., No. 10-cv-2414 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2010), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-119.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Technip S.A., No. 10-cr-439 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Technip], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/technip- sa/06-28-10-technip-%20information.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Technip, No. 10-cv-2289 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Technip], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/ comp-pr2010-110.pdf; Indictment, United States v. Tesler, supra note 50; Complaint, SEC v. Halliburton and KBR, supra note 90; Criminal Information, United States v. KBR, supra note 90; Criminal Information, United States v. Stanley, No. 08-cr-597 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2008), ECF No. 1, available at http://justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/stanleya/08- 29-08stanley-info.pdf. 133 See Criminal Information, United States v. AGA Medical Corp., No. 08-cr-172, ECF No. 1 (D. Minn. June 3, 2008), available at http://www. justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/agamedcorp/06-03-08aga-info. pdf. 134 Complaint, SEC v. Innospec, supra note 79; Criminal Information, United States v. Innospec, supra note 79; Superseding Criminal Information, United States v. Naaman, supra note 50, ECF No. 15, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ naamano/06-24-10naaman-supsersed-info.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Turner, supra note 50. 135 See sources cited supra note 68. 136 See sources cited supra note 68. 137 Section 30A(a)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a)(3), 78dd-3(a)(3). 138 See Section 30A(f )(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f ) (2)(A); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(3)(A), 78dd-3(f )(3)(A). 139 See Section 30A(f )(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f ) (2)(B); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(3)(B), 78dd-3(f )(3)(B). The “knowing” standard was intended to cover “both prohibited actions that are taken with ‘actual knowledge’ of intended results as well as other actions that, while falling short of what the law terms ‘positive knowledge,’ nevertheless evidence a conscious disregard or deliberate ignorance of known circumstances that should reasonably alert one to the high probability of violations of the Act.” H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 920; see also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100- 418, § 5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1423-24 (1988). 140 H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 920 (1988). 141 Section 30A(c)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(1). 142 H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 922. The conferees also noted that “[i]n interpreting what is ‘lawful under the written laws and regulations’ . . . the normal rules of legal construction would apply.” Id. 143 See United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Likewise, the court found that a provision under Azeri law that relieved bribe payors of criminal liability if they were extorted did not make the bribe payments legal. Azeri extortion law precludes the prosecution of the payor of the bribes for the illegal payments, but it does not make the payments legal. Id. at 540-41. 144 Section 30A(c)(2)(A), (B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c) (2); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(c)(2), 78dd-3(c)(2). 145 For example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that providing airline tickets to a government official in order to corruptly influence that official may form the basis for a violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. See Liebo, 923 F. 2d at 1311-12. 146 See generally U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 11-01 ( June 30, 2011) (travel, lodging, and meal expenses of two foreign officials for two-day trip to United States to learn about services of U.S. adoption service provider), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ fraud/fcpa/opinion/2011/11-01.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 08-03 ( July 11, 2008) (stipends to reimburse minimal travel expenses of local, government-affiliated journalists attending press conference in foreign country), available at http://www.justice.gov/ criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0803.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-02 (Sept. 11, 2007) (domestic travel, lodging, and meal expenses of six foreign officials for six-week educational program), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ opinion/2007/0702.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-01 ( July 24, 2007) (domestic travel, lodging, and meal expenses of six foreign officials for four-day educational and promotional tour of U.S. company’s operations sites), available at http://www.justice. gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2007/0701.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-04 (Sept. 3, 2004) (travel, lodging, and modest per diem expenses of five foreign officials to participate in nine-day study tour of mutual insurance companies), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2004/0404. pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-03 ( June 14, 2004) (travel, lodging, meal, and insurance expenses for twelve foreign officials and one translator on ten-day trip to three U.S. cities to meet with U.S. public sector officials), available at http://www.justice.gov/ criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2004/0403.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-01 ( Jan. 6, 2004) (seminar expenses, including receptions, meals, transportation and lodging costs, for one-and-a-half day comparative law seminar on labor and employment law in foreign country), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ opinion/2004/0401.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/goodyear/1989-05-11-goodyear-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/abb/09-20-10abbinc-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/abb/09-20-10abbinc-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/abb/09-20-10abbinc-info.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21922.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21922.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/depuy-inc/04-08-11depuy-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/depuy-inc/04-08-11depuy-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/international-harvester/1982-11-17-international-harvester-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/international-harvester/1982-11-17-international-harvester-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/international-harvester/1982-11-17-international-harvester-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/marubeni/2012-01-17-marubeni-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/marubeni/2012-01-17-marubeni-information.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-119.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/technip-sa/06-28-10-technip- information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/technip-sa/06-28-10-technip- information.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-110.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-110.pdf http://justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/stanleya/08-29-08stanley-info.pdf http://justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/stanleya/08-29-08stanley-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/agamedcorp/06-03-08aga-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/agamedcorp/06-03-08aga-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/agamedcorp/06-03-08aga-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/naamano/06-24-10naaman-supsersed-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/naamano/06-24-10naaman-supsersed-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2011/11-01.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2011/11-01.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0803.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0803.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2007/0702.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2007/0702.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2007/0701.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2007/0701.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2004/0404.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2004/0404.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2004/0403.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2004/0403.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2004/0401.pdf 111 96-01 (Nov. 25, 1996) (travel, lodging, and meal expenses of regional eventual act or decision or which do not involve any discretionary action,” government representatives to attend training courses in United giving the examples of “a gratuity paid to a customs official to speed the States), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ processing of a customs document” or “payments made to secure permits, opinion/1996/9601.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release licenses, or the expeditious performance of similar duties of an essentially 92-01 (Feb. 1992) (training expenses so that foreign officials could ministerial or clerical nature which must of necessity be performed in any effectively perform duties related to execution and performance of joint- event.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 8. venture agreement, including seminar fees, airfare, lodging, meals, and 161 Section 30A(f )(3)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f )(3) ground transportation), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ (B); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(4)(B), 78dd-3(f )(4)(B). fraud/fcpa/review/1992/r9201.pdf. 162 In a 2004 decision, the Fifth Circuit emphasized this precise point, 147 U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 11-01 ( June 30, 2011); commenting on the limited nature of the facilitating payments exception: U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-02 (Sept. 11, 2007); A brief review of the types of routine governmental U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-01 ( July 24, 2007); actions enumerated by Congress shows how limited U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-04 (Sept. 3, 2004); U.S. Congress wanted to make the grease exceptions. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-03 ( June 14, 2004); U.S. Routine governmental action, for instance, includes Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-01 ( Jan. 6, 2004). “obtaining permits, licenses, or other official 148 U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 96-01 (Nov. 25, 1996). documents to qualify a person to do business in 149 U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 11-01 ( June 30, 2011); a foreign country,” and “scheduling inspections U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-02 (Sept. 11, 2007); associated with contract performance or inspections U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-01 ( July 24, 2007); related to transit of goods across country.” U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-04 (Sept. 3, 2004); U.S. Therefore, routine governmental action does not Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-01 ( Jan. 6, 2004) . include the issuance of every official document or 150 U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-01 ( Jan. 6, 2004). every inspection, but only (1) documentation that 151 U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 08-03 ( July 11, 2008). qualifies a party to do business and (2) scheduling an 152 U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 11-01 ( June 30, 2011); inspection—very narrow categories of largely non- U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 92-01 (Feb. 1992). discretionary, ministerial activities performed by 153 U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 08-03 ( July 11, 2008). mid- or low-level foreign functionaries. 154 Id. United States v. Kay; 359 F.3d 738, 750-51 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal 155 Id.; U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-03 ( June 14, footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). 2004); U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-01 ( Jan. 6, 163 Non-Pros. Agreement, In re Helmerich & Payne, Inc. ( July 29, 2009) 2004); U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-01 ( July 24, [hereinafter In re Helmerich & Payne], available at http://www.justice. 2007). gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/helmerich-payne/06-29-09helmerich- 156 U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 11-01 ( June 30, 2011); agree.pdf; Admin. Proceeding Order, In the Matter of Helmerich & U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-02 (Sept. 11, 2007); Payne, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 60400 ( July 30, 2009) [hereinafter U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-01 ( July 24, 2007); In the Matter of Helmerich & Payne], available at http://www.sec.gov/ U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-04 (Sept. 3, 2004); U.S. litigation/admin/2009/34-60400.pdf. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-03 ( June 14, 2004); U.S. 164 Criminal Information, Vetco Gray Controls Inc., et al., No. 07- Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 04-01 ( Jan. 6, 2004). cr-4 No. (S.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2007), ECF Nos. 1-2, available at http:// 157 U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 07-01 ( July 24, 2007); www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/vetco-controls/02-06- U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 08-03 ( July 11, 2008). 07vetcogray-info.pdf. 158 For example, DOJ has previously approved expenditures on behalf of 165 Complaint, SEC v. Noble Corp., No. 10-cv-4336 (S.D. Tex. Nov. family members or for entertainment purposes under certain, limited 4, 2010), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ circumstances. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Rev. P. Release complaints/2010/comp21728.pdf; Non-Pros. Agreement, In re Noble 83-02 ( July 26, 1983) (declining to take enforcement action against Corp. (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ company seeking to provide promotional tour for foreign official and fraud/fcpa/cases/noble-corp/11-04-10noble-corp-npa.pdf; see also wife, where both had already planned a trip to the United States at their sources cited supra note 68. own expense and company proposed to pay only for all reasonable and 166 Working Group on Bribery, 2009 Recommendation of the Council for necessary actual domestic expenses for the extension of their travel to Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International allow the promotional tour, which would not exceed $5,000), available at Business Transactions, at § VI (recommending countries should http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/review/1983/r8302.pdf. periodically review their policies and approach to facilitation payments 159 Unlike the local law and bona fide expenditures defenses, the and should encourage companies to prohibit or discourage facilitation facilitating payments exception is not an affirmative defense to the payments “in view of the corrosive effect of small facilitation payments, FCPA. Rather, payments of this kind fall outside the scope of the particularly on sustainable economic development and the rule of law”); FCPA’s bribery prohibition. Prior to 1988, the “facilitating payments” Working Group on Bribery, United States: Phase 3, at 24 (Oct. 15, exception was incorporated into the definition of “foreign official,” which 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841. excluded from the statute’s purview officials whose duties were primarily pdf (commending United States for steps taken in line with 2009 ministerial or clerical. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. recommendation to encourage companies to prohibit or discourage L. No. 95-213, § 104(d)(2), 91 Stat. 1494, 1498 (1977) (providing that facilitation payments). the term foreign official “does not include any employee of a foreign 167 Facilitating payments are illegal under the U.K. Bribery Act 2010, government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof whose which came into force on July 1, 2011, and were also illegal under duties are essentially ministerial or clerical”). The original exception thus prior U.K. legislation. See Bribery Act 2010, c.23 (Eng.), available focused on the duties of the recipient, rather than the purpose of the at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents; see also payment. In practice, however, it proved difficult to determine whether U.K. Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance About a foreign official’s duties were “ministerial or clerical.” S. Rep. No. 100- Procedures Which Relevant Commercial Organisations Can Put into Place 85, at 53. Responding to criticism that the statutory language “does not to Prevent Persons Associated with Them from Bribing (Section 9 of the clearly reflect Congressional intent and the boundaries of the prohibited Bribery Act 2010), at 18 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/ conduct,” Congress revised the FCPA to define the exception in terms of guidance/docs/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf. the purpose of the payment. H. Rep. No. 100-40, pt. 2, at 77. In doing so, 168 See, e.g., Non-Pros. Agreement, In re Helmerich & Payne, supra note Congress reiterated that while its policy to exclude facilitating payments 163; Admin. Proceeding Order, In the Matter of Helmerich & Payne, reflected practical considerations of enforcement, “such payments should supra note 163. not be condoned.” Id. The enacted language reflects this narrow purpose. 169 In order to establish duress or coercion, a defendant must demonstrate 160 In exempting facilitating payments, Congress sought to distinguish that the defendant was under unlawful, present, immediate, and them as “payments which merely move a particular matter toward an impending threat of death or serious bodily injury; that the defendant did http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2004/0401.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/1996/9601.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/1996/9601.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/review/1992/r9201.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/review/1992/r9201.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/review/1983/r8302.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/helmerich-payne/06-29-09helmerich-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/helmerich-payne/06-29-09helmerich-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/helmerich-payne/06-29-09helmerich-agree.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/34-60400.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/34-60400.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/vetco-controls/02-06-07vetcogray-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/vetco-controls/02-06-07vetcogray-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/vetco-controls/02-06-07vetcogray-info.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21728.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21728.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/noble-corp/11-04-10noble-corp-npa.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/noble-corp/11-04-10noble-corp-npa.pdf http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841.pdf http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841.pdf http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf ENDIX notes 111 112 not negligently or recklessly create a situation where he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct (e.g., had been making payments as part of an ongoing bribery scheme); that the defendant had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law; and that there was a direct causal relationship between the criminal action and the avoidance of the threatened harm. See Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. No. 16 (2003); see also Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instr. No. 1.36 (2001); Sixth Circuit Pattern Jury Instr. No. 6.05 (2010); Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instr. No. 6.08 (1998); Ninth Circuit Pattern Jury Instr. No. 6.5 (2010); 1A Kevin F. O’Malley, Jay E. Grenig, Hon. William C. Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 19.02 (6th ed. 2008 & Supp. 2012). 170 S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 11. 171 Id. at 10. 172 Id. at 11. 173 United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540 n.31 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 174 Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 540 (citing S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 10-11). 175 Id. 176 These payments, however, must be accurately reflected in the company’s books and records so that the company and its management are aware of the payments and can assure that the payments were properly made under the circumstances. For example, in one instance, a Kazakh immigration prosecutor threatened to fine, jail, or deport employees of a U.S. company’s subsidiary. Believing the threats to be genuine, the employees in Kazakhstan sought guidance from senior management of the U.S. subsidiary and were authorized to make the payments. The employees then paid the government official a total of $45,000 using personal funds. The subsidiary reimbursed the employees, but it falsely recorded the reimbursements as “salary advances” or “visa fines.” The parent company, which eventually discovered these payments, as well as other improperly booked cash payments made to a Kazakhstani consultant to obtain visas, was charged with civil violations of the accounting provisions. Admin. Proceeding Order, In the Matter of NATCO Group Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 61325 ( Jan. 11, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2010/34-61325.pdf (imposing cease-and-desist order and $65,000 civil monetary penalty). 177 See Jury Instructions at 21, United States v. Aguilar, No. 10-cr-1031 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2011), ECF No. 511. 178 See, e.g., Pacific Can Co. v. Hewes, 95 F.2d 42, 46 (9th Cir. 1938) (“Where one corporation is controlled by another, the former acts not for itself but as directed by the latter, the same as an agent, and the principal is liable for the acts of its agent within the scope of the agent’s authority.”); United States v. NYNEX Corp., 788 F. Supp. 16, 18 n.3 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that “[a] corporation can of course be held criminally liable for the acts of its agents,” including “the conduct of its subsidiaries.”). 179 Pacific Can Co., 95 F.2d at 46; NYNEX Corp., 788 F. Supp. at 18 n.3. 180 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962). 181 Admin. Proceeding Order, In the Matter of United Industrial Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 60005 (May 29, 2009), available at http:// www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/34-60005.pdf; see also Lit. Release No. 21063, SEC v. Worzel (May 29, 2009), available at http://www.sec. gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21063.htm. 182 See, e.g., Philip Urofksy, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Successor Liability Resulting From Inadequate FCPA Due Diligence in M&A Transactions, 1763 PLI/Corp. 631, 637 (2009) (“As a legal matter, when one corporation acquires another, it assumes any existing liabilities of that corporation, including liability for unlawful payments, regardless of whether it knows of them.”). Whether or not successor liability applies to a particular corporate transaction depends on the facts involved and state, federal, and, potentially, foreign law. 183 See, e.g., Carolyn Lindsey, More Than You Bargained for: Successor Liability Under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 959, 966 (2009) (“Allowing a company to escape its debts and liabilities by merging with another entity is considered to lead to an unjust result.”). 184 See, e.g., Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271, 274 (1959) (affirming criminal successor liability for antitrust violations); United States v. Alamo Bank of Texas, 880 F.2d 828, 830 (5th Cir. 1989) (affirming criminal successor liability for Bank Secrecy Act violations); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 907 (9th Cir. 1974) (affirming criminal successor liability for conspiracy and Travel Act violations); United States v. Shields Rubber Corp., 732 F. Supp. 569, 571-72 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (permitting criminal successor liability for customs violations); see also United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 776 F.2d 1476, 1477 (10th Cir. 1985) (allowing criminal post-dissolution liability for antitrust, mail fraud, and false statement violations);. 185 Complaint, SEC v. The Titan Corp., No. 05-cv-411 (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2005) (discovery of FCPA violations during pre-acquisition due diligence protected potential acquiring company and led to termination of merger agreement), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/ comp19107.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Titan Corp., No. 05-cr-314 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005) (same) [hereinafter United States v. Titan Corp.], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ cases/titan-corp/03-01-05titan-info.pdf. 186 For a discussion of declinations, see Chapter 7. 187 See Complaint, SEC v. El Paso Corp., No. 07-cv-899 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2007), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. El Paso Corp.] (charging company with books and records and internal controls charges for improper payments to Iraq under U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp19991.pdf. 188 Complaint, SEC v. Alliance One Int’l, Inc., No. 10-cv-1319 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2010), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ complaints/2010/comp21618-alliance-one.pdf; Non-Pros. Agreement, In re Alliance One Int’l, Inc. (Aug. 6, 2010), available at http://www. justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-06-10alliance- one-npa.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Alliance One Int’l AG, No. 10-cr-17 (W.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2010), ECF No. 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-06- 10alliance-one-info.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Alliance One Tobacco Osh, LLC, No. 10-cr-16 (W.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2010), ECF No. 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ alliance-one/08-06-10alliance-one-tobaccoinfo.pdf. 189 See Criminal Information, United States v. Syncor Taiwan, Inc., No. 02-cr-1244 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2002), ECF No. 1, available at http:// www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/syncor-taiwan/12-05- 02syncor-taiwan-info.pdf; Plea Agreement, United States v. Syncor Taiwan, Inc., No. 02-cr-1244 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2002), ECF No. 14, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/syncor- taiwan/12-03-02syncor-taiwan-plea-agree.pdf. 190 See Complaint, SEC v. Syncor Int’l Corp., No. 02-cv-2421 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2002), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ complaints/comp17887.htm; SEC v. Syncor International Corp., SEC Lit. Rel. 17997, (Dec. 10, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/ litigation/litreleases/lr17887.htm. 191 See Complaint, SEC v. York Int’l Corp., supra note 115; Criminal Information, United States v. York Int’l Corp., supra note 115. 192 See Criminal Information, United States v. Latin Node, Inc., No. 09-cr-20239 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2009), ECF No. 1, available at http:// www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/litton-applied/03-23- 09latinnode-info.pdf; eLandia Int’l Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 20 (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ data/1352819/000119312509070961/d10k.htm. 193 See Criminal Information, United States v. Salvoch, No. 10-cr-20893 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2010), ECF No. 3, available at http://www.justice. gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/salvoch/12-17-10salvoch-info.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Vasquez, No. 10-cr-20894 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2010), ECF No. 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/ criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/vasquezjp/12-17-10vasquez-juan-info.pdf; Indictment, United States v. Granados, et al., No. 10-cr-20881, (S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2010), ECF No. 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/ http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2010/34-61325.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/34-60005.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/34-60005.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21063.htm http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21063.htm http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19107.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19107.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/titan-corp/03-01-05titan-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/titan-corp/03-01-05titan-info.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp19991.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21618-alliance-one.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21618-alliance-one.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-06-10alliance-one-npa.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-06-10alliance-one-npa.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-06-10alliance-one-npa.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-06-10alliance-one-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-06-10alliance-one-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-06-10alliance-one-tobaccoinfo.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-06-10alliance-one-tobaccoinfo.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/syncor-taiwan/12-05-02syncor-taiwan-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/syncor-taiwan/12-05-02syncor-taiwan-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/syncor-taiwan/12-05-02syncor-taiwan-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/syncor-taiwan/12-03-02syncor-taiwan-plea-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/syncor-taiwan/12-03-02syncor-taiwan-plea-agree.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp17887.htm http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp17887.htm http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17887.htm http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17887.htm http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/litton-applied/03-23-09latinnode-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/litton-applied/03-23-09latinnode-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/litton-applied/03-23-09latinnode-info.pdf http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1352819/000119312509070961/d10k.htm http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1352819/000119312509070961/d10k.htm http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/salvoch/12-17-10salvoch-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/salvoch/12-17-10salvoch-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/vasquezjp/12-17-10vasquez-juan-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/vasquezjp/12-17-10vasquez-juan-info.pdf 113 criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/granados-jorge/12-21-10granados-indict.pdf. within five years next after such offense shall have been committed.” 194 See Deferred Pros. Agreement, United States v. Snamprogetti, supra 208 See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957) note 60, ECF No. 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ (holding government must prove conspiracy still existed and at least fcpa/cases/snamprogetti/07-07-10snamprogetti-dpa.pdf. one overt act was committed within the statute of limitations); Fiswick 195 Compare Criminal Information, United States v. Snamprogetti, supra v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946) (“The statute of limitations, note 60, with Deferred Pros. Agreement, United States v. Snamprogetti, unless suspended, runs from the last overt act during the existence of supra note 60, ECF No. 3. the conspiracy. The overt acts averred and proved may thus mark the 196 See Press Release, General Electric Co., General Electric Agrees to duration, as well as the scope, of the conspiracy.”) (citation omitted); see Acquire InVision (Mar. 15, 2004), available at http://www.ge.com/files/ generally Julie N. Sarnoff, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 48 Am. Crim. L. usa/company/investor/downloads/sharpeye_press_release.pdf; Press Rev. 663, 676 (Spring 2011). Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, InVision Tech. Inc. Enters into Agreement 209 18 U.S.C. § 3292. with the United States (Dec. 6, 2004), available at http://www.justice. 210 28 U.S.C. § 2462. gov/opa/pr/2004/December/04_crm_780.htm; Company News; G.E. 211 S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 3 (noting that, in the past, “corporate bribery Gets InVision, a Maker of Bomb Detectors, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 2004, at has been concealed by the falsification of corporate books and records,” C4. that the accounting provisions “remove [] this avenue of coverup,” and 197 Non-Pros. Agreement, In re InVision (Dec. 3, 2004), available at that “[t]aken together, the accounting requirements and criminal [anti- http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/invision-tech/12-03- bribery] prohibitions . . . should effectively deter corporate bribery of 04invisiontech-agree.pdf; Non-Pros. Agreement, In re General Elec. Co., foreign government officials”). (Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ 212 S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 7. cases/invision-tech/12-03-04invisiontech-agree-ge.pdf; Complaint, SEC 213 Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A). v. GE InVision, Inc., f/k/a InVision Technologies, Inc., No. 05-cv-660, 214 Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2005), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 215 The accounting provisions contain a narrow exemption related to litigation/complaints/comp19078.pdf. national security and the protection of classified information. Under 198 See U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 08-02 ( June 13, this “national security” provision, “no duty or liability [under Section 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act] shall be imposed upon any person acting opinion/2008/0802.pdf; see also Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, in cooperation with the head of any federal department or agency Pfizer H.C.P. Corp. Agrees to Pay $15 Million Penalty to Resolve Foreign responsible for such matters if such act in cooperation with such head of Bribery Investigation (Aug. 7, 2012) (“In the 18 months following its a department or agency was done upon the specific, written directive of acquisition of Wyeth, Pfizer Inc., in consultation with the department, the head of such department or agency pursuant to Presidential authority conducted a due diligence and investigative review of the Wyeth business to issue such directives.” Section 13(b)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. operations and integrated Pfizer Inc.’s internal controls system into § 78m(b)(3). As Congress made clear, however, the exception is narrowly the former Wyeth business entities. The department considered these tailored and intended to prevent the disclosure of classified information. extensive efforts and the SEC resolution in its determination not to H.R. Rep. 94-831, at 11, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ pursue a criminal resolution for the pre-acquisition improper conduct of fraud/fcpa/history/1977/corruptrpt-94-831.pdf. Wyeth subsidiaries.”), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/ 216 Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A). August/12-crm-980.html. 217 H.R. Rep. No. 94-831, at 10. 199 18 U.S.C. § 2. 218 Id. 200 In enacting the FCPA in 1977, Congress explicitly noted that “[t]he 219 Section 13(b)(7) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7). concepts of aiding and abetting and joint participation would apply to a 220 H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 917 (1988), available athttp://www.justice. violation under this bill in the same manner in which those concepts have gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1988/tradeact-100-418.pdf. Congress always applied in both SEC civil actions and in implied private actions rejected the addition of proposed cost-benefit language to the definition brought under the securities laws generally.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 8. “in response to concerns that such a statutory provision might be abused 201 Pinkerton held that a conspirator may be found guilty of a substantive and weaken the accounting provisions at a time of increasing concern offense committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy about audit failures and financial fraud and resultant recommendations if the co-conspirator’s acts were reasonably foreseeable. See Pinkerton v. by experts for stronger accounting practices and audit standards.” Id. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946). 221 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Biomet, Inc., No. 12-cv-454 (D.D.C. Mar. 202 See United States v. MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 26, 2012), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Biomet], available at http:// 1998); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 982 (5th Cir. 1975). www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp22306.pdf; Criminal 203 See Criminal Information, United States v. Marubeni, supra note Information, United States v. Biomet, Inc., No. 12-cr-80 (D.D.C. Mar. 132; Criminal Information, United States v. JGC Corp., supra note 60; 26, 2012) [hereinafter United States v. Biomet], available at http://www. Criminal Information, United States v. Snamprogetti, supra note 60; see justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/biomet/2012-03-26-biomet- also Criminal Information, United States v. Technip, supra note 132. information.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Smith & Nephew Inc., No. 12-cv- 204 Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, “Prosecution of Persons Who 187 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2012), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/ Aid and Abet Violations,” explicitly provides that, for purposes of a litigation/complaints/2012/comp22252.pdf; Criminal Information, civil action seeking injunctive relief or a civil penalty, “any person that United States v. Smith & Nephew plc., No. 12-cr-30 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person 2012), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation fcpa/cases/smith-nephew/2012-02-06-s-n-information.pdf; Complaint, issued under this chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such SEC v. Johnson & Johnson, supra note 131; Criminal Information, provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is United States v. DePuy, supra note 131; Complaint, SEC v. Maxwell provided.” Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e). Technologies Inc., No. 11-cv-258 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 1 205 Under Section 21C(a) of the Exchange Act, the SEC may impose a [hereinafter SEC v. Maxwell Technologies], available at http://www.sec. cease-and-desist order through the SEC’s administrative proceedings gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21832.pdf; Criminal Information, upon any person who is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any United States v. Maxwell Technologies Inc., No. 11-cr-329 (S.D. Cal. provision of the Exchange Act or any rule or regulation thereunder, and Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ upon any other person that is, was, or would be a cause of the violation, fraud/fcpa/cases/maxwell/01-31-11maxwell-tech-info.pdf; Complaint, due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known would SEC v. Transocean, Inc., No. 10-cv-1891 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2010), ECF contribute to such violation. Section 21C(a) of the Exchange Act,15 No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/ U.S.C. § 78u-3(a). comp21725.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Transocean, 206 See Complaint, SEC v. Panalpina, Inc., supra note 68. Inc., No. 10-cr-768 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1, available at 207 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) provides: “Except as otherwise expressly provided http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/transocean-inc/11- by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, 04-10transocean-info.pdf. not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted 222 S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 7. http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/granados-jorge/12-21-10granados-indict.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/granados-jorge/12-21-10granados-indict.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/snamprogetti/07-07-10snamprogetti-dpa.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/snamprogetti/07-07-10snamprogetti-dpa.pdf http://www.ge.com/files/usa/company/investor/downloads/sharpeye_press_release.pdf http://www.ge.com/files/usa/company/investor/downloads/sharpeye_press_release.pdf http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/December/04_crm_780.htm http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/December/04_crm_780.htm http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/invision-tech/12-03-04invisiontech-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/invision-tech/12-03-04invisiontech-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/invision-tech/12-03-04invisiontech-agree-ge.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/invision-tech/12-03-04invisiontech-agree-ge.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19078.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19078.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0802.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0802.pdf http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-crm-980.html http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-crm-980.html http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/corruptrpt-94-831.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/corruptrpt-94-831.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1988/tradeact-100-418.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1988/tradeact-100-418.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp22306.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp22306.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/biomet/2012-03-26-biomet-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/biomet/2012-03-26-biomet-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/biomet/2012-03-26-biomet-information.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp22252.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp22252.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/smith-nephew/2012-02-06-s-n-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/smith-nephew/2012-02-06-s-n-information.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21832.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21832.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/maxwell/01-31-11maxwell-tech-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/maxwell/01-31-11maxwell-tech-info.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21725.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21725.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/transocean-inc/11-04-10transocean-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/transocean-inc/11-04-10transocean-info.pdf ENDIX notes 113 114 223 Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 224 Section 13(b)(7) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7). 225 See Complaint, SEC v. Siemens AG, supra note 48; Criminal Information, United States v. Siemens AG, supra note 48. 226 Complaint, SEC v. Siemens AG, supra note 48; Criminal Information, United States v. Siemens AG, supra note 48; Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www. justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html. 227 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Biomet, supra note 221 (bribes paid to government healthcare providers in which phony invoices were used to justify payments and bribes were falsely recorded as “consulting fees” or “commissions” in company’s books and records); Criminal Information, United States v. Biomet, supra note 221 (same); SEC v. Alcatel-Lucent, supra note 48 (bribes paid to foreign officials to secure telecommunications contracts where company lacked proper internal controls and permitted books and records to falsified); United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., supra note 48 (same). 228 Complaint, SEC v. Daimler AG, supra note 48; Criminal Information, United States v. Daimler AG, supra note 48. 229 Id. 230 Id. 231 Id. 232 Id. 233 Id. 234 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Tyco Int’l, supra note 9; Complaint, SEC v. Willbros, No. 08-cv-1494 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2008), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20571.pdf. 235 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Siemens AG, supra note 48; Complaint, SEC v. York Int’l Corp., supra note 115; Complaint, SEC v. Textron, supra note 115; Criminal Information, United States v. Control Components, Inc., No. 09-cr-162 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2009), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Control Components], available at http://www.justice. gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/control-inc/07-22-09cci-info.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. SSI Int’l Far East, Ltd., No. 06-cr- 398, ECF No. 1 (D. Or. Oct. 10, 2006) [hereinafter United States v. SSI Int’l], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ ssi-intl/10-10-06ssi-information.pdf. 236 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. El Paso Corp., supra note 187; Complaint, SEC v. Innospec, supra note 79; Complaint, SEC v. Chevron Corp., 07- cv-10299 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2007), ECF No. 1, available at http://www. sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20363.pdf. 237 Plea Agreement, United States v. Stanley, supra note 8; Plea Agreement, United States v. Sapsizian, supra note 8. 238 See Complaint, SEC v. Maxwell Technologies, supra note 221. 239 See Complaint, SEC v. Willbros Group, supra note 9. 240 15 U.S.C. § 7201, et seq. 241 Exchange Act Rule 13a-15, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15; Exchange Act Rule 15d-15, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-15; Item 308 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.308; Item 15, Form 20-F, available at http://www.sec.gov/ about/forms/form20-f.pdf; General Instruction (B), Form 40-F (for foreign private issuers), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/ form40-f.pdf. 242 See U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 33-8810 ( June 27, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2007/33-8810. pdf. 243 Id. 244 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977). 245 See supra note 48; SEC v. Technip, supra note 132, (French company); United States v. Technip, supra note 132, (same); see also Admin. Proceeding Order, In re Diageo plc, Exchange Act Release No. 64978 (SEC July 27, 2011) (UK company), available at http://www.sec.gov/ litigation/admin/2011/34-64978.pdf; Admin. Proceeding Order, In re Statoil, ASA, Exchange Act Release No. 54599 (SEC May 29, 2009) (Norwegian company), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ admin/2006/34-54599.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Statoil, ASA, No. 06-cr-960 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2006) (same), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/statoil-asa-inc/10-13- 09statoil-information.pdf. 246 Although private companies are not covered by the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA and do not fall within SEC’s jurisdiction, such companies generally are required by federal and state tax laws and state corporation laws to maintain accurate books and records sufficient to properly calculate taxes owed. Further, most large private companies maintain their books and records to facilitate the preparation of financial statements in conformity with GAAP to comply with financial institutions’ lending requirements. 247 See SEC v. RAE Sys. Inc., supra note 92; In re RAE Sys. Inc., supra note 92. 248 See Section 13(b)(6) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (6), which provides that where an issuer “holds 50 per centum or less of the voting power with respect to a domestic or foreign firm,” the issuer must “proceed in good faith to use its influence, to the extent reasonable under the issuer’s circumstances, to cause such domestic or foreign firm to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls consistent with [Section 13(b)(2)].” 249 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6). Congress added the language in sub- section 78m(b)(6) to the FCPA in 1988, recognizing that “it is unrealistic to expect a minority owner to exert a disproportionate degree of influence over the accounting practices of a subsidiary.” H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 917. The Conference Report noted that, with respect to minority owners, “the amount of influence which an issuer may exercise necessarily varies from case to case. While the relative degree of ownership is obviously one factor, other factors may also be important in determining whether an issuer has demonstrated good-faith efforts to use its influence.” Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 100-85, at 50. 250 Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, titled “Prosecution of Persons Who Aid and Abet Violations,” explicitly provides that for purposes of a civil action seeking injunctive relief or a civil penalty, “any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this title, or of any rule or regulation issued under this title, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.” See Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e). 251 See Complaint at 11-12, SEC v. Elkin, supra note 50, ECF 1. 252 SEC v. Elkin, supra note 50, ECF 6-9 (final judgments). 253 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Nature’s Sunshine Products, Inc., et al., No. 09-cv-672 (D. Utah, July 31, 2009), ECF No. 2, available at http://www. sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21162.htm. 254 See Admin. Proceeding Order, In re Watts Water Technologies, Inc. and Leesen Chang, Exchange Act Release No. 65555 (SEC Oct. 13, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ admin/2011/34-65555.pdf. 255 Id. at 2, 4, 6-7. 256 Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1. 257 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5). 258 Section 3(a)(9) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9). 259 Exchange Act Rule 13b2-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 260 Complaint, SEC v. Jennings, No. 11-cv-1444 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2011), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ complaints/2011/comp21822.pdf. 261 Complaint, id., ECF No. 1; Final Judgment, id., ECF No. 3. 262 Serious Fraud Office, Innospec Ltd: Former CEO admits bribery to falsify product tests ( July 30, 2012), available at http://www.sfo.gov. uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2012/innospec-ltd-- former-ceo-admits-bribery-to-falsify-product-tests.aspx. 263 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4)-(5). Congress adopted this language in 1988 in order to make clear that, consistent with enforcement policy at the time, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20571.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/control-inc/07-22-09cci-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/control-inc/07-22-09cci-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ssi-intl/10-10-06ssi-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ssi-intl/10-10-06ssi-information.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20363.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20363.pdf http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form20-f.pdf http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form20-f.pdf http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form40-f.pdf http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form40-f.pdf http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2007/33-8810.pdf http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2007/33-8810.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/34-64978.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/34-64978.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54599.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54599.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/statoil-asa-inc/10-13-09statoil-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/statoil-asa-inc/10-13-09statoil-information.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21162.htm http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21162.htm http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/34-65555.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/34-65555.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21822.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21822.pdf http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2012/innospec-ltd--former-ceo-admits-bribery-to-falsify-product-tests.aspx http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2012/innospec-ltd--former-ceo-admits-bribery-to-falsify-product-tests.aspx http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2012/innospec-ltd--former-ceo-admits-bribery-to-falsify-product-tests.aspx 115 criminal penalties would not be imposed “for inadvertent or insignificant Nos. 182, 816, 824 (judgments against foreign official defendants). errors in books and records, or inadvertent violations of accounting 282 Criminal Information, United States v. SSI Int’l, supra note 235 controls.” See S. Rep. No. 100-85, at 49; H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at (alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346); Plea Agreement, United 916 (“The Conferees intend to codify current Securities and Exchange States v. SSI Int’l, supra note 235, (Oct. 10, 2006), available at http:// Commission (SEC) enforcement policy that penalties not be imposed for www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/control-inc/07-24-09cci- insignificant or technical infractions or inadvertent conduct.”). plea-agree.pdf. 264 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). 283 See Ex-Im Bank, Form of Exporter’s Certificate, EBD-M-56 ( Jan. 265 See United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., supra note 48; see also United 2007), available at http://www.exim.gov/pub/ins/pdf/ebd-m-56.pdf. States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, supra note 56. 284 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 266 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, 285 22 C.F.R. §§ 130.2, 130.9. S.A., supra note 48, ECF No. 10, available at http://www.justice.gov/ 286 For example, in United States v. BAE Systems plc, BAE pleaded guilty criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcatel-etal/02-22-11alcatel-dpa.pdf. to conspiring to defraud the United States by impairing and impeding its 267 See Plea Agreement, United States v. Siemens AG, supra note 48, ECF lawful functions, to making false statements about its FCPA compliance No. 14, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ program, and to violating the AECA and ITAR. BAE paid a $400 siemens/12-15-08siemensakt-plea.pdf. million fine and agreed to an independent corporate monitor to ensure 268 See Minute Entry of Guilty Plea, United States v. Peterson, supra note compliance with applicable anti-corruption and export control laws. 8, ECF 13; see also Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Former Morgan Criminal Information and Plea Agreement, United States v. BAE Sys. Stanley Managing Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal plc, No. 10-cr-35 (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2010), ECF Nos.1, 8, available at Controls Required by FCPA (Apr. 23, 2012), available at http://www. http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bae-system/02-01- justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html. 10baesystems-info.pdf and http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ 269 See Criminal Information, United States v. Baker Hughes Svcs. cases/bae-system/03-01-10baesystems-plea-agree.pdf. In an action based Int’l, No. 07-cr-129 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2007), ECF No. 1, available at on the same underlying facts as the criminal guilty plea, BAE entered http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/baker-hughs/04-11- a civil settlement with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls for 07bakerhughesintl-info.pdf. violations of AECA and ITAR, including over 2500 ITAR violations 270 See United States v. Panalpina, Inc., supra note 68. that included a failure to report the payment of fees or commissions 271 Id. associated with defense transactions and failure to maintain records 272 See FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, ¶¶ involving ITAR-controlled transactions. BAE paid $79 million in 63-80. penalties, and the State Department imposed a “policy of denial” for 273 PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 12 and PCAOB AU Section 325. export licenses on three BAE subsidiaries involved in the wrongful 274 See Section 10A of the Exchange Act, 15U.S.C. § 78j-1. conduct. Consent Agreement between BAE Sys. plc and Defense Trade 275 18 U.S.C. § 1952. Controls at 17-20, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State 276 See, e.g., United States v. Nexus Technologies, supra note 53; Criminal (May 16, 2011), available at http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/ Information, United States v. Robert Richard King, et al., No. 01-cr-190 consent_agreements/pdf/BAES_CA.pdf; Proposed Charging Letter, In (W.D. Mo. June 27, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ re Investigation of BAE Systems plc Regarding Violations of the Arms fraud/fcpa/cases/kingr-etal/05-03-02king-robert-indict.pdf; Superseding Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, Indictment, United States v. Mead, supra note 44; Criminal Information, U.S. Dept. of State (May 2011), available at http://www.pmddtc.state. United States v. Saybolt North America Inc., et al., No. 98-cr-10266 (D. gov/compliance/consent_agreements/pdf/BAES_PCL.pdf. Mass. Aug. 18, 1998), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ 287 26 U.S.C. § 162(c)(1); see also Plea Agreement, United States v. Smith, fraud/fcpa/cases/saybolt/08-10-98saybolt-info.pdf. No. 07-cr-69 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009), ECF No. 89, available at http:// 277 See Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Kozeny, No. 05- www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/smithl/09-03-09smithl-plea- cr-518 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009), ECF No. 203, available at http://www. agree.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Titan Corp., supra note justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kozenyv/05-26-09bourke2nd- 185. supersed-indict.pdf; Judgment, United States v. Bourke, No. 05-cr-518 288 See USAM § 9-27.000. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2009), ECF No. 253, available at http://www.justice. 289 See USAM § 9-27.420 (setting forth considerations to be weighed gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kozenyv/11-12-09bourke-judgment.pdf. when determining whether it would be appropriate to enter into plea 278 Plea Agreement, United States v. Control Components, supra note agreement). 235, ECF No. 7; see also Order, United States v. Carson, supra note 119, 290 See USAM § 9-28.000 et seq. ECF No. 440 (denying motion to dismiss counts alleging Travel Act 291 See USAM § 9-28.710 (discussing attorney-client and work product violations), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ protections). cases/carsons/2011-09-20-carson-minutes-denying-motion-to-dismiss. 292 See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf. pdf. 293 See USAM§ 9-28.300.A; see also USAM § 9-28.700.B (explaining 279 See, e.g., Criminal Information, United States v. Esquenazi, supra note benefits of cooperation for both government and corporation). 44; Criminal Information, United States v. Green, supra note 44; Criminal 294 See USAM § 9-28.900 (discussing restitution and remediation). The Information, United States v. General Elec. Co., No. 92-cr-87 (S.D. Ohio commentary further provides that prosecutors should consider and weigh July 22, 1992), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ whether the corporation appropriately disciplined wrongdoers and a cases/general-electric/1992-07-22-general-electric-information.pdf. corporation’s efforts to reform, including its quick recognition of the 280 Foreign officials may “not be charged with violating the FCPA itself, flaws in the program and its efforts to improve the program. Id. since the [FCPA] does not criminalize the receipt of a bribe by a foreign 295 See USAM §§ 9-27.230, 9-27.420. official.” United States v. Blondek, 741 F.Supp. 116, 117 (N.D. Tex. 296 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(b)(7) (2011). 1990), aff ’d United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (“We 297 Id. § 8C2.5(f )(2) (2011). hold that foreign officials may not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 298 U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., Report of Investigation 371 for conspiring to violate the FCPA.”). Foreign officials, however, Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act can be charged with violating the FCPA when the foreign official acts of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship as an intermediary of a bribe payment. See, e.g., Information, United of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, SEC States v. Basu, No. 02-cr-475 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 2002) (World Bank Rel. Nos. 34-44969 and AAER-1470 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter employee charged with wire fraud and FCPA violations for facilitating Seaboard Report] available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ bribe payments to another World Bank official and Kenyan government investreport/34-44969.htm. official), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ 299 U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., Policy Statement basu/11-26-02basu-info.pdf; Information, United States v. Sengupta, No. Concerning Cooperation by Individuals in its 02-cr-40 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/ Investigations and Related Enforcements Actions, 17 criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/sengupta/01-30-02sengupta-info.pdf. C.F.R. § 202.12 ( Jan. 10, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 281 , Judgments, , note 44, ECF policy/2010/34-61340.pdf. See, e.g. United States v. Esquenazi supra http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcatel-etal/02-22-11alcatel-dpa.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcatel-etal/02-22-11alcatel-dpa.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens/12-15-08siemensakt-plea.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens/12-15-08siemensakt-plea.pdf http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/baker-hughs/04-11-07bakerhughesintl-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/baker-hughs/04-11-07bakerhughesintl-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kingr-etal/05-03-02king-robert-indict.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kingr-etal/05-03-02king-robert-indict.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/saybolt/08-10-98saybolt-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/saybolt/08-10-98saybolt-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kozenyv/05-26-09bourke2nd-supersed-indict.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kozenyv/05-26-09bourke2nd-supersed-indict.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kozenyv/05-26-09bourke2nd-supersed-indict.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kozenyv/11-12-09bourke-judgment.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kozenyv/11-12-09bourke-judgment.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/carsons/2011-09-20-carson-minutes-denying-motion-to-dismiss.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/carsons/2011-09-20-carson-minutes-denying-motion-to-dismiss.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/carsons/2011-09-20-carson-minutes-denying-motion-to-dismiss.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/general-electric/1992-07-22-general-electric-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/general-electric/1992-07-22-general-electric-information.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/basu/11-26-02basu-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/basu/11-26-02basu-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/sengupta/01-30-02sengupta-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/sengupta/01-30-02sengupta-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/control-inc/07-24-09cci-plea-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/control-inc/07-24-09cci-plea-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/control-inc/07-24-09cci-plea-agree.pdf http://www.exim.gov/pub/ins/pdf/ebd-m-56.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bae-system/02-01-10baesystems-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bae-system/02-01-10baesystems-info.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bae-system/03-01-10baesystems-plea-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bae-system/03-01-10baesystems-plea-agree.pdf http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/consent_agreements/pdf/BAES_CA.pdf http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/consent_agreements/pdf/BAES_CA.pdf http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/consent_agreements/pdf/BAES_PCL.pdf http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/consent_agreements/pdf/BAES_PCL.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/smithl/09-03-09smithl-plea-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/smithl/09-03-09smithl-plea-agree.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/smithl/09-03-09smithl-plea-agree.pdf http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/2010/34-61340.pdf ENDIX notes 115 116 300 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines at § 8B2.1(a)(2). 301 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(b). 302 See generally Debbie Troklus, et al., Compliance 101: How to build and maintain an effective compliance and ethics program, Society of Corp. Compliance and Ethics (2008) 3-9 [hereinafter Compliance 101] (listing reasons to implement compliance program, including protecting company’s reputation, creating trust between management and employees, preventing false statements to customers, creating efficiencies and streamlining processes, detecting employee and contractor fraud and abuse, ensuring high- quality products and services, and providing “early warning” system of inappropriate actions); Transparency Int’l, Business Principles for Countering Bribery: Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Edition 5 (2008) (citing benefits of anti-bribery program like protecting reputation, creating record of integrity enhances opportunities to acquire government business, protecting company assets otherwise squandered on bribes); Mark Pieth, Harmonising Anti-Corruption Compliance: The OECD Good Practice Guidance 45-46 (2011) [hereinafter Harmonising Anti- Corruption Compliance] (citing need for compliance program to prevent and detect in-house risks, such as workplace security or conflicts of interest, and external risks, like anti-trust violations, embargo circumvention, environmental hazards, and money laundering). 303 Debarment authorities, such as the Department of Defense or the General Services Administration, may also consider a company’s compliance program when deciding whether to debar or suspend a contractor. Specifically, the relevant regulations provide that the debarment authority should consider “[w]hether the contractor had effective standards of conduct and internal control systems in place at the time of the activity which constitutes cause for debarment or had adopted such procedures prior to any Government investigation of the activity cited as a cause for debarment,” and “[w]hether the contractor has instituted or agreed to institute new or revised review and control procedures and ethics training programs.” 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a). 304 Seaboard Report, supra note 298; U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, SEC Rel. No. 44969 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm. 305 USAM § 9-28.300. When evaluating the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, prosecutors are advised that while it may be appropriate to charge a corporation for minor misconduct where the wrongdoing was pervasive, “it may not be appropriate to impose liability upon a corporation, particularly one with a robust compliance program in place, under a strict respondeat superior theory for the single isolated act of a rogue employee.” Id. § 9-28.500.A (emphasis added). Prosecutors should also consider a company’s compliance program when examining any remedial actions taken, including efforts to implement an effective compliance program or to improve an existing one. As the commentary explains, “although the inadequacy of a corporate compliance program is a factor to consider when deciding whether to charge a corporation, that corporation’s quick recognition of the flaws in the program and its efforts to improve the program are also factors to consider as to appropriate disposition of a case.” Id. § 9-28.900.B. Finally, the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations provides that prosecutors should consider the existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s pre-existing compliance program in determining how to treat a corporate target. Id. § 9-28.800. 306 See USAM § 9-28.800.B; see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(a) (2011) (“The failure to prevent or detect the instant offense does not necessarily mean that the program is not generally effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct.”). 307 See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Former Morgan Stanley Managing Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by FCPA (Apr. 25, 2012) (declining to bring criminal case against corporate employer that “had constructed and maintained a system of internal controls, which provided reasonable assurances that its employees were not bribing government officials”), available at http:// www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html; Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., SEC Charges Former Morgan Stanley Executive with FCPA Violations and Investment Adviser Fraud, No. 2012-78 (Apr. 25, 2012) (indicating corporate employer was not charged in the matter and had “cooperated with the SEC’s inquiry and conducted a thorough internal investigation to determine the scope of the improper payments and other misconduct involved”), available at http://www.sec. gov/news/press/2012/2012-78.htm. 308 See USAM § 9-28.800.B. 309 See, e.g., Int’l Chamber of Commerce, ICC Rules on Combating Corruption (2011) [hereinafter ICC Rules on Combating Corruption], available at http://www.iccwbo. org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/business_in_society/Statements/ ICC_Rules_on_Combating_Corruption_2011edition.pdf; Transparency Int’l, Business Principles for Countering Bribery (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter Business Principles for Countering Bribery], available at http://www.transparency. org/global_priorities/private_sector/business_principles/; United Kingdom Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act of 2010, Guidance about procedures which relevant commercial organisations can put into place to prevent persons associated with them from bribing (2010), available at http:// www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance. pdf; World Bank Group, Integrity Compliance Guidelines (2011) [hereinafter Integrity Compliance Guidelines], available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/ Integrity_Compliance_Guidelines.pdf; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC Anti-corruption Code of Conduct for Business (2007) [hereinafter APEC Anti-corruption Code], available at http://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee- on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Task-Groups/~/media/ Files/Groups/ACT/07_act_codebrochure.ashx; Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Transparency Int’l, United Nations Global Compact, and World Economic Forum, Resisting Extortion and Solicitation in International Transactions: A Company Tool for Employee Training (2011), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_RESIST_Report_2011. pdf; Int’l Chamber of Commerce, et al., Clean Business Is Good Business, available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/ WEF_PACI_BusinessCaseFightingCorruption_2011.pdf; World Economic Forum, Partnering Against Corruption – Principles for Countering Bribery (2009) [hereinafter Partnering Against Corruption], available at http://www3. weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_Principles_2009.pdf; Working Group on Bribery, OECD, Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance 2010, [hereinafter OECD Good Practice Guidance] available at http://www.oecd. org/dataoecd/5/51/44884389.pdf; U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles [hereinafter The Ten Principles] available at http:// www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html. 310 This is also reflected in the Sentencing Guidelines, which recognizes that no single, formulaic set of requirements should be imposed, but instead focuses on a number of factors like applicable industry practice or the standards called for by any applicable governmental regulation, the size of the organization, and whether the organization has engaged in similar misconduct in the past. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1 & app. note 2 (2011). 311 This was underscored by then-SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman in 2003 in a speech on the SEC’s implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: “[T]he ultimate effectiveness of the new corporate governance rules will be determined by the ‘tone at the top.’ Adopting a code of ethics means little if the company’s chief executive officer or its directors make clear, by conduct or otherwise, that the code’s provisions do not apply to them. . . . Corporate officers and directors hold the ultimate power http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/2010/34-61340.pdf http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-78.htm http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-78.htm http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/business_in_society/Statements/ICC_Rules_on_Combating_Corruption_2011edition.pdf http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/business_in_society/Statements/ICC_Rules_on_Combating_Corruption_2011edition.pdf http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/business_in_society/Statements/ICC_Rules_on_Combating_Corruption_2011edition.pdf http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/private_sector/business_principles/ http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/private_sector/business_principles/ http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/Integrity_Compliance_Guidelines.pdf http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/Integrity_Compliance_Guidelines.pdf http://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Task-Groups/~/media/Files/Groups/ACT/07_act_codebrochure.ashx http://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Task-Groups/~/media/Files/Groups/ACT/07_act_codebrochure.ashx http://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Task-Groups/~/media/Files/Groups/ACT/07_act_codebrochure.ashx http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_RESIST_Report_2011.pdf http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_RESIST_Report_2011.pdf http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_BusinessCaseFightingCorruption_2011.pdf http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_BusinessCaseFightingCorruption_2011.pdf http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_Principles_2009.pdf http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_Principles_2009.pdf http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/51/44884389.pdf http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/51/44884389.pdf http://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html http://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html 117 and responsibility for restoring public trust by conducting themselves available at http://justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0802. in a manner that is worthy of the trust that is placed in them.” Cynthia pdf. Glassman, SEC Implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley: The New Corporate 330 Complaint, SEC v. Rae Sys., Inc., supra note 92; Non-Pros. Agreement, Governance, Remarks at National Economists Club (April 7, 2003), In re Rae Sys. Inc., supra note 92. available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch040703cag.htm . 331 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Business Ethics: A Manual for 312 Indeed, research has found that “[e]thical culture is the single biggest Managing a Responsible Business Enterprise in Emerging factor determining the amount of misconduct that will take place in a Market Economies (2004), available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/ business.” Ethics Resource Center, 2009 National Business goodgovernance/adobe/bem_manual.pdf. Ethics Survey: Ethics in the Recession (2009), at 41. Metrics 332 U.S. Dept. of State, Fighting Global Corruption: Business of ethical culture include ethical leadership (tone at the top), supervisor Risk Management (2d ed. 2001), available at http://www.ogc.doc. reinforcement of ethical behavior (middle management reinforcement), gov/pdfs/Fighting_Global_Corruption.pdf. and peer commitment (supporting one another in doing the right 333 See Harmonising Anti-Corruption Compliance, supra note thing). Ethics Resource Center, 2011 National Business 302, at 46 (“Anti-corruption compliance is becoming more and more Ethics Survey: Workplace Ethics in Transition (2012) at 19. harmonised worldwide.”). Strong ethical cultures and strong ethics and compliance programs are 334 OECD Good Practice Guidance, supra note 309. related, as data show that a well-implemented program helps lead to a 335 APEC Anti-corruption Code, supra note 309. strong ethical culture. Id. at 34. “Understanding the nature of any gap 336 ICC Rules on Combating Corruption, supra note 309. between the desired culture and the actual culture is a critical first step in 337 Business Principles for Countering Bribery, supra note 309. determining the nature of any ethics-based risks inside the organization.” 338 The Ten Principles, supra note 309. David Gebler, The Role of Culture at 1.7, in Society of Corporate 339 Integrity Compliance Guidelines, supra note 309. Compliance and Ethics, The Complete Compliance and 340 Partnering Against Corruption, supra note 309. Ethics Manual (2011). To create an ethical culture, attention must be 341 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), 78dd-3(e)(1)(A), 78ff(c)(1)(A). paid to norms at all levels of an organization, including the “tone at the 342 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), 78dd-3(e)(2)(A), 78ff(c)(2)(A); 18 top,” “mood in the middle,” and “buzz at the bottom.” Id. 1.9-1.10. U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3), (e) (fine provision that supersedes FCPA-specific 313 See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(2)(B)-(C) (2011). fine provisions). 314 Id. 343 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). 315 Id. 344 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). 316 Id. 345 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d); see Southern Union v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 317 See, e.g., Ethics and Compliance Officer Association 2344, 2350-51 & n.4 (2012). Foundation, The Ethics and Compliance Handbook: A 346 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(3), 78dd-3(e)(3), 78ff(c)(3). Practical Guide From Leading Organizations (2008) at 13-26 347 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are promulgated by the U.S. [hereinafter The Ethics and Compliance Handbook]. Sentencing Commission: 318 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(b)(4) (2011). The United States Sentencing Commission 319 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(b)(6) (2011) (“The (“Commission”) is an independent agency in the organization’s compliance and ethics program shall be promoted judicial branch composed of seven voting and two and enforced consistently throughout the organization through (A) non-voting ex-officio members. Its principal purpose appropriate incentives to perform in accordance with the compliance and is to establish sentencing policies and practices for ethics program; and (B) appropriate disciplinary measures for engaging the federal criminal justice system that will assure the in criminal conduct and for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent or ends of justice by promulgating detailed guidelines detect criminal conduct.”). prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders 320 See, e.g., Joseph E. Murphy, Society of Corp. Compliance and convicted of federal crimes. The Guidelines and Ethics, Using Incentives in Your Compliance and Ethics policy statements promulgated by the Commission Program (2011) at 1; The Ethics and Compliance Handbook, are issued pursuant to Section 994(a) of Title 28, supra note 317, at 111-23. United States Code. 321 Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC, Tone at U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 1A1.1 (2011). the Top: Getting It Right, Second Annual General Counsel Roundtable 348 Id. at ch. 3-5. (Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 349 Id. § 2C1.1. spch120304smc.htm. 350 Id. § 2C1.1(b). 322 See, e.g., ICC Rules on Combating Corruption, supra note 309, 351 Id. § 3B1.1. at 8. 352 Id. at ch. 4, § 5A. 323 See, e.g. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C); 353 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B), 2B1.1(b)(18)(A). Compliance 101, supra note 302, at 30-33. 354 Id. § 8C2.4 (a). 324 Corporate Board Member/FTI Consulting 2009 Legal Study, Buckle 355 Id. § 8C2.5. Up. Boards and General Counsel May Face a Bumpy Ride in 2009, at 5 356 Id. § 8C2.5(f ), 8C2.5(g). (“Interestingly, while 67% of general counsel say their company is subject 357 DOJ has exercised this civil authority in limited circumstances in to compliance under the FCPA, 64% of those say there is room for the last thirty years. See, e.g., United States & SEC v. KPMG Siddharta improvement in their FCPA training and compliance programs.”). Siddharta & Harsono, et al., No. 01-cv-3105 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (entry 325 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(b)(5)(B) (“The of injunction barring company from future FCPA violations based on organization shall take reasonable steps . . . to evaluate periodically the allegations that company paid bribes to Indonesian tax official in order effectiveness of the organization’s compliance and ethics program.”). to reduce the company’s tax assessment); United States v. Metcalf & 326 See, e.g., Compliance 101, supra note 302, at 60-61; The Ethics Eddy, Inc., No. 99-cv-12566 (D. Mass. 1999) (entry of injunction barring and Compliance Handbook, supra note 317, at 155-60; Business company from future FCPA violations and requiring maintenance of Principles for Countering Bribery, supra note 309, at 14. compliance program based on allegations that it paid excessive marketing 327 See, e.g., Michael M. Mannix and David S. Black., Compliance Issues and promotional expenses such as airfare, travel expenses, and per in M&A: Performing Diligence on the Target’s Ethics and Compliance diem to an Egyptian official and his family); United States v. American Program at 5.71-5.81, in Society of Corporate Compliance Totalisator Co. Inc., No. 93-cv-161 (D. Md. 1993) (entry of injunction and Ethics, The Complete Compliance and Ethics Manual barring company from future FCPA violations based on allegations that (2011). it paid money to its Greek agent with knowledge that all or some of 328 Complaint, SEC v. Syncor International Corp., supra note 190; the money paid would be offered, given, or promised to Greek foreign Criminal Information, United States v. Syncor Taiwan, Inc., supra note officials in connection with sale of company’s system and spare parts); 189. United States v. Eagle Bus Manufacturing, Inc., No. 91-cv-171 (S.D. Tex. 329 U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Op. Release 08-02 ( June 13, 2008), 1991) (entry of injunction barring company from future FCPA violations http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch040703cag.htm http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120304smc.htm http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120304smc.htm http://justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0802.pdf http://justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0802.pdf http://www.ita.doc.gov/goodgovernance/adobe/bem_manual.pdf http://www.ita.doc.gov/goodgovernance/adobe/bem_manual.pdf http://www.ogc.doc.gov/pdfs/Fighting_Global_Corruption.pdf http://www.ogc.doc.gov/pdfs/Fighting_Global_Corruption.pdf ENDIX notes 117 118 based on allegations that employees of the company participated in bribery scheme to pay foreign officials of Saskatchewan’s state-owned transportation company $50,000 CAD in connection with sale of buses) United States v. Carver, et al., No. 79-cv-1768 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (entry of injunction barring company from future FCPA violations based on allegations that Carver and Holley, officers and shareholders of Holcar Oil Corp., paid $1.5 million to Qatar foreign official to secure an oil drilling concession agreement); United States v. Kenny, et al., No. 79-cv- 2038 (D.D.C. 1979) (in conjunction with criminal proceeding, entry of injunction barring company from future FCPA violations for providing illegal financial assistance to political party to secure renewal of stamp distribution agreement). 358 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), 78dd-3(e)(1)(B), 78ff(c)(1)(B); see also 17 C.F.R. § 201.1004 (providing adjustments for inflation). 359 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(B), 78dd-3(e)(2)(B), 78ff(c)(2)(B); see als 17 C.F.R. § 201.1004 (providing adjustments for inflation). 360 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(3), 78dd-3(e)(3), 78ff(c)(3); see also 17 C.F.R. § 201.1004 (providing adjustments for inflation). 361 Section 21(B)(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3); see also 17 C.F.R. § 201.1004 (providing adjustments for inflation). 362 See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 §§ 202, 301, 401, and 402 (codified in scattered sections of Title 15 of the United States Code). 363 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-2, 9.407-2. 364 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(b). 365 See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-1, 9.407-1(b)(2). Section 9.406-1 sets forth the following non-exhaustive list of factors: (1) Whether the contractor had effective standards of conduct and internal control systems in place at the time of the activity which constitutes cause for debarment or had adopted such procedures prior to any Government investigation of the activity cited as a cause for debarment. (2) Whether the contractor brought the activity cited as a cause for debarment to the attention of the appropriate Government agency in a timely manner. (3) Whether the contractor has fully investigated the circumstances surrounding the cause for debarment and, if so, made the result of the investigation available to the debarring official. (4) Whether the contractor cooperated fully with Government agencies during the investigation and any court or administrative action. (5) Whether the contractor has paid or has agreed to pay all criminal, civil, and administrative liability for the improper activity, including any investigative or administrative costs incurred by the Government, and has made or agreed to make full restitution. (6) Whether the contractor has taken appropriate disciplinary action against the individuals responsible for the activity which constitutes cause for debarment. (7) Whether the contractor has implemented or agreed to implement remedial measures, including any identified by the Government. (8) Whether the contractor has instituted or agreed to institute new or revised review and control procedures and ethics training programs. (9) Whether the contractor has had adequate time to eliminate the circumstances within the contractor’s organization that led to the cause for debarment. (10) Whether the contractor’s management recognizes and understands the seriousness of the misconduct giving rise to the cause for debarment and has implemented programs to prevent recurrence. 366 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a). 367 Exec. Order No. 12,549, 51 Fed. Reg. 6,370 (Feb. 18, 1986); Exec. Order No. 12,689, 54 Fed. Reg. 34131 (Aug. 18, 1989). 368 48 C.F.R. § 9.407-2(b). 369 USAM § 9-28.1300 (2008). ; o 370 See, e.g., African Development Bank Group, Integrity and Anti-Corruption Progress Report 2009-2010 7, 14 (“As the premier financial development institution in Africa, the AfDB is determined to root out misconduct, fraud and corruption within its own ranks as well as in the implementation of the projects it finances. In order to do so, the Bank created an anti-corruption and fraud investigation division in November 2005 as its sole investigative body. The unit became operational in June 2006 and commenced investigations in January 2007. . . . Investigations conducted by the IACD [Integrity and Anti-Corruption Department] are not criminal proceedings; they are administrative in nature. Sanctions range from personnel disciplinary actions, such as separation, to loan cancellation and debarment for contractors, which can be temporary or permanent.”), available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/ Publications/Integrity%20and%20Anti-Corruption.pdf; The World Bank Group, Procurement: Sanctions Committee (“The World Bank’s debarment process was first formulated in July, 1996, and the Sanctions Committee was established in November 1998 to review allegations and recommend sanctions to the President. Written procedures were issued in August 2001 and are posted on the Bank’s website, along with the sanction actions.”), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDK:5000 2288~pagePK:84271~piPK:84287~theSitePK:84266,00.html. 371 See African Development Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter-American Development Bank Group and World Bank Group, Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions (Apr. 9, 2010), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/ AgreementForMutualEnforcementofDebarmentDecisions.pdf. 372 Id.; see also The World Bank Group, Cross-Debarment Accord Steps Up Fight Against Corruption (Apr. 9, 2010) (“‘With today’s cross-debarment agreement among development banks, a clear message on anticorruption is being delivered: Steal and cheat from one, get punished by all,’ said World Bank Group President Robert B. Zoellick.”), available at http:// web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:2 2535805~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html. 373 22 C.F.R. §§ 126.7(a)(3)-(4), 120.27(a)(6). 374 Authority under the AECA is delegated to the DDTC. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a). 375 22 U.S.C. § 2778(g)(1)(A)(vi), (g)(3)(B). 376 22 C.F.R. § 127.7(c). 377 See supra note 286. 378 See Gary G. Grindler, Acting Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Mem. to the Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys on Additional Guidance on the Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution (May 25, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo-guidance- monitors.pdf; Lanny A. Breuer, Assist. Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Mem. to All Criminal Division Personnel on Selection of Monitors in Criminal Division Matters ( June 24, 2009), available at http://www. justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3-supp-appx-3.pdf; see also Craig S. Morford, Acting Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Mem. to the Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys on Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford- useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf. 379 Historically, DOJ had, on occasion, agreed to DPAs with companies that were not filed with the court. That is no longer the practice of DOJ. 380 USAM § 9-27.230. 381 USAM § 9-27.230.B. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode/54.html http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode/34131.html http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Integrity and Anti-Corruption.pdf http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Integrity and Anti-Corruption.pdf http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDK:50002288~pagePK:84271~piPK:84287~theSitePK:84266,00.html http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDK:50002288~pagePK:84271~piPK:84287~theSitePK:84266,00.html http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDK:50002288~pagePK:84271~piPK:84287~theSitePK:84266,00.html http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/AgreementForMutualEnforcementofDebarmentDecisions.pdf http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/AgreementForMutualEnforcementofDebarmentDecisions.pdf http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22535805~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22535805~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22535805~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo-guidance-monitors.pdf http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo-guidance-monitors.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3-supp-appx-3.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3-supp-appx-3.pdf http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf 119 382 DOJ has recently declined matters where some or all of the following internally and still be treated as if he or she had reported to the SEC circumstances were present: (1) a corporation voluntarily and fully at the earlier reporting date , thus preserving their “place in line” for disclosed the potential misconduct; (2) corporate principles voluntarily a possible whistleblower award from the SEC; and (3) provide that a engaged in interviews with DOJ and provided truthful and complete whistleblower’s voluntary participation in an entity’s internal compliance information about their conduct; (3) a parent company conducted and reporting systems is a factor that can increase the amount of an extensive pre-acquisition due diligence of potentially liable subsidiaries award, and that a whistleblower’s interference with internal compliance and engaged in significant remediation efforts post-acquisition; (4) a and reporting system is a factor that can decrease the amount of an award. company provided information about its extensive compliance policies, See Exchange Act Rule 21F, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F. procedures, and internal controls; (5) a company agreed to a civil 396 See Exchange Act Rule 21F-7(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-7(b). resolution with the Securities and Exchange Commission while also 397 For example, SEC staff will not disclose a whistleblower’s identity in demonstrating that criminal declination was appropriate; (6) only a single response to requests under the Freedom of Information Act. However, employee was involved in the improper payments; and (7) the improper there are limits on SEC’s ability to shield a whistleblower’s identity, payments involved minimal funds compared to overall business revenues. and in certain circumstances SEC must disclose it to outside entities. 383 See Criminal Information, United States v. Peterson, supra note 8, For example, in an administrative or court proceeding, SEC may be Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Former Morgan Stanley Managing required to produce documents or other information that would Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required reveal the whistleblower’s identity. In addition, as part of ongoing by FCPA (Apr. 25, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/ SEC investigatory responsibilities, SEC staff may use information pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html (“After considering all the available provided by a whistleblower during the course of the investigation. In facts and circumstances, including that Morgan Stanley constructed and appropriate circumstances, SEC may also provide information, subject maintained a system of internal controls, which provided reasonable to confidentiality requirements, to other governmental or regulatory assurances that its employees were not bribing government officials, the entities. Exchange Act Rule 21F-7(a), 17 C.F.R. 240.21F-7(a). Department of Justice declined to bring any enforcement action against 398 Although SEC does not have an opinion procedure release process, Morgan Stanley related to Peterson’s conduct. The company voluntarily it has declared its decision to follow the guidance announced through disclosed this matter and has cooperated throughout the department’s DOJ’s FCPA Opinion Release Procedure. U.S. Sec. and Exchange investigation.”); see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., Comm., SEC Release No. 34-17099 (Aug. 29, 1980), available at http:// SEC Charges Former Morgan Stanley Executive with FCPA Violations www.sec.gov/news/digest/1980/dig082980.pdf. SEC Release No. 34- and Investment Adviser Fraud (Apr. 25, 2012), available at http://www. 17099 stated that, to encourage issuers to take advantage of the DOJ’s sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-78.htm (“Morgan Stanley, which is not FCPA Review Procedure, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, SEC charged in the matter, cooperated with the SEC’s inquiry and conducted would “not take enforcement action alleging violations of Section 30A a thorough internal investigation to determine the scope of the improper in any case where an issuer has sought and obtained an FCPA Review payments and other misconduct involved.”). letter from the Department, prior to May 31, 1981, stating that the 384 SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e). Department will not take enforcement action under Section 30A with 385 Deferred Pros. Agreement, In the Matter of Tenaris, S.A. (May 17, respect to the transaction involved.” Id. The release further noted that it 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112-dpa. would revisit this policy once the DOJ had evaluated the results of the pdf; see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., Tenaris to Pay FCPA Review Procedure after its first year of operation. A second release $5.4 Million in SEC’s First-Ever Deferred Prosecution Agreement (May stated that the SEC would continue to adhere to the policy announced 17, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112. in Release No. 34-17099. U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., SEC Release htm. No. 34-18255 (Nov. 13, 1981), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 386 See Non-Pros. Agreement, In re Tenaris, S.A. (May 17, 2011), available digest/1981/dig111381.pdf. at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/tenaris-sa/2011- 399 Both DOJ’s opinion procedure releases (from 1993 to present) and 03-14-tenaris.pdf. review procedure releases (from 1980-1992) are available at http://www. 387 See U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm., Enforcement Manual justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion. § 6.2.3. (March 9, 2012), available at http://www.sec-gov/divisions/ 400 The full regulations relating to DOJ’s opinion procedure are available enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf. at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/frgncrpt.pdf. 388 See id. § 6.2.4. 401 28 C.F.R. § 80.1. 389 See id. § 2.6. 402 28 C.F.R. § 80.3. 390 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c). 403 28 C.F.R. § 80.12 (“Neither the submission of a request for an 391 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e). FCPA Opinion, its pendency, nor the issuance of an FCPA Opinion, 392 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(3). The new provision defines “original shall in any way alter the responsibility of an issuer to comply with the information” to mean information that: accounting requirements of 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(2) and (3).”). (A) is derived from the independent knowledge 404 28 C.F.R. § 80.4. or analysis of a whistleblower; (B) is not known 405 28 C.F.R. § 80.5. to the Commission from any other source, unless 406 28 C.F.R. § 80.6. the whistleblower is the original source of the 407 28 C.F.R. § 80.14(a). This non-disclosure policy applies regardless of information; and (C) is not exclusively derived from whether DOJ responds to the request or the party withdraws the request an allegation made in a judicial or administrative before receiving a response. Id. hearing, in a governmental report, hearing, audit, 408 28 C.F.R. § 80.6. or investigation, or from the news media, unless the 409 28 C.F.R. § 80.2. whistleblower is a source of the information. 410 In connection with any request for an FCPA opinion, DOJ may 393 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and conduct whatever independent investigation it believes appropriate. 28 Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, C.F.R. § 80.7. 1841-49 (2010). 411 28 C.F.R. § 80.15. Once a request is withdrawn, it has no effect. 394 For detailed information about the program, including eligibility However, DOJ reserves the right to retain a copy of any FCPA requirements and certain limitations that apply, see Section 922 of the opinion request, documents, and information submitted during the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, available opinion release procedure for any governmental purpose, subject to the at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/dodd-frank-sec-922.pdf, restrictions on disclosures in 28 C.F.R. § 80.14. and the final rules on eligibility, Exchange Act Rule 21F-8, 17 C.F.R. § 412 28 C.F.R. § 80.8. 240.21F-8. 413 28 C.F.R. § 80.7. “Such additional information, if furnished orally, 395 For example, the rules: (1) make a whistleblower eligible for an award must be confirmed in writing promptly. The same person who signed if the whistleblower reports original information internally, and the the initial request must sign the written, supplemental information and company informs the SEC about the violations; (2) give whistleblowers must again certify it to be a true, correct and complete disclosure of the 120 days to report information to the SEC after first reporting requested information.” Id. http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-78.htm http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-78.htm http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112-dpa.pdf http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112-dpa.pdf http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112.htm http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112.htm http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/tenaris-sa/2011-03-14-tenaris.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/tenaris-sa/2011-03-14-tenaris.pdf http://www.sec-gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf http://www.sec-gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/dodd-frank-sec-922.pdf http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1980/dig082980.pdf http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1980/dig082980.pdf http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1981/dig111381.pdf http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1981/dig111381.pdf http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/frgncrpt.pdf ENDIX notes 119 120 414 28 C.F.R. § 80.9 (“No oral clearance, release or other statement purporting to limit the enforcement discretion of the Department of Justice may be given. The requesting issuer or domestic concern may rely only upon a written FCPA opinion letter signed by the Attorney General or his designee.”). 415 28 C.F.R. § 80.8. FCPA opinions do not bind or obligate any agency other than DOJ. They also do not affect the requesting party’s obligations to any other agency or under any statutory or regulatory provision other than those specifically cited in the particular FCPA opinion. 28 C.F.R. § 80.11. If the conduct for which an FCPA opinion is requested is subject to approval by any other agency, such FCPA opinion may not be taken to indicate DOJ’s views on any legal or factual issues before that other agency. 28 C.F.R. § 80.13. 416 28 C.F.R. § 80.10. DOJ can rebut this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. A court determining whether the presumption has been rebutted weighs all relevant factors, including whether the submitted information was accurate and complete and the activity was within the scope of conduct specified in the request. Id. As of September 2012, DOJ has never pursued an enforcement action against a party for conduct that formed the basis of an FCPA opinion stating that the prospective conduct would violate DOJ’s present enforcement policy. 417 As a general matter, DOJ normally anonymizes much of the information in its publicly released opinions and includes the general nature and circumstances of the proposed conduct. DOJ does not release the identity of any foreign sales agents or other types of identifying information. 28 C.F.R. § 80.14(b). However, DOJ may release the identity of the requesting party, the foreign country in which the proposed conduct is to take place, and any actions DOJ took in response to the FCPA opinion request. Id. If a party believes that an opinion contains proprietary information, it may request that DOJ remove or anonymize those portions of the opinion before it is publicly released. 28 C.F.R. § 80.14(c). 418 28 C.F.R. § 80.16. FCPA Unit Fraud Section, Criminal Division U.S. Department of Justice 1400 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ FCPA Unit Enforcement Division U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission 100 F Street, NE Washington, DC 20549 http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa.shtml http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa.shtml